Migration and Development? An Assessment of Recent EU Policy Initiatives

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Abstract
The idea that migration policy and development policy are interrelated and influence each other has gained ground over the past few years. The EU has been keen to link migration policy to development policy in several of its policy initiatives. Based on a discussion of the notion of 'migration and development', this article identifies four policy dilemmas facing policy-makers who aim to link migration policy and development policy. It then goes on to examine four EU policy initiatives (the Global Approach to Migration; the Policy Plan on Legal Migration; the thematic programme for the cooperation with third countries in the areas of migration and asylum; and the Mobility Partnerships) to determine how these initiatives aim to link migration policy and development policy. It finds that none of the policy initiatives adequately address the policy dilemmas. Only the two most recent initiatives (the thematic programme and the Mobility Partnerships) address the broad range of suggested policies which link migration policy and development policy. Generally, it is clear from the initiatives that the EU prioritises the reduction of illegal immigration to its territory. Inconsistencies between the EU's various policies, as well as between its different institutional actors, are problematic for attempts to achieve a 'comprehensive' policy in the area of migration and development.

Keywords
Migration; Development; Mobility Partnerships

DURING THE PAST FEW YEARS, THE NOTION OF ‘MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT has gained ground in the academic literature. In essence, this notion implies that migration and development are interrelated, and one therefore influences the other. The European Union (EU) has been particularly concerned to link migration policy and development policy. Since migration and asylum became an EU competence under the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), and the Tampere European Council (1999) called for the establishment of a common EU migration and asylum policy, there have been several Communications issued in this area. These have often emphasised the need to manage migration, and particularly to reduce illegal immigration (Roig and Huddleston 2007: 368). Already in 1994 the Commission called for “action on controlling migration flows” (Commission 1994: 3) and in its 2000 Communication it mentioned the “fight against illegal immigration” as part of a coherent immigration policy (Commission 2000). However, policy documents have also highlighted the need for cooperation with third countries. In 2001, for example, the Commission stated...
that “migration issues should be integrated in the existing partnerships, which are the
general framework of our relations with third countries” (Commission 2001: 8). In 2002, the
Commission issued the Communication on ‘Integrating migration issues in the European
Union’s relations with third countries’, in which it established a link between migration policy
and development policy, stating that “to maximise the potential positive effects of migration
on development, and to reduce the negative ones, migration issues ought to be part and
parcel of Community development policy” (Commission 2002a: 13). The Council endorsed
this Communication in its 2003 Conclusions on migration and development, and stated that
“the long-term objective of the Community should be to continue to address the root causes
of migration, in partnership with third countries, in due recognition of the effect of long-term
development programmes on migratory flows” (Council 2003: 6) implying that increased
levels of development will reduce migratory flows. The Hague Programme, agreed by the
European Council in 2004, stated that “policies which link migration, development
cooperation and humanitarian assistance should be coherent and be developed in
partnership and dialogue with countries and regions of origin” (Council 2004: 22). In 2005
the Commission issued the Communication ‘Migration and Development: some concrete
orientations’ (Commission 2005a). In this document, the Commission stated that it “believes
that the links between migration and development offer a significant potential for furthering
development goals” (ibid.: 2) and identified the policy areas which can improve the impact of
migration on development, namely remittances; diasporas; circular migration and brain
circulation; and mitigating the adverse effect of brain drain.

In the past there has been fierce criticism in the academic literature of the EU’s migration
policies, with some authors arguing that development interests are secondary to security and
migration concerns. In particular, migration management and combating illegal migration
(which are in the interest of the EU) are more prominent policy goals than fostering legal
migration from developing countries to the EU (Bendel 2005; Chou 2006).

The question raised, therefore, is: to what extent have EU policy initiatives linked migration
policy and development policy? This article will examine the linkages between migration and
development as they have evolved in EU policy since the Commission Communication on
migration and development in 2005. In particular, it focuses on the following initiatives: the
Global Approach to Migration; the Policy Plan on Legal Migration; the thematic programme
for the cooperation with third countries in the areas of migration and asylum; and the Mobility
Partnerships.

The article is structured as follows. The first section introduces the discussion on the notion
of ‘migration and development’ and the assumptions associated with it. On this basis, the
article shows that there are four policy dilemmas that actors seeking to link migration and
development policy invariably have to face. This discussion on migration and development
will then be applied to the concrete policy initiatives by the EU in order to determine how
these policies aim to deal with the migration and development policy dilemmas.

Migration and development

Which types of policies could be pursued if migration and development are to be addressed
simultaneously? In the context of this paper, it is the international migration of citizens from
developing countries to developed countries which is of interest. Naturally, this is a simplified
view of international migration since many authors point to the importance of migration
between developing countries, and this has been recognised also by the Commission
(2005a: 11). However, for the purposes of examining EU policy, this distinction between
developing and developed countries is appropriate. Development refers particularly to the
development situation of the country of origin of migrants, where development is understood
in broad terms, including not only simple economic measures such as GDP but also overall welfare, security, rights etc. As this article is concerned mainly with the design of policy initiatives, the term ‘development’ will not be specifically operationalised here.

Migration, particularly from developing to developed countries, is often a very sensitive political issue, perceived as a threat to the sovereignty and cultural integrity of the receiving country and therefore undesirable (Skeldon 1997: 22; Hammar and Tamas 1997: 1). However, it is generally agreed that it is impossible to halt migration (de Haas 2005: 1280). With reference to Europe, Lucas (2005: 303) contends that “the long eastern border and Mediterranean coastline are almost impossible to seal” and Wets (2004: 22) points to the sizeable population growth in developing countries as a factor that will continue to cause mass migration. Lucas therefore argues that “an inability to control migration has focused attention on migration management, including the role of economic development at origin as a device for reducing migration pressures” (2005: 3; emphasis added). This is reflected in attempts by policy-makers to link migration policy to development policy (see for example Martin et al. 2007, on the UN’s High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development).

However, the notion that development in the countries of origin can reduce migratory pressures, in a process that is beneficial for both receiving countries and countries of origin, is simplistic. Instead, the “ambivalent” view that “the migration-development relationship is complicated, unresolved, unsettled, uncertain, critical, even unexplored (!), or both positive and negative for emigrant as well as for immigrant countries” has gained ground (Hermele 1997: 134). In the discussion on migration and development, it is therefore important to distinguish between two separate assumptions: First, migration can impact on development (both positively and negatively); and second, development can impact on migration (cf. Fischer et al. 1997: 92; Lucas 2005: 3). The next section will outline the nature of these presumed effects.

**Presumed positive effects of migration on development**

There are three main benefits of migration for development that are mentioned in the literature: remittances; the role of diasporas; and the return of migrants. Remittances (by migrants to their families or communities in the country of origin) can form a significant financial inflow for countries of origin. In 2003, remittance flows to developing countries amounted to $142 billion, up from $18.4 billion in 1980 (Ghosh 2006: 7). For some countries, remittances are worth more than official development assistance (ODA) (Wets, 2004: 26) and in 1994 the value of remittances to Cape Verde exceeded exports by 16 to 1 (Taylor 1999: 68). Comparing remittances to aid flows, de Haas (2005: 1277) comments that ‘this ‘private’ foreign aid seems to flow directly to the people who really need it, does not require a costly bureaucracy on the sending side, and far less of it is likely to be siphoned off into the pockets of corrupt government officials’. Hermele (1997: 139) gives examples of the evidence of remittances being put to productive uses – for example being invested in education and agricultural equipment in South Africa. Remittances may also have a job-creating effect: remittances sent to the country of origin stimulate demand which is met by domestic production (Portes 2009: 7). Hermele (1997: 139) estimates that 570,000 jobs have been created in Bangladesh either directly or indirectly as a result of the remittances sent by the 200,000 migrants abroad. Remittances may even prevent further emigration from developing countries, by providing an important social safety net for families in difficult times (Newland 2003).

Migrants are often said to have a broader role in the development of their country of origin than simply remitting money to families and communities. The diaspora of a country can be
seen as “potential ‘ambassadors’ or lobbyists in defence of national interests abroad” (Nyberg-Sørensen et al. 2002: 15; emphasis in original). Emigration is therefore not necessarily a net loss for the country of origin, as “through international migration, important transnational networks are being developed, which can act as agents to facilitate cultural, political and economic exchanges and ensure sustainable links between countries of origin and destination” (IOM 2004: 6; cf. Lucas 2005: 11). This also gives countries of origin access to knowledge, new technologies and new markets (IOM 2004: 9). In addition, the diaspora’s continued engagement in the country of origin may lead them to establish institutes of higher education there (Portes 2009: 16) or to promote trade with the receiving country (Lucas 2005: 293).

Migrants returning to the country of origin bring with them several benefits that can positively impact on development, such as “their superior training and skills, management experience, their ties to foreign institutions and networking capacity acquired while abroad” (IOM 2004: 9-10; cf. Portes 2009: 8). These factors can then be invested in the country of origin, contributing to its development. It is often argued that the intention to return home is crucial for the diaspora to remain engaged in the country of origin and share the benefits of migration with those left behind – otherwise the positive role that they can play, as described above, will eventually fade, leaving no positive impact of migration on the development of the country of origin (Lucas 2005: 299).

In addition to these main positive effects of migration on development, other effects are also mentioned in the literature. Portes (2009: 5) points out that emigration can provide a “safety valve to poverty and unemployment”. The assumption is that developing countries have a surplus of labour, so that the departure of some can lead to employment opportunities and higher wages for those left behind (Lucas 2005: 290). Success stories of previous migrants may encourage others in the country of origin to attempt to follow in their footsteps, for example by pursuing higher education. However only a few of those who increase their human or social capital actually leave, which provides a net gain for the country of origin (Wets 2004: 25).

Presumed negative effects of migration on development

There are, however, several potential negative effects of migration on development, most of which can be derived simply by viewing the potential positive effects in a different light (Hermele 1997: 138). Probably the most-cited negative impact of migration is the so-called ‘brain drain’, which is defined as the permanent emigration of highly-skilled labour, causing developing countries to lose their “most active and innovative citizens” (Skeldon 1997: 3). While developed countries have tended to increase the barriers to immigration for semi-skilled and low-skilled migrants, high-skilled migrants are in demand (Hugo 2003). Commander et al. (2002: 2) point out that “there are a significant number of small countries – principally in the Caribbean, Central America and Africa – with very high skilled migration rates” and in developing countries the highest emigration rates are to be found among university graduates (Olesen 2002: 136). The costs associated with this are the lost benefits usually associated with a highly-skilled workforce (such as higher productivity); lost tax revenue that would have been gained if highly-skilled migrants had stayed in the country of origin (Lucas 2005: 9); and the “loss of return on the investment made by the country of origin towards the training and education of its nationals” (IOM 2004: 9).

It is also possible to criticise the ability of remittances to impact on development in the country of origin. In particular, developing countries “may easily become dependent on this source of income, which is overall vulnerable to changes in the economic, political and social evolutions in the migrant receiving countries” (Wets 2004: 27). Dependence on remittances
reduces the incentive in the country of origin to generate jobs (Lucas 2005: 295) and the costs involved in remitting money can be substantial (ibid.: 298). Remittances also tend to be used for consumptive purposes (such as housing, land purchase, transport, repayment of debts) rather than productive purposes (which will contribute to the structural development and economic growth of the country of origin) (Hermele 1997: 136), and do not flow to the poorest members of society (de Haas 2005: 1278). As de Haas (ibid.: 1275) points out, “general development constraints – such as bad infrastructure, corruption, red tape, a lack of macroeconomic stability, the absence of appropriate public policies (schooling, health care, land reform, etc.), market failures, difficult access to international markets because of trade barriers, a lack of legal security and a lack of trust in government institutions – are all likely to play a constraining role in remittance transfers”, and arguably these are problems present in all countries usually defined as ‘developing’. In addition, as well as having no measurable impact on development, there is a chance that remittances can have an outright negative impact on the country of origin, for example by causing an inflation in real estate prices, increased unemployment, or the concentration of land ownership in the hands of a few families (Nyberg-Sørensen et al. 2002: 21). Kapur and McHale (2003: 49) argue that remittances have helped finance internal conflicts and sustain developing countries’ belligerent foreign policies.

Portes (2009: 11) criticises the assumed ability of diasporas to contribute to the development of their country of origin. He argues that migrants are only able to make modest contributions to developmental projects, as their income in the receiving country tends to be low, and that diaspora involvement is a “one-generation phenomenon”, with the second generation being more orientated towards the receiving country.

Although it is assumed that developing countries benefit from migrants returning after stays abroad, the reality of return may not be so positive. Nyberg-Sørensen et al. (2002: 12) argue that most migrants do not acquire skills abroad that are useful in the country of origin (cf. Di Maria and Stryszowski 2009: 307). Olesen (2002: 137) lists four reasons for migrants to return: failure (not being able to find a job in order to survive and send back remittances); conservatism (not being able to thrive away from friends and family); retirement (having earned enough money to want to retire comfortably in the country of origin); and innovation. Of these, only migrants in the last group will definitely contribute to the development of their country of origin; those in the ‘retirement’ group may contribute depending on what they spend their money on; and those in the first two groups (i.e. ‘failed’ migrants) are unlikely to contribute to the development of the country of origin (cf. Nyberg-Sørensen et al. 2002: 22-23). As Commander et al. (2002: 20) argue: “the best migrants tend to stay”.

Presumed effects of development on migration

Development is also presumed to have an effect on migration, though there is disagreement as to the nature of this effect. There are two main arguments made here. The first states that development in the country of origin will lead to fewer people wanting to migrate (cf. Lucas 2005: 295) since migration is assumed to occur because of differences in the development levels of countries of origin and receiving countries (Nyberg-Sørensen et al. 2002: 11). As a result, migrants move in order to improve their employment opportunities and general welfare, but given the choice they would prefer to stay in the country of origin. Migration is therefore “to a substantial extent, a reflection of the failure of migrants’ countries of origin to create jobs and prevent violence” (Lucas 2005: 289) and one way to reduce migration from developing countries is therefore to encourage their development. Olesen (2002: 141) estimates that the level of development needed in order to reduce emigration is an income of more than $8,000 per capita.
However, as Hermele (1997: 141) argues, the assumption that underdevelopment stimulates migration is far from certain and it is simplistic to assume that development can reduce migration. The second argument maintains that development will actually lead to more migration, initially at least (Massey 1988). Generally, migrants do not come from the very poorest sectors of society, as the costs involved in migrating are considerable and migrants may have to pay for obtaining a visa, for the services of recruitment companies, or for undocumented entry assisted by traffickers and smugglers (Lucas 2005: 276-281). Making the poorest richer (through development of the country of origin) will therefore provide them with the means to migrate (Nyberg-Sørensen et al. 2002: 10). Both Massey (1988: 387) and Skeldon (1997: 6) point out that the arrival of industrialisation in Europe coincided with increased emigration. There are two possible outcomes of this argument. The first is that there is a ‘migration hump’, where a certain level of development of countries of origin must be reached before people are encouraged to stay put (Nyberg-Sørensen et al. 2002: 10). Below this level, development is assumed to increase migration, but beyond it migration will gradually decrease. However, Massey (1988) provides the second possible outcome, arguing that migration becomes a self-perpetuating process, increasingly unrelated to the economic and social conditions which originally caused it. Networks of migrants abroad provide potential migrants with valuable resources and contacts, reducing the risks associated with moving and thus making migration more likely (Nyberg-Sørensen 2002: 11; Massey 1988: 397). In other words, migration leads to more migration.

Policy options which can be distilled from the debate on ‘migration and development’

Given the above discussion, which policy options can be formulated to address the various assumptions? Migration and development policies may actually have conflicting objectives (Nyberg-Sørensen et al. 2002: 17). It is therefore important for such policies to achieve coherence and consistency – a “comprehensive approach” (IOM 2004: 18). This section will highlight some policy suggestions based on the above discussion and will, on this basis, identify four policy dilemmas facing decision-makers who attempt to link migration policy and development policy.

If migration is assumed to have an effect on development, then policy options that can be derived from the above discussion relate to: remittances; the role of the diaspora; the return of migrants; and countering the ‘brain drain’. The International Organization for Migration suggests several ways in which developed countries can aim to make remittances more effective in contributing to development (IOM 2004: 12-13). For example, the transfer of remittances could be made cheaper (the average cost of remitting is 13% of the amount remitted) and the use of reliable channels to remit could be promoted. Developed countries could also consider exempting remittances from taxation or encouraging the establishment of foreign bank branches on their territory (de Haas 2005: 1279). Offering legal status to migrants will allow them to earn more, and therefore remit more to families or communities in the country of origin (Newland 2003).

To encourage diasporas to maintain close links with their communities in the countries of origin, receiving countries could promote the creation of migrant associations on their territory (IOM 2004: 11). However, developed countries’ integration policies provide a first policy dilemma. Although such integration policies might help migrants to settle in a new society, they are likely to hamper migrants’ attempts to maintain links with their country of origin (Newland 2003). Integration policies should therefore not focus exclusively on assimilation into the receiving country as this may break transnational ties.

The twin goals of encouraging the return of migrants to their country of origin and countering the brain drain are closely related in that both aim to avoid permanent or
damaging emigration of workers from developing countries. There are several possible policy options that could encourage the return of migrants to their country of origin. Many of these are policies that need to be enacted by the developing country concerned, such as providing reintegration assistance to returning migrants, involving them actively in policymaking, or offering incentives such as tax exemptions to encourage return (IOM 2004: 13-14). However, developed countries also have a role to play, particularly by encouraging circular or return migration. The concepts of circular and return migration are closely related since both imply that migration to developed countries should be temporary. However, where return migration implies a permanent return to the country of origin (after a period of time spent in the receiving country), circular migration specifically implies repeated migration between the receiving country and the country of origin (see Cremona 2008: 1; de Haas 2005: 1282). Return migration could be encouraged by, for example, offering more student scholarships with conditions attached for return (IOM 2004: 11) or financing return programmes for highly-skilled migrants (Hermele 1997: 154). Olesen (2002: 139) argues that developed countries need to untie the aid given to developing countries. Instead of, for example, hiring a European for a development project in Mozambique, it would be better to hire an equally qualified member of the Mozambican diaspora living in Europe, thus fostering return migration. In order to encourage return or circular migration, de Haas (2005: 1282) suggests improving the legal situation of migrants. Developed countries could make pensions built up by migrants in the receiving country transferable, encouraging return migration after retirement (Newland 2003). For circular migration to take place, it is important that developed countries provide migrants with the genuine right to migrate again, after a period of return to the country of origin (de Haas 2005: 1282), for example by easing the availability of re-entry visas (Hugo 2003; Weil 2002: 49). However, restrictive migration policies by developed countries provide a second policy dilemma, as they make return or circular migration less likely as migrants fear that visiting their country of origin means it will be impossible for them to return again to the receiving country where they have been living (de Haas 2005: 1278; Newland 2003; Weil 2002: 47).

A further policy dilemma is the tension between, on the one hand, attempts by developed countries to attract highly-skilled migrants and, on the other, the need to counteract the brain drain. The IOM therefore points out that some developed countries have adopted guidelines for the recruitment of workers from developing countries, including a list of countries that are vulnerable to the loss of skilled workers and that should therefore not be targeted (IOM 2004: 10). Developed countries could also fund “stay-at-home packages” for potential highly-skilled emigrants (Hermele 1997: 154), or mitigate recruitment policies by supporting education and training in the countries of origin (Newland 2003).

It should be noted that these policy options all assume that possibilities for migration from developing to developed countries exist since allowing some form of migration is clearly the most important element of a policy that assumes that migration impacts on development. Equally, the opposite can also be assumed in that development impacts on migration. The above discussion highlights that the most likely effect is that development increases migration, at least in the short run. These observations produce a significant policy dilemma for decision-makers in developed countries as they are committed (for example through the Millennium Development Goals) to encouraging the development of poorer countries. However they also have a tendency to try and restrict immigration. Massey (1988: 385), with reference to Mexican migration to the United States, argues that “if the United States seeks to promote economic development in Mexico and eliminate the incentives for migration in the long run, probably the most effective policy it can adopt in the short run is to set generous quotas for the legal entry of Mexican immigrants”. This is, however, politically unpopular, given that immigration is often seen as undesirable, or even an issue of security (see above). Indeed, there is a prevalent discourse in many developed countries focused on the need to ‘fight’ illegal immigration. However, Lucas (2005: 284) argues that the negative...
views surrounding immigration in the receiving country, such as the concern that immigration may decrease wages or place a strain on the fiscal system, may not be justified because on average, immigration leads to a gain for citizens of the receiving country. As a consequence, a policy option might therefore be to change the discourse surrounding immigration. Bhagwati (2003: 99) agrees, arguing that “there must be a seismic shift in the way migration is addressed”. Indeed, Bendel (2007: 45) points out that providing legal migration opportunities to EU territory would actually provide member states with more control over illegal migration.

Finally, Weil (2002: 41) suggests that a policy of ‘co-development’, consisting of sustained cooperation between receiving countries and countries of origin to solve the problems they face, can bring major benefits to all. Such cooperation should include a commitment by developing countries to repatriate their nationals if they are found to be residing illegally in the receiving country (ibid.: 52).

Migration and development in EU Policy

To what extent have the above policy options been reflected in EU policy initiatives, and how have the policy dilemmas been addressed? In the academic literature there has been much criticism of the EU’s migration policies towards third countries. Chou (2006: 2) has characterised the EU’s approach as ‘coercive’, as it “uses development aid or related incentives in exchange for third countries’ cooperation in achieving EU migration objectives, such as the tackling of irregular migration”. The Commission itself has acknowledged that readmission agreements, in particular, “work mainly in the interest of the Community, [so] third-countries are naturally very reluctant to accept such agreements. Their successful conclusion, therefore, depends very much on the positive incentives (‘leverage’) at the Commission’s disposal” (Commission 2002b: 24). This leverage often comes in the form of a visa facilitation agreement (Trauner and Kruse 2008). Castles (2006: 759) has argued with regard to the Commission’s Policy Plan on Legal Migration that ‘win-win’ outcomes for countries of origin and receiving countries “look very much like an afterthought”. Sterkx (2008: 134-135) identifies a process of ‘externalisation’ in EU migration policy (exemplified by the extraterritorial control of migration flows), which he argues “narrows down the comprehensive approach”. Bouteillet-Paquet (2003: 360) agrees, stating that “partnership with countries of origin is a euphemism for a policy that has so far produced little more than extended the control driven policy, while very few progress [sic] has been made in the field of economic development and root causes prevention”.

How might these tendencies in EU policy be explained? Lavenex and Kunz (2008: 452-454) argue that the focus of EU initiatives on immigration control with only vague, non-committal mentions of development interests, can be attributed to the dominance of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) ministers meeting in the Council; the understaffing of Directorate-General (DG) Justice, Freedom and Security; and the strategic importance of immigration openings and visa facilitation in the EU’s external relations. Boswell (2003: 626) also identifies institutional problems in this policy field, arguing that there is a difference between JHA officials in the Council (who are concerned with migration management) and development and external relations officials in the Commission, who seek to avoid the use of development policy and funding to prevent migration flows. Indeed, within the Commission, DGs Justice, Freedom and Security (JLS), External Relations (Relex) and Development have responded in very different ways to the requirement to integrate migration policies into the EU’s external relations (Boswell 2008), with DG JLS embracing the new agenda immediately, and DGs Relex and Development being much more sceptical. Such incoherence will undoubtedly hamper efforts to combine migration policy and development policy in a comprehensive approach. Haddad (2008: 196) argues that the control-oriented approach of the EU in the
External dimension of migration and asylum policies results from a perceived need to reinforce the external border of the EU (after the abolition of internal borders under the Schengen agreement) and a perceived need to control the new external borders of the EU (after the eastern enlargements).

As outlined earlier, this article will examine the linkages between migration policy and development policy (based on the above discussion) in the Global Approach to Migration; the Policy Plan on Legal Migration; the thematic programme for the cooperation with third countries in the areas of migration and asylum; and the Mobility Partnerships.

In December 2005, the European Council adopted the Global Approach to Migration, based on an agreed need to "ensure that migration works to the benefit of all countries concerned" (Council 2005: 7). Priority actions were to be focussed on Africa and the Mediterranean based on an integrated approach. This was followed only a few weeks later by the Commission’s Policy Plan on Legal Migration (Commission 2005b). The policy plan was a response by the Commission to a request by the European Council to define a road map for the Hague Programme, and in it the Commission proposes directives on the conditions of entry and residence of four types of migrants: highly skilled workers; seasonal workers; intra-corporate transferees; and remunerated trainees. In 2006, a Commission Communication outlined a thematic programme for the cooperation with third countries in the areas of migration and asylum (Commission 2006). Such a thematic approach, the Commission argued, "responds to the need for integrating migration and asylum issues into the Community policies of cooperation and development, whereas, at the same time, it may contribute to better match the Community’s own interests in the fields concerned, while responding to the call for improved policy coherence" (ibid.: 7). More recently, in 2007, the EU launched the Mobility Partnerships. These Partnerships are to be agreed with individual third countries, and EU member states sign up to participate on an opt-in basis. The Communication from the Commission on the Mobility Partnerships made it clear that they should have development-related aims in terms of “exploiting potential positive impacts of migration on development and responding to the needs of countries of origin in terms of skill transfers and of mitigating the impact of brain drain” (Commission 2007: 2). However, the Communication also emphasises that the partnerships have migration-related aims, namely “to identify novel approaches to improve the management of legal movements of people between the EU and third countries ready to make significant efforts to fight illegal migration” (ibid.).

Global Approach to Migration (GAM)

In terms of linking migration policy and development policy, the GAM is rather vague. This is particularly surprising given that it was adopted only three months after the Commission Communication on migration and development; the GAM, however, does not make any mention of the Communication. This is a serious flaw in terms of the EU trying to achieve a ‘comprehensive’ approach with migration policies and development policies aligned, particularly given that the Global Approach was extended to cover the eastern and south-eastern neighbouring regions in 2007 (Council 2007).

The GAM calls for initiatives to be launched “to promote cheaper and more easily available remittance services” (ibid.: 9), without, however, providing any detailed indications of what such initiatives might include (one example mentioned above was encouraging the establishment of foreign bank branches on EU territory, which will make it easier for migrants to send remittances and thus contribute to the development of their country of origin). Other proposals are equally vague: the EU will “consider supporting efforts of African states to facilitate members of diasporas to contribute to their home countries” and “explore options to
mitigate the impact of skill losses in vulnerable sectors” \textit{(ibid.); emphasis added}). As outlined above, integration policies affect migrants' attempts to maintain links with their countries of origin, and migrant recruitment policies of developed countries contribute to skills losses. However, these links are not made in the GAM which does not deal with these policy dilemmas.

In addition, the GAM does not mention circular or return migration at all. There is no specific focus on legal migration (although, as outlined above, the linkages between migration policy and development policy assume that legal migration is a possibility). Although the GAM states that “[a]ction must be taken to reduce illegal migration flows and the loss of lives, ensure safe return of illegal migrants, strengthen durable solutions for refugees, and build capacity to better manage migration, including through maximising the benefits to all partners of legal migration” \textit{(Council 2005: 9; emphasis added)}, there is no indication that legal migration will be fostered as such (for example by increasing migration opportunities for third-country nationals to the EU). Indeed, it is noted that “action must be taken to reduce illegal migration flows” \textit{(ibid.: 7). In other words, there is no attempt to change the discourse surrounding immigration – instead, the notion of 'risk' is explicitly associated with migration, in that Frontex is asked to present a risk analysis report on Africa.}

The principle of cooperation with third countries seems to form an important element of the GAM; indeed, two of the three pillars of the Approach are 'Dialogue and cooperation with Africa' and 'Work with neighbouring countries' (the final one being 'Increasing operational cooperation between member states'). Several proposals for such cooperation are outlined \textit{(ibid.: 9). For instance, the EU will implement projects to combat trafficking in cooperation with Morocco. The GAM highlights that these proposals "form part of a broader agenda for developing the EU's relationship with Africa and the Mediterranean" \textit{(ibid.: 7). However, the extent of input by the third countries mentioned in defining the projects to be pursued might be questioned; the country-specific Action Plans prepared by the High-Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration, for example, did not include any input from partner countries, leading to an angry reaction from Morocco \textit{(Chou 2006: 18). As the Commission has acknowledged that third countries are reluctant to accept readmission agreements (see above), and as the GAM outlines readmission agreements as an important element of cooperation with both Morocco and Algeria, it can be presumed that the input of these countries in determining the agenda outlined by the GAM has been minimal. This is therefore not an instance of co-development as defined by Weil \textit{(2002; see above).}}

\textit{Policy Plan on Legal Migration}

Although the Policy Plan proposes directives on the conditions of entry of certain types of migrants into the EU, it does not deal with the issue of remittances or the role of diasporas in contributing to the development of their country of origin at all. Indeed, the Commission stresses the importance of the integration of migrants into EU societies, for example through information packages on arrival and language and civic orientation courses \textit{(Commission 2005b: 9)}, without any mention of the impact this can have on migrants’ ties with their countries of origin. Securing an improved legal status for migrants is addressed. For instance, the proposed directive on conditions of entry for seasonal workers states that the aim should be to "provide the necessary manpower in the Member States while at the same time granting a secure legal status and regular work prospective to the immigrants concerned" \textit{(ibid.: 7). As explained above, a secure legal status will allow migrants to earn more, and therefore remit more to their families/communities in the country of origin, thus increasing the developmental impact of migration. However, at the same time a focus on integration of migrants into the receiving country can be detrimental to links with
families/communities in the country of origin. The Policy Plan leaves this dilemma unresolved.

The Plan further states that “ethical recruitment should be considered for sectors particularly vulnerable to brain drain” (ibid.: 7), which may help developing countries to hold onto their most innovative citizens. However, the very first proposal in the Policy Plan is for a directive on the conditions of entry of highly skilled workers, which is at odds with the stated need to ensure ethical recruitment. The Commission emphasises that most highly skilled migrants currently reside in the US and Canada, and that Europe needs to attract more of them (ibid.). This illustrates the dilemma between development concerns and EU member states' wishes to increase the number of highly skilled workers in their labour markets – in this case, development concerns are clearly secondary. As Chou (2006: 13) argues, “an immigration policy privileging those with high skills… [is] an illustration of how the EU does not take into consideration the impact that EU migration policies… have on the development in the developing/sending countries”.

The proposed directive on conditions of entry for seasonal workers specifically envisages repeat circular migration: “the scheme will propose a residence/work permit allowing the third-country national to work for a certain number of months per year for 4-5 years” (Commission 2005b: 7). The Policy Plan states (in line with the discussion above) that such a regular work perspective for migrants can contribute to the development of the country of origin. This section of the Plan prioritises the need for circular migration over a desire for restrictive immigration policies.

Already at the outset, the Policy Plan emphasises that legal migration to the EU will become necessary, given demographic trends and the aim of fulfilling the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs. As the Policy Plan highlights, some member states already experience labour and skills shortages, both in unskilled and highly-skilled sectors (ibid.: 4). However, at the same time, “immigration does not provide in itself a long-term solution to falling birth rates and an ageing population” (ibid.: 5) – instead, priority should be given to attracting more EU citizens and legally resident migrants into the labour market. Indeed, combating illegal migration remains a priority: “Admission of economic immigrants is as inseparable from measures on integration on the one hand, as it is from the fight against illegal immigration… on the other” (ibid.: 4). Therefore, there is some incoherence in the plan. Although it does contribute to the gradual change in the discourse surrounding immigration (by emphasising that immigration is a positive phenomenon that will become necessary for the EU), the Commission is equally quick to point out that this will not be the main priority in EU policy and that the focus on reducing illegal immigration will remain central. As outlined above, the possibility of legal migration needs to exist in order for migration and development to work together. However, the Policy Plan will not create more migration opportunities for citizens of non-EU countries. Instead, the aim of the plan is “to guarantee a common framework of rights to all third-country nationals in legal employment already admitted in a member state, but not yet entitled to long-term residence status” (ibid.: 6).

The final section of the Policy Plan highlights the need for enhanced collaboration with third countries on economic migration (ibid.: 10). Specific proposals are suggested such as monitoring the migration of skilled workers from developing countries in order to identify sectors vulnerable to brain drain. However, these proposals outline action to be taken by the EU, and it is not clear what the role of third countries will be. It is therefore not clear whether the EU here envisages a real policy of co-development with equal input from partner countries.

As outlined above, to achieve a ‘comprehensive’ approach allowing migration and development to work together, migration policies should be aligned with development
policies. However, in addition to the need for policy coherence, the institutional framework of the EU requires coherence between several different actors (in particular the Commission and the 27 member states) in order for policies to be truly comprehensive. In the Policy Plan, the Commission recognises that this may be problematic: the contributions by the various actors to the Policy Plan “showed a general support for a common EU policy for economic immigration, albeit with important differences in the approaches to be followed and in the expected end result” (ibid.: 3). If there are such differences in the expectations that various actors have of migration policy, it will be difficult to achieve a comprehensive approach between migration policy and development policy.

Thematic programme for the cooperation with third countries in the areas of migration and asylum

The thematic programme identifies five strands to be addressed: fostering the links between migration and development; promoting well-managed labour migration; fighting illegal immigration and facilitating the readmission of illegal immigrants; protecting migrants against exploitation and exclusion; and promoting asylum and international protection (Commission 2006: 9). It therefore seems that fostering legal migration of third-country nationals to the EU will form an important element. The communication seeks to move beyond a focus on fighting illegal immigration. While managing migration is acknowledged as a valid goal, “the additional challenge today lies in the development of policies which recognise the need for migrant workers to make our economies function in those sectors where the EU is facing labour and skills shortages” (ibid.: 9). This, it is stated, “presupposes an approach which goes beyond the questions of border control and fight against illegal immigration, to incorporate other dimensions of the migratory phenomenon” (ibid.). The Communication further specifies that “it is necessary to move from a ‘more development for less migration’ approach to one of ‘better managing migration for more development” (ibid.: 10).

However, the specific aims identified deal with the dissemination of information about migrants’ rights and obligations in the EU and the implementation of legislative frameworks for migrant workers (ibid.: 11), rather than promoting opportunities for legal migration. In addition, this section of the programme is immediately followed by that on ‘fighting illegal immigration and facilitating the readmission of illegal immigrants’, which begins by emphasising that “preventing the unauthorised entry of migrants remains essential” (ibid.). The thematic programme therefore does not substantially contribute to shifting the discourse surrounding immigration to the EU.

As the Communication notes, “migration is... part of developing countries’ modernisation process and an intensive debate is currently ongoing on the question of how migration can better contribute to development” (ibid.: 4). Reference is specifically made to the 2005 Communication on migration and development and the thematic programme “should support the implementation of the measures identified on this occasion” (ibid.: 10). The proposed measures cover the main elements identified in the discussion above on migration and development, though in some cases they could be more detailed. For instance, encouraging diasporas to contribute to the socio-economic development of their country of origin is listed as a priority, but no details are given as to the types of projects which might achieve this (one example identified above would be the promotion of migrants’ associations). However, other proposals do identify the means for achieving the stated goals – remittances, for example, should be facilitated, among others by reducing the cost of such transfers. The Communication further states that the effect of the brain drain should be mitigated, and here reference is made to a 2005 Communication by the Commission that recognised the potential negative impact of highly-skilled emigration on developing countries, particularly in the healthcare sector (Commission 2005c). Furthermore, the voluntary return of
professionals should be supported, including through assistance with social security schemes. Although this last point is not clearly specified, this might imply making social security benefits transferable, which was identified as a policy option promoting return migration. The thematic programme does, therefore, “[respond] to the need for integrating migration and asylum issues into the Community policies of cooperation and development, whereas, at the same time, it may contribute to better match the Community’s own interests in the fields concerned, while responding to the call for improved policy coherence” (ibid.: 7).

In terms of achieving a ‘comprehensive’ approach, the thematic programme acknowledges that “actions under the budget heading B7-667 have sometimes resulted in the financing of operations isolated from the existing programming” (ibid.: 6), implying an incoherent approach to cooperation with third countries in the area of migration and asylum. The thematic programme will therefore provide a community framework for cooperation between EU member states and third countries and “facilitate the creation of synergies between the Community and member states approaches in this field” (ibid.: 7). This should ensure a comprehensive approach in terms of EU and member state actions.

The thematic programme also recognises that cooperation with third countries is required for policies to be effective and efficient (ibid.: 4). However, this is not framed first and foremost in terms of migration and development. Rather, the association is made between the migratory pressure from developing countries and the lack of institutional capacity in these countries for dealing with migration, as a result of which “illegal immigration constitutes an increasingly widespread phenomenon”. It is therefore questionable to which extent policies developed on this basis would be genuine examples of co-development, rather than attempts by the EU to persuade third countries to help reduce illegal migration to the EU.

The Mobility Partnerships

It was outlined above that the notion of migration and development presumes that some migration is possible, and that if developed countries want to promote circular and return migration in particular it is important to ease restrictions on immigration. The Commission Communication does foresee that Mobility Partnerships will provide opportunities for migration from the partner countries to the EU (Commission 2007: 5) and the texts of the two existing Mobility Partnerships both state as the first goal of the agreements the facilitation of legal migration (Council 2008b: 2; Council 2008c: 2). This is a particularly innovative aspect of the Mobility Partnerships and suggests a different view on migration than the notion of ‘combating’ illegal migration.

However, the Communication also states that such legal migration possibilities will depend on the labour market needs of member states and must respect the principle of Community preference for EU citizens (ibid.). Third countries’ cooperation on combating illegal immigration into the EU is a precondition for a Mobility Partnership (Commission 2007: 2) and the language of the partnerships still emphasises the “fight” against illegal migration. The Select Committee on European Scrutiny of the House of Commons has stated that “the UK believes that mobility partnerships… should not be unduly focussed on legal migration” (2009), suggesting that illegal migration is still a priority concern for the member states. A real shift in the discourse surrounding immigration can therefore not be discerned. This is reflected in the projects proposed. For instance, of the 64 projects proposed under the agreement with Moldova, only seven relate to labour migration schemes, and of these only two projects propose new possibilities for labour migration (the others dealing instead with, for example, bilateral agreements on local border traffic or the dissemination of information in Moldova on EU labour market regulations). The Mobility Partnership with Cape Verde consists of 31 proposed projects – 10 projects relate to the facilitation of labour migration
more generally, but of these only three propose to create new possibilities for labour migration (again, the rest relate instead to providing information to Cape Verdeans wishing to migrate or proposals to strengthen the integration of Cape Verdeans living or working in the EU). Measures relating to the management of migration seem to feature much more prominently in both agreements. In the Mobility Partnership with Moldova, there are 17 proposals relating to border control (including document security and combating illegal migration and the trafficking of human beings), and five proposals relating to monitoring migration flows (including capacity-building). The Mobility Partnership with Cape Verde contains seven proposals relating to border control and four relating to monitoring migration flows.

The Commission’s Communication on Mobility Partnerships refers to facilitating remittances (Commission 2007: 6), though it is listed as a measure which could be included in the agreements, and no specific details are given as to how this should be achieved. While the agreement with Moldova contains three projects related specifically to the role of remittances and elaborated in more detail (for example, Romania and Italy propose to “design a Financial Instrument for Self-Employment and Small Business Development with a view to encouraging migrants to invest remittances, particularly in local communities”; Council 2008b: 13), the agreement with Cape Verde contains only one proposal by France to enhance the role of remittances, for example by reducing the cost of money transfers, but no specific details are given as to how this should be achieved (Council 2008c: 12).

Both the agreement with Moldova and that with Cape Verde contain proposals to strengthen the role of the diasporas. For instance, both Spain and Portugal propose to support the work of Instituto das Comunidades, a diaspora organisation for Cape Verdeans (ibid.: 11). However, one policy dilemma highlighted above is between the role of diasporas in their country of origin, and the integration policies of the receiving country of migrants. This is an issue not addressed by the Mobility Partnerships.

Both Mobility Partnerships state that temporary or permanent return policies can help to mitigate the effects of emigration of the highly-skilled. The Mobility Partnership with Moldova contains a proposal by the Czech Republic and Cyprus to offer circular migration projects including support for the reintegration of returning migrants (Council 2008b: 11), though no specific details are given as to the form of these projects. In terms of encouraging circular (i.e. repeated) migration, the Commission recognises that offering some permanent form of privileged mobility to the EU will help to encourage migrants to return to their country of origin (Commission 2007: 9) and argues that greater flexibility should be introduced by member states’ consulates, so that multiple-entry visas can be issued and visa application fees waived in certain cases (ibid.: 7). There are some signs of member states moving towards less restrictive migration policies in order to foster circular migration – for example, in the Mobility Partnership with Moldova, Germany proposes to allow Moldovans who legally reside in Germany the possibility to leave for extended periods of time without losing their residence rights (Council 2008b: 13). The Commission has suggested changes to the long-term residents’ directing to allow migrants to leave the receiving country for two or three years without losing resident rights (Commission 2007: 10).

The Communication on Mobility Partnerships refers to the need to avoid a ‘brain drain’ (ibid.: 7), suggesting also how this could be achieved (for example by excluding from the Mobility Partnership migration from sectors that are under strain in the partner country). The chapter on circular migration further proposes that member states could commit to not recruiting in sectors affected by brain drain; that mechanisms should be implemented to make it easier for migrants to divide their lives between the EU and the country of origin; and that the EU should support developing countries in creating attractive professional opportunities (ibid.: 12). However, the Commission’s proposed legislation, which accompanies the
Communication, might increase the risk of brain drain from partner countries – proposals include the admission of highly-skilled migrants, seasonal migrants, and remunerated trainees (ibid.: 10), though so far a legislative proposal has only been put forward for a ‘Blue Card’ scheme for highly-skilled migrants. This is hardly surprising given the international competition to attract highly-skilled migrants, who are seen as more desirable for the receiving country than low- or unskilled migrants (Castles 2006). However, it is in direct conflict with actions to counteract brain drain.

In terms of a ‘comprehensive’ approach by the EU, the Commission recognises the importance of coherence and consistency not only of EU migration and development policies (see for example Commission 2005a: 11), but also of action at the Community and member state levels (Commission 2007: 14). The Mobility Partnerships with Moldova and Cape Verde specifically state that the signatories are acting within the existing framework of cooperation. For Moldova, this is the European Neighbourhood Policy (Council 2008b: 1), and for Cape Verde this is the Cotonou Agreement (Council 2008c: 1). It is, however, beyond the scope of this paper to assess whether the provisions of the Mobility Partnerships are really consistent with existing agreements and this will have to be addressed in future research. More generally, there is a problem of consistency in EU action as not all member states are taking part in the partnerships (15 member states take part in the agreement with Moldova; only five take part in the agreement with Cape Verde). The Commission (2007: 3) itself recognises that Mobility Partnerships have a complex legal nature, as some of the issues they address are Community competences and others are member state competences.

One recommendation outlined above was that cooperation is needed between developing and developed countries if migration and development are to work together – an agreement should therefore not be one-sided. This is true of the Communication on Mobility Partnerships, which also lists the commitments expected from partner countries, which include, as suggested above, “a commitment effectively to readmit [their] own nationals and to cooperate fully in identifying them” (ibid.: 4). The Commission emphasises that dialogue and cooperation between the EU and partner countries is essential (ibid.: 12), and both Mobility Partnerships contain projects proposed by the partner countries. For example, Moldova proposes to “consider strengthening the activities of the Information Centres for the Moldovan migrants in the Moldovan diplomatic missions” (Council 2008b: 13). As the Mobility Partnerships are such new instruments, little is yet known about how the agreements were prepared and negotiated and further research is therefore needed to establish whether the partnerships truly reflect cooperation between the EU and the third countries concerned.

Conclusion

This article has provided an assessment of the linkages between migration policy and development policy in EU policy initiatives since 2005, particularly in terms of the four policy dilemmas identified: the desire to integrate migrants into receiving countries through integration policies versus the need for migrants to maintain links to their country of origin in order to contribute to its development; the restrictive immigration policies by developed countries versus the developmental benefits of circular and return migration; the desire of developed countries to attract highly-skilled migrants versus the need to prevent a brain drain for developing countries; and the need to foster development by allowing legal migration or accepting increased immigration as a result of development versus the prevalent discourse in many developed countries on illegal immigration as a ‘threat’ to be combated.
Overall, the initiatives all address at least some of the issues identified in the discussion on migration and development, such as remittances, the role of diasporas and counteracting brain drain. There seems also to be a development over time, with the later initiatives (the thematic programme and the Mobility Partnerships) incorporating more of the suggested policy options derived above. However, the fact that the idea of ‘migration and development’ is not fully and consistently incorporated into all Communications, despite the priorities identified in the Commission’s 2005 Communication on migration and development and the requirement in the Communication on ‘Policy Coherence for Development’ that “non-development policies [including migration] should respect development policy objectives” (Commission 2005d: 3), suggests that EU policies on migration and development are incoherent. Indeed, the Mobility Partnerships (due to their complicated legal nature) risk inconsistency between EU and member state actions. This hampers the EU’s attempts to achieve a ‘comprehensive’ approach in this policy area.

This inconsistency also means that the policy dilemmas are in several cases simply not dealt with – for instance, the GAM makes no mention of circular or return migration at all, and therefore it cannot begin to address the tension between circular or return migration on the one hand, and member states’ restrictive immigration policies on the other. None of the policy initiatives identify the tension between integration policies and the role of diasporas in contributing to the development of their country of origin. Some policy initiatives are outright contradictory due to their failure to address adequately the policy dilemmas identified above. The Policy Plan on Legal Migration, for example, recognises that brain drain is problematic for developing countries, but also emphasises that the EU needs to attract more highly-skilled migrants. The same is true of the Commission Communication on the Mobility Partnerships, which also proposes legislation on the admission of highly-skilled workers. All the policy initiatives contain attempts at changing the discourse surrounding immigration by highlighting the necessity or desirability of immigration. Ultimately, however, they still emphasise the ‘fight’ against illegal immigration, leaving this policy dilemma unresolved. In addition, ‘legal migration’ in these policy initiatives more often than not refers to projects such as capacity-building activities to improve partner countries’ abilities to deal with migratory flows or disseminating information amongst the citizens of partner countries about the legal migration channels to the EU; ‘legal migration’ does therefore not refer to increasing the number of opportunities for legal migration to the EU or fostering such movements. This confirms the criticism in the academic literature that EU policy prioritises migration management and attempts to reduce illegal immigration over attempts to foster legal migration. This observation is problematic for migration and development as the existence of legal migration opportunities is essential to positive linkages between migration and development.

The article has addressed the design of EU policy initiatives in relation to the discussion on migration and development; future research should therefore address the implementation of the initiatives. This is particularly relevant for the Mobility Partnerships: as the most recent of the initiatives examined, not much research has yet been conducted on the partnerships. However, the Commission indicated in 2008 that Mobility Partnerships will form an important part of the ‘Mobility and Security Pacts’ to be offered to third countries in the Eastern Partnership (Commission 2008: 6). As the partnerships become more widely used in the EU’s relations with third countries, an understanding of their impact on the linkages between migration policy and development policy becomes ever more important. In addition, future research could also address the institutional dynamics involved both in policy-making and implementation in the case of migration and development – several authors (e.g. Boswell 2008) argue that the various actors at EU level have different approaches to this policy field, which could be expected to influence policy outcomes.

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References


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