Europe as a Symbol: The Struggle for Democracy and the Meaning of European Integration in Post-Franco Spain

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Abstract

This paper analyses the effect that some political actors’ behaviours had on the image of the European integration process in Spain during General Franco’s dictatorship and its influence on the country’s European policy during the democratic transition and the adhesion to the European Economic Community (hereafter EEC). The EEC’s condemnation of the Spanish political regime and the pro-European stances assumed by the democratic opposition created a strong bond between the ideas of European integration and democratization in the eyes of the Spanish public. After Franco’s death in 1975, joining the EEC was seen as a natural move of the transition to democracy by all political actors and received an overwhelming support from civil society. Consequently, between 1977 and 1985, Spain negotiated its adhesion. Yet, the decision to join the EEC was not just a rational choice in political or economic terms; it was understood as a means to fulfil recognition of the democratization of the country.

Keywords

Spain; European Movement; Public opinion; Civil society; Democratization

Over the last years, research on the history of European integration has increasingly focused on topics relating to public opinion, political consensus, images and stereotypes, reflecting the concern over the democratic deficit that has been traditionally attributed to the process of European integration.¹ Such studies have targeted issues related to historical debates among political parties concerning European integration or the roles of societal actors and pro-European entities, to quote just a few.² Within this context, the Spanish experience is somewhat peculiar. As we shall see in the following pages, the vision of European integration was biased in Spain by the fact that the beginning of the process coincided with the existence of a national authoritarian regime. Further, the regime’s relations with the rest of Western Europe were hampered by the disparity of political systems and deeply conditioned the Spanish vision of European integration and the way Europe was communicated to society. This applies to the Spanish public opinion as well as to Franco’s successive governments and particularly to the period of transition to democracy. Historically, the Spaniards’ self-perception in relation with Europe has questioned in many occasions the Europeanness of Spain. This fact is due to some historical peculiarities of the Iberian country such as the American dimension of the Spanish Monarchy in the past centuries or its historical decline through a series of conflicts, where Spain demonstrated some specific religious or cultural characteristics, signalling a partition with the rest of the continent. This was already handled by the literature of the 18th and 19th centuries, giving rise to a romantic image of Spain, on one side, and the so-called black legend on the other (both originated in Europe and later exported to Spain itself). By 1898, the loss of the remaining colonies in America and the Pacific motivated a self-conscience crisis where Spanish

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intellectuals asked themselves about the very “essence” of the country. Since then, progressive thinkers have identified the approach to Europe with the necessary modernisation of the country’s political, social and economic structures. As philosopher José Ortega y Gasset famously put it in 1910, if Spain was the problem Europe was the solution.

The Spain-Europe dichotomy has been therefore present all throughout the 20th century, as Europe (actually the main powers of Western Europe) has been the reference for progress, modernization and normalization for most of Spanish progressive thinkers. Notwithstanding, the triumph of the insurgents in the Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939 and the following imposition of General Franco’s dictatorship accentuated such dichotomy and filled it with a political meaning: the Spanish regime was condemned and rejected by its neighbours and the main powers after the Second World War. In spite of the international acceptance demonstrated by the agreements signed with the United States and the Vatican in 1953, the country was excluded from the process of European integration from its very beginning and the regime’s first response was a fierce nationalist discourse against the ‘decaying European democracies’. Later on, as the EEC advanced in the implementation of its policies (especially the Common Agricultural Policy, which endangered the Spanish agricultural exports), Franco’s government pointed that it was mandatory in economic terms to get closer to the Community and that there was also a political need to overcome the years of isolation. Nevertheless, the Spanish attempt to join the EEC in 1962 collided against the opposition of the European Parliament and several member states who would not admit a dictatorial regime.

Thus, the Spanish government’s perception of the process of European integration during Franco’s dictatorship was marked by the contradiction between two opposed necessities: on one side, to establish contacts with the member States of the EEC in order to get the crucial investments for the modernisation of the Spanish industry (the same countries whose tourists gained more and more importance for the Spanish economy); on the other, the defence of the authoritarian regime against any attempts to let EEC countries exercise political influence in the relations with Spain. Within this context, the attitude of the anti-Francoist opposition, in conjunction with the EEC institutions, the pro-European entities and other political actors, stressed the importance of the political obstacles - i.e. the dictatorship - that kept Spain apart from Europe. This created a strong bond between democracy and Europe - This was helpful for the opposition since Europeanism could be used sometimes as a semi-tolerated discourse to denounce the regime, given the value of relations with Europe for Franco’s government (especially in economic terms).

3 About the Spanish people’s self-perception in the 19th century, see J. Álvarez Junco, Mater dolorosa. La idea de España en el siglo XIX (Madrid: Taurus, 2001).
As we will see, such identification persisted after the death of the dictator in 1975 at the core of public opinion and political parties’ discourses on European policy. Therefore, democracy, political and economic modernization and the end of international isolation were the keynotes of the Spanish thought on the European process in the immediate post-Franco era. When Spain negotiated the terms of its adhesion to the EEC theoretical considerations about the different ways of political integration or the limits of sovereignty transfers, which were at the core of the European debate in other countries, did not appear on the agenda. Political parties, social partners, media and Europeanist organisations played an important role at communicating a vague idea of Europe connected to democratization and welfare. This helps us understand the overwhelming support Spanish public opinion expressed concerning European integration as an abstract concept - and especially the participation of Spain in it –, whereas general knowledge of, or interest regarding, the Treaties and institutions that shaped the European integration process remained scarce.

THE FRANCO REGIME AND THE DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION BEFORE THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS

From the Foundation of the Communities to the Munich Meeting (1951-1962)

The international community expressed its rejection of Francoist Spain in 1946 through the United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 32 (I) and 39 (I) and the consequent withdrawal of most foreign ambassadors from the country. This rejection resulted in the non-invitation of Francoist authorities to the organisations preceding the unification process in Europe, such as the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) or the Council of Europe. Yet, representatives of the different opposition groups were invited to attend important meetings such as the Congress of London in 1947, where the Socialist Movement for the United States for Europe was created, or the Congress of The Hague in 1948, where the International European Movement was officially established. Anti-Francoist leaders soon realised that taking part in Europeanist groups and activities could be a powerful strategy for several purposes: on one hand it allowed them to spread their criticism of the lack of political freedom in Spain; on the other, they appeared as a democratic alternative to the Franco regime before the democratic countries. Thus, in 1949 the exiled Salvador de Madariaga (liberal), Julio Just (republican), Rodolfo Llopis (socialist) and Manuel de Irujo (Basque nationalist) founded in Paris the Spanish Federal Council of the European Movement (Consejo Federal Español del Movimiento Europeo, CFEME), which became the strongest voice of the opposition’s pro-European trend. The CFEME provided a space for a varied range of anti-Francoist ideologies and the contacts between the opposition and the European institutions. It was also a channel that allowed the opposition to express its desire to join the European integration process once Franco was out of power, turning back to the idea of Europe as a future solution to Spain’s problems.

At the same time, inside Spain, several groups interested in European integration arose with a variety of interests: from economic approaches based on academic research to merely cultural. Among the most prominent ones one has to mention the Society for Spanish and European Economic Studies, founded in 1950 by José Larraz, a former member of government, and the Institutes for European Studies created in Zaragoza and Barcelona. Other groups had a more demanding political character,

like the Association for the Functional Unity of Europe, created in Salamanca in 1955 by professor Enrique Tierro Galván, whose activities would last just a few years due to the government’s pressure. Yet, the most relevant pro-European entity was the Spanish Association for European Co-Operation (Asociación Española de Cooperación Europea, AECE). Founded in 1954 by members of the National Catholic Association of Propagandists under the patronage of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it quickly evolved to pro-democratic stances under the leadership of representatives of Christian democracy such as José Yanguas Messía, José María Gil-Robles or Fernando Álvarez de Miranda. By the late 1950s the AECE was already a leading organisation within the domestic opposition to Francoism, adopting Europeanism as the basic reference for all changes Spain needed to face in order to overcome dictatorship and isolation.

Political parties also endeavoured to promote themselves in the framework of Europeanism. Beyond their presence in the CFEME (and later in the AECE as well), democratic forces tried to come up to their European partners and the EEC institutions in order to get their moral, economic and logistic support for their fight against Francoism. By doing so they also sought to ensure a good position in the scenario of a post-Francoist democratic Spain, anticipating the role that European countries could possibly play in it. For such purpose, the main leftist force from before the war, the Spanish Workers’ Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE), then in exile or secrecy, took advantage of its links with other European socialist parties and the contacts made by its exiled leaders in France. Basque and Catalan nationalist groups promoted the creation of their own regional pro-European entities: the Basque Council and the Catalan Council of the European Movement, both integrated in the CFEME and located in Paris. Moreover, the Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco, PNV) - almost hegemonic among Basque anti-Francoist trends - and the Catalan party Democratic Union of Catalonia (Unió Demòcrata de Catalunya, UDC) - the most pro-European among Catalan forces - joined in 1965 the European Christian Democratic Union together with other Spanish parties through the so-called Christian Democratic Spanish Team. The only significant exception to this trend was the Spanish Communist Party (Partido Comunista de España, PCE), which, following instructions from Moscow, kept itself separate from this Europeanist spirit and condemned the European Community as an imposition abiding only by American interests - a position that would change in the 1970s.

The Francoist government’s first reaction to the creation of the European Communities was suspicious and reluctant. The Spanish press, under strict control by the government, did not pay much attention to the Treaties of Paris and Rome, and the European integration project was presented as a mere chimera. Notwithstanding, some figures within the regime realised the convenience of developing their own version of Europeanism -a conservative and Catholic one,

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16 D. Barba, La oposición durante el franquismo. 1. La democracia cristiana (Madrid: Encuentro, 2001), 128-138.
adapted to the Francoist principles and established links with groups and associations in other countries that had similar standards. Thus, in 1952 a European Centre for Documentation and Information (Centro Europeo de Documentación e Información, CEDI) was founded within the structures of the Institute of Hispanic Culture -created in 1946 for the international promotion of Spanish culture.- Funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the CEDI collaborated with other conservative groups in Europe, such as the Office International of Laussane, the Lerins group in France, Wilton Park in Britain or the Academy of International Law of Brussels, holding meetings and conferences and publishing their proposals for a European construction based on Christianity and traditional values.

Moreover, in 1957, after the signature of the Treaty of Rome, Franco appointed Pedro Gual Villalbí Minister for the observation of the European integration process, with the task of assessing how the EEC and the EFTA would affect Spanish interests. Other new members of the government, such as the ministers of Commerce and the Treasury, Alberto Ullastres and Mariano Navarro Rubio respectively, managed to convince Franco that the autarkical policies applied since the end of the Civil War impeded the recuperation of the Spanish economy and that external aid was indispensable. This led to the entry of Spain in the Organisation for European Economic Co-Operation (OEEC), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in 1958 and to design a plan for the stabilization of the Spanish economy, where priority was given to the introduction of Spain in the international market and the promotion of foreign investments. At last, in February 1962, fearing a breakdown of the Spanish exports after the implementation of the EEC Common Agricultural Policy, Franco finally made up his mind and Spain officially applied for association with the EEC. In the letter addressed to the President of the Council of Ministers of the EEC, Mr. Couve de Murville, the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fernando María Castiella, stressed the “European vocation” of Spain and insinuated that full adhesion should be possible once the economic obstacles were solved, obviating the political distance between the Spanish regime and the EEC.

In this context, Europeanist groups from the opposition took the initiative with the double aim of appearing before the Spanish and international public opinion as a unified front against Francoism, and preventing any temptation from the EEC to accept the Spanish application. In the previous years there had been several attempts to co-ordinate the opposition’s Europeanist efforts: in 1961 the Council of Europe invited some representatives of these groups to speak at the Parliamentary Assembly in the framework of the elaboration of a report on the political situation in Spain; also in 1961 the AECE projected a “pro-European week” that was to be held in Majorca, gathering representatives of political forces from various European countries but it was cancelled by the government just few days before. In June 1962, four months after the Spanish application for the EEC, a new attempt was made in connection with the celebration in Munich of the 4th Congress of the International European Movement. 118 representatives of different organisations from inside Spain and from exile attended the congress. After two days of debates, a common declaration was approved by the Spanish group demanding the EEC to reject Spain’s application as long as democratic and representative institutions did not exist in the country, freedom of speech and strike

were not recognised, political parties were not permitted, and the rights of the regional communities were not respected.25

The symbolic hug in Munich between Salvador de Madariaga, leading figure of the exiled group, and José María Gil Robles, the Catholic monarchist who had led the conservative right before the Civil War, represented the unity of the opposition in its rejection to Franco and their plans for the participation of Spain in the European Communities once the dictator had been left behind.26 Such unity - comprising conservative elements - appeared as the most worrying feature of the gathering to the regime’s eyes. Thus, the Spanish government mobilised its propaganda machinery in order to denounce the congress as a contubernio (an old fashioned word meaning “plot” that was recovered for this occasion), and to present the participants as enemies of the national interest (the Spanish application was anyway neglected after the European Parliament approved the Birkelbach Report, which established that associated countries should have democratic regimes). Personal reprisals were administered against some of the participants in the contubernio who were forced to choose between the exile and the compulsory confinement on the isle of Fuerteventura as they tried to get back to Spain27.

Munich’s contubernio was a fundamental event in the history of anti-Francoist opposition for several reasons. Firstly, the Francoist propaganda had the paradoxical effect of publicising the existence of groups and personalities that had yet remained unknown to the majority of Spaniards as they worked underground or were subject to censorship. Secondly, the contubernio unified most of the opposition groups around the idea of Europeanism and the fight against dictatorship (even the communist party sent two unofficial delegates to Munich). Thirdly, it showed the Spanish people that the EEC’s rejection of Spain was exclusively due to political reasons. It became evident that, though the Spanish government had already understood the economic necessity of joining the Community, this would not be possible as long as Franco remained in power but it could be attained as soon as democracy was re-established. In the following years (and especially after the Press Act of 1966 that allowed some scope for freedom of expression), the growing liberal media focused on this contradiction. Thus, the communication policy of the government unwillingly linked Europe to democracy, and the identification between both concepts, which had been assumed by the opposition since the 1940s, became now evident for a large part of the population. Lastly, the above mentioned unity of the diverse anti-Francoist trends has been interpreted by historians as the historical closing of the political polarisation that led to the Civil War and, at the same time, as an essential step towards the national reconciliation that would make democratic transition possible in the future.28


In spite of the setback experienced in 1962, the Spanish government did not desist from approaching the EEC in economic terms. A second letter was sent to the EEC in 1964 requesting the opening of talks for a commercial agreement. Thus, after a long period of bargains, the EEC and Spain signed a preferential commercial agreement in 1970. It established a mutual reduction of tariffs, especially for industrial products, as part of the commercial policy of the EEC towards its neighbouring countries.

25 F. Álvarez de Miranda, Del’ contubernio’ al consenso (Barcelona: Planeta, 1985); J. Vidal-Beneyto, Memoria democrática (Madrid: Foca, 2007), 27-47.
27 ‘Decreto Ley 17/1962, de 8 de junio, por el que se suspende en todo el territorio nacional y por el plazo de dos año, el artículo 14 del Fuero de los Españoles’, Boletín Oficial del Estado, 138, 9 Jun. 1962, 7909.
The agreement proved to be highly beneficial for Spain as the tariff concessions the EEC made favouring Spain were larger than those the EEC was granted, so during the time the agreement was in effect (until 1986) it favoured the development of the Spanish industrial sector (which had been growing since the 1960s).\footnote{29} Besides, the regime sought to present the agreement as a political success and a proof of international acceptance, despite the fact that the EEC authorities insisted that the agreement completely lacked political content and dealt only with commercial issues.\footnote{30} Nonetheless, Europeanist organisations such as the CFEME and the AECE declared that the agreement did not mark the end of the Spanish problem regarding relations with the EEC and that this problem would be fixed only after the end of the dictatorship.\footnote{31}

During the regime’s final years, the susceptibility of Spain to European influence and the presence of EEC issues in political and economic debates increased. The relative openness of the regime and the influx of capital from France and the Federal Republic of Germany into Spanish industry favoured more and more the inflows of ideas and cultural references challenging some of the conservative principles of the Francoist regime. The rise of tourism, which would become the driving force of the Spanish economy, also had a powerful impact in this sense. On the other side, the relative liberalisation of the press after the Press Act of 1966, which among other changes abolished prior censorship, permitted the publication of liberal journals such as Madrid and magazines such as

\textit{Cuadernos para el diálogo, Arbor or El Ciervo}, where references to European democracies were frequent.\footnote{32} Thus, since a direct denouncement of the Spanish regime’s anachronism was impossible, more and more news about the European Communities appeared in the journals, with articles and reports about democratic regimes and economic welfare, showing indirectly that it was the dictatorship that prevented Spain from joining them. As Manuel Müller pointed out, whilst the regime’s discourse still saw Europe in the context of economic modernisation, the press had expanded the notion that Europe also implied democratization.\footnote{33} Even a part of the catholic and conservative press took part in this process, like the Tácito group, composed of intellectuals and politicians belonging to the Francoist administration whose political thoughts had already evolved to democratic positions; in their articles - published in the catholic journal \textit{Ya} - they defended the necessity of reforms in order to come closer together with European democracies.\footnote{34}

In fact, as the end of the dictatorship approached, the interest of the EEC in the political situation in Spain increased, as well as the efforts made by the democratic opposition to get political, economic and media support from European partners, aiming at promoting their roles in the post-Francoist Spain scenario. After the enlargement to the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark in 1973, the EEC had to negotiate with Spain the conditions of implementation of the 1970 agreement to the new member states. Moreover, following the requirements of the General Agreement on Tariffs and

\footnotesize{29 A. Alonso, \textit{España en el Mercado Común. Del acuerdo del 70 a la Comunidad de Doce} (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1985), 44-73.
32 Censorship continued to be applied anyway after publication, and journals were under the threat of seizures and economic penalties as the article no. 2 of the Act restricted the freedom of press to the limits of the regime’s Fundamental Principles. About the role of the Spanish press in the late Francoism and the Transition to democracy, see C. Castro Torres, \textit{La prensa en la transición española, 1966-1978} (Madrid: Alianza, 2010); I. Renaudet, \textit{Un parlement de papier. La presse d’opposition au Franquisme durant la dernière décennie de la dictature et la transition démocratique} (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2003); K. Maxwell, ed., \textit{The Press and the Rebirth of Iberian Democracy} (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983); M. Á. Aguilar, ed., \textit{Los medios de comunicación en la frontera democrática} (Madrid: Universidad Internacional Menéndez Pelayo, 1982).
34 J. Tusell, \textit{La transición española a la democracia} (Madrid: Historia 16, 1999), 54. Grupo Tácito, Tácito (Madrid: Ibérico Europea de Ediciones, 1975).}
Trade, the agreement had been signed for a period of six years and it had to be upgraded no later than 1976, so delegates from both sides continued to negotiate. At the same time, the European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe renewed their interest in the situation of Spain, sending delegations and approving declarations about the lack of freedom in the country.  

The main political organisations, such as the PSOE or the PCE, published their manifestos and declarations in the foreign press or at meetings organised by European institutions, aware of the fact that the relative freedom of the press existing in Spain would allow their words to cross the borders. In July 1974 the PCE announced at a press conference in Paris the creation of the Democratic Board (Junta Democrática), with the participation of the Socialist Party of the Interior - a leftist party rivalling the PSOE -, the formerly traditionalist Partido Carlista and the labour organisation Workers’ Commissions (Comisiones Obreras, CCOO), together with some individual figures connected with pro-European groups, such as José Vidal-Beneyto, a high-ranking official at the Council of Europe. In June 1975, the PSOE presented also in Paris the Platform for Democratic Convergence (Plataforma de Convergencia Democrática), together with several Christian democratic parties, Basque nationalists, Catalan republicans, some minor communist groups and the trade union General Union of Workers (Unión General de Trabajadores, UGT). 

The role played by European political forces in the promotion and organisation of Spanish parties in the final stage of the dictatorship was crucial, especially in the consolidation of a strong social-democratic alternative that could prevent the risk of a de-stabilisation of the country after Franco’s death. Since the PCE seemed to be the strongest anti-Francoist force not only in exile but also inside the country -where it counted on a wide network of cells and also CCOO’s support-, in the 1970s the PSOE endeavoured to get media, political and financial support from European partners. European socialists - and especially the Socialist Group in the European Parliament - had been at the core of many initiatives denouncing the dictatorship in Spain and supporting the anti-Francoist opposition which had reinforced the pro-European character of the PSOE. The German Social-Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD) assumed a major role in providing economic support to the PSOE through the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. Liberals and Christian democrats from the FRG also understood the importance of sponsoring their partners in Spain and used their foundations as a channel to implement their influence in the democratic transition.

In the end, the last days of Franco’s life coincided with a worsening of relations with Western Europe that eventually placed Spain again in a position of isolation similar to the one it suffered in 1945. In September 1975 eleven death sentences were pronounced against members of the organisations Basque Country for Freedom (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, ETA, Basque separatist) and Anti-Fascist and Patriotic Revolutionary Front (Frente Revolucionario Antifascista y Patriota, FRAP, Marxist-Leninist). Five of them were confirmed by General Franco in spite of petitions for clemency arriving from governments and institutions from around the world - including the Vatican -, and on the 26 September they were executed. A wave of protests arose in many countries, including boycotts against Spanish enterprises, refusal to unload merchandise from Spanish ships or the assault on the

36 F. Jáuregui and P. Vega, Crónica del antifranquismo (Barcelona: Planeta, 2007), 874-887.  
40 A. Muñoz Sánchez, El amigo alemán. El SPD y el PSOE de la dictadura a la democracia (Barcelona: RBA, 2012).
Spanish Embassy in Lisbon. The Council of Ministers of the EEC decided to cancel the negotiations in process and to freeze all relations with Spain, and the EEC countries (with the only exception of Ireland) withdrew their ambassadors from Madrid. Less than two months later, on 20 November, Francisco Franco passed away at the age of 83.41


After his coronation as King of Spain, Juan Carlos I stated in his first speech to the Cortes - the non-democratic parliament established by Franco -:

> "The idea of Europe would not be complete without a reference to the Spanish people and the consideration of the work carried out by many of my predecessors. Europe must count on Spain and we Spaniards are Europeans. It is a necessity of this moment that both sides understand this, and that all of us draw consequences from it."

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The reference to “Europe” - which in this case must be understood as a synonym of the EEC - sought to be meaningful in a moment when relations with Spain were temporarily frozen but a new era started with the decease of the dictator. All parts involved in the transition to democracy - government, political parties, social organisations - understood the importance of getting support from the European Communities for the development of the political reforms but also their acceptance of the Spanish democratic system once it was fulfilled, as a condition for the adhesion to the EEC. Thus, this hazy concept of Europe was recurrent in the public discourses in the year and a half that passed between Franco’s death and the first democratic elections in June 1977. Relations with the EEC countries were a priority for the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, José María de Areilza, who visited all capital cities of the States of the EEC in order to convey the idea that things were changing and a democratic Spain would soon knock at the Community’s door.43 The European Parliament kept a watchful eye on what was going on in Spain: in May 1976 a Resolution based on the Report provided by the French member Maurice Faure declared that the admittance of Spain to the Community was preconditioned upon the success of its political reforms.44 Simultaneously, the Spanish press, less restricted then, increased its interest in the European Communities in the belief that once the political obstacles were surmounted, the Spanish accession would meet no trouble.45

Political scientists and historians have insisted on the fact that the Spanish transition to democracy was built upon the “consensus” of the different forces that took part in it. Although the remaining structures from the Francoist regime, such as the Army, the Movimiento (the official party under Franco regime) and part of the administration, were reluctant to introduce any reforms whatsoever, and some members of the leftist opposition refused to accept any pact with the Francoist elites, the “negotiated reform” was finally the triumphant way that allowed the gradual transformation of the dictatorship into a democratic system through legal changes designed by the government and the

42 'Mensaje del Rey', *ABC*, 23 Nov. 1975, 3.
45 An example of the importance that the communications about Europe had in the media during the transition was the first issue of *El País* (which appeared in May 1976 and became a newspaper of record in the following years), where the front page presented an article about the European Parliament’s demand of recognition of political parties in Spain. R. Vilaró, ‘El reconocimiento de los partidos políticos, condición esencial para la integración en Europa’, *El País*, 4 May 1976, 1. Interview of Ramón Vilaró with the GHistRI (Research Group on History of International Relations of the Universidad Complutense de Madrid), 4 July 2012.
main political parties (“from Law to Law” according to the expression coined by Torcuato Fernández Miranda, one of the leading figures of this process). The idea of Europe -that could be filled with different meanings as we will see- was fundamental for this consensus in several ways. First of all, from a political standpoint all groups shared a not very well defined target of homologación (equalisation) with Western Europe, i.e. the construction of a political system akin to those of Spain’s closest neighbours, so as to finish the irregularity that Francoist Spain had represented in recent history. Secondly, political forces shared the goal of joining the EEC, which in turn demanded such political transformation and remained vigilant with it. In this sense, the admission of Spain to the Council of Europe on November 1977 - before the promulgation of the Constitution - bore a great symbolic value, expressing the acknowledgment of Spain as a democracy. Finally, the involvement of European personalities, parties and foundations in the Spanish transition aiming to influence its results or privilege some actors (for example, the German SPD in favour of PSOE), contributed to strengthen links between the new Spanish elites and the EEC countries.

The Spanish application to the EEC was officially presented on 28 July 1977, just six weeks after the first democratic elections -won by the Union of Democratic Centre (Unión de Centro Democrático, UCD) led by prime minister Adolfo Suárez. Although no debate was held in the Parliament before the application, it counted on the unanimous support of the chamber. Indeed, all parties had included in their electoral manifestos the adhesion to the EEC as the most important target in foreign policy. This made Spain the first country to apply for accession to the EEC counting on the support of all parliamentary forces - which had not been the case, for example, for the two other candidate countries in the same years, Greece and Portugal, where communists and eventually socialists objected to it.

According to B. Álvarez Miranda, three reasons explain this unanimity. First, adherence to the EEC would mean the end of the (relative) international isolation Spain had suffered under Franco. Second, it would weaken reactionary stances and temptations to reverse the democratic process (mainly from the Army), anchoring the country to democracy. Third, all parties understood that adhesion to the EEC would have beneficial consequences for the Spanish economy, due to the importance of commercial exchanges already practised with the member States. Other studies have interpreted the pro-European unanimity as a coincidence rather than as a consensus. Some scholars outline the different meanings the European integration process had for the Spanish political forces during the transition, in accordance with their ideologies. Thus, the socialists would have seen the EEC as the space for the construction of a ‘Europe of workers’, a goal shared by other European socialist parties. For the Communist Party (which only since 1972 had declared itself in favour of a democratic Spain joining the EEC), Europeanism would be a means to distance themselves from Moscow in the context of the Eurocommunist strategy developed in those years together with the communist parties from Italy and France. The political centre and the right would have seen European integration as an opportunity for economic growth and the expansion of enterprises. Finally, nationalist parties from Catalonia and the Basque Country would have pinned

47 E. Muñoz Alemany, El proceso de integración de España en el Consejo de Europa (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1989); J. L. Messía, Por palabra de honor. La entrada de España en el Consejo de Europa, 24-11-1977. Un largo recorrido desde el Congreso de Munich de 1962 (Madrid: Parteluz, 1995).
their hopes of a progressive disintegration of the centralist State on the ideal of the “Europe of the peoples”.49

Nevertheless, when we analyse the parties’ political discourses we see that, above all other considerations, the main value European integration was given in their communication strategies was symbolical. If we take a look at the motivations the parties put forward to defend their Europeanism in election manifestos, parliamentary debates or appearances in the media, we find that economic or strategic arguments were not as frequently used as cultural or historical considerations. We could say that the main parties stuck to a common discourse, basically asserting that Spain being a European country was enough to justify all efforts to join the EEC, above the economic or political benefits. By getting acceptance within the EEC, Spain’s Europeanness would be at last recognised; the secular questioning of the Spanish identity would be finally solved. Thus, apart from offering solutions to specific problems relating to economic development and consolidation of democratic institutions, joining the EEC was seen as the end of the Spanish search for its own identity. The King’s pronouncement mentioned above (“we Spaniards are Europeans”) was somehow the core idea shared by all political trends. This has led some scholars to conclude that the debate on Europe was banal, if it existed at all, for accession to the EEC was not seen as a way to take part in an active integration process but as a recognition that Spaniards were as European as Italians or Germans.50

We can find numerous examples of these attitudes in the documents of the parties during the period of negotiations with the EEC.51 The UCD, which held the government between 1977 and 1982, never did define a concrete strategy in its policy regarding the EEC beyond the will to fulfil the adhesion. Statements of its leaders on European integration were always vague and often contradictory. Interviewed about European policy, prime minister Adolfo Suárez declared that the determination of the Spanish government to join the EEC was grounded in the conviction of “forming part of Europe”, and the member of the government Ignacio Camuñas went as far as to say in Parliament that opposing the adhesion to the EEC would be “reactionary”.52 Unlike the UCD, the other party in power during the period of negotiations, the PSOE (which held the government from 1982 on) had a background of dealing with European integration in its political programmes, since it took part in the Europeanist groups during the dictatorship. Reviewing the articles and notes on the EEC that appeared in the official journal of the party, El Socialista, one perceives an interesting evolution from the years of Francoism, when the EEC was seen as a “Europe of merchants” that needed a radical transformation in order to serve to the working class’ needs, to the democratic period, when the EEC was saluted as a signifier of “freedom, progress and democracy”.53 The PSOE’s positions regarding the negotiations for adhesion were not free of contradictions either: from 1977 to 1982 the PSOE accused the UCD of neglecting the national interest and hastening to conclude the Treaty of


Accession in order to take advantage of it in electoral terms. After 1982, the PSOE government was accused by the opposition exactly in the same terms, especially since Prime Minister Felipe González committed himself to achieve the adhesion before 1986, and the Treaty finally signed in 1985 was deemed severely detrimental by economic sectors like farmers or fishermen.  

The conservative Popular Alliance (Alianza Popular, AP, renamed Popular Party, PP, in 1989), a minor force in the parliament between 1977 and 1982, the main opposition party after 1982, also changed its discourse on the EEC according to circumstances. By 1976-77 its foundational texts and first electoral manifesto interpreted joining the EEC a consequence of “our European condition” and a “policy of prestige” for Spain, giving prominence to cultural and historical considerations over the economic ones. Yet, as the negotiations went on, the AP became the champion of the national interest, backing the employers’ associations in their protests against whatsoever concessions the Spanish government could make to the EEC regarding industrial exports. At the end of the process, the AP was extremely critical about the conditions of the Treaty: the party’s official journal foresaw an “economic disaster” for the northern coast of Spain, affected by the reduction of milk and bovine production, and the loss of 75,000 jobs in the Canary Islands, among other harmful consequences. Nevertheless, the AP never questioned its posture favouring adhesion to the EEC: the furthest it reached in its critical stances was the insinuation of a future renegotiation of the conditions once Spain had fully entered the Community. As a matter of fact, the AP supported the ratification of the Treaty of Adhesion in Parliament and its leaders stressed that their criticism referred only to the way the government had negotiated the adhesion, not to the adhesion itself.

The communists of the PCE had begun to accept the idea of Spain joining the EEC only in the 1970s, as a part of their strategy to get autonomy from the Soviet Union and also as a means to meet the rest of the democratic opposition in a common space in the last years of the dictatorship. After 1975 the PCE kept supporting the accession to the EEC, which, according to secretary general Santiago Carrillo, could be used as an instrument for the international awareness of the working class. Nevertheless, during the negotiations the PCE met other opposition parties in their demand of the defence of national interests, mainly the right of Spanish workers to move to other EEC countries without a transitory period. But the value the EEC had for the communists was also primarily symbolical: in 1983, when Felipe González quitted the idea of leaving NATO, ambiguously arguing that NATO membership would be helpful in the negotiations with the EEC, some members of the PCE Central Committee proposed to withdraw the party’s support to joining the EEC. After voting, the Central Committee refused to do so, on the grounds that such change of position would be seen by
the electorate as “a weakening of our Europeanism”. At last, although the Treaty of Adhesion did not match the PCE’s demands on social issues and rights of workers, the PCE ratified it anyway outlining its “symbolical value” (in the words of parliamentary spokesman Pérez Royo) for the recognition of the Europeanness of Spain.

All these issues show how parties adapted to a situation where Spanish public opinion was overwhelmingly favourable to adhesion to the EEC, but where specific details of the consequences of the adhesion remained obscure and unattractive to the public. Opinion surveys carried out by the Institute for Public Opinion show a wide support to adhesion throughout this period. The percentage for and against joining the EEC evolved as follows: 74-4 in 1976; 56-4 in 1978; 67-7 in 1979; 65-4 in 1980; 65-11 in 1983; 70-6 in 1984; 66-7 in 1985. In some cases surveys inquired the concrete reasons for this support. For example, in 1979, 52 per cent of the interviewed answered that joining the Common Market would benefit the Spanish industry (10 per cent expressed the opposite); 55 per cent agriculture (9 per cent disagreed); 53 per cent employment; 58 per cent trade relations; and 52 per cent tourism. Yet, in a similar survey the same year only 17 per cent of the interviewed considered themselves ‘well informed about the pros and cons of joining the Common Market’ (68 per cent did not). In 1980 the same question yielded a result of 1 per cent feeling ‘very well informed’, 14 per cent who felt ‘quite informed’, 46 per cent ‘little informed’ and 28 per cent ‘not informed at all’. In other words, there was a feeble understanding of the implications of joining the Communities, which the same surveys put down to a lack of interest of the interviewed in the technical issues relating to the EEC.

But this neglecting of technical or political aspects of European integration was parallel to a massive enthusiasm on the recognition of the Europeanness of Spain through the admittance to the EEC. There was a “European fashion” expressed for example through the indiscriminate use of the prefix euro- as a means to embellish or increase the appeal of any product or service. All the same, there was in these years a boom of pro-European organisations in the political as well as the professional fields. After the legalisation of the European Movement in Spain in 1978, all relevant political parties and trade unions adhered to the CFEME, and so did numerous cultural and professional associations. New pro-European groups appeared between 1978 and 1985 within the CFEME or outside of it, such as the European Federalist Youth of Catalonia, the Association for European Integration, the Democratic Association of Women for Europe, or the Spanish sections of the Association of European Journalists, the Council of Municipalities of Europe and the European Association of Teachers, to quote just a few. Europeanism, which during the dictatorship had been a flag of anti-Francoist opposition, had now become a universal attitude, shared by all of the political actors from left to right and including peripheral nationalist parties, trade unions and employers’ organisations.

61 PCE, Central Committee Meeting, 28 Jun 1983, Minutes.
64 The examples range from the Euro-residencias (a group of retirement homes that had no connection with Europe nor the EEC) to eurocola, a cola drink designed by the company Pascual to compete with Coca-Cola in the Spanish market. This spontaneous wave of popular Europeanness was satirised by the theatre company Els Joglars in the TV show Yo somos europeos (broadcasted in 1989), which depicted an old and traditional Spain where all efforts to Europeanize its image were a mere disguise.
65 In some cases the emergence of these pro-European entities was ephemeral. Their historic records are housed at the Archives of the CFEME. See C. López Gómez, ‘El Archivo del Consejo Federal Español del Movimiento Europeo’, in A. Barrio Alonso, J. de Hoyos Puente and R. Saavedra Arias, eds., Nuevos horizontes del pasado. Culturas políticas, identidades y formas de representación (Santander: Universidad de Cantabria, 2011).
Moreover, given the public value *Europeanness* had acquired as a signifier of democracy and modernisation, many parties and institutions struggled to get hold of an Europeanist image by joining supranational (European) organisations. In some cases they even endeavoured to appear “more European” than others: thus, the UGT, one of the founding members of the European Trade Unions Confederation (ETUC), vetoed CCOO access to the ETUC until 1990. Although this veto was officially based on the communist ideology of CCOO, UGT secretary for international relations would admit later that its real purpose was to retain exclusively for the UGT the prestige of being the only Spanish partner of ETUC. A similar controversy existed around the accession of the Spanish agrarian syndicates to the European Committee of Professional Agrarian Organisations (COPA in its French acronym): in 1986 the conservative Spanish Union of Agrarian Federations (*Unión de Federaciones Agrarias de España*, UFADE) and National Confederation of Farmers and Ranchers (*Confederación Nacional de Agricultores y Ganaderos*, CNAG) temporarily vetoed the pro-communist Co-ordinator of Farmers’ and Ranchers’ Associations (*Coordinadora de Organizaciones de Agricultores y Ganaderos*, COAG) access to the COPA. Also in the framework of the European Movement there was a struggle between several organisations to get official recognition: thus, there were two rivaling Spanish women’s sections of the European Movement -that eventually reunited in 1985-; several attempts to create Spanish sections of the Young European Federalists (with which the already existing Catalan section was reluctant to collaborate) and even two federations of municipalities contended for being recognised as the Spanish section of the Council of Municipalities of Europe (CME).

Nevertheless, the integration of unions, employers groups and professional associations in Europeanist organisations responded to a logical concern for the defence of their interests at the EEC level, through the participation in the position making of the Community social partners such as ETUC, COPA or the Union of Industries of the European Communities (UNICE). But, regarding the internal debate in Spain on the EEC and European integration, the meaning of this massive pro-European involvement was virtually nil, since no party nor group could really prove that its stances on European integration topics were significantly different (not to say more or less European) than any other’s. Hence, the Europeanism of political parties and social actors was in general terms as hazy and undefined as surveys proved support of public opinion was to European integration: massive but -paradoxically- irrelevant.

**CONCLUSION**

Political speeches and press articles about the signature of the Treaty of Adhesion of Spain to the EEC on 12 June 1985 presented this fact as the most relevant historical event of contemporary Spain, insisting - again - more on its symbolic value than on the real content of the text endorsed. This

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68 About the split of the feminine section of the CFEME, see Asociación de Mujeres Europeístas, Proceedings, meeting 27 May 1982, *Fondo Movimiento Europeo - Movimientos Femeninos, ACFEME*. ‘Elegida la junta directiva de Mujeres por Europa’, *El País*, 1 Jun. 1982. About the variety of unofficial sections of the Youth European Federalists in Spain, see Proceedings of the Meeting of all Spanish Groups in contact with JEF-Europe, April 1979, HAEU, JEF-22. As to the municipalities, in 1979 several mayors from Catalan towns and villages addressed to the Secretary General of the CME, Thomas Philippovich, asking for the acceptance of a Catalan association of municipalities as the Catalan section of the CME. The CME promoted then the creation of a section representing the whole of Spain, but several Catalan municipalities refused to participate: ‘Constitución de l’Associació Catalana de Corporacions Locals - Secció Catalana del Consell des Communes d’Europe’, October 1979, HAEU, CCRE-185.
assertion has been repeated by the historiography, which has even adopted the year 1986 (when the accession came into force) as the final milestone of the political transition.\textsuperscript{69} That same year, the Eurobarometer ranked Spain as one of the countries with a higher level of satisfaction about the participation in the EEC and support to the ideal of an integrated Europe.\textsuperscript{70} Yet, in a study published by the Spanish Centre for Sociological Research (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, CIS) in 1989, F. Moral concluded that the views the Spanish public opinion had of the EEC were still under the influence of strong stereotypes linking Europe to democracy and modernity.\textsuperscript{71}

These stereotypes were deeply rooted in the history of the mutual perceptions between Spain and Europe and also in the self-perception of the Spaniards in past times. But the relations between Spain and the EEC during Franco’s regime had a profound impact on the Spaniards’ vision of Europe after 1975, as J. Díez Medrano has pointed out.\textsuperscript{72} Specifically, the pro-European strategy developed by the democratic opposition since the 1940s, together with the refusal of the EEC to admit Spain in 1962 and the impact obtained by the Munich meeting, shaped a scenario where identification between Europeanism and democracy deeply marked the role of the EEC in the political debate during the transition and the first years of democracy.

This identification favoured an overwhelming support for accession to the EEC by the public opinion and the unanimity of political parties, but hindered the existence of a genuine debate in which different vision or ideologies on European integration were confronted. Similarly, the public opinion did not perceive European integration as a project to achieve but rather as a point of arrival, and interpreted accession to the EEC as the ultimate recognition of overcoming Francoism. Political parties, meanwhile, deliberately avoided any temptation of questioning too harshly the European policy of the successive governments, fearing that this meant a loss of their pro-European image. Instead, parties and other organisations, such as trade unions, tried to associate their image to pro-European entities such as the European Movement. They adapted to the prevailing Europeanism in post-Franco Spanish society: a widespread and transversal Europeanism, but intellectually uncritical.

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\textsuperscript{71} F. Moral, \textit{La opinión pública española ante Europa y los europeos} (Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 1989). Still in 1992 a CIS survey included the question ‘With which of the following words do you identify Europe?’, and the most repeated answer (ahead of free market, prosperity, concurrence, freedom, welfare, employment, and others) was democracy. Cfr. I. Szmolka, \textit{Opiniones y actitudes de los españoles ante el proceso de integración europea} (Madrid: CIS, 1999), 16.

\textsuperscript{72} J. Díez Medrano, \textit{Framing Europe. Attitudes to European Integration in Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom} (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 159-178.