Communicating European Integration in the Age of the World Wars: Print Media Discourses on the Unity of Europe, 1914-1945

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Abstract

This paper argues that the communication of European integration by the media did not begin with the European unification process after 1950. It draws upon a broad definition of the term ‘European integration’ favoured by modern historiography, and in so doing shows that in the first half of the 20th century journalists communicated various notions of the unity of Europe to their readers. By linking media history and discourse analysis, the article examines three different facets of mediating European integration in German, British and American newspapers between 1914 and 1945. It traces ‘integrational thinking’ in press coverage in three different sectors in particular, namely politics, economy and culture. Although discourses on continental unity were of course ambivalent and far from pointing straight towards European integration in the sense of a present-day European Union, they played an important role in the age of the World Wars. The article thus conceptualises a long-term historical perspective on communicating European integration.

Keywords

European integration; 1914-1945; Print media; Cartelization; Radio

‘EUROPEAN INTEGRATION’ BEFORE 1945?

The years between 1914 and 1945 in many ways marked an epoch of violent disintegration in Europe and could certainly never be described as the heyday of “European thought”. Be that as it may, the communication of European integration by the media did not begin with the political unification of Europe after 1950. Rather, journalists in European and extra-European countries communicated various notions of the unity of Europe in the first half of the 20th century. By shaping and often “transnationalizing” the political discourse, they sometimes even became “political actors” in their own right.¹

For the purposes of this paper it is necessary to define the term “European integration”, which has been re-evaluated by newer historiography. Studies on European integration developed rapidly after 1945 and were initially shaped by theory debates primarily influenced by historical writing and political science. Traditionally limited to the fields of politics and economics, they were with few exceptions² restricted to developments following the end of World War II. Up to the present day many textbooks on European integration only commence with 1945 and thus categorically ignore the foregoing years.³ After the content- and time-related focus of classic integration concepts had been successively expanded during the last two and a half decades by incorporating the aspect of societal

integration in the form of structural convergences and conflations on the social plane,\(^4\) more recent European studies have highlighted a further perspective, namely that of culture. This does not refer to those cultural policies pursued within the framework of the European unification process,\(^5\) but rather to a debate reaching much farther back in history than 1945 about the continent and its essential characteristics, and hence the development of ‘collective thought patterns that ascribed a certain identity – of whatever kind – to Europe and thus construed it as a single entity’.\(^6\)

Along with Guido Thiemeyer\(^7\) this paper will therefore distinguish between three facets of “European integration”: First, straightforward political integration, to wit the formal institutionalisation of Europe, marked, e.g., by the founding of European organisations. This process is deeply connected with the founding and development of the European Communities after World War II, though it had – as will be shown – unsuccessful or shorter-lasting predecessors. An economic or social integration of the continent marks the second facet of “European integration”, important elements of it being the creation of a common market, the equalisation of lifestyles, the interweavement of European societies, and growing transnational contacts in the realm of civil society. As Hartmut Kaelble and others have shown, historically these developments can only be conceived as long-term processes dating far back into the 19th century.\(^8\) Thirdly, one must not overlook the cultural dimension of “European integration”, which involves how contemporaries thought about, imagined and perceived “Europe” as a common unity, namely the construction of a “European identity”. Thiemeyer convincingly argues that, while there are close interconnections between the individual elements of “European integration”, it is analytically useful – especially for historians – to draw clear distinctions between them, not least because it enables us to take a long-term perspective on the integration of the continent. Thus defined, the concept of “European integration” for the years preceding 1945 seems not at all anachronistic, as claimed by Wolfgang Burgdorf,\(^9\) and can thus be referred to in the following to help analyse and interpret not merely current public debates about Europe but also discussions in the print media, which have identified some of the integrative tendencies within Europe that can be discerned in the political, economic and social sectors.\(^10\)

Methodologically, this paper aims to link media history and discourse analysis. While conducting a qualitative media content analysis, it treats newspapers as platforms for discourses relevant to society. Drawing on a constructivist approach in terms of cultural history, it will be argued that Europe and thus “European integration” do not exist per se, but only as discursive constructs.\(^11\) Quality papers provide an ideal source for examination, as the print media were both actors and instruments in the communication of “European integration”. By avoiding high literature, political theory and the history of ideas in favour of mass-media sources spanning a broad thematic spectrum, this paper aims to determine the public meaning of “Europe” for contemporaries in a much more thorough manner than was done in previous research. Moreover, newspapers play a particularly significant role with respect to the historical shaping of “European” modes of thought.

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\(^7\) Ibid., 9-12.


\(^10\) This paper will not directly address any aspects concerning the disintegration of Europe in the interwar years that has been the subject of many studies; regarding the economic sector cf. J. Eloranta and M. Harrison, ‘War and disintegration, 1914-1950’, in S. Broadberry and K. O’Rourke, eds., *The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe. Volume II: 1870 to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 133-155.

One of the basic insights of recent culture and media history is the recognition that communicative processes and structures have played a decisive role in shaping the construction of social realities and can thus be viewed as essential vehicles for establishing and stabilising collective identities. The media in their turn shape communication, which can then be experienced in large-scale modern societies that do not permit direct interaction among their members. The constitutive, socialising impact of the media, nowadays parleyed with slogans like “media culture” and “media society”, is the result of a long-term historical process that was catalysed and accelerated by the media revolution taking place during the final decades of the 19th century. The circumstances of gradual media dissemination – which of course occurred at different times in different nations and was accompanied by ambivalent consequences that need not be discussed in detail at present – were to be found mainly in such milestones of technical progress as the invention of the high-speed printing press with subsequent mass newspaper circulation and telegraphy, which significantly expedited the emergence of the modern popular press. The “golden age” of the press, which now dawned in the form of a veritable “newspaper boom” and applied equally – albeit with some slight differences – to all three of the countries analysed (Germany, Great Britain and the USA), was of course also definitively linked to growing press freedom and increasing literacy rates in the respective societies.

At the same time the media revolution guaranteed an internationalisation of coverage in the dailies, for example by means of correspondent networks established by many newspapers, and the emergence of news agencies. As a consequence of their increasing cross-border activity, the print media in a sense became a transnational community of discourse in which processes of journalistic dialogue, mutual observations and citations – although not always by consensus – and finally a tendency for national media agendas and news contents to align were the dominant characteristics.

This development generated specific conditions that led to a more or less steady consolidation of communication, particularly in Europe. In this context the development of European communication structures facilitated the transfer of knowledge about foreign countries in general and the continent of Europe in particular, allowing Europeans to engage in figurative encounters and contacts. Ultimately the media thus functioned as important agents of cultural translation and allowed individuals to experience the European space. Therefore, if imagined communities are primarily created via their reception of mass media, it was precisely the daily press, as the preeminent basic medium during the first half of the 20th century, that furnished the infrastructure for European

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discourse and consequently provides an ideal research subject for this paper, for the construct “Europe” is also primarily constituted and stabilised by means of communication and interaction in the media.\footnote{P. Ther, ‘Comparisons, Cultural Transfers, and the Study of Networks. Toward a Transnational History of Europe’, in H.-G. Haupts and J. Kocka, eds., Comparative and Transnational History (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009), 204-225, 215.}

A digital full-text analysis allows the examination of a very broad spectrum of articles concerning European integration and a quantification of the findings. Several thousand articles conveying European perspectives are included in this investigation. While the paper places emphasis on articles that incorporate the term “Europ*” in the headline, it does not distinguish between the various forms of journalistic presentation. With regard to the discourse-analytical approach it makes no difference whether representations of European integration were articulated in editorials, reports or news dispatches. Rather it is crucial that specific representations appear frequently, as they were printed repeatedly by the newspapers. The countries selected for examination are nations whose position on Europe and the European idea differed and which – not least in the perception of contemporaries – represented the centre of Europe (Germany), its periphery (Great Britain), and finally, the outside view on Europe (USA). Two newspapers which complement each other analytically will be studied per country: The Kölnische Zeitung and the Vossische Zeitung, The Times and the Manchester Guardian, the New York Times and the Chicago Tribune.

THREE FACETS OF ‘EUROPEAN INTEGRATION’ IN PRINT MEDIA RECEPTION BETWEEN 1914 AND 1945

*Communicating the political integration of Europe*

German, English and American quality papers partly reflected the political unification discourses of the interwar period, which were strongly led by intellectuals and politicians who argued that Europe could only save itself from downfall through unification.\footnote{Cf. e.g. ‘Dr. Butler Prophesies “The United States Of Europe”. Certain to Come, Says the Head of Columbia University’, New York Times, 18 Oct. 1914, SM3; ‘Für die “Vereinigten Staaten von Europa”’, Vossische Zeitung, no. 369, 7 Aug. 1923, 1-2; ‘The United States of Europe. How to Make War Impossible’, Manchester Guardian, 5 May 1924, 4; ‘Wheeler Urges Turning Europe into Federation’, Chicago Daily Tribune, 13 Mar. 1944, 2.}

As for the contemporary motives of this perceived desire for a political “European integration”, most articles point to peacekeeping and increasing prosperity, which European nations could not achieve individually. Sometimes journalists even became independent actors, they themselves demanding a stronger political cooperation in Europe; this holds true especially for the Berlin-based Vossische Zeitung, which was the only quality paper to strongly focus on the unity of Europe in the 1920s; for example by publishing a long and emphatic editorial with the evocative title “Einigt Europa!” in early 1926.\footnote{‘Einigt Europa!’ Vossische Zeitung, no. 128, 17 Mar. 1926, 1-2.}

However, the only small time frame in which the daily press was intensely debating the question of a political unification of Europe along democratic and federal lines were the late 1920s and early 1930s, especially in connection with the failed European unification initiative of French politician Aristide Briand in 1929/30.\footnote{Cf. ‘United Europe Plan Set Forth to 28 Nations’, Chicago Daily Tribune, 10 Sep. 1929, 1; ‘European Federation. M. Briand’s New Initiative’, The Times, 19 Apr. 1930, 10; ‘Briand’s Vorschlag überreicht. Das Europa-Memorandum’, Vossische Zeitung, no. 232, 17 May 1930, 1; ‘A Federation Of Europe. M. Briand’s Memorandum’, The Times, 17 May 1930, 11; ‘Briands Europapakt’, Kölnische Zeitung, no. 427, 7 Aug. 1930, 1.}

The journalists showed basically no interest whatsoever in covering the various European movements\footnote{See C. H. Pegg, Evolution of the European Idea, 1914-1932 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983).} in the inter-war years. Most importantly the Pan-European Movement, founded in 1923 by Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi and a favoured object of research
by present-day European historiography, never in fact became more than a side issue in quality press coverage. With the exception of the *Vossische Zeitung*, whose long-time chief editor, Georg Bernhard, was a close friend of Coudenhove, who even contributed articles himself from time to time, “Pan-Europe” was notoriously absent from German, English and American newspapers. Neither *The Times* nor the *Manchester Guardian* even mentioned the idea and organisation prior to 1926 (the year of the first congress of the Pan-European Union in Vienna) and only referred to it once in a while in later articles. The unimportance of the Pan-European movement in the eyes of the quality papers is further revealed by the fact that the name “Coudenhove-Kalergi”, in percentage terms, was probably the most misspelled individual name in the daily press of the 1920s.\(^{25}\)

Anti-liberal, nationalist-hegemonic, and even more or less violent unification models clearly had more impact on newspaper coverage dealing with the political integration of Europe between 1914 and 1945 than did their liberal counterparts. Until 1945, they posed, in a way, not an alternative path of “European integration” but rather the common one. When for example during World War I German author and politician Friedrich Naumann published his bestselling book “Mitteleuropa” in connection with the question of war aims, a lively debate broke out which was not restricted to Germany. While this plan, which called for a European confederation spanning large parts of Central and Southeast Europe under the relatively informal domination of Germany, was in fact a fairly modest manifestation of German war aims, English and American journalists portrayed “Mitteleuropa” as an immense threat not only for the Allied war efforts, but also for their political system as a whole.\(^{26}\) One reason for this was the apparent lack of a counter concept of their own for the integration of Europe. Thus, the *Times* published a letter to the editor from a businessman who complained that up to that point about 80 per cent of his fellow countrymen were completely indifferent to “European politics” and suggested maps of German “Mitteleuropa” to be hung up at public places to awaken interest in the problem in England.\(^{27}\)

This shortcoming revealed itself once again in an even more dramatic way during the first half of World War II, when the military successes of the National Socialists actually “unified” a large part of Europe. The de facto “integration” of the continent was, of course, by no means a “European”, but rather a nationalistic unification, that was to a certain degree conventionalised in German propaganda as the building of a “New Europe” serving as a bulwark against Bolshevism.\(^{28}\) While this propagandist character was regularly emphasised by English and American journalists, they were clearly alarmed by the purported positive reception of the “new European order” by some of the occupied and allied countries.\(^{29}\) A leading article in the *Chicago Tribune* in early 1943 emphasised that ‘Hitler, in creating a European super-government, may be perpetrating a fiction, but he has stumbled upon a device very useful to his purposes’. Through this deception, the National Socialists could secure the loyalties of non-Germans in the name of Europe and thus ‘will have established a legalistic base for conscripting all the labour and troops’ they need: ‘They will be fighting for Europe

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– their Europe.\textsuperscript{30} Once more the absence of Allied concepts regarding continental unification and the perceived threat of the National Socialists’ “new European order” went hand in hand. Leading articles and commentaries in British and American papers agreed that the Allies needed to demonstrate more precisely that they could offer Europe an alternative to the German “New Europe”.\textsuperscript{31} Thus, the \textit{Manchester Guardian} complained in October 1940 that so far not enough was being done to stimulate “the imagination of Europe” with a democratic plan for the integration of Europe in answer to the proposals of Hitler.\textsuperscript{32}

\textbf{Communicating the economic integration of Europe}

While mostly sceptical of, or completely uninterested in, any initiative towards political integration of the continent, the newspapers under study broadly covered attempts at transnational economic cooperation in Europe during the interwar period. German and British journalists emphasised the need for stronger economic unity on a regular basis, often stressing close ties between the European national economies that presumably even formed a natural economic entity.\textsuperscript{33} In the face of persistent economic problems during the interwar years, newspapers in Germany, England and the USA often occupied themselves with concrete policy initiatives for Europe’s economic, financial and industrial integration.\textsuperscript{34} Although various attempts undertaken on the political side to effect a stronger economic unification of the European states, especially in the years between 1925 and 1933, were unquestionably tentative and lastly unsuccessful, the daily press devoted a great deal of attention to them and emphatically stressed the importance of international rapprochement in this area. Thus reports on potential accords for reducing customs fees, cooperative measures in questions of agriculture, currency and finance, and fundamental economic negotiations between European states frequently appeared in newspapers as a means of providing a glimmer of hope during the economic crisis.\textsuperscript{35}

Hence in the spring of 1930 and in spite of the trade conflicts plaguing the nations on the continent, the \textit{Vossische Zeitung} expressed the hope that the Geneva tariff conference would at least offer a respite that might further the “economic consolidation of Europe”.\textsuperscript{36} The \textit{Times} declared the French Tardieu Plan, issued at the beginning of 1932 and providing for a tariff preference system expanded

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item 'Hitler's New Europe', \textit{Chicago Daily Tribune}, 19 Mar. 1943, 16.
\item 'The War and Democracy', \textit{Manchester Guardian}, 3 Oct. 1940, 4.
\item ‘Zweiteilung Europas’, \textit{Vossische Zeitung}, no. 110, 6 Mar. 1930, 2.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
to form a kind of Danube Federation with an array of central European states, to be a first ‘experiment in that policy of European solidarity which all good men wish’.37 One year later Ferdinand Kuhn, Jr., chief London correspondent for the New York Times, interpreted a wheat commodities accord agreed by 21 European states as a first auspicious defeat for the economic nationalism that had been rife in Europe for some time.38 In fact, despite its having a more or less strong anti-American thrust, even US papers occasionally promoted stronger economic integration for Europe, e.g. in the shape of a pan-European tariff union, in the expectation that it would also be of advantage for the United States in the long term.39

**Cartelization**

Moreover the daily press repeatedly examined in great detail the *de facto* achievements in economic integration effected by the private sector. Of central significance in this context was the watchword of cartel-building that also shaped the discourse about “Europe”, especially during the 1920s and early 1930s, when many international cartels were established. These were generally short-lived and fragile but nevertheless exceedingly numerous.40 In fact, as a rule, journalists scrutinised this development very carefully and portrayed agreements and settlements about production rates, prices, import and export quotas as well as the actual establishment of cartels within specific branches of industry in a positive light.41 Thus in 1926 the Berlin correspondent of The Times reported on a forthcoming conference to be held by leaders of the European coal industry for the purpose of abolishing the ‘disastrous competition in the coal markets’ by forming a continental syndicate.42 One year later both the New York Times and the Chicago Tribune published an article identifying the slow post-war recovery of consumption as the cause of the formation of trusts and cartels in Europe, a phenomenon which was now manifesting itself to an unprecedented extent.43 In

37 'Cooperation in Europe. A New French Proposal', The Times, 7 Mar. 1932, 12. On the Tardieu Plan, that was mainly conceived in reaction to the German-Austrian Customs Union project of the previous year and as a counterbalance to the growing influence of Germany in the Danube region, but had to be abandoned in April 1932 at the Four Power Conference in London due to vigorous German and Italian opposition, cf. Schmale, *Geschichte Europas*, 132. The Vossische Zeitung thus interpreted the integration plan of the French Minister President Tardieu as an attempt at interest-driven nationalist politics and accused France of having missed every opportunity to engage in “constructive common policy” and hence find a way out of the European crisis (cf. ‘Zwischeneuropa’, Vossische Zeitung, no. 150-151, 29 Mar. 1932, 1-2; ‘Ein halbes Jahr zu spät’, Vossische Zeitung, no. 160, 2 Apr. 1932, 1-2).


42 ‘European Coal Markets’, The Times, 19 Apr. 1926, 14, 16.

the summer of 1929 the *Vossische Zeitung* reprinted an article from the London *Daily Mail* that called for England to affiliate itself with the ever more closely-affiliated European industrial unions because they believed it to be sensible from an economic standpoint.44

The fact that cartel formation and agreements made by European industry were often implicitly and sometimes explicitly directed against competition from the USA and hence – like an aluminium cartel founded in 1926 – had some anti-American features, was noted with interest by observant journalists and examined critically by American newspapers in particular. Nevertheless in the mid-1930s the *New York Times* described the work of European cartels now dominating various sectors of industry in a thoroughly positive manner, seeing in them a model for Franklin Roosevelt’s *New Deal*, which the paper supported. The reason for this was that Europeans not only tolerated, but indeed welcomed measures similar to the *National Industry Recovery Act*, which was highly controversial in the USA due to its proposed state interventions in industry and economy, as a means ‘of organizing individual business in order to avoid the risk of unlimited competition’.45

With the founding of the *International Steel Cartel* in the autumn of 1926 the debates surrounding the consolidation and aggregation of a European economic space by means of syndicate formation reached their climax. The print media had already kept a sharp eye on opening negotiations to finalise a European steel pact initiated two years previously, which was highly anticipated.46 The *New York Times*, for example, quoted the CEO of the *United States Steel Corporation* as stating that the union of European competitors was by no means necessarily disadvantageous for producers in the USA, and that in fact he hoped that the new syndicate would succeed.47 An article in the foreign edition of the *Vossische Zeitung* commented that the transnational economic entanglements in Europe, which had been expedited by the emergence of cartels, not only made financial sense, but represented the best possible security measure for political peace at the same time.48 This judgment was also confirmed by the Paris correspondent of the *Kölnerische Zeitung*, who approvingly referred to a French newspaper article arguing that the continent had finally embarked upon the doubtless long road leading to a United States of Europe, and that increasing economic cooperation had finally averted the danger of a Franco-German conflict in particular.49

In the wake of the actual conclusion of the *International Steel Cartel*, German, British and American newspapers intensified their coverage, giving in-depth information about the association’s activities.50 In so doing, the journalists repeatedly highlighted the importance of the syndicate. The

Berlin correspondent of the *Times* reported at the beginning of 1926 that there were voices in Germany claiming that the creation of the European Steel Cartel had been the most important event since the end of the war.\textsuperscript{51} Several days later, in a letter to the editor, a reader stated that he “highly welcomed” the creation of cartels, which he viewed as symptomatic of the general tendency towards continental consolidation, and produced a long list of numerous contemporaneous transnational alliances as well as projected ones, even going so far as to mention the “European Association of Bottle Manufacturers”, which purportedly included all of the important producers in this sector.\textsuperscript{52} At the beginning of the 1930s, on the occasion of a meeting held by the syndicate in Paris, the *New York Times* informed its readers, with obvious admiration, about the previous successes of this “powerful industrial combine” and its latest plans ‘for making Europe’s first great achievement in industrial unity the most powerful factor in the world steel trade’.\textsuperscript{53} Shortly after Great Britain joined the cartel in the middle of the decade, the *Times* quoted a statement made by the chairman of an English steel corporation that the nation’s iron and steel industry was working amicably with the cartel to the benefit of all parties.\textsuperscript{54}

Overall, during the interwar years German, British and American newspapers projected various notions of an on-going economic integration of Europe. Despite the economic nationalism of those years the necessity and importance of transnational agreements was often emphasised, and their occasional conclusions were welcomed. In the face of a lasting economic depression in most continental states, cooperation across national boundaries was viewed as a means of solving problems, initiating recovery processes, and increasing prosperity.

### Communicating the cultural integration of Europe

The third example of “European integration” coverage focuses on the development and subsequent Europeanization of infrastructure networks which, according to newer historiography, forms an important facet of the *de facto* integration of Europe in the first half of the 20th century.\textsuperscript{55} This process was intensely scrutinised by contemporary journalists, whose reporting implicitly or explicitly reflected the changing “mental maps” of Europe with respect to technical progress and modernization, as can best be illustrated in the field of radio broadcasting. The newspapers especially highlighted the possibility of transnational wireless reception by publishing information about European radio programs, for example, or details about the frequencies and wavelengths of foreign stations.\textsuperscript{56} In 1928, the *New York Times* dedicated a long article to questions of transnational broadcasting in Europe and particularly stressed the “thrill” it represented for Europeans. A map (next page) illustrated the opportunity enjoyed by a London listener ‘[to] travel across Europe from nation to nation’ thanks to the reception of more than 200 European broadcasting stations.\textsuperscript{57}

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\textsuperscript{51} ‘European Steel Trust’, *The Times*, 2 Oct. 1926, 10.
even further, the *Chicago Tribune* pointed out a ‘whole new world of possibilities of European intercourse’ due to radio broadcasting, which in fact could function as a ‘possible cementing influence between nations now becoming dimly conscious of a unity that the foreground of their history seems to deny’. For this reason, radio broadcasting was even foreseen to have direct implications for the international politics of Europe in the medium term.\(^{58}\)

*Figure 1: A Variety of Languages and Music from Foreign Lands Greets the Broadcast Listener in England*

Consequently the radio appeared not only as a communication channel that helped to rapidly overcome wide distances, but also as a contact medium that changed traditional perceptions of space in Europe, and as such was a kind of European cultural mediator. In this vein the *Times* wrote about an international Christmas program broadcast by the BBC that included musical contributions from various European countries. Behind this was the idea of acquainting listeners with ‘the voices of ordinary people on the Continent at Christmas’, in order to highlight commonalities and differences in the way the feast was celebrated throughout Europe.\(^{59}\) As early as the summer of 1920 the *Chicago Tribune* and the London *Times* reported on a concert given by the opera singer Nellie Melba in Chelmsford, England, which was broadcasted live to many parts of Europe, including for example Berlin, Warsaw, Madrid and Oslo.\(^{60}\) In addition to musical performances,\(^{61}\) German, British and

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American journalists covered traditional dance music, election results, coronation ceremonies and obituary reports that were transmitted transnationally via radio.62

A specific European-ness possessed by the medium of radio was thus, on the whole, perceived by the print media with great appreciation and acknowledgement. Of course radio reports, especially those giving accounts of technological advances, frequently had nationalist overtones such as when the leading role played by some European nations was to be emphasised.63 In this context the Times even went so far as to diagnose a “Race for Power” among the nations of the continent, which might lead to problems in the allocation of wavelengths and consequently disturb reception.64 Conversely, this argumentation underscored the relevance of the European space as a category of reference not to be ignored in questions of modernisation, which explains why the development of broadcasting and radio during the interwar years nevertheless continued to be viewed from a European vantage point.65 In 1925 the Chicago Tribune even saw a kind of internal momentum at work in the development of broadcasting in Europe, one that defied attempts by several nations to exercise stricter controls.66 Only a few years before the outbreak of the Second World War Orrin Dunlap Jr., the first radio editor of the New York Times, stated that even in “war-shadowed Europe” no standstill could be detected in this regard: ‘Politically the Old World may be confused, but in radio it seems to be moving in one direction – ahead, despite barbed-wire frontiers and fortifications’.67

The main problem in expanding the continental radio network was seen to lie in the aforementioned question of how to allocate European frequencies. That the confusion in the European network which resulted from numerous transmitters located within a limited area and generating high rates of interference could only be remedied through international cooperation was evident not only to the watching journalists of the Times and the New York Times.68 The Vossische Zeitung repeatedly deplored “Europe’s unfortunate broadcasting conditions” and the “difficult radio situation” on the continent and hence also the chaos resulting from the ‘impracticality of European frequency allocation.’69 Nevertheless the Berlin newspaper did express sympathy for the requests of smaller

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nations for a redistribution of frequencies, even if this was directed against the interests of older and mightier “radio nations”, Germany among them, that had so far secured the best frequencies for themselves. The Manchester Guardian also pointed out the limited continental “Ether Space” in the light of which the tendency towards modern, high-performance transmitters in Europe called for extensive cooperation among European states. Particularly in the decade between 1925 and 1934, German, British and American print media repeatedly reported on international conferences dedicated to solving this problem. In this way the coordination of radio frequencies in Europe became a symbol for the necessity of Europe-wide cooperation in modern times.

What the more recent history of technology has described as Europe’s “hidden integration” thus involved in the field of radio a second component in addition to the technical forms of its infrastructure, namely the transnational cooperation that seemed unavoidable if there was to be continued development. Journalists repeatedly stressed the presumed successes of this kind of Europeanization. When delegates from eight European states met in London in April of 1925 and founded the “International Broadcasting Union” (UIR), that was later gradually expanded and whose main responsibility was the allocation of transmission frequencies in Europe, it was not only the Vossische Zeitung that reflected on the significance of the new “European Radio Headquarters”. Even in the USA there was a downright euphoric reception for the organisation in particular and of tendencies towards stronger cooperation of the European broadcasting nations in general. Thus the New York Times commented that European development in broadcasting was groundbreaking even in comparison with the USA, not so much in respect of technical advances but rather “when it comes to establishing order and coherence in the sphere of broadcasting”. The conferences, wavelength testing and scientific congresses regularly organised by the UIR were reported on exhaustively and with a sense of hope.

Consequently, the watching media mainly portrayed the integration of broadcasting in Europe as a success story. When the UIR celebrated its tenth anniversary in 1935, it was not mere chance that...
the London Times paid it tribute with a lengthy article that recast the goal of the organisation’s founding as the desire to save the ‘European broadcasting situation from a threatening chaos’. Had the frequencies previously been allocated on purely national grounds, ‘although the stations had international spheres of influence’, the situation had vastly improved since that time thanks to the efforts of the UIR.\textsuperscript{78} An editorial published a few days later even judged its history to be a ‘conspicuous example of the success with which European countries can cooperate when cooperation is essential’, an observation given additional weight by the ensuing publication of a letter of thanks sent to the editor by the UIR’s General Secretary.\textsuperscript{79}

CONCLUSION

All in all, German, British and American newspapers surprisingly reflected and communicated various forms of “European integration” at a time when not many people within and without the continent were concerned with the unification of Europe. Whereas between 1914 and 1945 notions of a political integration of Europe were only marginal issues of newspaper coverage, the quality press kept a keen eye on economic manifestations of continental integration. Most importantly, during the interwar years the cultural side of an ongoing European integration process was emphasised, not least in connection with certain developments of modernity such as radio broadcasting, but also with other processes such as the aggregation of electricity networks in Europe.\textsuperscript{80}

While this cultural dimension arguably had the biggest impact on communicating “European integration” during the first half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, journalists recognised strong interconnections among the three outlined facets of the integration process. They rarely championed any direct political integration of the continent but rather emphasised the \textit{de facto} existence of European unity and the need for transnational cooperation in the economic sector as well as in connection with the development of radio broadcasting. In this respect they indeed took on the role of political actors because, in the heyday of nationalism, they placed European issues firmly on the public agenda. Their reporting and news coverage showed that the relationship between the “nation” and “Europe” was often not characterised by a rigid antagonism; rather, the omnipresent national objectives were frequently interpreted and discussed within a European framework, which indicates an increasing awareness of the importance of transnational contacts and relations. It can therefore be said that newspapers projected and communicated broad notions of “European integration” at a time where the terms “Europe” and “integration” were separated as widely as one can possibly imagine on an actual historical and political level. Thus they helped to create a common ground for integrative thinking that must be regarded as an important factor in understanding the history of “European integration” in its long-term perspective.

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