Taking Stock of EU Military Conflict Management

Annemarie Peen Rodt

University of Bath

Abstract
Over the last decade, the EU has established itself as a player in the international field of conflict management. Both its civilian missions and military operations have played a significant part in this development. This article takes a closer look at the EU’s military endeavours in conflict management. It presents a theoretically grounded definition and a corresponding set of criteria for success in military conflict management and evaluates the operations accordingly. The article provides a comprehensive review of all the EU military conflict management operations to date. The analysis is structured and focused around the criteria for success, which provides a more nuanced picture of the Union’s operational achievements throughout its first decade in military conflict management.

Keywords
CFSP; ESDP; CSDP; Military operations; Conflict management; Violent armed conflict

SINCE THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) LAUNCHED ITS FIRST MILITARY OPERATION WITHIN the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 2003, its endeavours in military conflict management have rapidly developed. By 2010, the EU had engaged militarily to contribute to the management of conflicts in Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR). Five operations into the EU’s experience as a military conflict manager, it is time to take stock of its success so far. This article evaluates each of the five operations and comparatively assesses the EU’s performance in military conflict management from 2003 to 2010.

Defining success

In order to evaluate the success of EU military conflict management operations, the term ‘success’ must first be defined. The definition of success is crucial to the evaluation of military conflict management operations, yet it is hardly discussed in the ESDP literature. The scholarly tradition varies considerably with regard to its definitions of success, which are often implicit rather than explicit. This article develops a definition and a theoretical framework for the systematic evaluation of success in EU military conflict management operations. This facilitates an evaluation, which takes into account both actor- and target-specific perspectives on success. It is important to include both internal EU-specific and external conflict-specific perspectives in the evaluation of success in EU military conflict management operations. The internal perspective allows for an analysis of whether an operation successfully achieved its purpose for the EU, whilst the external perspective assesses the operation according to the purpose of conflict management, that is, to manage the violent aspect of the conflict. Internal success thus refers to an operation that

is successful from the point of view of the EU, whereas external success indicates a positive impact on the conflict situation on the ground. Both of these aspects of success are necessary for an operation to be an overall success. Moreover, it is important to consider not only what an operation has achieved, but also how it achieved it. Internal and external success can both be divided into two key success criteria, the first of which evaluates whether the operation achieved its purpose (goal attainment) and the second of which examines the way in which the operation sought to achieve this purpose (appropriateness). Success in EU military conflict management operations will thus be evaluated according to four criteria: internal goal attainment, internal appropriateness, external goal attainment and external appropriateness. Examining success according to these four criteria will allow for a more nuanced analysis of the level and nature of success in each operation and for a focused and systematic comparison of success in different operations. To this end, a set of indicators are identified for each of the four success criteria. Internal goal attainment will be evaluated according to whether the key objectives in each operation’s mandate were achieved. Internal appropriateness will be assessed according to the timeliness, efficiency and cost-effectiveness of its implementation. External goal attainment will be evaluated according to whether continuation, diffusion, escalation and intensification of violence are prevented. Finally, external appropriateness will be evaluated according to whether the application of force was discriminatory with regard to combatants and non-combatants and proportional in its military response to the challenge at hand. An operation is only a complete success if these indicators are met and all four success criteria are fulfilled. This is illustrated in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1: Success in military conflict management operations

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1 Once a conflict has turned violent, violence may develop in a variety of different ways. Naturally, conflicts do not necessarily develop in a linear fashion and may move back and forth between different stages of violence and non-violence. If, however, a conflict becomes more violent, there are four different processes by which this may take place: namely, through (1) continuation, (2) diffusion, (3) escalation and (4) intensification of violence. Continuation is when the violent aspect of a conflict continues over time. Diffusion occurs when violent conflict in one geographic area generates violence in another area. Escalation is when new actors become involved in an existing conflict. Intensification is when the violence increases either in the number or nature of violent incidents (Gelditsch 2007; Lobell and Mauceri 2004: 1-10).
EU military conflict management operations

According to the definition developed above, a military conflict management operation is a success when its purpose has been achieved and implemented in an appropriate manner from both internal and external perspectives. This section will examine the success of the five EU military conflict management operations launched from 2003 to 2010.

Operation Concordia

Macedonia’s stability has repeatedly been threatened by animosity between its ethnic Macedonian and Albanian communities. The Albanian minority, which made up 25 per cent of the population, suffered discrimination under the Yugoslav regime in the 1970s and 1980s. Following the country’s independence in 1991, ethnic Albanians remained under-represented in state institutions and many feared that discriminations against them would become embedded in the new Macedonian state (Glenny 2001; ICG 2005a). On the flip-side, many ethnic Macedonians suspected that the Albanian community had a separatist agenda (Mace 2004). In January 2001, the inter-ethnic conflict turned violent as the Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA) and Macedonian state forces clashed in Tetovo (Mace 2004). Observers at the time feared that a fully-fledged civil war might break out and potentially destabilise the southern Balkan region once again (Glenny 2001). To avoid this, the EU and NATO pushed hard for a negotiated settlement. An agreement was finally reached in Ohrid in August 2001. The Framework Agreement ended the violent conflict and NATO forces were deployed to keep the peace (Mace 2004). On 31 March 2003, as NATO terminated its deployment in Macedonia, the EU launched its first ever military operation in its place. The EU operation, code-named ‘Concordia’, was authorised by United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1371 (2001). The Berlin Plus arrangements, which were completed just two weeks before, allowed Concordia to use NATO assets.2 The operation comprised 350 staff and was initially mandated for six months. Upon request from the Macedonian president, it was extended until 15 December 2003 (Council Joint Action 2003/92/CFSP 27/1/2003; Council of the EU 2009a).

Concordia was mandated to contribute to a stable and secure environment to allow the Macedonian government to implement the Framework Agreement. The United Nations (UN) mandate, which the operation inherited from NATO, endorsed three main objectives: to support the implementation of the Framework Agreement, to contribute to the security of its observers and to secure the environment for its implementation. All three objectives were achieved and Concordia’s internal goal attainment was a success (Augustin 2005; ICG 2005a: 48-49). The absence of violent conflict throughout the deployment demonstrated a great improvement in the security situation since 2001. Minor civil unrest occurred in northern Macedonia in September 2003, which EUFOR supported the Macedonian security forces in defusing, but a fully-fledged civil war never materialised. Although fully implementing the final aspects of the Framework Agreement remains a political challenge for the country, the environment in which it is attempting to do so is now secure (Howorth 2007: 231-241).

With regard to the internal appropriateness of its implementation, Concordia experienced minor problems. A senior diplomat based in Skopje at the time confirmed that some EU officers engaged in criminal activity in Macedonia. On at least one occasion, EU officers deliberately misinformed the EUFOR command. This caused COMEUFOR to make an

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2 EU High Representative Solana and NATO Secretary General Robertson concluded the Berlin Plus arrangements for strategic partnership between the two organisations in crisis management in March 2003. These arrangements allow the EU to make use of NATO assets and capabilities in such operations (NATO 2006).
unsubstantiated public accusation of excessive use of government force in confrontation with a criminal group. Other operational problems resulted from political turf battles concerning security clearance for non-NATO EU Member States, the place of NATO’s regional command in Naples in Concordia’s chain of command and how long command arrangements should stay in place after the end of the operation. These challenges were all of relatively minor character and resolved on a case-by-case basis (ISIS 2003; Mace 2004). Despite these minor limitations to its efficiency, the operation did successfully achieve its internal goals in a timely and cost-effective manner. From the EU perspective, Concordia was a relative success. The fact that the operation was a military success contributed to its political-strategic success. It demonstrated that the EU was capable of conducting a small-scale military operation. It also illustrated that the Berlin Plus arrangements worked relatively well in practice. Concordia set a precedent, however small, for subsequent operations. It added to the EU’s comprehensive approach towards Macedonia and to the Union’s quest for political leadership in the country and the region (Cascone 2008; Dobbins et al. 2008; Mace 2004). Overall, the operation was politically beneficial to the EU at a comparatively low cost. It added a military dimension not only to the EU’s role in Macedonia and the Western Balkans, but to the ESDP as a whole. In other words, Concordia was a significant internal success.

From a conflict perspective, the absence of sustained violent conflict in Macedonia during and after Concordia demonstrates that the violent conflict has been successfully managed. A continuation, diffusion, escalation or intensification of violence did not occur after the crisis in 2001. The question is to what extent these positive developments are attributable to Concordia. Macedonia was relatively stable by the time EUFOR deployed and it is often stressed that it was NATO, not the EU, which stepped in militarily to manage the 2001 crisis (Cascone 2008). So was it NATO, rather than the EU, which successfully managed the Macedonian conflict?

The stability in Macedonia today is the joint achievement of its political leadership, civil society and population (both Albanian and Macedonian) on the one hand, and the international community, on the other hand. The EU’s engagement, of which Concordia was a component, has played a crucial part in this process. The EU and the US worked with ethnic Macedonian and Albanian political leaders to reach a conflict settlement and prevent more violence. Together they managed to facilitate the signing of the Framework Agreement in 2001. Thereafter, NATO completed three military conflict management operations in the country before handing over its responsibilities to the EU in 2003 (Mace 2004; Ludlow 2003; Robertson 2003). From 2001 to 2003, NATO was thus the international provider of military security in the country, but since the Ohrid Agreement the EU has taken the political lead in the international effort in Macedonia. Under the joint leadership of the EU Special Representative (EUSR) and European Commission (EC) delegation, the EU, through a combination of political, financial, technical, military (Concordia) and police assistance, has played a crucial part not only in the securitisation, but also the stabilisation and normalisation of the conflict. The EU’s multifaceted approach towards Macedonia incorporated military conflict management within the wider European integration process. This was framed within the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), which aims at eventual EU membership for the country. Although the US and the local authorities must be commended for their efforts, it is the EU that has taken the lead (Mace 2004). Whilst NATO handled the military aspect of the 2001 crisis, the EU has led the political conflict management since then. With the launch of Concordia, the EU took over the military conflict management effort as well. Although the security situation in the country was more stable in 2003 than when NATO engaged in 2001, the security challenges it faced must not be underestimated. Tensions still existed and there was a perception among international representatives on the ground at the time that violent conflict could resume. The fact that the UNSC deemed it appropriate to authorise an EU follow-up operation to
the NATO deployment is an indicator of the international community’s security concerns at the time. As one aspect of a wider EU (and international) approach towards the management of the conflict, Concordia played an important part in providing a secure environment in which the implementation of the Framework Agreement and the SAP could take place. By guaranteeing the military management of the conflict, it facilitated its political management. In this way, the operation successfully facilitated the management of the conflict and contributed to the prevention of more violence during and after its deployment. As such, Concordia’s external goal attainment was successful.

EUFOR never applied force in Macedonia. Observers disagree on whether it should have been more forceful in its approach and doubts have sometimes been expressed as to whether EUFOR would have been willing and able to manage the situation if hostilities had recommenced (ICG 2005b; Howorth 2007). However, the evaluation of an operation must be based on actual events rather than hypothetical scenarios. The fact that the conflict did not return to sustained violence illustrates that it was possible to manage the security situation in the country without the application of force. Thus, EUFOR’s non-application of force was proportionate to the challenge at hand. As it did not use force, EUFOR also ensured that it did not harm civilians. Concordia was therefore successful in its external appropriateness. It is important to recognise that other actors helped to ensure that the situation did not deteriorate and in this way added to Concordia’s success. This serves as a reminder that a successful operation cannot necessarily be accredited to the EU alone, but it does not detract from the success of the operation overall.

**Operation Artemis**

Since the mid-1990s, the DRC has been engulfed in a myriad of intertwined conflicts. At the sub-state level, there are violent competitions for land, power and resources. These conflicts, which have been particularly fierce in the east of the country, have often assumed an ethnic dimension. At the state level, belligerent parties have struggled for control of the state apparatus and, at the regional level, the DRC is involved in a regional conflict formation, which has affected much of central and southern Africa. Regional actors, in particular Rwanda and Uganda, have also engaged in the fighting within the DRC (Prunier 2009; Tull 2009). In 1999, the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement made way for the authorisation of the United Nations Organisation Mission in DRC (MONUC). In late 2002, an agreement was reached on the withdrawal of 23,000 Rwandan soldiers and most of the 10,000 Ugandan soldiers from the DRC, but militias supported by both governments remained active in the country. The Sun City Agreement ushered in a transitional government in 2003, in which President Kabila would share power with four vice-presidents, including former rebel leaders Bemba and Ruberwa. The war officially ended in 2004, but the violence continued and the security situation in Ituri, the Kivus and Katanga remained volatile (ICG 2008d; Prunier 2009; Tull 2009).

The violence in Ituri became the focus of Operation Artemis, the first of two EU military conflict management operations in the DRC. From 1999 to 2003, factional fighting in Ituri killed an estimated 50,000 people and caused an additional 500,000 people to flee the district (Homan 2007). At the time of the Artemis deployment, Ituri and its district capital, Bunia, were engulfed in crisis following the withdrawal of the Ugandan People’s Defence Force subsequent to the Luanda Agreement between Uganda and the DRC in September 2002. Ethnic Lendu militias and the ethnic Hema Union of Congolese Patriots were fighting for the control of Bunia. In search of safety thousands of civilians gathered around the MONUC Headquarters, where a 700-strong Uruguayan battalion struggled to cope. Belligerents inflicted large-scale atrocities upon the civilian population and observers warned of another potential genocide in the Great Lakes region. The crisis undermined the
Sun City Agreement and risked re-engaging Uganda and Rwanda in the conflict. The UN called for urgent help from the international community (Tull 2009).

The EU, on French initiative, responded positively to the UN request, and in June 2003 the EU agreed to deploy its first military conflict management operation in Africa. Operation Artemis was designed as a stop-gap measure to fill the security vacuum in Bunia pending MONUC reinforcements. EUFOR’s mandate was set out in UNSCR 1484 (2003). At its peak the operation comprised 2,200 troops. The operation officially ended when it handed over its responsibilities to the reinforced UN mission in September 2003 (Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP 5/6/2003; Howorth 2007: 231-241).

Artemis’ mandated purpose was to contribute to the stabilisation of the security conditions and the humanitarian situation in Bunia pending MONUC reinforcements. The operation had three key objectives: to ensure the protection of displaced persons, civilians, the UN and humanitarian agencies in Bunia, to ensure the protection of the airport and to give impetus to the peace process in the DRC and the Great Lakes region (Ulriksen et al. 2004; Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP 5/6/2003). During its deployment, EUFOR prohibited the open bearing of arms in Bunia and established check-points to the entrances of the city. It secured the airport and the refugee camps in its area of operations. Several militia groups were contained, some were disarmed and the supply chains of several groups were disrupted. An important element of the operation was its presence and show-of-force missions carried out by ground forces patrolling throughout Bunia. This enabled humanitarian organisations to travel to areas that they had previously been unable to reach. It allowed a daily influx of 1,000-1,500 refugees into the city and made it possible for the Ituri Interim Administration to resume activities. The operation re-established basic order in Bunia and filled the security gap until MONUC reinforcements arrived. This had a positive effect on the peace process. In terms of its internally defined purpose, the operation was undeniably a success (Gegout 2005; ICG 2005b: 46-49; Ulriksen et al. 2004).

EU soldiers were on the ground within seven days of the official decision to deploy. The rapid force projection was an internal achievement for the EU, although France had undertaken much of the planning prior to the official EU decision to undertake the operation (ICG 2005b: 46-49; Howorth 2007: 231-241; Ulriksen et al. 2004). Nonetheless, significant logistical challenges were overcome. The local infrastructure was wholly inadequate and the operation revealed a general EU shortage in strategic lift capacity. Artemis overcame these problems through a concerted effort by its engineers, charter arrangements and strategic lift support from Canada and Brazil (Giegerich 2008; Homan 2007; Ulriksen et al. 2004). These issues illustrated potential challenges for future, more ambitious operations, but for its internally defined purpose Artemis was able to quickly and efficiently overcome them. From an internal EU perspective, Artemis was both a military-strategic and political-strategic success. It demonstrated that the Union could successfully undertake military operations on a significant scale, on its own and outside of Europe. It bridged the political divide on security and defence policy matters within the EU at the time and added a military dimension to the Union’s engagement in Africa (Hadden 2009: 1-21; Homan 2007; Ulriksen et al. 2004). However, the involvement of EU soldiers in the torture of a Congolese civilian hampered the operation’s internal appropriateness and threw a shadow over the operation’s otherwise stellar internal success (Deutsche Welle 2008; SVT 2008).

From an external conflict perspective, Artemis’ track record was also mixed. Upon its deployment, EUFOR had alleviated the Ituri crisis. It regained control in its area of operations and prevented what was otherwise expected to be a serious deterioration of the security situation in Bunia. A common criticism of Artemis is that it was too limited in the time, scope and geographical area of its operation (Homan 2007). Artemis restored
stability in Bunia only temporarily, and because it did this mainly by driving the militia out of its area of operations, it allowed them to continue to operate elsewhere (Giegerich 2008). Like the wider international effort in the DRC, Artemis left much to be desired in terms of managing the violent conflict in the country. The positive impact that the operation did have on the Ituri conflict, however, must not be underestimated. It is important to recall that over 50,000 people had been killed in Ituri between 1999 and 2003. At the time of the Artemis deployment the crisis was spiralling out of control and no other international security actor was willing and able to provide even a short-term stabilisation of the situation. The effect that this operation had on the ground was significant both in terms of its direct limitation of human rights abuses and indirectly as the lull in violence allowed access to humanitarian aid, refugee movement and resumption of political negotiations in Kinshasa (Howorth 2007: 231-241; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 174-198; Tull 2009). These were significant achievements. However, as with any military conflict management operation, and in particular one as limited as Artemis, there was a danger that the violent conflict would recommence after the soldiers withdrew. The geographical, temporal and functional constraints of Artemis’ mandate compromised the sustainability of its positive impact on the conflict. Shortly after Artemis handed over its responsibilities to MONUC, the security situation in Ituri deteriorated once again. Renewed massacres in October 2003, just a month after the EUFOR withdrawal, added to the enormous suffering already sustained by the civilian population. The atrocities took place despite continued peacekeeping efforts in the region. However, even with its reinforced mandate, MONUC had lesser capabilities in Ituri than Artemis. In effect, it failed to sustain the positive momentum and prevent more violence (Giegerich 2008).

Although Artemis made significant improvements in Bunia throughout its deployment, the broader international strategy of securing peace and stability in Ituri, let alone the DRC and the Great Lakes, was only temporarily advanced by its deployment (Giegerich 2008; Homan 2007). Since then, there has been another upsurge in violence (UNSG 2009). Not even in the specific area in which the EU force was deployed did the operation have sustainable success in preventing more violence. After Artemis’ withdrawal, the violent conflict in Ituri continued and intensified. The deterioration in the security situation was in part due to the limitations to Artemis’ mandate and MONUC’s failure to sustain EUFOR’s achievements. The EU force was successful in its external goal attainment during the deployment, but the international conflict management effort, of which Artemis was part, failed to prevent the continuation and intensification of violence after the withdrawal of the EU troops. Albeit significant in the short term, the positive impact of the operation on the violent conflict proved short-lived and unsustainable in the longer term. This is not to blame EU soldiers for the actions of belligerent parties or the failures of the UN, but rather to reflect that, as part of the wider international conflict management effort, Artemis did not succeed in preventing more violence in Bunia, in Ituri or in the DRC. In effect, it was only a partial success in its external goal attainment.

Operation Artemis was the first EU military conflict management operation that came under direct attack. Its ground forces were caught up in violent confrontations with local militias on several occasions. EUFOR killed more than 20 militiamen during its deployment, but the armed confrontations were localised and of short duration (Giegerich 2008). Considering the precarious security situation in which the troops operated, the specificities of the armed confrontations and their positive impact overall on the security situation in Bunia at the time, the use of force was proportionate to the challenge at hand. However, French soldiers tortured a Congolese civilian during the operation (Deutsche Welle 2008; SVT 2008). Swedish soldiers filed complaints regarding this incident with their operational chief in the field and to their superiors upon return to Sweden. The Swedish armed forces subsequently undertook an official investigation, which concluded that torture had taken place. The Swedish report was sent to the French defence department,
which undertook its own investigation and concluded that no offence had been committed (SVT 2008). However, the accounts by the Swedish soldiers, the Swedish Army’s official report and an independent investigation by the Swedish National Television all conclude that this was indeed a disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force. The operation was thus only a partial success in its external appropriateness. The torture of a civilian during an otherwise successfully conducted operation demonstrates why it is important to evaluate not only the achievements, but also the conduct of EU forces.

**Operation Althea**

The violent conflict in BiH started in April 1992. Over the next three and a half years, the war, which was fought mainly between factions of ethnic Serbs, Croats and Muslims, claimed 97,207 lives (Research and Documentation Centre Sarajevo 2007). The violent conflict ended when the US forced through a settlement in November 1995 in Dayton (Chandler 2000; Glenny 2001; Silber and Little 1996). The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFAP) and the constitutional structures it put in place ended the war, but have since been criticised for not ensuring a sustainable peace in the country (Chandler 2000). The GFAP authorised an international High Representative (HR) to facilitate, mobilise and coordinate the civilian aspects of the peace implementation process. The UN endorsed the establishment of a multinational NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) to undertake the military aspects of the GFAP and assume the authority transferred from the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the country. After the 1996 elections, IFOR was replaced by the smaller NATO Stabilisation Force (SFOR) (NATO 2005).

When NATO decided to withdraw, UNSCR 1551 (2004) endorsed the launch of an EU military conflict management operation in its place. The idea that the EU might take over from NATO in BiH had first been aired at the European Council in Copenhagen in 2002. However, the handover was not officially approved until the Berlin Plus arrangements had been tested in Macedonia (Cascone 2008; ICG 2005b: 49-51). In December 2004, the EU’s Operation Althea took over military conflict management in BiH. The EU initially deployed 7,000 troops to the country under a Chapter VII mandate. The force has since been reduced to 2,200 troops (backed by over-the-horizon reserves). The EU is currently preparing Althea’s evolution into a non-executive, capacity-building operation, but an official decision on the transition is still outstanding (Council of the EU 2009b; Howorth 2007; Solana 2009).

Althea’s operational purpose is to provide a military presence in order to contribute to a safe and secure environment in BiH. It is mandated to deny conditions for a resumption of violence, to manage any residual military aspect of the GFAP and, thus, to allow EU and international actors to carry out their responsibilities in the country. The operation is explicitly framed as part of the EU’s comprehensive approach, which also comprises political, economic, social and policing instruments intended to support conflict management and European integration in BiH. These efforts are framed within the Stabilisation and Association Process. In October 2006, the Council changed Althea’s mandate from a military conflict management mandate to a military policing mandate, but its operational focus remains the maintenance of a safe and secure environment, ensuring compliance with the GFAP and supporting the joint offices of the HR/EUSR (Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP 12/07/2004; Council of the EU 2009b; Howorth 2007).

As the operation is still ongoing, it is too early to undertake a conclusive evaluation of its success, but some preliminary observations can be made. From an internal military-strategic perspective, Althea has been a success so far. It has provided a military presence contributing to a safe and secure environment in BiH. It has successfully denied conditions
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for a resumption of violence. It has managed the military aspects of the GFAP and allowed the EU and other international actors to carry out their responsibilities in the country.

Althea has been timely, efficient and cost-effective in its implementation to date. This initially was helped by the fact that the EU operation was taking over responsibilities from NATO. SFOR had been a largely European undertaking and many of the former NATO troops remained in the country under the EUFOR command. Much of the EUFOR mandate and operation plan also mirrored previous SFOR commitments. The handover and successful implementation of the operation was further facilitated by the Berlin Plus arrangements between NATO and the EU and their joint experience in Macedonia (ICG 2005b: 49-51). Detailed joint planning and preparation helped the two organisations avoid misunderstandings and overlap at the practical level and facilitated an internally successful implementation of Althea so far. Although there have been political disagreements between the two organisations, these were resolved by commanders on the ground and did not detract from the positive achievements and implementation of the EUFOR operation (Cascone 2008). Overall, Althea has been an internal success so far.

Sustained violent conflict has been kept at bay throughout EUFOR's deployment in BiH and the return of violence remains, at worst, a threat rather than a reality - a threat, the seriousness of which is much disputed. Policy-makers and analysts disagree whether the country is at real risk of more violence. Ethno-political tensions remain high and, in March 2009, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) announced that the Office of the High Representative (OHR) will remain open and active until the current political deadlock is resolved. Alongside the appointment of yet another last High Representative in March 2009, the open-ended mandates of both OHR and EUFOR illustrate that PIC does not perceive the situation in BiH to be stable enough for the international community to disengage and EU troops to leave. PIC, which comprises 55 countries and agencies, insists that EUFOR remains crucial to the maintenance of a safe and secure environment in the country (PIC 2009a, 2009b and 2009c).

Operation Althea has been, and still is, perceived to play a significant deterrent role in BiH. Like in the Macedonian case, the security situation in BiH had much improved since NATO's engagement immediately after the peace agreement, but an authoritative international presence, both military and civilian, was still considered essential upon NATO's withdrawal (ICG 2004). Throughout the operation, the principal challengers to security have been organised criminals, so one might ask whether Althea is really a conflict management operation. EUFOR was, and still is, deployed in BiH in case the security situation deteriorates. When Althea was launched, it was widely believed to be a necessity for the national security and territorial integrity of BiH that the EU troops provide a credible military and political deterrent in the country. This was a similar line of thinking as in Macedonia, although the threat there was perceived to be less perilous. In BiH, the return to war was understood as a real threat both by many Bosnians and international observers at the time (Black 2003; Harton 2004; ICG 2004). Nevertheless, the security situation in BiH has remained stable and the country's territorial integrity has not been challenged militarily since the Dayton agreement. This is attributable in part to EUFOR's presence. National events, such as the ten-year commemoration of the Srebrenica massacre, which divided the population and was widely perceived as a threat to national security, have taken place without major disturbances. So have regional events such as the Kosovo declaration of independence, which, it was feared, might provoke a deterioration of the security situation in BiH. It had a destabilising effect politically, but BiH has remained secure militarily (ICG 2004, 2008e). These are indicators that EUFOR, which has principal authority for military conflict management in the country, is doing its job well.
EUFOR is only one aspect of a mammoth effort to consolidate peace in BiH. The EU provides the political backbone of this international engagement in the country. Like in Macedonia, the EU has combined its integration process and made conditional its enlargement on conflict management in BiH. EUFOR contributes to this wider effort by guaranteeing a secure environment, in which the SAP can progress, should the political leadership in BiH want it to (Cameron 2006; OHR 2009). Whether Althea will continue to successfully manage the security aspects of this process and the GFAP remains to be seen. However, as part of the wider EU and international community approach, the operation has thus far succeeded in preventing more violence. In other words, Althea is a preliminary success in terms of its external goal attainment.

Althea has only applied force on one occasion. This was a shooting incident involving Italian officers seeking to arrest a person indicted for war crimes. The officers came under fire and one person was killed in the exchange. It is important to recognise that the EUFOR soldiers opened fire only once they had been fired upon. The person who was killed in the confrontation was carrying an automatic weapon at the time (Bassuener and Ferhatvic 2008). Therefore, despite its unfortunate outcome, this incident does not compromise the external appropriateness of the operation. Althea meets this criterion both with regard to the proportion and discrimination of its use of force.

**EUFOR DR Congo**

In June 2006, the EU launched its second military operation in the DRC. This operation, codenamed EUFOR DR Congo, was deployed to support the UN mission in the country, MONUC, during the period encompassing the DRC elections in July 2006. The mandate was set out in UNSCR 1671 (2006). EUFOR DRC deployed 400 military personnel in an advance element to Kinshasa and a battalion-sized over-the-horizon force on stand-by in neighbouring Gabon. At peak strength in mid-August 2006, EUFOR DRC had 2,466 troops in the field, but a maximum of 1,000 were deployed in the DRC at any one time. The operation was concluded in November 2006 (Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP 27/4/2006; Council of the EU 2006).

EUFOR DRC’s operational purpose was to support MONUC during the elections. To this end, the mandate singled out four key objectives: to support MONUC in its efforts to stabilise the security situation in its area of deployment, to contribute to the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, to contribute to the protection of Kinshasa airport and to execute limited operations to extract individuals in danger (Council of the EU 2006). Election observers confirm that the election went relatively smoothly, but scholars question the extent to which this can be attributed to the EU operation (Gegout 2007; Giegerich 2008; Howorth 2007: 231-241). In terms of its internally defined operational objectives, the operation was a success. When fighting broke out between supporters of the two presidential candidates in Kinshasa in August 2006, EUFOR supported MONUC in managing the disturbances. It helped separate the fighting factions and re-establish order. It assisted in the recovery of diplomats trapped by the violence and mediated between the belligerent parties. EUFOR also airlifted weapons out of areas occupied by groups of demobilised soldiers and participated in humanitarian initiatives (Gegout 2007; Giegerich 2008).

With regard to the timeliness of its deployment, the operation experienced significant problems. As the EU did not have permanent planning and control capacities, EU-level operational planning could not start until Operational Headquarters had been designated. No Member State was keen to adopt the framework responsibilities and the force generation for EUFOR DRC was slow and cumbersome. In effect, the deployment was continuously delayed (Giegerich 2008). It took the EU almost three months to respond
affirmatively to the UN’s request and six months until the force was operational in the field. This was a significant difference from the rapid Artemis response three years earlier. The delay was partly due to UK and German reluctance towards the operation and their hesitance to deploy troops. The UK ruled out participation, given its military commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. Germany was eventually convinced on the condition that only 100 of its 780 troops would be deployed in Kinshasa, while the rest would remain as part of the reserve in Gabon (Howorth 2007: 231-241). Once the force was deployed, the operation was efficiently implemented. Militarily the operation was a relative success, although this was in large part been due to its very limited mandate (Gegout 2007; Giegerich 2008; Howorth 2007: 231-241). It is important, however, not to underestimate the internal political-strategic significance of the operation for the EU. Politically, EUFOR DRC confirmed the EU’s capacity for autonomous military action outside of Europe. It demonstrated once again that the EU could serve as a partner for the UN in difficult situations (Hadden 2009; Rye Olsen 2009). It also added another dimension to the Union’s emerging approach to the DRC (Dobbins et al. 2008). Overall, the operation was an internal success, albeit limited by the narrow scope of its mandate and the delay in its deployment.

From an external conflict management perspective, the success of the operation was even more limited. Although it successfully provided support to MONUC in Kinshasa, it contributed little to the management of the violence in other parts of the country at the time. When the EU launched EUFOR DRC, the security situation in the country was still dire. The International Rescue Committee estimated that 1,200 people, half of them children, died daily as a consequence of the conflict (UNICEF 2006). The security situation in the east of the country was particularly unstable. In July alone, while EUFOR DRC was being deployed to Kinshasa, 17,000 people fled renewed fighting in Ituri. Despite the increased violence and the need for further international assistance in eastern DRC, EUFOR was confined to the capital and much of the force remained in reserve in Gabon. Although the operation successfully supported MONUC in handling disturbances in Kinshasa, EUFOR’s achievements with regard to the management of the conflict as a whole did not constitute an external success (Gegout 2007). At its launch, Haine and Giegerich (2006: 1) warned that the operation would be “limited, brief, risk-averse and ultimately ineffective”. In terms of its contribution towards the management of the DRC conflict, EUFOR DRC was exactly that. It did not successfully prevent more violence. On the contrary, the violent conflict continued and intensified in the east of the country. In terms of its external goal attainment, the operation was therefore only a partial success. With regard to its external appropriateness, the operation was successful, however, as it did not use force.

The security situation in the DRC is still volatile and the humanitarian situation is desperate. Neither Operation Artemis nor EUFOR DRC facilitated an end to the violent conflict. These two operations, however, unlike Concordia and Althea, were not mandated, equipped or intended to operate throughout the country or indeed to manage the DRC conflict as a whole. In both cases, the EU forces were intended to support MONUC in the DRC only for a few months at a time. Unlike in the Balkans, where the EU had a lead role in international conflict management during operations Concordia and Althea, the EU and its military conflict management operations played only a marginal supporting role to the much larger UN operation in the DRC. MONUC is the backbone of the international attempt to manage the violent conflict in the DRC. It is important to keep this in mind, when considering the limitations to the external success of the two EU operations.

**EUFOR CHAD/CAR**

The EU’s most recent military conflict management endeavour was a joint operation in Chad and CAR. A complex conflict formation exists within and between Chad, CAR and neighbouring Sudan. The alarming security situation in the region is consequences of
sub-state, state, regional and international conflict dynamics. Both Chad and CAR were experiencing domestic conflicts of their own before the 2003 Darfur conflict erupted in Sudan (Berg 2008). Despite the domestic problems in Chad and CAR, however, EUFOR Chad/CAR was intended to alleviate the consequences of the Darfur crisis on the security situation in the refugee camps in eastern Chad and north eastern CAR. The operation was authorised by UNSCR 1778 (2007) and was launched in January 2008. The mandate authorised an operation of one year’s duration from the date upon which it reached Initial Operating Capability (IOC). It reached IOC in March and Full Operating Capability in September 2008. The fully deployed force consisted of 3,400 troops. The deployment comprised Rear Headquarters at N'Djamena, Force Headquarters at Abeche and three multinational battalions stationed in the eastern parts of Chad at Iriba, Forchana and Goz Beïda with a detachment at Birao (CAR) (Council Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP 15/10/2007; Council of the EU 2009c).

EUFOR Chad/CAR was a bridging operation intended to support the civilian United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), while the UN prepared its military component to this mission. The mandated purpose of EUFOR Chad/CAR was to contribute to the improvement of security in eastern Chad and north eastern CAR. EUFOR had three key objectives: to protect civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced persons, to facilitate delivery of humanitarian aid and free movement of humanitarian personnel by helping to improve security in the area of operations and to contribute to protecting UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment (Council of the EU 2009c; Hadden 2009: 5-21).

Due to EU resource shortfalls and instabilities in the Chadian capital at the time, there were initial delays to the launch of the operation (Ehrhart 2008). Once the force was on the ground, it constituted the largest and most multinational military operation that the Union has launched in Africa. EUFOR Chad/CAR was undertaken in a vast, remote and inhospitable area of operations and its deployment alone represented an unprecedented logistical challenge for the EU. The construction of the operational infrastructure from brown-field sites to finished camps involved a massive building effort. EUFOR completed six camps of up to 2,000 people capacity and undertook major work on N'djamena and Abeche airports to facilitate the deployment and the sustainability of the operation (Council of the EU 2009c; Nash 2008). Considering the delicate security situation, the vast area of operations, the logistical circumstances on the ground and the Union’s relative inexperience in military conflict management, the deployment represented a great challenge, and upon its completion, a great achievement for the EU. Once the bases had been constructed, the airports developed and the troops and equipment had safely arrived, EUFOR established a robust military presence on the ground. The presence of the troops, their regular patrols and targeted operations had a significant deterrence effect, which quickly helped increase security in their area of operations. EUFOR helped protect civilians and facilitated the delivery of humanitarian aid in the time and space that the troops were operating. With regard to its operational objective to protect the UN presence, the operation did not fail either, although it took months before EUFOR could assist the UN, because the deployment of the civilian UN component of MINURCAT was continuously delayed (Ehrhart 2008; Oxfam 2008; Pop 2009).

With regard to its implementation, EUFOR Chad/CAR had mixed results. The initial delays to the deployment hindered a timely execution of the mandate in the first half of the operation. EUFOR Chad/CAR was launched in January 2008, but did not reach Full Operating Capability until September 2008. The first part of the operation was focused on deployment, building and engineering tasks. The operation ran into significant problems in acquiring the necessary troops and equipment from the EU Member States. France, which was the main instigator of the operation, eventually announced that it would fill the
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gaps. Once the necessary troops and equipment were deployed, EUFOR Chad/CAR was both efficient and cost-effective in achieving its objectives in the field. From a political-strategic perspective, the operation had significant value for the EU. It enhanced the operational experience of the ESDP. It was another autonomous operation in Africa conducted without the help of the US, and it enhanced the Union’s credibility as a military actor. It also increased the EU’s involvement and influence in Africa (Mattelaer 2008; Rye Olsen 2009). This all added to the cost-effectiveness of the operation. EUFOR was only partially successful with regard to its internal appropriateness, however, due to the delays in the deployment and the limited capability of the operation during the first half of the mandate. Moreover, the internal appropriateness of the operation was compromised when two EUFOR soldiers crossed into Sudanese territory. One was killed and the other wounded. This was a high cost for the EU, which had never previously lost a soldier in combat (BBC 2008; Pineau 2008). Consequently, the operation was only a partial internal success overall.

The conflict context in which EUFOR Chad/CAR engaged was difficult. Just 24 hours after the operation had been launched, its deployment was interrupted by a major rebel offensive on Chad’s capital, N’djamena. Sources suggest that the rebel alliance consciously decided to storm the city in anticipation of the EU deployment (Fletcher 2008). Both EUFOR Chad/CAR and MINURCAT were initially delayed. EUFOR managed to restart its deployment with relative speed, but the problems facing the MINURCAT deployment directly affected EUFOR, which was dependent on effective cooperation with the UN mission. EUFOR’s presence, its regular patrolling and targeted operations, nonetheless, contributed to an increased sense of security in its area of operations (Oxfam 2008). EUFOR had a positive, albeit limited, impact on security in both CAR and Chad, but in both countries its achievements risked being compromised, if the UN follow-up mission did not successfully manage to sustain them. At the time observers questioned whether MINURCAT was up to the challenge (Ehrhart 2008; ICG 2009a). When EUFOR handed over responsibility to MINURCAT in March 2009, the situation in the area was still precarious. The operation, which was specifically mandated to protect refugees from the conflict in Darfur, withdrew amid rising tensions resulting from the international arrest warrant issued against Sudanese President al-Bashir. Sudan responded to the indictment by expelling thirteen humanitarian agencies from Darfur. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and President Obama warned that the situation may deteriorate even further (Pop 2009). This instability illustrates that EUFOR Chad/CAR did not facilitate an end to violent conflict in the region (ICG 2008b; ICG 2008c).

Like Artemis in the DRC, EUFOR Chad/CAR did have some success in temporarily alleviating the violence in its area of operations pending UN reinforcements (Mattelaer 2008; Oxfam 2008). However, unlike Artemis, which was deployed with remarkable speed, EUFOR Chad/CAR, had less impact than its mandate allowed, because of the delays to its own and MINURCAT’s deployment (Ehrhart 2008). Moreover, the EU soldiers were not authorised to provide security within the refugee camps. This was intended to be provided by Chadian police officers trained by MINURCAT. However, the Chadian police and MINURCAT did not fulfil this role and a security vacuum left the refugee camps unprotected against local bandits and militias (Mattelaer 2006; Oxfam 2008). As aid workers in the area were increasingly threatened, humanitarian efforts were also downscaled. This negatively affected EUFOR’s ability to support the delivery of humanitarian aid. Likewise, Chadian and Sudanese objections to an EU deployment directly on the border between the two countries limited the success of the operation in managing the regional aspect of the conflict. Consequently, the proxy war between Sudan and Chad continued while EU troops were deployed in the region. As EUFOR was not operating in the border area, the operation also had little impact on the humanitarian consequences of conflict in these areas (Ehrhart 2008; Ladzic 2008).
This operation, like the two operations in the DRC, was not mandated, equipped or intended to operate throughout these three countries. With significant limitations to its mandate, EUFOR was not able to successfully manage the violent conflict in the region. It did not succeed in preventing more violence; however, the troops did help improve the situation in their area of operations. From a conflict management perspective, the operation was therefore a partial success. Once it was deployed and where this took place, EUFOR did deter violence and significantly improved the security situation. However, the contribution of the operation to the international efforts to manage the conflict was limited by a lack of support from domestic, regional, European and international actors involved both in the conflict and its management.

EUFOR Chad/CAR repeatedly came under fire and on three occasions its soldiers fired back. Two of these incidents were confrontations with local armed groups in Chad and the third incident occurred when a EUFOR vehicle strayed into Sudan. In Chad, both attacks on EUFOR were conducted by unidentified armed groups. EUFOR sustained no serious casualties and there are no reports of the insurgent groups suffering fatalities. In both incidents, EUFOR opened fire only after they were fired upon and on both occasions civilians were helped from the scene by EUFOR soldiers. In the third incident, where the EU vehicle crossed into Sudan, both the Sudanese authorities and EUFOR claim to have fired in self-defence and both reported casualties. France officially criticised the Sudanese army for its disproportional response, but the incident could have been avoided if the EU troops had not strayed into Sudanese territory (EUFOR Chad/CAR 2008a, 2008b, 2008c; Pineau 2008). The EUFOR soldiers’ use of force, however, was proportionate to the armed opposition they met in Sudan and discriminatory in the sense that it did not target civilians. Consequently, despite this incident, the operation was externally appropriate.

**Conclusion**

The EU launched five military conflict management operations between 2003 and 2010. Concordia, Althea, Artemis, EUFOR DRC and EUFOR Chad/CAR were intended to help manage conflicts in Macedonia, BiH, DRC, Chad and CAR. This article set out to examine their success. According to the definition developed above, an operation is a success when its purpose has been achieved and implemented in an appropriate manner from both an internal perspective and an external perspective. To evaluate the success of the EU operations accordingly, the definition was broken down into four success criteria. The internal goal attainment criterion evaluated whether the operations successfully fulfilled their mandates and key operational objectives. The internal appropriateness criterion assessed their implementation with regard to timeliness, efficiency and cost-effectiveness. The external goal attainment criterion examined the contribution that each operation made to the management of the violent conflict. Finally, the external appropriateness criterion assessed the appropriateness of the use of force in terms of discrimination between combatants and non-combatants and the proportionality of the military response. The definition and criteria for success allowed for an assessment of success in EU military conflict management operations, which took into account both an internal EU-specific perspective and an external conflict-specific perspective on success. A break-down of the success of the five operations is provided in Table 2 below.
Table 2: Success in EU military conflict management operations: 2003-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Internal goal attainment</th>
<th>Internal appropriateness</th>
<th>External goal attainment</th>
<th>External appropriateness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concordia</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Partial success</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artemis</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Partial success</td>
<td>Partial success</td>
<td>Partial success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Althea</td>
<td>Preliminary success</td>
<td>Preliminary success</td>
<td>Preliminary success</td>
<td>Preliminary success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR DRC</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Partial success</td>
<td>Partial success</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR Chad/CAR</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Partial success</td>
<td>Partial success</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The different degrees of success illustrate why it is important to include both goal attainment and appropriateness criteria for success and why it is necessary to evaluate these from both internal and external perspectives. It also demonstrates why it is useful to evaluate success comparatively and to undertake this comparison in a structured and focused way to get a more nuanced picture of EU military conflict management. In terms of its overall performance as a military conflict manager, the EU has so far had unlimited success in achieving its self-defined operational objectives. It has also been relatively successful in implementing these objectives, although delays in force generation and deployment and misconduct by individual soldiers have at times limited the Union’s achievements in this regard. From an external perspective, the Union’s track record is much less consistent. The EU has contributed a great deal to conflict management in the Western Balkans, albeit chiefly in the post-violent phase of the conflicts. In Central Africa, the Union’s military conflict management achievements have been much more modest. Here, the EU has provided temporary relief and supplement to UN-led conflict management efforts, rather than the other way around. Finally, all five operations have been discriminatory and proportional in their application of force with the exception of an isolated torture incident during Operation Artemis. Overall, the five EU operations constitute a relative success from the point of view of the EU. With regard to the management of the conflicts in which it engaged, however, the EU’s success is much more modest. This illustrates why it is important to include both perspectives when assessing the EU’s success as a military conflict manager.

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References


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