Practising EU Security Governance in the Transatlantic Context: A Fragmentation of Power or Networked Hegemony?

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Abstract

Security governance is commonly understood as an answer to the new and constantly changing security environment after the Cold War. In the context of the European Union (EU), the governance approach is believed to understand better the evolving institutional characters, networks, and processes of the EU’s actions in global politics. By employing a neo-Gramscian framework we challenge the ‘orthodox view’ in the EU governance literature that networks are flexible and hierarchy-immune responses to increasingly global policy challenges. We argue that networks in and of themselves reproduce existing power structures, and discuss the presence and replication of hegemony through these networks by examining the EU’s governance system post the Lisbon Treaty.

Keywords

European security governance; Gramsci; transatlantic relations; CFSP; critical theory

The end of the Cold War and the bi-polar conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States of America (USA) heralded a new series of challenges and changes regarding how we understand and theorise about the emerging structures of international politics. Security governance is conceived as a response to these new challenges and complexities. It is posited as an alternative and yet complementary theoretical construct that seeks to capture and explain the contemporary changes, emerging dynamics, and fluidity amongst the wider range of public and private actors and agents operating within the context of the new global security environment. Governance thus has quickly become a competitor to existing theories, especially in the field of International Relations (IR) that are prone to neglect the ‘concepts of change, complexity, and dialectics’ (Rosenau 2000: 162). In a sense, the security governance approach is an attempt to bridge this lacuna by providing an alternative theoretical framework that facilitates the observation and identification of the changing features, players, and networks of international actors.

Network analysis has become one of the core aspects in the governance research design. Traditional theoretical approaches to security are seen to be increasingly unable and ill-equipped to account for the diminishing nature of inter-state conflicts, as well as the rise of non-traditional, non-state based security threats and actors such as terrorism, civil wars, cyber wars, or transnational crime (Krahmann 2008: 1). This is so because the authors and perpetuators of these security threats are increasingly non-state actors and networks who themselves are not confined to a centralised territorial space. Kirchner (2007: 5) echoed these limitations by noting that ‘agency is now attributed overwhelmingly to non-state actors that are beyond the reach of states or the traditional instruments of states in which threats posed against states are now indirect rather than direct’.

In the context of the European Union (EU), the governance framework is well equipped to analyse the evolving institutional characters, networks, and processes of the EU’s actions (Sperling and Kirchner 2008: 1). It does so by recognising the existence of the member states as heterogeneous rather than homogenous actors (Sperling 2009: 2), and acknowledging the ‘porousness of states, the involuntary abnegation of sovereignty, and the emergence of malignant non-state actors [that] has affected these states in different measure’ (ibid: 1).

As a result of this porousness of states, a great degree of fragmentation and diffusion of authority has been noted in the EU governance literature. This is especially the case in
the area of European integration and Europe’s foreign and security policy. Today, a multiplicity of security actors are involved in the management of the EU’s security affairs who are themselves members of formal and informal networks (see Mérand 2008; Wolin 2000). Indeed, the sociologically informed concept of networks is often identified in the EU governance literature as a flexible and hierarchy-immune response to increasingly global policy challenges (Jessop 2003: 101-102) that fosters a new pluralism and empowers civil society groups, and is thus believed to enhance the democratization of public policy.

According to some, this view can be conceived as the ‘orthodox view’ in EU governance studies and has long prevailed in the literature (see Marinetto 2003). It is the objective of this article to challenge this orthodox view of governance, and European (security) governance in particular. We argue that networks simply reproduce existing power structures and relations among the relevant actors. More specifically, these often-times loosely constituted networks reproduce the same hierarchies and power structures that can be found in states, governments, trade unions or any other type of political organisation (Davies 2011). We elaborate our theoretical critique of the governance approach in the empirical section by examining the practice of EU governance after the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 and focusing on the EU’s experience in Libya as a case in point. Through the application of a neo-Gramscian approach to governance networks (Lowndes 2001) and positing that a transnational (or supranational) hegemony exists to which the nation states are increasingly subordinate (Cox and Schechter 2002) we discuss the presence and replication of hegemony through these networks in the context of transatlantic affairs. Specifically, based on the case of the EU’s experience in Libya in 2011 we show that political leaders and high-ranking government officials particularly remain the true orchestrators of governance networks and thereby replicate existing social structures. We also show how decisions and outcomes produced are highly constrained by market-based considerations.

This neo-Gramscian approach to European governance provides an innovative perspective to existing scholarship by questioning the normative aspects of global governance, which is an element that is often overlooked in mainstream analysis of European security governance. A network analysis was chosen as the focus of this article because policy networks are known to be relatively stable and show a steady yet dialectical interdependence between, in the case of the EU, political elites in the member states and those at the supranational level.

In order to show that existing power structures and possibly hegemony are replicated through the governance approach and almost entirely blended out of existing studies on governance, it is necessary to revisit the ontological underpinnings of the governance, and particularly the security governance, concept. We accomplish this in the first and second sections of the article. While the first section discusses the governance approach from a broader political science perspective, the second section discusses the epistemological and ontological tenets of security governance with a particular focus on the European Union. By grounding our argument in the existing literature, we achieve two objectives. First, we are able to place our theoretical critique firmly within the existing literature on governance and security governance. Second, this approach allows us also to show that ideas such as systems of rule, heterarchy of self-organisation, networks, the absence of authority and hierarchy, and fragmentation of power are to be found at the core of that literature. Third, it allows us to show that the literature on EU security governance particularly mainly discusses the external dimension of the EU’s external actions, including the EU’s preferred policy tools such as assurance, prevention, compulsion, and protection. However, in so doing, it fails to pay attention to the internal dimension of the EU’s policy and preference formation processes and thus power structures. The penultimate section empirically applies and tests our theoretical critique on the governance approach as discussed in sections one and two of the article. Specifically, we use the EU governance system after the Lisbon Treaty, with a focus on
Libya in 2011, to show that the European security governance literature shows a gap in the sense that networks in and of themselves reproduce already existing power structures.

FROM GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNANCE: (RE)FRAMING THE POLITICAL PROCESS

The current manifestation of the government-governance debate is rooted in the political and economic changes of the late twentieth century, especially in an ever-increasing global connectedness of people, goods, and services, which some scholars label ‘globalization’. These forces have undoubtedly affected the institution of the nation state, particularly in its ability to govern sovereignly. To be sure, government is not synonymous with governance although at one point in time governance was indeed associated with government, namely through ‘the exercise of power by political leaders’ (Kjaer 2004: 1). Rosenau (1992: 4) echoes this by noting that ‘both [governance and government] refer to purposive behaviour, to goal-oriented activities, to systems of rule’.

Although sometimes used interchangeably within the mainstream political discourse, the more specialised literature signifies and defines each term by its own meaning and by a distinct set of practices, methods, and processes. The concept of authority—informal or formal—is at the heart of the debate. Rosenau, for example, distinguishes the two terms by arguing that:

  government suggests activities that are backed by formal authority, by police powers to insure the implementation of duly constituted policies, whereas governance refers to activities backed by shared goals that may or may not derive from legal and formally prescribed responsibilities and that do not necessarily rely on police powers to overcome defiance and attain compliance (ibid).

Rhodes (1996: 652) builds on this definition by finding that the term government can be defined as the ‘activity or process of governing or governance, a condition of ordered rule, those people charged with the duty of governing, or governors and the manner, method or system by which a particular society is governed’.

The interchangeable use of the two terms has its roots in history, especially in Europe, starting with government. In the aftermath of World War II and the processes of rebuilding and reconstructing broken societies, Western liberal democracies in Europe and North America experienced an expansive definition of government. The term became synonymous with expanded civil liberties, freedoms and the construction of a welfare state system that provided generous social programmes and services for European citizens. In many ways, this expansion resulted in a growing bureaucratic apparatus that was needed to manage, administer, and regulate the new social programmes. Indeed, western liberal democratic governments took on a higher profile embarked on political projects of regulation, economic redistribution and, more generally, an expansion of the political sphere of society (Pierre and Peters 2000: 2).

Put differently, the post-war period witnessed an ontological shift of the political and economic classes regarding the perceived obligations and responsibilities accorded and afforded to the nation state. No longer was the state expected to remain a passive actor regulating the functions and operations of the domestic and global order but instead to become an active participant in the ordering, regulating and governing of the political, social and economic spheres. Thus, ‘this period of time is associated with western liberal governments acting as appropriate, legitimate and unchallenged engines for social change, equality and economic development’ (ibid.). In short, until about the mid-1970s, the processes and practices associated with post-war governing meant expanding
administrative duties and centralised bureaucracies as well as increased legitimacy, leverage and power accorded to state officials.

This consensus on the role and interventionist nature of the state started to disintegrate in the late 1970s as a consequence of the turmoil in the global economy and financial instabilities resulting in fiscal cutbacks of government programmes, especially the institution of the welfare state writ large (Mayntz 1993: 9). Indeed, the pushback in the 1980s led to a shift towards the governance paradigm both in terms of theory and practice while acknowledging problems associated with ‘bureaucratization, fiscal deficits, inefficiencies, and overregulation’ (ibid). Those attacks were launched predominantly by free-market pundits who challenged the activist and interventionist role of the state philosophically and ideologically by calling upon the primacy of the market to manage the ever-increasing forces of globalization. This ideologically driven narrative became institutionalised domestically with the electoral victories of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher who called for replacing the role of the state with the free market — that is ‘privatization, deregulation, cut-backs in public spending, tax cuts, monetarist economic policies, radical institutional and administrative reforms (Pierre and Peters 2000: 2) — while advocating a strong role for the state in the area of foreign and security policies and expressing a clear distrust for international institutions. Such change of practice was believed to be foundational for the continued health and prosperity of advanced liberal democratic governments. As these tenets became more legitimised and accepted in society, there was a concomitant shift in emphasis conceptually, empirically, and rhetorically from a discourse of government to one of governance. Indeed, governance established itself as an acceptable and preferred ideological alternative to government, and ergo, governing.

At the most general level, the term governance ‘denotes a conceptual or theoretical representation of co-ordination of social systems as well as the role and function of the state in that process’ (Pierre 2000: 3). Above all, governance seeks to provide an explanatory framework to illustrate and navigate the increasing complexity and accelerated change(s) associated with the (inter)national environment as well as the socio-political and economic processes and practices that accompany it. It is thus conceived as being a distinct and more encompassing concept than government (Rosenau 1992: 4) and denotes a shift from ‘institutions to processes of rule’ (Pattberg 2006: 4; Walters 2004: 29; Rosenau 1992: 7) to the ‘pluralization of the forms of government’ (Walters 2004: 31). Others have defined governance as ‘systems of rule, as the purposive activities of any collectivity that sustains mechanisms designed to insure its safety, prosperity, coherence, stability and continuance’ (Rosenau 2000: 162). Kjaer (2004: 3), on the other hand, defined governance as the ‘stewardship of formal and informal political rules of the game. Governance refers to those measures that involve setting the rules for the exercise of power and settling conflicts over such rules’.

In spite of these definitional variances, scholars appear to be in agreement that at the ontological core of the governance term is the delinking of a central authority (i.e. government) from the political process of rule and governing at the local, national, and international levels. As Rosenau (2005: 122) puts it, ‘the process of governance is the process whereby an organization or society steers itself, and the dynamics of communication and control are central to that process’. To be clear, the absence of a central authority does not equate to a descent into chaos or anarchy, but rather an organisational reshuffling and diffusion of the centres or networks of power and the advent of other political actors into the process of governing (Bevir and Rhodes 2010). The resulting ‘heterarchy of self-organization’ at the international level assumes the existence of multiple centres of power and a ‘multiplicity of responses to a globalizing world’ (Webber et al. 2004: 5). Therefore, the notion of ‘steering’ is foundational in understanding the mechanisms and policy outcomes of governing denoting ‘the structures and processes that enable governmental and nongovernmental actors to coordinate their interdependent needs and interests through the making and
implementation of policies in the absence of a unifying authority’ Krahmann (2003: 331). Indeed, within the theoretical (re)framing of governance theory is the understanding that ‘political institutions no longer exercise a monopoly of the orchestration of governance’ (Pierre 2000: 4). No longer are governments and their associated bureaucracies and agencies the monolithic and hegemonic player in the process of governing. Governance catapults and redefines the goals of government by ‘managing the rules of the game in order to enhance the legitimacy of the public realm’ (Kjaer 2004: 15). It does so by propagating the notions of efficiency, accountability and responsibility while denoting the fragmentation of a political authority amongst the variety of local, national and international agents towards formal and informal networks and non-governmental organisations.

Yet, while the discourse on governance perpetrates and advances the principle of accountability, the political reality is one of diminishing transparency and public accountability of the processes and practices of governing to beholden national and global publics. More abstractly speaking, the concept of governance broadens the spatial boundaries by recognising the existence, interplay and ascending power of a variety of actors in the processes of governing and policy outcomes. Above all, it does so by placing emphasis on self-governing networks, for by ‘drawing on the imagery of cybernetics and complexity theory, governance presents a conceptual landscape of self-regulating systems and proliferating networks [...]’ in which governance ‘takes place within, and in relation to, networks presumed to have their own autonomy and materiality’ (Walters 2004: 30).

By doing so, governance provides a window that widens the spatial landscape by acknowledging that no single governing agency—either public or private—is capable of individually solving the diverse, complex and dynamic problems that are arising as the result of the growing global interdependence of economies, societies and political cultures writ large (see Pollitt 2003: 36). There is no longer a precise top-down hierarchy with regards to policymaking and governance in governing institutions whereby the national government is singled out as being the preeminent actor (Kennett 2008: 4). Indeed, governance denotes the blurring of boundaries between the public and private spheres in regard to the policy process and its outcomes, and is seen as being decentralised and horizontal (Daase and Friesendorf 2010: 2). This transformation, however, has not rendered the role of the state irrelevant or even obsolete (Jessop 2000).

What all these definitions of governance seem to share is the assumption that the new form of social relations by way of social networks is free from power structures or even hierarchy. Indeed, some analysts have mistakenly implied that the concept of governance somehow suggests an absence of coercion, strong material incentives, or hard power for the management of networks (Stoker 2011). However, networks do not exclusively operate on mutual trust and respect to help facilitate social relations inside the network as commonly assumed (Lambright et al. 2010: 77). On the contrary, they are full of power games, bullying, and coercive practices (Kickert et al. 2009). Above all, they are subject to powerful states or their particularistic interests. As Davies (2011: 5) puts it, ‘[t]he historical ubiquity of governance networks itself says nothing about the power relations they embody, hierarchical or otherwise, their authenticity as vehicles for democratic inclusion or their changing form and function over time.’ Indeed, in building on neo-Gramscian approaches to governance it is vital to understand the nature, quality and purpose of connections among the members of the network as well as the power relations they embody.

Neo-Gramscian perspectives were initially applied to the study of hegemony and questions of world order in the field of International Political Economy by highlighting the historical specificity of capitalism and production in the areas of knowledge, institutions, and products (Cox 1987, 1983, 1981). Hegemony in the Gramscian sense tried to understand how a ruling group establishes and maintains its rule, for example through
consent, domination (Rupert 1995) within the state and its institutions, or the development of ideas and norms. Those ideas then allow one to analyse the extension of power relations beyond the nation state and the economy into civil society where a particular perception of the world was developed and maintained. In other words, Gramscian approaches tried to understand how dominant states are configured and how they transport ideas and construct institutional structures. However, Cox’s analysis of hegemony largely remained state centric (Moss 2000; Carchedi 1997: 108-109). More recent modifications to those established approaches (Bonefeld 2002, 2001) focused their analysis on the social relations of production, which are equally expressed in the state and the labour (or the ‘market’). Both engender social forces. Consequently, this social ontology suggests that class struggle in the neo-Gramscian sense can be understood as a ‘heuristic model for the understanding of structural change’ (Cox and Sinclair 1996: 57-58), also at the international level whereby the class struggle takes place between national capital and labour and the transnational forces of capital and labour (van Apeldoorn 2002: 26-34). Against this backdrop, it is evident that neo-Gramscian approaches acknowledge agency in the social relations of production, which is considered dialectical (Joseph 2008, 2002). In that sense, one is equipped to uncover, for example, the social forces behind processes of globalization or networks, and to highlight the role of social ideas in that process. Specifically, in the neo-Gramscian sense, ideas have two functions: first, they form a constitutive part of intersubjective meanings whereby individuals and groups understand their social situation and the possibilities for social change (Gill and Law 1988). Second, ideas can be used to legitimise material interests (i.e. certain policies and decisions) by intellectuals or members of the elite (Bieler 2006: 123) who are able to articulate and enforce those ideas due to their class location. This has sometimes been referred to as ‘transnational hegemony’ (Morton 2003; Gill 2003, 1993, 1990; Gill and Law 1988: 355). What is interesting and important in the context here is that these so-called historical blocs involve reproduction and ongoing consent and coercion. In responding to a call to widen the concept of hegemony to include issues such as identity (and its formation), culture, and the role of class at different levels of analysis, this article discusses through a network analysis how existing power structures within the European Union, for example amongst policy elites (Marsh and Rhodes 1992), are essentially replicated through either formal or informal channels and processes, and do not depend on mutual trust (Davies 2011). Moreover, network analysis has shown that networks are heavily governmentalised by a dominant alliance (or alliances) while social partners are marginalised (Kokx and van Kampen 2009). By the same token, when networks experience openness and plurality, they tend to close (Lawless 2004).

In summary, simply because networks became the prevalent focus of recent literature on governance, this does not necessarily mean that a networked society or community is open, non-hierarchical or that power relations are symmetric (Hart 2003: 221). As we show below in discussing the most recent institutional changes under the Lisbon Treaty, even a relatively close network, such as the transatlantic partnership, is full of power relations that are asymmetrical. Indeed, it shows a reflection of hierarchy that is usually found in the international system of states, and does not require high levels of trust to function (Klijn 2008: 119). That is to say that transatlantic connectivity is a form of power in itself, and thus can be used as a vehicle to include or exclude states in and from the decision-making process. More specifically, a network such as the transatlantic partnership consists of formal rules and regulations that are enforced by states (Lagadec 2012), which in turn recreates existing power relations. Contrary to liberal conceptions of the state and civil society, neo-Gramscian approaches show that societal groups (or social classes) are competing for leadership (political or otherwise) and sometimes dominance (hegemony) of social relations. This is particularly visible in the current Euro crisis where, at the time of writing, Germany and France appear to be the two hegemonic players (Paterson 2011). In short, networks reproduce and sometimes perpetuate existing hierarchies and inequalities, and thus create distrust amongst its members. Networks are, as Stone (2009: 266-7) noted, as routine and unexceptional as
command. They show that hierarchy is still the norm (Magnette 2003: 144; Davies 2000), which is inscribed in elites and their language (Hayward 2004; Habermas 1987). This suggests that the democratic potential of policy networks according to the orthodox view of governance is exaggerated.

This critical perspective and sometimes partial misconception of the governance concept can also be found in the more specialised literature on security governance, which we will discuss in the next section and which is relevant to understanding the transatlantic partnership conceived of as a network between European states, the United States, and Canada.

FROM GOVERNANCE TO SECURITY GOVERNANCE

Security governance scholars are united in sharing the ontological assumption that in the age of globalization threats to national security ‘extend beyond national borders and also are structured along functional lines’ (Krahmann 2005: 23). This allowed for the outsourcing of security tasks from governments to private companies or NGOs to maintain order. In that vein, security governance delineates itself from traditional IR theory in its treatment of security policy in that the former ‘is marked by non-linear and horizontal policy coordination while under traditional notions, security policy was seen as having a specific chain of command’ (Daase and Friesendorf 2010: 2). The theoretical challenge remains how to address adequately ‘the internal differentiation and fragmentation’ (ibid) of the post-Cold War security architecture. Rosenau’s observation that the world is a ‘globalizing space’ and that national sovereignty is transferred from the domestic to the European level holds merit here. Moreover, ‘this multi-centric world competes, cooperates or otherwise interacts with the state-centric world’ (Rosenau 2005: 163), and thereby renders the pure national and international levels of analysis obsolete. In short, we are told that the new world order is so decentralised that it does not appear to lend itself either to hierarchy or coordination under hegemonic leadership. The result is a multi-level system of governance—a system of continuous negotiation among interconnected governments at several territorial tiers (Marks et al. 1996). Specifically, the concept of multi-level governance points at the consequences of European integration for domestic political institutions, actors, and policy processes and vice-versa (Kohler-Koch 2003, 2000, 1998; Börzel 1999) whereby the state assumes the role of a ‘meta-governor’—that is ‘coordinating different forms of governance without necessarily providing exact coherence amongst them’ (Walters 2004: 31). It also indirectly suggests an increased level of participatory democracy by promising to engage a wider share of civil society as well as an absence of power relations or hegemony in a given network of states and their policy elites. In short, the multi-level governance concept implies a fragmentation of political authority and absence of power as a currency to manage those networks at different political levels.

As with the debates on governance, there is a multiplicity of applications regarding the theorising of security governance. It has been conceived as a general social theory:

as a theory of networks, as a system of international and transnational regimes and as a heuristic device for recasting the problem of security management in order to accommodate the different patterns of interstate interaction, the rising number of non-state actors, the expansion of the security agenda, and conflict regulation or resolution (ibid: 5).

As noted by Wagnsson and Hallenberg (2009: 127), ‘security governance gains its conceptual purchase from a broad view of what constitutes security, the process of securitization, the role of non-state actors as agents of threat, and the importance of non-state referents as central components of many security governance systems’. Put differently, security governance is seen as a platform in which alternative forms of
governance can be categorised while being elastic enough to accommodate theoretical frameworks that focus on other aspects and facets of the security dilemma. Security governance, especially in competing concepts such as security communities or regimes, is thus arguably more global in its conceptual application and scope given its capacity to account for a large number of actors and ‘its focus on institutionalized cooperation on shared norms’ (ibid: 128). As such, security governance is an inherently interdisciplinary analytical device while situating itself firmly within the wider security and governance discourses. More specifically, it borrows from the discourse on security by recognising the ascendency of other threats beyond those associated with the military defence of the state. Security governance thus accepts and acknowledges the utility of a broadened non-military orientated security agenda. By the same token, it delineates itself from rationalist IR theory ontologically by recognising the loss of primacy of state-centric approaches to international politics as well as the ascendancy of multiple private and public actors in the realm of security policy making. It also borrows from the governance approach by recognising the diffusion of authority, the process of coordination and management by a diverse set of actors into the sphere of security as well as states subcontracting many of their security tasks to other international actors and institutions (ibid: 4). It also seems to suggest an absence of power relations, the existence of mutual trust among members of a network, and a fragmentation of political authority.

Indeed, the conceptual appeal of the security governance concept is its ability to cast a wider net of framing and capturing the interests, actions and players involved in the attainment of group security and the containment of threats and new found risks. While security governance acknowledges the central role still played by the state, theorists also acknowledge the evolving trend towards a new system of security architecture, particularly in regards to governing transatlantic relations. Specifically, the security governance concept comprises five central features:

- heterarchy; the interaction of a large number of actors, both public and private;
- institutionalization that is both formal and informal; relations between actors that are ideational in character, structured by norms and understandings as much by formal regulations; and finally collective purpose’ (Webber et al. 2004: 8).

More abstractly speaking, the security governance literature delineates four categories of national security governance policy: assurance (post-conflict intervention), prevention (pre-conflict intervention), compulsion (military intervention), and protection (internal security) (Sperling 2009: 7). These categories fulfill two associated functions: institution building and conflict resolution while employing two sets of instruments of governance — the persuasive (economic, political and diplomatic) and the coercive (military intervention and policing). These four categories of security governance can be pursued simultaneously. For post-Westphalian entities like the European Union, a strong normative reliance and use of civilian policy instruments such as the above-mentioned persuasive tools is seen to be the preferred instrument of statecraft over the use of more coercive or military measures. It is in this way that security threats and the regulation of those threats are cast as problems of governance rather than government.

However, following recent scholarship on governance (Newman 2004), we take issue with such conceptualisations of security governance. First, we hold that even a networked society is not free from existing power structures. Indeed, it replicates them as the level of trust amongst the members of a network is generally found to be decreasing. This is especially the case in the context of the current Euro crisis where national (self-) interests seem to prevail over community (or network) interests (Oppermann 2012); one may also think of the transatlantic rift that was caused by the Iraq war in 2003 (Pond 2004). Above all, the current literature often blends out existing power relations in networks such as the transatlantic partnership and tends to sell the network approach as the conventional wisdom (some would say ideology) in governance studies. However, as Hart (2003: 221) reminds us, even though people are social
animals and are inclined to network, not only is the assumption that networks are non-hierarchical misleading, connectedness in and of itself is a form of power and can be used as a tool for inclusion or exclusion of members of the network (Jansen 2002: 272). Moreover, even if trust among members of the network exists, one should ask who has an interest in maintaining the trust, at what cost, and to what end. As the case study below on the EU post-Lisbon Treaty and its experience in Libya will show, powerful nation states especially continue to impose their national preferences on other members of the network.

Second, conceptualisations of multi-level governance structures seem to assume that networks are more inclusive of societal predispositions and foster participatory engagements amongst European citizens. However, as neo-Gramscian studies have shown (Davies 2011) networks are not self-governing entities but rooted in existing hierarchies of European states. Third, the concept of multi-level governance operates in the context of a policy market place where diverse interests and ideas are traded among the members of the network and at different levels of analysis. In turn, this market place is dominated by existing power structures and the existence of rights and regulations that constitute and enforce the rules for the operation of the marketplace. Such rules and regulations in and of themselves can be considered a form of coercion that provides discipline to agents. Above all, the rules were made and at least indirectly enforced by the coercive powers of the state.

Finally, as we show in the next section, the instruments of security governance (assurance, prevention, compulsion, and protection) only discuss the external dimension of European security governance - that is how the EU governs externally with other states or on certain policy issues - while overlooking the internal dimension. Moreover, these instruments are the mere reproduction of existing power relations among the various actors (Schmidt and Zyla 2012) and hegemony within these governance networks by powerful member states. Therefore, we will explicate our theoretical critique on the governance literature empirically in the following section, by discussing EU governance structures after the Lisbon Treaty with a focus on the transatlantic security partnership.

**TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY PARTNERSHIP POST-LISBON: MULTIPLE ACTORS – COHERENT ACTION?**

The transatlantic partnership is based on two pillars: NATO in security terms and the bilateral relations between the EU and the USA (Burghardt 2006: 5). With regards to the former, for forty years, West Europeans became accustomed to dependence on the United States via NATO for their very survival, and debates over burden-sharing dominated the agenda (Howorth 2012: 1). In the mid-1990s in the course of adopting the Maastricht Treaty and as a consequence of the European failure to address developments in former Yugoslavia, European integration moved from a mainly economic endeavour towards the relatively new area of foreign, security and defence policy. The latest integration step took place with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009. The Treaty’s aim was to enhance the coherence of the external action of the EU and to reply to the long existing request by the United States to clarify who is responsible for Europe’s foreign and security policy. To judge the innovations brought to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) with the Lisbon Treaty two years after its entry into force, it is necessary to take a closer look at the institutional setting and to discuss whether the theoretical concept of security governance applies when put into practice. Specifically, this section will analyse the networks and the interplay between the various actors that governed the EU’s security and defence policy in Libya in 2011.
The new EU institutional framework can best be described as single by name, dual by regime and multiple by nature (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 66). Contrary to the Treaty establishing the Constitution for Europe, which also set up a common regime for the different aspects of the Union’s external action, the Lisbon Treaty formally separates CFSP and thus CSDP from other areas of EU external relations such as trade and development aid. Indeed, it is the only policy field covered by the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) declaring that ‘the common foreign and security policy is subject to specific rules and procedures’ (Art 24 (1) TEU). This norm already implies a limited role for the EU as a supranational organisation and creates differentiated institutional dynamics that hinder the coherence of the EU’s foreign policy (Wouters et al. 2012: 7).

Thus it is not surprising that CFSP and CSDP still remain strongly intergovernmental, and unanimity in the Council as well as the European Council remains the general rule (see Art. 31 (1) TEU) (cf. Giumelli 2013 in this issue). It is therefore up to the member states to decide within the EU network in which direction CFSP and CSDP shall develop according to their national interests. As a result, existing power relations among EU member states are very likely to be mirrored rather than eliminated from the institutional set ups as well as policy decision-making processes. Despite the strong role of EU member states in CFSP/CSDP, European capacities remain limited. By 2010, only three EU and NATO countries, the UK, France and Greece, spent above the new post-Cold War benchmark of 2 per cent of GDP on defence while the remaining 21 European member states of NATO spent an average of 1.3 per cent (Howorth 2012: 1). Therefore it is not surprising that the dominant two, the UK and France, and with some exceptions Germany, form the club of the big three in CFSP/CSDP, remain the dominant actors and initiators for CFSP/CSDP actions. All member states are equal, but there is a need to recognise that some naturally contribute more than others, and take more of the burden and the risk, whether in political clout, financial resources or military capabilities (Crowe 2003: 546). Chris Patten (2005: 159–160) pointed out that there is no European policy on a big issue unless France, Germany and the UK are on side. This could clearly be witnessed by the events in Libya in 2011 where France and the UK were mainly pushing for action, but not necessarily within the EU framework; that was to a certain degree blocked by Germany, as will be shown later.

The Treaty of Lisbon did not change the intergovernmental character of the policy field and member states continue to exercise their national interests with regards to the EU’s foreign, security and defence policy whereby the powerful nation states especially, such as the big three, impose their national preferences on other members of the network. The most obvious example underpinning this argumentation was the mission EUFOR Tchad/RCA transferring a French national interest into a European one (Asseburg and Kempin 2009: 75). At the same time, certain competences that are relevant for CFSP and CSDP are spread over all EU actors, including the European Council, the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission as well as the 28 member states. This set of different actors raises questions about the coherence of EU external relations and the dominant role of powerful nations within CFSP and CSDP and calls for defining the core principles of the EU’s policy.

However, today’s security challenges are not confined to the CFSP and CSDP policy areas: EU security and defence actors also have to cooperate ‘across’ EU policy domains (see Carta 2013 in this issue) and with national and international actors. One of the main novelties of the Lisbon Treaty in the area of security and defence was the creation of the new office of the High Representative (HR). The new office is triple-hatted, covering the tasks of the former High Representative for CFSP/Secretary General of the Council, the Commissioner for External Affairs and the Chair of the External Relations Council. The rationale behind this new configuration was to inject more visibility and stability into the external representation of the EU on CFSP matters and more consistency between the different sectors of the EU’s external action (Piris 2010: 245). The HR covers a wide range of competences. S/he conducts the CFSP (Art. 18 (2) TEU),
presides over the newly established Foreign Affairs Council (Art. 18 (3) and Art. 27 (1) TEU) and holds the post of one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission (Art. 18 (4) TEU). Facing this job profile, the HR has only limited resources compared to the Council and the Commission, and must therefore depend on his/her power of persuasion vis-à-vis the two other institutions and the capacity to move and act between the different hats (Wessels and Bopp 2008: 22). Despite possible conflicts with the President of the European Council, the post of the HR should increase the coherence and efficacy of CFSP and CSDP.

In line with previous ideas laid down in the failed Constitutional Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty includes provisions for the establishment of the EEAS that should serve as a functional interface between all the main institutional actors of European foreign policy and support the HR in carrying out his/her tasks (CEPS et al. 2007: 133). In 2010, the Council adopted the Decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the EEAS (Council 2010), after having consulted the European Parliament (EP) and having obtained the consent of the Commission (Art. 27 TEU). The EEAS has been created as an autonomous body of the Union under the authority of the HR, made up of a central administration and of the Union Delegations to third countries and to international organisations (Art. 1). The EEAS is tasked with supporting the HR in the fulfillment of tasks foreseen in Art. 18 and Art. 27 TEU. According to Art. 2 paragraph 2 of the decision, the EEAS assists the President of the European Council, the President of the Commission and the Commission in the exercise of their functions in the area of external relations. Its mandate and responsibilities are much broader than those of a traditional diplomatic service. The Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) and the Military Staff (EUMS) form part of the EEAS and are placed under the direct authority and responsibility of the HR (Wouters et al. 2012: 22).

The EEAS is likely to become the centre of information-sharing on the latest political developments outside the Union and foreign policy-making with EU institutions and ministries. Serving the HR, the President of the Council and the Commission, it could complement and harmonise their activities and contribute to horizontal and vertical coherence in European foreign policy (Gaspers 2008: 33).

How do the new instruments work when put into practice and what are the power dynamics that can be witnessed? The first test case for the new institutional setting in CFSP and CSDP, also with regard to the transatlantic perspective, proved to be the Arab Spring and the intervention in Libya in 2011 in particular. The Libyan revolution against the Qaddafi regime began on 17 February 2011 in the context of similar turmoil that occurred in Tunisia and Egypt. After heavy bombardments on the Libyan population by the Qaddafi forces, international pressure for intervening in Libya accelerated, and the EU found itself, as with the Iraqi crisis, in a situation of divergence. France and the UK – partly due to domestic pressures and interests – pushed for military action while Germany abstained from the UNSC resolution vote and rejected the participation of the German forces in the war; this as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council and in spite of the adoption of the UNSC Resolution 1973/2011 that authorised ‘all necessary measures’ to protect civilians in Libya from pro-Qaddafi forces. In so doing, Berlin obstructed the perception of a united and common European approach to the crisis in Libya and contributed to a malfunctioning of the network. Germany’s abstention from the vote on Security Council Resolution 1973 has undermined the EU’s attempts to become a credible global defence player. Germany’s concerns were not to be found in the ends however, but in the means of how to deal with the situation (Corts Díaz 2012: 50).

On the EU level, the first reactions by EU officials were statements issued by the HR, the Council President and the Commission condemning the violence in Libya. While these statements demonstrated a common European approach to the situation in Libya, the later statements by the HR and the Council President proved to be different with regards to the means and ends of the military intervention (Koenig 2011: 8). The events in Libya
showed that the newly created post of the HR has not contributed to strengthening the Union’s common voice and coordination as was originally expected. There are two main reasons underlying this assessment. The first one is that Lady Ashton has been exercising her duties as HR for a relatively short period of time and it could be argued that, in the long term, the new post will become a point of reference under which the EU’s responses towards conflict prevention and crisis management could be orchestrated. The second reason is more related to the personality chosen for this post; contrary to her predecessor, Javier Solana, Lady Ashton does not embody the strong and charismatic personality required to coordinate such an international response vis-à-vis the USA, NATO, China, Russia and other regional organisations (Corts Díaz 2012: 48).

On 22 May, the EU in the framework of the EEAS opened a Liaison Office in Benghazi in order to support ‘the nascent democratic Libya in border management, security reform, the economy, health, education and in building civil society’ (Vogel 2011). Nonetheless, the role of the EEAS remained very limited throughout the whole Libyan operations and this fact was heavily criticised by the European Parliament (ibid: 8-9).

Focusing on EU member states, it was not just Germany that was reluctant to support a stronger EU military engagement in Libya. From an operational perspective, a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the mission EUFOR Libya was elaborated during an extraordinary meeting of the EU Military Committee on 11 April 2011. But due to the opposition of Sweden in the Foreign Affairs Council on 12 April, no agreement could be reached on the concept, the operational plan, or a military operation itself. Sweden’s significance here was its position as the framework nation of one of the two battle groups on stand-by, whose deployment was debated with regard to a possible engagement in Libya (Blochinger 2011). The Swedish position was also supported by Finland that was also taking part in the Nordic battle group in that half year. Obviously, the EU’s response in setting up EUFOR Libya was not supported by all member states, nor did it seem to fulfill the UN’s needs and thus appeared to be rather a symbolic gesture (Koenig 2011: 11). Due to the fact that there was also a disagreement among NATO member states, a coalition of the willing was set up between the USA, Canada, Denmark, France and the UK. Thus, it was mainly a European NATO endeavour backed by the United States to fight the Qaddafi troops, because due to internal pressures, the USA ceded the command of a NATO operation to its European allies. France took the lead as commander of the operation, but President Sarkozy soon discovered that he lacked the support of the majority of EU member states. France’s worst expectations of its EU counterparts’ reliability were confirmed. The UK continued its tradition of unconditionally staying on the side of the USA. As Corts Díaz (2012) rightly points it out, it is interesting to observe how France and Britain have travelled back to the old days of Realpolitik in order to regain importance on the world stage via a pure idealistic logic. The strategic culture of both countries clashes with Germany’s pacifism which has become an object of ‘national pride’. Speck (2011: 3) summarised Germany’s position succinctly by noting that: ‘Since others still make war, we [Germans] have learnt the lessons of history and become a force for peace’. It must be stated though that technically a compromise that would have allowed German participation without military intervention was possible. The Libya crisis has therefore shown the reluctance of German leaders to seek compromises with the international community. The conclusion can be drawn that Germany’s increasing role in the EU’s economy is not leading to a ‘will to exercise foreign policy leadership’ (Speck 2011: 1). Thus, CSDP is faced with a lack of coherence due to the divergence of interests, ideas, norms among the big three major players in foreign, security and defence terms.

On the other hand, the transatlantic security partnership is also the subject of change. Already in January 2012, in its 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance document, an American pivot towards the Asia-Pacific region could be witnessed, which left the Europeans with more responsibility for managing the security needs in their immediate neighbourhood. Operation Unified Protector introduced the concept of the United States ‘leading from behind’, but this term was misleading due to the vital engagement of the United States

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in carrying out the operation. But the Obama administration’s insistence that the Europeans should at least be perceived to be ‘taking the lead’ in Libya represented a paradigm shift in both political and symbolic ways (Howorth 2012: 2). Nonetheless, the non-existence of a common European approach led to frustration on both sides of the Atlantic and the distribution of responsibilities on the European side was not solved. It also showed that in spite of many efforts, powerful EU member states continued to be in the driver’s seat.

CONCLUSION

If we understand governance in the EU as the emergence of new governing arrangements, processes and practices and accept heterogeneity and different interests among actors, the conduct of European foreign, security and defence policy could serve as the best example. Indeed, as shown above, the Lisbon Treaty foresees many players in the making of CFSP and CSDP. With regard to Europe’s foreign, security and defence policy, the EU constitutes a network of these various actors that still operate under the hegemony of national prerogatives. Thus, it is not surprising that for the time being, no real common foreign and security policy has been developed and this still remains at stake, even after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Although the primary objective of the Lisbon Treaty was to allow the EU to become a more effective global actor, the Libya crisis has shown the EU is still far from this goal. Whether or not the capabilities exist to facilitate rapid and effective EU action, it is an open question as to whether member states would be able to agree on their troops’ deployments. The positions of the EU’s major powers concerning Libyan affairs are the most recent and public illustration of a division that has haunted the CSDP. For the near future, no major improvements are visible. With regard to the role of the big three, it seems that France will follow its logic of pragmatism and flexibility in order to pursue its own interests as much as possible. The driving engine concerning UK foreign policy will remain tied to its special relationship with the USA. Until the UK is not forced to choose between the USA and Europe, it will remain caught ‘between a rock and soft place’ (Corts Díaz 2012: 53). Germany, on the other hand, finds itself within ‘a renewed pacifist drift in its foreign policy’ (Speck 2011: 1) that together with its rising economic power makes it seem that Germany is not likely to contribute to a fully-fledged EU foreign policy, as long as its aspirations of building a fully federal Union are not fulfilled.

Despite this negative experience, EU member states are continuing and deepening the institutionalised co-operation in foreign, security and defence policy based on shared norms and thereby reproducing hierarchical structures already in place at the member states level (see Schmidt and Zyla 2012). This political power game within the EU network makes it difficult for other actors to interact properly with the EU. However, due to exogenous forces in global politics, the transatlantic partnership will undergo fundamental changes in the future as the USA is shifting its interest towards Asia-Pacific and is asking whether retreat from Europe will force the EU to do its homework in the immediate neighborhood. Thus, it will be up to the network and the power relations within the network to make European security governance more efficient and better structured.

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1 The term globalization should not be understood restrictively by simply connoting its economic dimension. The more recent literature has also pointed to processes in other policy areas such as social, environmental, or health policy. For a discussion see Scholte (2008) and Zürn (2003).
Indeed, Rhodes (2007: 1246) goes a step further and characterises governance as networks by showing an interdependence between organisations, continuous interactions among network members, game-like interactions rooted in trust, and a significant autonomy from the state.
REFERENCES


