

# On 'a Continuum with Expansion'? Intelligence Co-operation in Europe in the Early Twenty-first Century

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## Abstract

This article argues that during the early twenty-first century, generally we have witnessed greater intelligence co-operation in Europe. Indeed, we can even appropriately discuss the increased 'regionalisation of intelligence'. Effectively reflecting 'uneven and combined development', persistently these co-operative intelligence trends appear to be occurring haphazardly, non-uniformly and at several different rates at the different levels of relations in the various 'pockets' of European intelligence co-operation. This article concludes by arguing that overall there is the development of an ever-more complex web consisting of a plethora of various overlapping international intelligence liaison arrangements that collectively provide a form of regional intelligence coverage in Europe. How they overlap is important, accounting for the connections, and notably the 'disconnects', that publicly come to our attention.

## Keywords

Information sharing; Intelligence co-operation; Liaison; Law Enforcement; Policing; CFSP; CDSP; EUROPOL; EUROJUST

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IN THIS ARTICLE, SEVERAL INTERCONNECTED PROPOSITIONS ARE PRESENTED FOR THEIR consideration. Adopting a broad approach that intends to comprehensively survey the highly complex and dynamic terrain of contemporary European intelligence co-operation - and other closely associated activities, which essentially involve any form of critical information flows -, many timely insights seek to be provided. In its main, this article argues that during the early twenty-first century, generally we have witnessed greater intelligence co-operation in Europe. Indeed, when examining wider trends, we can even appropriately discuss the increased '*regionalisation of intelligence*'.

The enhanced intelligence co-operation in Europe has been most focussed on the issue of counter-terrorism. This was catalysed especially in the wake of high-profile terrorist atrocities - notably the 11 March 2004 Madrid attacks and the 7 July 2005 London bombings.<sup>1</sup> Other issues that have spurred closer regional intelligence and security co-operation, such as confronting transnational 'organised crime', civil protection and crisis

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<sup>1</sup> T. Wetzling, 'European counterterrorism intelligence liaisons' in S. Farson, P. Gill, M. Pythian and S. Shpiro (eds), *PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National Approaches (vol. 2)* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2008), pp.498-532; T. Wetzling, 'Intelligence Cooperation: Dimensions, Activities and Actors', *Issues & Challenges of Intelligence Accountability in Democratic Societies* (Geneva: 10-12 December 2007); R.J. Aldrich, 'International intelligence cooperation in practice', ch. 2 of H. Born, I. Leigh and A. Wills (eds), *International Intelligence Cooperation and Accountability* (London: Routledge, 2011).

management concerns, have also formed important priorities. These factors equally should not be more overlooked.<sup>2</sup> This is an approach that also largely chimes, but not exclusively, with the 'Copenhagen School' in security studies; particularly where there is an emphasis on 'widening' conceptual lenses so that analysis goes beyond merely focussing on 'traditional/classical', strongly 'Cold War era-associated', and solely 'military-orientated' security concerns.<sup>3</sup>

When taken together, persistently the co-operative intelligence trends (known in the parlance of the intelligence world as 'liaison') effectively reflect the condition of 'uneven and combined development'. They are occurring non-uniformly, and in their work, along with their evolution, they are underway at several different rates of development. This is particularly marked at the different 'levels' of relations in the various 'pockets' of European co-operative intelligence activity. High complexity is manifest.<sup>4</sup>

Ultimately, this article concludes by arguing that overall in Europe there is the development of an ever-more complex web consisting of a plethora of variously overlapping international intelligence liaison arrangements. Collectively, these provide a form of regional intelligence coverage and intelligence and security reach, resulting in the delivery and production of *effects and outcomes* that can, in turn, today, be regarded as being generally satisfactory. How the arrangements and their associated networks overlap and complement one another is important, accounting for the connections, and notably the 'disconnects', that publicly come to our attention. Room for tidying remains.

The developments are essentially on 'a continuum with expansion'. But as ever when working in the 'sensitive' and slightly 'fenced-off' intelligence world, and indeed when researching it, important caveats remain. Distinct operational parameters and limitations therefore continue to feature in a dominant manner, but essentially they do not overwhelm practically.

### ***Examining this subject***

A wider concern can be readily articulated. This consideration especially accounts for why the subject under-examination in this article has much contemporary relevance and why it

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<sup>2</sup> See, e.g., 'A Secure Europe in a Better World', *European Security Strategy (ESS)* (Brussels: European Union, 12 December 2003); 'Providing Security in a Changing World', *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - S407/08* (Brussels: EU, 11 December 2008); 'sub-strategies', e.g., 'Fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction', *EU strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction* (Brussels: 10 December 2003); *The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy* (Brussels: European Union, 30 November 2005); *EU Internal Security Strategy* (Brussels: EU, 25 February 2010); 'Commission presents a new set of EU measures to better protect European citizens', *EU Press Release*, and 'The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe', *EU Communication from The Commission to The European Parliament and The Council* (22 November 2010); see also the essays in B. Giegerich (ed.), *Europe and Global Security* (London: IISS/Routledge, 2010). For the developing concept of 'Societal Security' in Europe, see the work of the 'European Societal Security Research Group', via their website: <<http://www.societalsecurity.eu/>> (accessed: 5/12/2010); see also 'The Stockholm Programme', *EU* (Last updated: 16 March 2010); 'Understanding Civilian Protection: Concepts and Practices' and 'Exploring Civilian Protection', *Brookings/United States Institute for Peace* (14 September 2010); J.P. Burgess, 'Non-Military Security Challenges', ch. 4 in C.A. Snyder (ed.), *Contemporary Security and Strategy* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2008 [2ed.]), pp.60-78.

<sup>3</sup> See, e.g. references in P. Hough, *Understanding Global Security* (London: Routledge, 2008 [2ed.]); see also B. Buzan, J. De Wilde and O. Wæver, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998); B. Buzan and L. Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), esp. from p.212.

<sup>4</sup> On different 'levels' of intelligence liaison relations and their dynamics, A.D.M. Svendsen, *Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11* (London: Routledge, 2010), pp.167-73; A.D.M. Svendsen, 'Painting rather than photography: Exploring spy fiction as a legitimate source concerning UK-US intelligence co-operation', *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 7, 1 (March 2009), pp.1-22.

deserves being opened up to at least a degree of closer and further scrutiny. In terms of scholarship and our understanding, although being increasingly addressed over time, we start from a comparatively and relatively 'low-base'. Both generally, on a global basis, and more specifically with regard to regions, such as Europe, studying international intelligence co-operation is especially important today. This is because during the so-called 'War on Terror' and 'Long War' (c.2001-09), and continuing during the subsequent years since, international intelligence co-operation has expanded exponentially. Including extending into 'globalisation realms', it now effectively represents the most significant dimension of intelligence.<sup>5</sup>

Hand-in-glove has been a similarly burgeoning accountability and oversight deficit.<sup>6</sup> This is concerning and matters to us all, whatever our exact status. Indeed, 'profound implications'<sup>7</sup> have been starkly witnessed during the early twenty-first century. For example, prominent episodes of US 'extraordinary renditions', 'intensive interrogations', and 'torture' allegations have emerged publicly, and their 'fallout' has had a significant and ongoing impact in several individual European countries, as well as regionally, across Europe as a whole.<sup>8</sup>

Furthermore, while over recent years much scholarship has been undertaken concentrating on the broader and closely overlapping theme of 'security co-operation' in

<sup>5</sup> See, e.g., J.E. Sims, 'Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals, and Details', *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 19 (Summer, 2006), p.195; Leader, 'Reforming the intelligence services: The spy game', *The Economist* (19 March 2005), p.12; 'International intelligence networks' in 'Opaque Networks', ch. 6 in A.S. Roberts, *Blacked Out: Government Secrecy in the Information Age* (Cambridge: CUP, 2006), pp.135-138. In the military operation context, 'Information Sharing' in Sqn Ldr S. Gardner, 'Operation IRAQI FREEDOM – Coalition Operations', *Royal Air Force Historical Society Journal*, 36 (2006), p.30; 'Globalising homeland security', *Jane's Intelligence Digest* (6 October 2006); A. Svendsen, 'The globalization of intelligence since 9/11: frameworks and operational parameters', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 21, 1 (March 2008), pp.129-144; A.D.M. Svendsen, 'The globalization of intelligence since 9/11: The optimization of intelligence liaison arrangements', *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 21, 4 (2008), pp.661-678; R.J. Aldrich, 'Beyond the vigilant state: globalisation and intelligence', *Review of International Studies*, 35, 4 (October 2009), pp.889-902; R.J. Aldrich, "'A Profoundly Disruptive Force": The CIA, Historiography and the Perils of Globalization', *Intelligence and National Security*, 26, 2 & 3 (2011); A.D.M. Svendsen, *Understanding the 'Globalization of Intelligence'* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming).

<sup>6</sup> See, e.g., Roberts, *Blacked Out*, p.139; R.J. Aldrich, 'Global Intelligence Co-operation versus Accountability: New Facets to an Old Problem', *Intelligence and National Security*, 24, 1 (February 2009), pp.26-56; Born, Leigh, Wills (eds), *International Intelligence Cooperation and Accountability*; B. Müller-Wille, 'Improving the democratic accountability of EU intelligence', *Intelligence and National Security*, 21, 1 (2006), pp.100-128.

<sup>7</sup> M. Rudner, 'The globalisation of terrorism: Canada's intelligence response to the post-September 11 threat environment', *Canadian Issues* (September, 2002).

<sup>8</sup> Many issues can be cited here: S. Grey, 'The corrosion of secrecy – the CIA's policy of covert renditions', *Chatham House Meeting* (26 October 2006); A. Roberts, 'Review Essay: Torture and Incompetence in the "War on Terror"', *Survival*, 49, 1 (Spring 2007), pp.199-212; J. Egeland and M. Aguirre, 'Torture: America's policy, Europe's shame', *OpenDemocracy.net* (17 June 2009); T. Porteous and N. Inkster, 'Intelligence Cooperation and Torture', *International Law Discussion Group Meeting Chatham House* (5 July 2010); R. Brody, 'Europe must come clean on its involvement in CIA torture', *EuropeanVoice* (24 September 2009); A. Kingsbury, 'Milan's Botched CIA Capers and the War on Terrorism', *US News & World Report* (11 November 2010); J. Stein, 'Spanish prosecutors want 13 CIA agents arrested', *The Washington Post* (13 May 2010); S. Bengali, 'Other countries probe Bush-era torture, not U.S.', *McClatchy* (18 August 2010); S. Swann, 'What happened in Europe's secret CIA prisons?', *BBC* (6 October 2010); M. McKee, 'Europe rights court to review Macedonia role in CIA extraordinary rendition', *Jurist* (14 October 2010); 'CIA rendition flights did land in Ireland: Ahern', *BelfastTelegraph* (17 December 2010); 'Amnesty says EU "failing" over CIA renditions', *BBC* (15 November 2010); 'Swedish ire stopped CIA "terror flights"', *The Local - Sweden*, and J. Nylander, 'CIA rendition flights stopped by Swedish military', *SwedishWire* (5 December 2010); 'Senator Marty explains opposition to blacklists', *Swissinfo.ch* (21 December 2010); 'Former top US diplomat questions DK govt. claims', *Politiken.dk* (12 January 2011); R. Norton-Taylor, 'Ministry of Defence ordered to disclose involvement in US-led rendition', *The Guardian* (19 April 2011); 'More Afghan detainee data must be released – judge', *BBC* (18 April 2011); 'UK judges say they cannot free Afghanistan detainee', *BBC* (29 July 2011); I. Cobain and R. Norton-Taylor, 'Lawyers to boycott UK torture inquiry as rights groups label it a sham', *The Guardian*, and S. Swann, 'Spy chiefs to give public evidence at rendition inquiry', *BBC* (6 July 2011); 'Campaigners to shun UK inquiry into detainee "torture"', *BBC* (4 August 2011); 'Polish officials may face charges over secret CIA prisons', *Warsaw Business Journal* (1 June 2011).

Europe, particularly with a strong emphasis on 'governance' concerns, considerably less has been written about the main focus of this article, namely the more specific area of 'intelligence co-operation' in Europe.<sup>9</sup> Different approaches to the 'problems' encountered also exist, such as the contrastable law enforcement/security-dominated methodology of 'see and strike' and the intelligence methodology of 'wait and watch'.<sup>10</sup>

With the analysis advanced below, this article now aims to better contribute towards more fully addressing this observed 'paucity' in the overall subject literature. This is together with better highlighting some of the analytical complexities involved in, and during the course of, that addressing. In summary, building on the foundations of the existing scholarship, this article aims to perform the reflective functional role of being a comprehensive 'introduction' to this subject, with the analysis it presents being primarily connective and explorative in nature. Enduring reference utility similarly intends to be advanced.

Accordingly, as it seeks to better bridge discernible 'gaps', comprehensive observation is one of the main tasks undertaken throughout this article. Beginning with an exploration of the theme of 'intelligence *and* Europe' and its witnessed increased 'regionalisation' (and what is meant by that process), this article continues to examine the vexing question of how recent intelligence co-operation in Europe can be best evaluated, with the key structures facilitating contemporary European intelligence co-operation then being unpacked in-depth.

Following the presentation of this analysis, how wider European intelligence co-operation *trends* can be best captured is then discussed. Finally, several overall conclusions are presented, demonstrating that, extending into the future, many pressing challenges still remain within this domain of intelligence activity. At the least, these need their continued consideration for constantly maintaining the fashioning of the most advantageous effects and outcomes.

Advancing an increasingly enhanced understanding of this subject, as it continues to unfold in our contemporary context, can be most useful. Not least, this occurs as an ever-more sophisticated response is required in an ever-more timely manner in our 'just-in-time' society. Notably, operational through to strategy/policy-orientated 'ends' and 'missions' can be most effectively accomplished by applying the helpful 'tool' and 'mechanism' of intelligence co-operation, as a 'means' and as an ongoing issue management 'solution'. This emerges as being in much demand in order to effectively navigate and address the multiple regional(-ised) to global(-ised) intelligence and security concerns that are currently confronted in Europe and in closely linked theatres beyond.<sup>11</sup> We begin with the 'higher-level' constructs involved.

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<sup>9</sup> See, e.g., the essays under 'Part 1: Europe' in E.J. Kirchner and J. Sperling (eds), *Global Security Governance: Competing Perceptions of Security in the 21st Century* (London: Routledge, 2007); see also M.E. Smith, *Europe's Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation* (Cambridge: CUP, 2003); S.G. Jones, *The Rise of European Security Cooperation* (Cambridge: CUP, 2007), as well as some of the other sources focussed on this theme cited throughout this article, e.g., Giegerich (ed.), *Europe and Global Security*.

<sup>10</sup> Svendsen, *Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror*, p.34.

<sup>11</sup> A.D.M. Svendsen, 'Intelligence Liaison: An essential navigation tool', ch. in J. Schroefl, B.M. Rajae and D. Muhr (eds), *Hybrid and Cyber War as Consequences of the Asymmetry* (Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang Intl., 2011). This observation also ties into the overlapping arguments essentially that 'global', 'social' and 'public goods' exist, and these constructs are not disconnected from being closely linked to intelligence, see, e.g., *IJSS Strategic Survey 2009* (London: IJSS/Routledge, 2009), p.387; J.S. Nye, Jr., 'The American National Interest and Global Public Goods', *International Affairs*, 78, 2 (2002), pp.233-244; H. Altinay (ed.), *Global Civics* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2011).

## Exploring the increased 'regionalisation' of intelligence in Europe

The issue of intelligence in Europe has increasingly emerged. Not all comfortably, it has acquired a higher public profile, and it has become a subject of much concern and debate. This has in part been fuelled by the experience of the US and the subsequent European homeland terror attacks, as well as the responses to them.<sup>12</sup> Greater contextualisation is necessary.

Alongside the prominent terrorism concerns, further law enforcement and intelligence liaison driving factors in Europe, and more generally in the increasingly globalised context in international affairs, have featured. These include key security issues that extend from being regional-to-global (even 'glocal') in their impact, such as: Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation, increased organised crime, illegal immigration, people and drugs (narcotics) trafficking, as well as fulfilling the demands of peacemaking, peacekeeping and other humanitarian, civil protection and crisis management operations.<sup>13</sup>

A brief literature survey suggests that earlier, around the end of the twentieth century, the issue of intelligence *vis-à-vis* Europe was arguably more overlooked.<sup>14</sup> It was also more understudied - albeit an imbalance beginning to be addressed more seriously around 2000.<sup>15</sup> During 2000-01, there were also several debates surrounding the controversial European Parliamentary Inquiry into the UKUSA arrangement's ECHELON system.<sup>16</sup> By 2011, the subject of 'intelligence and Europe' is now being more effectively addressed in the literature. The trend of closely following behind the curve of developments and events occurring in the 'real-world' continues.<sup>17</sup>

These developments can be readily characterised. Generally we are witnessing greater intelligence co-operation - even if admittedly that intelligence co-operation is mixed, and can be regarded as emerging haphazardly and incrementally in places.<sup>18</sup> Indeed, today,

<sup>12</sup> See, e.g., as already discussed above; see also 'Norway PM Jens Stoltenberg warns against "witch hunt"', *BBC* (1 August 2011).

<sup>13</sup> On these issues, F.B. Adamson, 'Crossing Borders: International Migration and National Security', *International Security*, 31, 1 (Summer 2006), pp.165-199; 'MPs warn over Turkey migrant risk to EU', *BBC* (1 August 2011); T. Farrell, 'Humanitarian Intervention and Peace Operations', ch. 15 in J. Baylis, *et al.* (eds), *Strategy in the Contemporary World* (Oxford: OUP, 2010 [3ed.]), pp.308-332; A. Vines, 'Rhetoric from Brussels and reality on the ground: the EU and security in Africa', *International Affairs*, 86, 5 (September 2010), pp.1091-1108; 'EU Ministers Call for WMD Readiness', *Global Security Newswire* (8 November 2010); 'UK decides to opt in to EU-wide cyber security plan', *BBC* (3 February 2011). On the negative fallout from overall globalisation, see, e.g., S. Weber, N. Barma, M. Kroenig, E. Ratner, 'How Globalization Went Bad', *Foreign Policy* (January/February 2007); J.A. Scholte, 'Globalization and (In)Security', ch. 9 in *Globalization: A critical introduction* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005 [2ed.]), pp.279-315.

<sup>14</sup> As an exception, see, e.g., N. Gal-Or, *International Cooperation to Suppress Terrorism* (London: T&F, 1985), pp.74-76.

<sup>15</sup> See, e.g., C. Baker, 'The search for a European intelligence policy' (c.2001), *Federation of American Scientists (FAS) e-print*; O.R. Villadsen, 'Prospects for a European Common Intelligence Policy', *CIA Studies in Intelligence*, 9 (Summer 2000); K. O'Brien, 'Europe weighs up intelligence options', *Jane's Intelligence Review* (1 March 2001).

<sup>16</sup> J. Richelson, 'Desperately seeking signals', *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (March/April 2000); P.R. Keefe, *Chatter* (London: Random House, 2005), pp.288-89; 'Echelon: An Anglo-Saxon Conspiracy Claim', *The Economist* (29 April-5 May 2000); 'Spying on or for Europe', *Jane's Foreign Report* (4 May 2000).

<sup>17</sup> See, e.g., the literature cited throughout this article; B. Müller-Wille, 'For Our Eyes Only?: Shaping an Intelligence Community Within the EU' (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, EU, 2004); J.I. Walsh, 'Intelligence-Sharing in the European Union: Institutions Are Not Enough', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 44, 3 (2006), pp.625-43 and ch. 4 in his *The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing* (NY: Columbia UP, 2010), pp.88-109; B. Fägersten, 'European Intelligence Cooperation: Drivers, Interests and Institutions', *SIIA Working Paper No. 6* (Stockholm: Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 2008); J.I. Walsh, 'Security Policy and Intelligence Cooperation in the European Union', *Paper prepared for the biennial meeting of the European Union Studies Association, Los Angeles* (April 2009).

<sup>18</sup> For the 'incremental' dimension, A. Daun and T. Jäger, 'Geheimdienstkooperation in Europa', *Welt Trends*, Nummer 51, Jahrgang 14 (Sommer 2006).

collectively this greater intelligence co-operation is taking place on a sizeable enough scale in Europe to allow the discussion of trends pertaining to the increased *regionalisation* of intelligence. A form of regional intelligence coverage exists for all participants.

Several relevant insights can equally be drawn from other closely related bodies of scholarship. This includes from the literature focussed on the themes of 'regionalism' and 'regionalisation' in the overlapping security context, as well as from the literature concentrating on the broader theme of (general) 'international co-operation'. These more generally concerned sources offer added value in further helping us to extend our understanding of the developments undergone in this more specific realm, namely, in this article, in relation to the co-operative intelligence interactions underway in Europe.<sup>19</sup>

Indeed, Swedish scholar Björn Hettne's 'new regional theory' is most instructive. This is particularly where Australian scholar Craig A. Snyder summarises it as arguing that 'the development of regionalism is dependent on the support of the regional great power(s), the extent of reciprocity that exists in the relations of the states in the region, and the level of strategic reassurance that exists among these states.'<sup>20</sup>

Preliminary observations soon emerge. Unsurprisingly, particularly in the wake of the deeply shocking 11 September 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks in the United States, the intelligence co-operation in and beyond Europe in the early twenty-first century has mostly been focussed on the issue of counter-terrorism.<sup>21</sup> In Europe, this co-operation was then essentially catalysed substantially further, particularly internally, in the wake of the 11 March 2004 Madrid attacks, in which 191 people were killed.

Most immediately, the Madrid attacks resulted in widespread demands for increased and more effective sharing of counter-terrorism-related intelligence within Europe. These movements were to be accomplished within the region both *geographically* as well as *organisationally* within the *EU framework*, for example with the enhancement of the Joint Situation Centre (SitCen).<sup>22</sup> This call resonated strongly as discoveries were made during the course of the *post facto* investigations that the perpetrators of the Madrid attacks had substantive connections to a number of European countries.<sup>23</sup> The 7 July 2005 bombings

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<sup>19</sup> See C.A. Snyder, 'Regional Security and Regional Conflict', ch. 13 in his (ed.), *Contemporary Security and Strategy*, pp.227-242; 'Regionalism' in M. Griffiths and T. O'Callaghan, *International Relations: The Key Concepts* (London: Routledge, 2002), pp.273-275; J. Bergenäs, 'Fighting Security Challenges With Regional Cooperation', *World Politics Review* (8 December 2010); 'Enhanced diplomacy, regional organizations key to countering terrorism, OSCE expert tells security conference', *Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe* (18 February 2009); 'Co-ordinated UN, OSCE action key to addressing regional security challenges', *OSCE* (15 February 2011); also, e.g., I.W. Zartman and S. Touval (eds), *International Cooperation* (Cambridge: CUP, 2010); B. Mendelsohn, 'International Cooperation in the War on Terrorism', *ISN Insights* (28 June 2010); C. Norrlof, *America's Global Advantage* (Cambridge: CUP, 2010).

<sup>20</sup> Snyder, 'Regional Security and Regional Conflict', p.227.

<sup>21</sup> See, e.g., W. Rees, *Transatlantic Counter-terrorism Cooperation* (London: Routledge, 2006); '15th ASEAN-EC Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC) Joint Press Release, Jakarta', *ASEAN website* (26 February 2005); 'ASEAN, a key partner for Europe', *EU website* (undated).

<sup>22</sup> See, e.g., the distinctions outlined below, and the changes the EU SitCen underwent in 2004-5, detailed below.

<sup>23</sup> Much literature can be cited here - see, e.g., J. Lichfield, *et al.*, 'Madrid: The Aftermath: Europe must share terror intelligence', *The Independent* (17 March 2004); B. Waterfield, "'Enhanced intelligence" high on EU anti-terror agenda', *theparliament.com* (16 March 2004); B. Waterfield, 'Madrid meeting to assess EU terror threat', *theparliament.com* (22 March 2004); B. Waterfield and N. Smith, 'Special Report: "Combating terror" in the EU', *theparliament.com* (25 March 2004); R. Norton-Taylor and R. Cowan, 'Madrid bomb suspect linked to UK extremists', *The Guardian* (17 March 2004); 'European anti-terror body urged', *BBC* (21 March 2004); M. Ranstorp and J. Cozzens (Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, St. Andrews University, UK), 'The European terror challenge', *BBC* (24 March 2004); T. Ország-Land, 'EUROPE - EU appoints "anti-terrorism Tsar"', *Jane's Terrorism & Security Monitor* (1 April 2004).

in London similarly spurred some close UK intelligence interactions with both their European and other international intelligence liaison partners.<sup>24</sup>

The important impact of the broader context in which these co-operative intelligence activities are embedded and taking place is likewise demonstrable. Multiple and mutually shared terrorist threats to Europe regionally, to specific European countries, and to their close partners beyond, such as, most notably, to the US, Canada and Australia, have also continued to be manifested since.<sup>25</sup> In the wake of the horrific attacks in Norway on 22 July 2011, with the bombing in Oslo and the shooting on the island of Utøya, in which 77 people are reported to have died, Norwegian Intelligence co-operated widely with their European and international partners as part of their *post facto* investigations, firmly demonstrating that mode of activity remains a valuable tool.<sup>26</sup>

### Evaluating intelligence co-operation in Europe

As the mini-analysis undertaken above so far demonstrates, several complexities within this domain of activity evidently begin to quickly and increasingly emerge. Enhanced introspection into this area of research and analysis, and how those processes are conducted in this context, is now helpful. How and where to begin evaluating intelligence co-operation in Europe are more moot points. Unfortunately, analyses are highly prone to a substantial array of shortcomings; therefore undertaking some methodological reflection is essential.

Many areas need addressing. Considerations such as: (i) how 'Europe' is conceptualised; (ii) which units of analysis or actors are selected for examination; and (iii) which precise levels of experience and activity are focussed upon; as well as (iv) which approach is adopted – such as how far in-depth (macro to micro) the analysis is followed through – can all contribute towards differing interpretations.

Mindful of these considerations, this article tries to establish some clear operational parameters for its analysis. Firstly, 'Europe' is conceptualised as a geographic entity, extending from the Atlantic to the Urals.<sup>27</sup> Then, secondly, a macro 'structural' analysis

<sup>24</sup> I. Cobain, 'Police call in foreign terror experts', *The Guardian* (12 July 2005); E. Sciolino and D. Van Natta, Jr., 'With No Leads, British Consult Allies on Blasts', *The New York Times* (11 July 2005).

<sup>25</sup> Several sources can be cited here: 'US links al-Qaeda to recent Europe terror plot – report', *BBC* (1 October 2010); P. Finn and G. Miller, 'New focus on Europeans who have traveled to Pakistan to train at militant camps', *The Washington Post* (30 September 2010); F.J. Cilluffo, J.B. Cozzens and M. Ranstorp, *Foreign Fighters: Trends, Trajectories & Conflict Zones* (Washington, DC: HSPI, George Washington University & CATS, Swedish National Defence College (FHS), Stockholm, 1 October 2010); W. Maclean, 'Analysis: Terrorism alerts reflect evolving militant threat', *Reuters*, and R. Norton-Taylor, 'British intelligence denies US terror warnings sparked by new info', *The Guardian* (3 October 2010); W. Maclean, 'European firms vigilant but call U.S. alert vague', *Reuters* (4 October 2010); W. Maclean, 'Analysis: Europe, U.S. juggle divergent tolerance of risk', *Reuters* (5 October 2010); A. Nicoll (ed.), 'Terrorist threats in Europe: hype or reality?', *IISS Strategic Comments*, 16, 35 (October 2010); 'Editorial: Sweden's Near Miss', *The New York Times* (13 December 2010); C. Bryan-Low, 'Fears of Extremism Widen to Scandinavia', *The Wall Street Journal* (16 December 2010); 'Germany "bomb plotters under al-Qaeda orders"', *BBC* (30 April 2011); 'Sweden terror threat stands despite bin Laden death', *The Local - Sweden* (3 May 2011); 'Osama bin Laden death: Met boss's terror threat warning', *BBC* (4 May 2011); J. Madslie, 'Norway's far right not a spent force', *BBC* (23 July 2011); W. Englund and M. Birnbaum, 'Norway attacks: Shaken nation sees hint of Oklahoma City', *The Washington Post* (24 July 2011); 'Norway holds memorial services...', *Associated Press* (29 July 2011); T. Hyland, 'Wolves at our door? What we can learn from Norway's horror', *Sydney Morning Herald* (31 July 2011); A.D.M. Svendsen, 'Re-fashioning risk: Comparing UK, US and Canadian security and intelligence efforts against terrorism', *Defence Studies*, 10, 3 (September 2010), pp.307-335.

<sup>26</sup> 'PM says Norway cooperating [sic.] with foreign intelligence', *Reuters* (23 July 2011); 'Norway attacks: "Breivik acted alone"', *BBC* (27 July 2011); D. Barrett, 'Norway massacre: British traders helped supply Breivik's arsenal of weapons', *Daily Telegraph* (30 July 2011).

<sup>27</sup> For the importance of 'geography' and 'geographical' considerations, see, e.g., H. de Blij, *The Power of Place* (Oxford: OUP, 2009); P. Porter, 'Geography, Strategy and the National Interest: The Maps are too Small', *The World Today* (May 2010), pp.4-6; C. Gallaher, et al., *Key Concepts in Political Geography* (London: Sage, 2009).

(MSA) approach is adopted. This is done in order to try and better capture the overall, underlying and longer-term trends.

Insofar as it can be physically located *per se*, European intelligence co-operation is recognised as occurring in several different areas of activity. For instructive illustrative purposes, some of the main different intelligence co-operation structures that can be found in Europe will next be highlighted in turn.

### Structures facilitating European intelligence co-operation

To keep the analysis undertaken in this article within clear boundaries, three main categories are focussed upon. Into these, the variously overlapping different intelligence liaison arrangements in Europe can be placed more or less appropriately.<sup>28</sup> Simultaneously, some informed insights into their significant connections are offered. By, first, better understanding the 'structures' participating, a greater understanding of the intelligence dynamics, and the more 'cultural' aspects involved in the European intelligence interactions, can then be valuably communicated:<sup>29</sup>

Firstly, there is a plethora of **bilateral relationships** traversing Europe.<sup>30</sup> These are the oldest (most traditional) arrangements and, in their comparatively well-ried and tested forms - especially where 'standards' and 'best practices' in the interactions have become most operationalised for facilitating trust - they represent the most 'exclusive' intelligence liaison relationships that exist in Europe. They thereby usually facilitate the greatest and speediest qualitative and quantitative exchange of 'secret intelligence'. This product figures in the 'purer' form of operationally viable ('actionable' or 'serious') intelligence, present in its myriad of different forms (tactical through to strategic), including the exchange of some 'rawer' (or less 'sanitised'/'diluted') product.

With reference to widespread counter-intelligence and security anxieties that exist in the European context, these bilateral intelligence liaison arrangements are also most likely to be preferred by intelligence practitioners.<sup>31</sup> As the UK Intelligence and Security Committee's (ISC) 2006 *Annual Report* noted when evaluating 'European Co-operation', the familiar sources and methods protection considerations were important: 'Co-operation on operational matters is primarily bilateral, to ensure that intelligence is shared where necessary and to protect operational sources and information-gathering techniques.'<sup>32</sup> Adopting network terminology, the intelligence and security services, concentrated in the 'hubs' of national European capital cities, then strive to form 'nodes' - for instance, joining up their different bilateral European intelligence liaison partner relationships in their

<sup>28</sup> See also the arrangements listed on 'Foreign authorities', *Politiets Efterretningstjeneste (PET)/Danish Security and Intelligence Service website* (2009).

<sup>29</sup> On 'culture' in the context of intelligence liaison, A.D.M. Svendsen, 'Connecting intelligence and theory: Intelligence Liaison and International Relations', *Intelligence and National Security*, 24, 5 (October 2009), pp.723-725; W. Rees and R.J. Aldrich, 'Contending cultures of counterterrorism: transatlantic divergence or convergence?', *International Affairs*, 81, 5 (October 2005), pp.905-923.

<sup>30</sup> See, e.g., S. Hess, 'Intelligence Cooperation in Europe 1990 to the Present', *Journal of Intelligence History*, 3, 1 (Summer 2003); 'Europe' in Sir Stephen Lander, 'International intelligence cooperation: an inside perspective', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 17, 3 (October 2004), pp.481-493; 'French-Spanish co-operation quells terrorist threat', *Jane's Intelligence Digest* (12 May 2009); 'Juan Carlos: Basque arrested over Spain "murder plot"', *BBC* (7 July 2011).

<sup>31</sup> See, e.g., where in the NATO context it is observed that bilateral intelligence sharing continued to be 'preferred' and was judged to be the 'more effective route', in R.N. McDermott, *Countering global terrorism: developing the anti-terrorist capabilities of the Central Asian Militaries* (February, 2004), p.8; see also T. Espiner, 'European Commission suffers "serious" cyberattack', *ZDNet* (24 March 2011).

<sup>32</sup> UK ISC, 'European Co-operation', *Annual Report 2005-2006* (June 2006), p.28, para.99.



headquarters, alongside engagement with 'privatised' and 'outsourced'<sup>33</sup> dimensions of intelligence activity.<sup>34</sup>

Secondly, there are various **multilateral Europe-region-centred** intelligence liaison arrangements. These developed most markedly from around the early to mid-1990s, after the Cold War thaw and the dismantling of the 'Iron Curtain' in Europe. Again, each of these arrangements involves different combinations of parties. Most significantly, they include: the *Club of Bern* (CoB),<sup>35</sup> which consists of the European Union (EU) Member States' security services, and also those of Switzerland and Norway; the *Counter Terrorist Group* (CTG), which is essentially the counter-terrorism intelligence-focussed subgroup of the CoB (formed after 9/11 in September 2001);<sup>36</sup> the *Middle European Conference* (MEC), which consists of '16 intelligence services of 13 states of Western and Central Europe'<sup>37</sup>; as well as, perhaps more peripherally, the more recent 'War on Terror'-associated and more operationally-focussed arrangements. These in turn include 'Alliance Base' in Paris, which involves some European countries - notably the UK, Germany and France - with the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).<sup>38</sup> With more of a law enforcement focus, the Police Working Group on Terrorism (PWGT) likewise features.<sup>39</sup>

In this category - within the CTG, for instance - discussions are generally more concerned with higher and macro level considerations and strategic issues. As the UK ISC report noted: 'All of the [UK intelligence] Agencies contributed to discussions which resulted in the formulation of the EU Counter-Terrorism Action Plan, which draws strongly on the UK's CONTEST model' (the UK's 2003 counter-terrorism strategy).<sup>40</sup>

More peripherally, transatlantic-spanning arrangements, in which several European countries are involved, perhaps could also be argued to be sitting at least on the fringe of this category.<sup>41</sup> These latter arrangements include: the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and its own plethora of variously overlapping intelligence-associated

<sup>33</sup> On contemporary intelligence 'privatization' trends, see, e.g., J.R. Bennett, 'Private intel, the new gold rush', *ISN Security Watch* (1 July 2008); P.R. Keefe, 'Privatized Spying: The Emerging Intelligence Industry', ch. 18 in L.K. Johnson (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), from p.296.

<sup>34</sup> J. Arquilla and D. Ronfeldt (eds), *Networks and Netwars* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001); W.K. Wark, 'Introduction: "Learning to live with intelligence"', *Intelligence and National Security*, 18, 4 (Winter, 2003), p.2.

<sup>35</sup> N.B.: This group is sometimes referred to with the alternative spelling of 'Club of/de Berne'.

<sup>36</sup> L. Lugna, 'Institutional Framework of the European Union Counter-Terrorism Policy Setting', *Baltic Security and Defence Review*, 8 (2006), p.126; "'Club de Berne" meeting in Switzerland', *Press Release - Federal Office of Police, Switzerland* (28 April 2004).

<sup>37</sup> 'History of the SIS', *Official Slovak Information Service (Slovenská informačná služba) website* (accessed: 28/03/2007).

<sup>38</sup> D. Priest, 'Secret Anti-Terrorism Unit Pairs CIA, Europeans', *The Washington Post* (7 April 2005). On transatlantic intelligence co-operation, G.M. Segell, 'Intelligence Agency Relations Between the European Union and the U.S.', *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 17, 1 (2004), pp.81-96; W. Rosenau, 'Liaisons Dangereuses?: Transatlantic Intelligence Cooperation and the Global War on Terrorism', ch. 4 in D. Hansén and M. Ranstorp (eds), *Cooperating Against Terrorism: EU-US Relations Post September 11: Conference Proceedings* (Stockholm, Sweden: National Defence College, 2006), pp.31-40; R.J. Aldrich, 'US-European Intelligence Co-operation on Counter-Terrorism: Low Politics and Compulsion', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 11, 1 (February 2009), pp.122-139; 'Europe says Americans slow in sharing intelligence from Osama bin Laden cache in Pakistan', *Associated Press* (13 May 2011); for some sharing, R. Winnett and D. Gardham, 'Osama bin Laden planned Easter bomb campaign, files seized in US raid show', *Daily Telegraph* (20 May 2011).

<sup>39</sup> On 'law enforcement' focussed arrangements, M. Deflem, 'Europol and the Policing of International Terrorism: Counter-Terrorism in a Global Perspective', *Justice Quarterly*, 23, 3 (September 2006), pp.336-359.

<sup>40</sup> UK ISC, 'European Co-operation', pp.28-9, para.101.

<sup>41</sup> By 2007, NATO-EU security and defence co-operation was also burgeoning - see e.g., 'NATO and the EU: Time for a New Chapter', *NATO* (29 January 2007); 'NATO-EU: a strategic partnership', *NATO* (27 October 2010); see also refs to the US-led 'Proliferation Security Initiative' (PSI) in Svendsen, *Understanding the 'Globalization of Intelligence'*, and to the US-led 'Container Security Initiative' (CSI), e.g., Svendsen, *Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror*, p.21, p.58; 'Full container screening "not best" move: US security chief', *AFP* (22 June 2011).

arrangements - including, with NATO members participating to different extents, the NATO Special Committee, the US Joint Analysis Center (JAC) and the NATO-supporting 'Intelligence Fusion Centre', based at US EUCOM (European Command) at RAF Molesworth in Cambridgeshire, UK<sup>42</sup> - and then there is the International Special Training Centre (ISTC) for Special Operations Forces, located in Germany.<sup>43</sup>

Open source intelligence (OSINT) partnerships also exist, such as the 'International Open Source Working Group' (IOSWG), which includes several European nations, notably: Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, the UK, Italy, Austria, Sweden, Norway, France and Belgium, as well as there being more 'exclusive' European OSINT partnerships, including the 'Budapest Club', established in 2007.<sup>44</sup>

Together with all of these arrangements, operating alongside are the increasingly internationally connected European countries' national terrorism threat analysis centres, including: the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) in the UK, the 'Centre for Terrorism Analysis' in Denmark, and the 'Coordination Center' in Germany, which act as intelligence 'fusion centres'.<sup>45</sup>

Furthermore, as Dutch intelligence scholar Cees Wiebes has reportedly observed, in parallel there exists a degree of burgeoning intra-European signals intelligence (SIGINT) co-operation, occurring at least amongst some select countries: 'Since the end of the 1990s ... co-operation between the monitoring services of France, Germany and the Netherlands has grown and the countries exchange "Sigint" daily. Together with Denmark and Belgium, a "Group of Five" is slowly taking shape.'<sup>46</sup> Meanwhile, focussed on issues such as money laundering, the 'Egmont Group', an 'international law enforcement financial intelligence exchange network', might also be cited within this category.<sup>47</sup>

Thirdly, there are the **European Union (EU) intelligence arrangements**. Developed from around the late-1990s onwards, these again contribute to varying degrees. These arrangements essentially act as specialist intelligence liaison 'pockets' within the EU framework as a whole, namely as part of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy

<sup>42</sup> See, e.g., 'NATO Special Committee', *NATO* (2006); 'New NATO intelligence centre opens in Britain', *UK Ministry of Defence* and 'Global Intelligence Assessment [sic.] for NATO Countries', *NATO SHAPE* (16 October 2006); 'Intelligence fusion centre initial operational capability (IOC) ceremony', *NATO SHAPE* (12 October 2006); B. Tigner, 'NATO seeks more than a quick fix to its rapid-reaction command structure', *Jane's International Defence Review* (8 January 2009); 'Situation Centre (SITCEN)', *NATO* (2 December 2010); 'NATO nations deepen cooperation on intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance', *NATO* (17 March 2011).

<sup>43</sup> 'The International Special Training Centre (ISTC) Exhibiting at Defendory International', *MarketWatch* (7 October 2008). For the activities of various European countries' Special Operations Forces in theatre, e.g., in Afghanistan: A. Finlan, *Special Forces, Strategy and the War on Terror* (London: Routledge, 2009), p.131, and Svendsen, *Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror*, p.79, p.83, p.90.

<sup>44</sup> 'International Partnerships' panel at the *US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) Open Source Conference* (Washington, DC: 16-17 July 2007); A. Dyèvre, 'Intelligence cooperation: The OSINT option', *Europolitics* (28 October 2008); A. Rettman, 'EU intelligence services opening up to collaboration', *EUObserver* (18 January 2011).

<sup>45</sup> Denmark's 'Centre for Terrorism Analysis' in K. Tebbit, *Benchmarking of the Danish Defence Intelligence Service: Introduction and Summary* (Copenhagen: April 2006), pp.iii-iv, paras.11-12; for the German 'Coordination Center', F.T. Miko and C. Froehlich, 'Germany's Role in Fighting Terrorism: Implications for U.S. Policy', *Congressional Research Service* (27 December 2004), pp.7-9; 'Germany minister now warns of terror attack threat', *Reuters* (6 November 2010); see also 'Poland's anti-terrorist center gears up to protect Euro 2012', *Associated Press* (17 May 2011); for Sweden's National Centre for Terrorist Threat Assessment (NCT), 'Suicide attack could happen again: prosecutor', *The Local - Sweden* (3 June 2011).

<sup>46</sup> S. Fidler, 'The human factor', *Financial Times* (7 July 2004); M. Rudner, 'Britain betwixt and between: UK SIGINT alliance strategy's transatlantic and European connections', *Intelligence and National Security*, 19, 4 (2004); E. Cody, 'Europe's antiterrorism agencies favor human intelligence over technology', *The Washington Post* (12 May 2010); On Swedish SIGINT developments, D. Nohrstedt, 'Shifting Resources and Venues Producing Policy Change in Contested Subsystems: A Case Study of Swedish Signals Intelligence Policy', *Policy Studies Journal*, 39, 3 (August 2011), pp.461-484; 'Signals intelligence', *Sweden.gov.se* (24 August 2009).

<sup>47</sup> 'Serbia cleans up its act on money laundering', *Jane's Intelligence Digest* (16 February 2009).

(CFSP) and, as of 2010, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (previously the European Security and Defence Policy - ESDP).<sup>48</sup>

As Björn Müller-Wille has elaborated, the types of intelligence arrangements in this third category include: 'the EU Satellite Centre [(SatCen)], the Joint Situation Centre [(SitCen)]<sup>49</sup> and the Intelligence Division of the European Military Staff... [which] are responsible [for] providing the "strategic" intelligence support needed for the decisions that fall within the Council's competencies... [including] issues such as the launching and preparation of an EU peace support operation (PSO)<sup>50</sup>, in the process also extending European intelligence arrangements partially into the wider realm of peacekeeping intelligence (PKI).<sup>51</sup> Simultaneously overlapping are initiatives, such as the EU Terrorism Working Group (TWG) and MONEYVAL, the Council of Europe's anti-money laundering arrangement.<sup>52</sup>

In this EU intelligence arrangement category, law enforcement intelligence liaison contributions from EUROPOL on the issue of terrorism, together with EUROJUST initiatives, can be included.<sup>53</sup> Notably, as Lauri Lugna from the Estonian Ministry of the Interior has noted: 'EUROPOL is charged with building and maintaining a database of information supplied by the Member States, and using this data to analyse crimes, conduct specific investigations at the request of national law enforcement authorities, and request that the latter launch such investigations.'<sup>54</sup> By 2006, further strengthened internal EU co-operation between EUROPOL and the SitCen also appeared to be emerging.<sup>55</sup>

But, within this domain of activity, further challenging complexities clearly exist. The 'structural' considerations are not the only ones that are encountered. The *type* of intelligence product being interacted over during the conduct of liaison in these contexts similarly has an important role to perform. This factor now needs to be better brought into

<sup>48</sup> See later discussion below; see also, e.g., 'Conceptual Framework on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) Dimension of the fight against terrorism', *European Union* (?c.2005), p.6; Maj. Gen. João Nuno Jorge Vaz Antunes, European Union Military Staff's Intelligence Division, 'Developing an Intelligence Capability: The European Union', *CIA Studies in Intelligence*, 49, 4 (2005); A. Podolski, 'European Intelligence Co-operation - Failing Part of the CFSP and ESDP?', *Centrum Stosunków Międzynarodowych, Center for International Relations (Poland) Reports & Analyses 6/04/A* (2004).

<sup>49</sup> On the 'SitCen', 'Written answers: Home Department - SitCen', *Hansard* (Monday, 27 June 2005); 'Examination of Witnesses (Questions 92-99): Mr Johnny Engell-Hansen (Head of Operations Unit, SitCen)', *Civil Protection and Crisis Management in the European Union - European Union Committee, UK House of Lords* (21 January 2009); 'William Shapcott - director of EU SitCen', *Jane's Intelligence Review* (18 August 2009); 'French diplomat to head EU intelligence agency', *AFP/EUbusiness* (July 2010) - Shapcott retired during the summer of 2010, with Ilkka Salmi from Finland becoming appointed head of the SitCen in December 2010.

<sup>50</sup> B. Müller-Wille, 'Rethinking European intelligence cooperation', *YES Danmark* (c.2005), via URL: <<http://www.yes-dk.dk/>> (accessed: 26/01/2007).

<sup>51</sup> On PKI, see B. de Jong, W. Platje and R.D. Steele (eds), *Peacekeeping Intelligence: Emerging Concepts for the Future* (Oakton, VA: OSS, 2003); D. Carment and M. Rudner (eds), *Peacekeeping Intelligence: New Players, Extended Boundaries* (London: Routledge, 2006); A.W. Dorn, 'United Nations Peacekeeping Intelligence', ch. 17 in Johnson (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence*; J.A. Ravndal, 'Developing Intelligence Capabilities in Support of UN Peace Operations', *NUPI Report* (Oslo: 22 December 2009).

<sup>52</sup> 'National and international cooperation', *Säkerhetspolisen (Säpo - Swedish Security Service) website* (December 2009); "'Hire non-Swedes for sensitive posts": Säpo', *The Local - Sweden* (7 December 2009); 'Serbia cleans up its act on money laundering'; see also references to the 'European Expert Network on Terrorism Issues (ENER)' as cited in fn. 48 of Cilluffo, Cozzens and Ranstorp, *Foreign Fighters*, p.19; on the theme of tackling the financing of terrorism, V. Pop, 'Commission to propose new EU anti-terrorism tool', *EUObserver* (12 July 2011).

<sup>53</sup> 'Europe's anti-terror capacity', *BBC* (16 August 2006); B. Fägersten, 'Bureaucratic Resistance to International Intelligence Cooperation - The Case of Europol', *Intelligence and National Security*, 25, 4 (August 2010), pp.500-520; Lugna, 'Institutional Framework of the European Union Counter-Terrorism Policy Setting', p.125.

<sup>54</sup> *ibid.*, p.124; see also the Gijs de Vries citation, below; M. Deflem, *The Policing of Terrorism* (London: Routledge, 2010), from p.127; focussed on organised crime, e.g., 'Irish rhino horn racket uncovered by Europol', *BBC* (7 July 2011); see also V. Dodd and M. Taylor, 'Scotland Yard called in over Breivik's claims he met "mentor" in UK', *The Guardian* (25 July 2011).

<sup>55</sup> 'Subject: Implementation of the Action Plan to Combat Terrorism', *Council of the European Union* (Brussels: 19 May 2006).

the overall analytical narrative being presented. This is so that several of the main intelligence dynamics involved can be better understood. The 'intelligence' that features in the EU is essentially *strategic*, rather than *tactical* and *operational*, and can be characterised in its composition as being all-source-based assessments-*derived*. An important analytical distinction emerges, which can also extend more widely into the other somewhat overlapping European region and geographic arrangements.

Defined intelligence controls persist. Due to all the prevailing security and counter-intelligence anxieties concerning the protection of sources and methods that exist in such multilateral contexts (see as discussed above), for greater comfort, the intelligence supplied to the EU is based on 'sanitised' strategic, finished and processed intelligence. This is packaged and delivered to the SitCen instead more as diluted *information* input from EU Member States' intelligence communities.<sup>56</sup> For example, according to the UK ISC: 'The UK (in particular the JIC [UK Joint Intelligence Committee] and JTAC) is one of the biggest providers of *information* to SitCen papers'<sup>57</sup>, revealing the nature, as well as the form, of the UK's contribution.<sup>58</sup>

In the EU context, this 'information' arguably then *becomes* 'intelligence' when 'loaded' in a 'purposeful manner'. For instance, this occurs *within* the SitCen during the conduct of its own analysis, and *when* it generates its own product ready for dissemination amongst its own select customers, including EU Commissioner Baroness Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and head of the recently created (July 2010) European External Action Service (EEAS).<sup>59</sup>

However, a criticism can be raised that it is still just essentially *information* rather than more serious *intelligence* that is being handled in the EU context. Other distinct limits with these EU intelligence arrangements can be highlighted. Notably, limited resources, such as small staff sizes, can be cited (with the SitCen in 2010 consisting of around 100 personnel<sup>60</sup>), suggesting the need for the strict prioritisation of tasks. These considerations in turn raise many questions, including regarding the impact of bureaucratic factors, such as the issue of 'time-lags', during day-to-day business processes.<sup>61</sup> This is not least as wider, concerning events, such as those rapidly occurring in their multitude in international affairs, are meanwhile frequently unfolding in high-tempo and condensed-space operating environments.<sup>62</sup>

Further developments can be implemented. The concerns identified here naturally suggests that intelligence and information arrangements under the umbrella of the EU have plenty of scope for their gradual expansion and extension into the future. Indeed, during the summer of 2008, there were attempts by various European countries to better improve SitCen's intelligence capabilities, as well as to extend 'standardisation' processes

<sup>56</sup> M. Seiff, 'MI5 Chief won't share all secrets with EU', *UPI* (14 September 2005).

<sup>57</sup> UK ISC, 'European Co-operation', p.29, para.102 (emphasis added).

<sup>58</sup> See also 'Report on Support from Member States Security and Intelligence Services to SITCEN', *EU* (21 November 2005 [declassified: 10 June 2011]); R. Jeffreys-Jones, 'Rise, Fall and Regeneration: From CIA to EU', *Intelligence and National Security*, 24, 1 (2009), pp.103-118.

<sup>59</sup> M.K.D. Cross, 'EU Intelligence Sharing & The Joint Situation Centre: A Glass Half-Full', *Paper prepared for delivery at the 2011 Meeting of the European Union Studies Association* (3-5 March 2011).

<sup>60</sup> N. Gros-Verheyde, 'L'Europe a aussi ses propres agents secrets', *ouest-france.fr* (21 février 2010).

<sup>61</sup> For limits, Müller-Wille, 'Rethinking European intelligence cooperation'; J. Stevenson, 'Law Enforcement and Intelligence Capabilities', ch. 2 in *Adelphi Paper*, 44, 367 (London: IISS, November 2004), p.55; B. Tigner, 'EU struggles to define coherent response to Libyan crisis', *Jane's Defence Weekly* (25 February 2011); B. Tigner, 'NATO takes tougher approach to cyber security', *Jane's Defence Weekly* (28 February 2011); F. Bicchi and C. Carta, 'Arab Uprisings Test EU Architecture', *ISN Insights* (7 March 2011).

<sup>62</sup> For these 'events', see, e.g., J. Healy, 'Popular Rage Is Met With Violence in Mideast', *The New York Times* (17 February 2011); e.g. for an EU public announcement on an 'event', A.D.M. Svendsen, 'Strategy and disproportionality in contemporary conflicts', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 33, 3 (June 2010), p.376.

within its framework – most critically including trying to work around operational obstacles.<sup>63</sup>

According to *The Guardian* newspaper, evaluating the internal EU report seen during August 2008: ‘While cooperation between national police forces in the EU was advancing, the report conceded that the sharing of espionage and intelligence material was a “considerable challenge” as it clashed with the “principle of confidentiality” [(or the ‘third party rule’, known interchangeably as the ‘control principle’, which is intended to preserve the confidentiality of secret exchanges between different parties during intelligence liaison)] that is the basis for successful exchanges.’<sup>64</sup>

For improved intelligence sharing within the EU context, there needs to be the continued further addressing of the ever-present secrecy-sharing dilemma that exists with regard to multilateral arrangements.<sup>65</sup> Moreover, this addressing requires being undertaken adopting a cultural (including a philosophical), as well as a structural, approach towards facilitating sharing activities.<sup>66</sup>

Whether into the future there is a greater centralisation of intelligence and information liaison arrangements in the EU context still remains to be seen.<sup>67</sup> Although the SitCen evolves over time, a distinct ‘EU CIA’ is probably going to remain highly unlikely, while an ‘EU NIC’ - that is: undertaking higher and more strategic level monitoring work, more akin to the research-based/dominated activities of the US National Intelligence Council (NIC), for instance with its in-depth future ‘global scenarios’ development (but on more of a ‘regional’ basis) - is a much more realistic model on which to focus attention.<sup>68</sup> Within this domain of activity, there are certainly not going to be any rapid or dramatic movements, with trends continuing, as witnessed previously, on a gradual, evolutionary path.<sup>69</sup>

During November 2008, the UK House of Lords reportedly ‘warned’ that ‘intelligence on terrorism, drug trafficking and serious fraud is not being routinely shared with Europol... over fears of leaks’, with the UK Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA)’s exchange with EUROPOL being particularly criticised. Generally, therefore, political-to-policy and strategy-orientated drivers still appear stronger than more regularised operational movements.

<sup>63</sup> ‘MI5 forced to share intelligence with EU’, *politics.co.uk* (7 August 2008).

<sup>64</sup> I. Traynor, ‘Secret EU security draft risks uproar with call to pool policing and give US personal data’, *The Guardian* (7 August 2008).

<sup>65</sup> See, e.g., R.J. Aldrich, ‘Transatlantic Intelligence and Security Cooperation’, *International Affairs*, 80, 4 (2004), p.732.

<sup>66</sup> See, e.g., the methodologies of ‘need-to-know’, ‘need-to-share/pool’, and ‘need-to-use’ as referenced in S.R. Atkinson, ‘Returning Science To The Social (Making Sense Of Confusion: A Case For Honest Reflection)’, *The Shrivenham Papers*, 10 (Shrivenham: UK Defence Academy, July 2010), p.iv.

<sup>67</sup> See, e.g., J.M. Nomikos, ‘The European Union’s Proposed Intelligence Service’, *Power and Interest News Report (PINR)* (17 June 2005); J.M. Nomikos, ‘A European Union Intelligence Service for Confronting Terrorism’, *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 18, 2 (2005), pp.191-203; J. Rüter, *European External Intelligence Co-operation* (Saarbrücken, Germany: VDM Verlag Dr. Mueller e.K., 2007).

<sup>68</sup> US National Intelligence Council (NIC), [http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC\\_home.html](http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_home.html) (accessed: 3/02/2007); NIC 2020 Project, [http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC\\_2020\\_project.html](http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2020_project.html) (accessed: 3/02/2007); ‘Global Trends 2025’, *ODNI* (November 2008); T. Fingar and M. Burrows, ‘Press Briefing’, *ODNI* (20 November 2008); M. Burrows, ‘Press Briefing’, *ODNI* (21 November 2008); *Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World* (Washington, DC: NIC/ODNI, November 2008); US NIC and EU Institute for Security Studies (ISS), *Global Governance 2025: At a Critical Juncture* (September 2010); A. Rettman, ‘EU intelligence bureau sent officers to Libya’, *EUObserver* (12 April 2011).

<sup>69</sup> See also Gros-Verheyde, ‘L’Europe a aussi ses propres agents secrets’; J. Richards, ‘Intelligence centres – The EU mulls a strategic intelligence rethink’, *Jane’s Intelligence Review* (12 November 2010).

These last aspects seem to take longer to 'catch-up', preferring to proceed more cautiously on more protected, specific and detailed individual (*ad hoc*) case-by-case bases.<sup>70</sup>

However, despite their imperfections, these EU intelligence arrangements and initiatives are rightly recognised as being important in the EU context and beyond. This is particularly when dealing with pressing transnational issues, such as, most prominently, counter-terrorism.<sup>71</sup> In 2005, with still-relevant initiative-driving aspirations clearly apparent, the EU's Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator remarked:

Timely and accurate information - its collection, analysis and dissemination - is essential to prevent acts of terrorism and to bring terrorist suspects to justice. Progress is being made in implementing the decisions of the Council to improve the exchange of terrorism related information. Last year [2004] the Council decided to stimulate co-operation among Europe's security and intelligence services by reinforcing the Situation Centre (SitCen) in the Council Secretariat.

He continued:

As a result, SitCen now provides the Council with strategic analysis of the terrorist threat based on intelligence from Member States' security and intelligence services and, where appropriate, on information provided by Europol. Meanwhile, Europol is also strengthening its counter-terrorism task force. Eurojust is playing an increasingly prominent role in helping national prosecutors and investigating judges to co-operate across borders.<sup>72</sup>

Ultimately, whatever is generally thought of the 'intelligence' material handled in the EU - and its usefulness, especially at the lower and micro levels of experience and activities, such as operationally and tactically - the EU intelligence arrangements clearly continue to have substantial and sufficient relevance. They are certainly worth the effort of sustaining into the future.<sup>73</sup> In recent years, important EU efforts have also been witnessed concerning the addressing of pressing 'radicalisation' issues.<sup>74</sup>

As the implementation of the EU Lisbon Treaty increasingly gathers momentum, especially with the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) during July

<sup>70</sup> "Cops Fear Sharing Information", *Sky News* (12 November 2008); Fägersten, 'Bureaucratic Resistance to International Intelligence Cooperation - The Case of Europol'; D. Casciani, 'UK opts-in to plan to share evidence between EU police', *BBC* (27 July 2010).

<sup>71</sup> However, these initiatives have not been universally popular - see, e.g., 'EU : «Anti-terrorism» legitimises sweeping new «internal security» complex', *Statewatch* (28 January 2005); T. Bunyan, 'The EU state gears up for action: Internal Security Strategy & the Standing Committee on Internal Security (COSI)', *Statewatch* (12 February 2010); see also 'The European Union: New Purpose, Old Methods?', ch. 4 in P. Todd and J. Bloch, *Global Intelligence: The World's Secret Services Today* (London: Zed, 2003), pp.101-133.

<sup>72</sup> 'Exchange of Information' in *Address by Mr Gijs de Vries, European Union Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, to the EUROMED Meeting* (Brussels: 18 May 2005), p.3; G. de Vries, 'The European Union's Role in the Fight Against Terrorism', *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, 16 (2005), pp.3-9; G. de Vries, 'Towards a European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice?', *Challenge Europe, Issue 14, European Policy Centre website* (16 September 2005); for an overview, E.R. Hertzberger, 'Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Cooperation in the European Union', *UNICRI Report* (July 2007); R. Gowan and S. Batmanglich, 'Too Many Institutions? European Security Cooperation after the Cold War', ch. 5 in B.D. Jones, S. Forman and R. Gowan (eds), *Cooperating for Peace and Security* (Cambridge: CUP, 2010), pp.80-97.

<sup>73</sup> B. Glick, 'European data sharing system to help police track weapons', *Computing.co.uk* (27 November 2008).

<sup>74</sup> K. Haahr, 'Europe's emerging solutions to radical Islam', *Jane's Islamic Affairs Analyst* (18 December 2009); A. Wilner, 'From Radicalization to Terrorism', *ISN Insights* (8 June 2011); 'EU says radicalization is gravest threat', *United Press International* (13 July 2011); L. Vidino, *Radicalization, Linkage, and Diversity: Current Trends in Terrorism in Europe* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2011); M. Goodwin, 'Norway attacks: We can no longer ignore the far-right threat', and A.S. Myhre, 'Norway attacks: Norway's tragedy must shake Europe into acting on extremism', *The Guardian* (24 July 2011); G. Hewitt, 'Norway and the politics of hate', *BBC*, and B. Riedel, 'Oslo's Clash of Civilizations', *Brookings* (25 July 2011); see also 'Sweden advances plan to combat extremism', *The Local - Sweden* (5 August 2011).

2010, and with the ESDP becoming re-branded as the CSDP, interest remains keen as 2011 progresses to see what are the fullest implications of these changes both for the SitCen (which became part of the EEAS in late 2010<sup>75</sup>), and for the overall process of multi-functional information-sharing in the EU, over the longer-term.<sup>76</sup>

Shorter-term impact is already clearer. Consisting of three units, essentially the 'Operations Unit', the 'Analysis Unit' and the 'Consular Unit', in detail,

the SITCEN contributes [...] by:

- providing all-source assessment on CFSP issues and assessment of the terrorist threat to the Union and its Member States;
- providing 24/7 support for the day-to-day conduct of CSDP crisis management operations;
- providing support for the functioning of the EU-Crisis Coordination Arrangements;
- operating the secure communications networks linking the foreign affairs, defence, intelligence and security communities of the Member States and the Institutions.<sup>77</sup>

Ultimately, the value of sustained co-operative intelligence efforts in the EU context is starkly obvious. This is demonstrably the case if we work from the simple basis that the lack of these initiatives and arrangements altogether would engender worse scenarios, resulting in counter-productive ignorance concerning especially the key issue area of counter-terrorism within the EU zone.<sup>78</sup> Moreover, European intelligence co-operation clearly extends further than merely the 'components' just examined. Wider trends also demonstrate significance.<sup>79</sup>

<sup>75</sup> A. Rettman, 'Competition heating up for EU intelligence chief job', *EUObserver* (14 September 2010); A. Rettman, 'EU diplomats to benefit from new intelligence hub', *EUObserver* (22 February 2010); 'EU Situation Centre (EU SITCEN)' in J. Rehr and H. Weisserth (eds), *Handbook on CSDP* (Brussels/Vienna: European Security and Defence College/Austrian Ministry of Defence and Sport, 2010), p.47. For a wider survey/overview of recent European security developments, see 'Europe's Evolving Security Architecture' in A. Nicoll (ed.), *Strategic Survey 2010* (London: Routledge/IISS, 2010), pp.64-81, esp. 'European Union: making Lisbon work', pp.75-77; A. Rettman, 'Ashton picks Finn to be EU "spymaster"', *EUObserver* (17 December 2010).

<sup>76</sup> Of note, see B. Waterfield, 'EU security proposals are "dangerously authoritarian"', *The Daily Telegraph* (10 June 2009); H. Brady, 'Intelligence, emergencies and foreign policy: The EU's role in counter-terrorism', *Centre for European Reform Essay* (July 2009); ISIS Europe, 'The Setting Up of the European External Action Service (EEAS): Laying the Basis for a More Coherent EU Foreign Policy?', *European Security Review*, 47 (December 2009), p.5, col.2; G. Gya, ISIS Europe, 'Breaking the EU silos in CFSP', *European Security Review*, 49 (May 2010); 'Council establishes the European External Action Service', *Council of the EU* (26 July 2010); A. Rettman, 'Ashton eyes October for decision on top jobs', *EUObserver* (16 July 2010); N. Meo, 'Baroness Ashton's new European Union diplomatic service faces £45m cost overrun', *The Daily Telegraph* (18 July 2010); C. Brand, 'EU member states cling to crisis-management powers', *European Voice* (22 July 2010); C. Wendling, 'Explaining the Emergence of Different European Union Crisis and Emergency Management Structures', *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management*, 18, 2 (June 2010), pp.74-82; 'WEU report warns EU on foreign and security policy', *Jane's Defence Weekly* (12 May 2011); C. Carta, 'The EEAS: One for All, or One Among Many?', *ISN Insights* (25 May 2011); A. Menon, 'European Defence Policy from Lisbon to Libya', *Survival*, 53, 3 (2011), pp.75-90..

<sup>77</sup> 'EU Situation Centre (EU SITCEN)' in Rehr and Weisserth (eds), *Handbook on CSDP*, p.47.

<sup>78</sup> B. Müller-Wille, 'The Effect of International Terrorism on EU Intelligence Co-operation', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 46, 1 (2008), pp.49-73; M. Den Boer, C. Hillebrand and A. Nölke, 'Legitimacy under Pressure: The European Web of Counter-Terrorism Networks', in *ibid.*, pp.101-124; R. Coolsaet, 'EU Counterterrorism strategy: value added or chimera?', *International Affairs*, 86, 4 (June 2010), pp.857-873.

<sup>79</sup> See also, e.g., 'NATO head worried about low European defense spending, calls on allies to reduce US reliance', *Associated Press* (16 June 2011); B. Tigner, 'Europe must pool defence resources, senior politicians

## Capturing wider European intelligence co-operation trends

Along the lines presented above, the overall prevailing wider trends concerning intelligence co-operation in Europe collectively point towards the increased 'regionalisation of intelligence'.<sup>80</sup> This is despite, within that regional framework, the overlapping international intelligence liaison developments over time occurring in a mixed manner, in both their operation and evolution, and varying in their 'specialness'. This mixture effectively spans the full-spectrum of being, at times, more haphazard and *ad hoc* (for instance, work being conducted more case-by-case), as well as, at other times, being more regularised, and with developments occurring more systematically and incrementally (for example, as seen with the EU SitCen).<sup>81</sup> Variations in nature exist.

Borrowing the reported words of the former Director General of the British Security Service (MI5), Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller (2002-07), the discernible overall regionalisation trends can be evaluated as being essentially on 'a continuum with expansion'.<sup>82</sup> This assessment stands even if you adopt a sceptic's stance.

Admittedly, over time, due to the potent mixture of factors involved, these trends have not had a smooth development, and unevenness therefore continues to be effectively reflected. For instance, time-consuming and problematic trade-offs have been evident - including the 'secrecy-sharing dilemma' and the 'constraints' somewhat imposed by the ever-present counter-intelligence and security anxieties, shown where strictly sanitised 'information' rather than 'intelligence' *per se* features (as discussed with regard to the EU, above).

Moreover, due to their differing natures, the intelligence liaison relationships in Europe are also clearly of varying degrees of 'exclusivity'. At times, they are somewhat differently focussed, together with handling different types of intelligence according to their different operating parameters. Stemming from these considerations, these arrangements then operate to what can be regarded as varying degrees of effectiveness in terms of their outcomes, as seen frequently depending upon information and communications security (INFOSEC/COMSEC) and Information Assurance (IA)-associated factors, such as which (who) and how many parties are involved.<sup>83</sup> Questions and worries about maintaining the *momentum* of counter-terrorism initiatives have also figured, especially as the immediacy of terrorist threats essentially ebb as time progresses between shocks.<sup>84</sup>

Evidently, further advances have still yet to be made. This conclusion extends to applying in several different areas, in many different directions, and to many different extents. However, this situation of overall and underlying trends on the whole tending to be on 'a continuum with expansion' is discernible, especially if those developments are: (i) referred

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warn', *Jane's Defence Weekly* (30 June 2011); J. Hale, 'Dutch Call on EU To Pool, Share Capabilities', *DefenseNews* (29 June 2011); 'Weimar Triangle countries join forces in EU combat group', *Jane's Intelligence Review* (15 July 2011).

<sup>80</sup> See, e.g., the general literature on 'regionalism' and 'regionalisation' as discussed above.

<sup>81</sup> For other general trends involved: On 'problem-solving', see, e.g., C.E. Lindblom, 'The Science of "Muddling Through"', *Public Administration Review*, 19 (Spring, 1959), pp.79-88; C.E. Lindblom, 'Still Muddling, Not Yet Through', *Public Administration Review*, 39 (1979), pp.517-26. On the 'risk management' dimension see, e.g., S.D. Gibson, 'In the Eye of the Perfect Storm: Re-imagining, Reforming and Refocusing Intelligence for Risk, Globalisation and Changing Societal Expectation', *Risk Management: An International Journal*, 7, 4 (2005), pp.23-41; M.V. Rasmussen, *The Risk Society at War* (Cambridge: CUP, 2006); C. Coker, *War in an Age of Risk* (Cambridge: Polity, 2009).

<sup>82</sup> UK ISC, 'Policy: International Co-operation on Terrorism', *Annual Report 2003-2004* (June 2004), p.22, para.74.

<sup>83</sup> For details of variations, see, e.g., as charted in Lugna, 'Institutional Framework of the European Union Counter-Terrorism Policy Setting', pp.111-139.

<sup>84</sup> G. Corera, 'Seeking a united front against terrorism', *BBC* (9 March 2005); 'EU anti-terror plans may "peter out"', *BBC* (2 April 2004); B. Müller-Wille, 'Building a European Intelligence Community in response to terrorism', *European Security Review*, 22 (ISIS, Europe, April 2003); Nicoll (ed.), 'Terrorist threats in Europe: hype or reality?'



to collectively; (ii) examined over the longer-term (for example, traced over the years from 2000 to 2011); and also (iii) if the literature on this subject is comprehensively explored.<sup>85</sup>

Also, equally, there is evidently sufficient room for substantial overlap in terms of both intelligence targeting concerns and requirements (or topics of interest), and in at least elements of the intelligence/information product that is handled. This is most apparent where, for instance regarding the EU SitCen:

On the basis of open source and classified information coming from Member States and the European institutions, SITCEN monitors and assesses international events 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The focus lies on sensitive geographical areas, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The information and evaluations provided by EU SITCEN are of a civilian and military nature, covering all aspects of EU crisis management.<sup>86</sup>

Meanwhile, intelligence liaison sceptics and critics are more likely to query the *extent* of the observed wider trends. This is as well as those critics disputing their prevalence and effectiveness, especially if the minutiae and low and micro levels involved in intelligence activities are particularly highlighted over general trends, and above the generally prevailing incentives for enhanced co-operation.<sup>87</sup>

This last point starkly suggests the involvement of further complexities. For instance, particularly when thinking in terms of counter-terrorism intelligence, the *quality* of the intelligence, as well as the *quantity* (or volume) of intelligence exchanged, is another worthy factor.<sup>88</sup> Moreover, generally, human intelligence (HUMINT) is shared differently from signals intelligence (SIGINT), and differently again from imagery intelligence (IMINT), and from the other 'collection disciplines' or 'INTs' that exist.<sup>89</sup> Also in some circumstances, rather than intelligence sharing *per se* taking place, merely 'access' to intelligence is granted, for example provided in Secure Compartmentalised Information Facilities (SCIFs), as evident in NATO.<sup>90</sup> Assessment difficulties persist as generalisability limits are rapidly encountered.

Further analytic efforts, therefore, need their extension. Indeed, when attempting to evaluate intelligence co-operation and its associated trends, it is most helpful if an awareness of these further cascading levels of multiple complexities is effectively communicated, for instance through being explicitly conveyed and then being better taken into account. This is especially when that analysis is trying to be undertaken in a comprehensive manner at the macro level. Again, this communication can be done most expeditiously through engaging in some extended methodological reflection. This observation now brings us to overall conclusions.

<sup>85</sup> For an earlier account, see, e.g., B. Müller-Wille, 'EU intelligence cooperation: A Critical Analysis', *Contemporary Security Policy*, 23, 2 (August 2002); F. Gregory, 'The EU's role in the war on terror', *Jane's Intelligence Review* (1 January 2003); T. Makarenko, 'Europe adapts to new terrorist threats', *Jane's Intelligence Review* (1 August 2003). For later surveys, see UK ISC, 'European Co-operation', pp.28-9, paras.98-103; G. Lindstrom, 'OPINION – Europe seeks unity on homeland security', *Jane's Defence Weekly* (7 June 2006).

<sup>86</sup> 'EU Situation Centre (EU SITCEN)' in Rehl and Weisserth (eds), *Handbook on CSDP*, p.47.

<sup>87</sup> For an example of a 'sceptical perspective' regarding intelligence liaison, see, e.g., M. Smith, 'Intelligence-sharing failures hamper war on terrorism', *Jane's Intelligence Review* (1 July 2005); 'Bureaucracy blocks EU terror fight', *UPI* (1 August 2005).

<sup>88</sup> See as discussed above with regard to the 'bilateral arrangements'.

<sup>89</sup> For the different 'INTs', see Svendsen, *Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror*, pp.11-12.

<sup>90</sup> See the itemisation of these complexities in *ibid.*, pp.41-42.

## Conclusion

Much can be deduced. Overall in Europe there is the discernible development of an ever-more complex web consisting of a plethora of various overlapping international intelligence liaison arrangements. Essentially, the three broad 'categories' detailed above capture these, and, in their overall mosaic-like arrangement, they collectively provide a form of regional intelligence coverage in Europe.

Unpacking the three categories in-depth allows us several valuable insights not only into the European co-operative intelligence entities that exist, but also into the intelligence dynamics and interactions that occur (and equally not!) both within and between them. These entities clearly operate to varying degrees of speed and effectiveness, depending upon the constraints and limits, even operational obstacles, they encounter, and likewise they develop at different rates. Overall, similar processes, for not too dissimilar reasons, occur over time both *within* and *across* the three different categories.

In our contemporary era, this discernible mode of regional intelligence co-operation has been focussed mainly on the key issue of counter-terrorism - although other regionalised-to-globalised security concerns, such as organised crime and WMD proliferation, together with peacekeeping and crisis management considerations, are simultaneously present to a considerable extent. This occurs primarily due to regional intelligence and security reach continuing to be extended into 'newer' realms of activity as demands, requirements, and strategic and operational remits all become widened.<sup>91</sup>

Closely associated with broader globalisation trends apparent in international affairs, the 'regionalisation of intelligence' developments charted throughout this article are essentially on 'a continuum with expansion'. Moreover, notwithstanding the observation that details and specifics - as well as the low and micro levels of experience and activity - matter significantly in the intelligence world, the overall trends are not ambiguous.<sup>92</sup>

However, as seen when generalising, while the trends may not be ambiguous in themselves - especially in terms of more tangible *widening* and *structural* developments - how far they precisely extend and endure - particularly in terms of less-tangible *deepening* and *cultural* (including philosophical) developments - are more debatable issues. Concerns such as these will continue to be hotly contested into the future, and no easy answers present themselves. A 'complex co-existence plurality' of developments is encountered.

Further conclusions are apparent. While significant caveats remain, suggesting that distinct operational parameters and limitations for all the arrangements continue to feature, the important overlap of the various arrangements in Europe allows them to perform in a more empowering than hindering manner. The limitations do not overwhelm the whole 'system'. Intelligence co-operation trends within Europe can therefore be generally evaluated positively as being essentially on an upward trajectory, even if that trajectory is caveated.<sup>93</sup>

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<sup>91</sup> Technically, these have just become more prominent issues in recent years, e.g., due to all the globalisation developments undergone. See, historically, e.g., M.J. van Duin, 'Emerging European Experience with Crisis Management', *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management*, 1, 1 (March 1993), pp.57-60; see also A. Boin, *et al.*, *The Politics of Crisis Management* (Cambridge: CUP, 2005).

<sup>92</sup> Svendsen, 'The globalization of intelligence since 9/11: frameworks and operational parameters'; Svendsen, 'The globalization of intelligence since 9/11: The optimization of intelligence liaison arrangements'; Aldrich, 'Global Intelligence Co-operation versus Accountability: New Facets to an Old Problem'; Aldrich, 'Beyond the vigilant state: globalisation and intelligence'.

<sup>93</sup> *IISS Strategic Survey 2009*, pp.35-36.

The essence is that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, and generally the overall 'system' that does currently exist appears to work substantially on that basis. Already present, at their least, as a reasonably adequate starting foundation on which further European intelligence co-operation developments can be built, these trends now need to continue to be better harnessed into the future. Seizing and maintaining a 'forward'-driving initiative continues to be required in an increasingly timely fashion. This is in order to have an appropriately continuing transformative effect on wider developments in Europe and beyond as time progresses.<sup>94</sup> Opportunities also figure.

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<sup>94</sup> A. Boin and M. Ekengren, 'Preparing for the World Risk Society: Towards a New Security Paradigm for the European Union', *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management*, 17, 4 (December 2009), pp.285-294; P. Muncaster, 'European Commission talks tough on security', *V3.co.uk*, and W. Maclean, 'Europe must do more to counter plots -EU official', *Reuters* (1 October 2010).