The EU and Strategic Culture: Virtual Identity vs Uploaded Preferences

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1. Introduction

TI. Introduction1: Clashing Constructivisms
During the last decade of the twentieth century, International Relations theorists witnessed a clash of two theory sets. On one side, realist theories, seemingly invulnerable to attack with their wide-ranging explanatory powers. Ranged against realism were the newer constructivist contenders, which successfully engaged with realism by explaining the behavioural outcomes integral to power and interest. Constructivism presented a challenge to realism based on three propositions, all of which have shed light on actor construction and motivation in ways not previously appreciated in the discipline of IR. First, agents as socialising entities are mutually constituted within the structure that they inhabit. Second, structures themselves need not always be material in nature but may also be normative or ideational. Third, the crucial role of identity constituting both interests and outcomes.

Providing IR with new methods of understanding the world of international politics, constructivism placed previously unappreciated ideational and cultural elements firmly on the agenda. However the task of tackling culture as a variable and isolating the ideational motivations inherent in actor behaviour is fraught with difficulties, a task that too soon began to divide the constructivism camp. Two clear camps have arisen to battle over the epistemology and methodology of studying social units in a socialised structure. Conventional constructivism is the first sub-set, and is located firmly within mainstream social science practices. Following the research design initiated by Wendt, Adler, Checkel and others, conventional constructivism continues to focus on ideational themes including norms, society and culture, but ‘its scholars are largely positivist in epistemological orientation’ as well as dedicated bridge-builders.2 When faced with the task of amassing empirical casework to explain institutional and organisation outcomes, conventional constructivism appears an obvious choice.

In contrast, for those theorists investigating ‘how possible’ questions involving actor identities, interests and behavioural outcomes, the second sub-set of critical constructivism affords a natural home. Critical constructivism rejoices in its use of a constitutive epistemology, its rejection of positivist approaches and its ‘variety of discourse-theoretic techniques’.3 However, this approach also dismisses the suggestion of causal links between the ideational forces of identity and the behavioural responses of preference formation and policy outcome. For many, critical constructivism possesses a mandate that appears too broad (even tautological) in its insistence on a multidisciplinary approach that ‘illuminate[s] the effects of a given political-economic structure upon institutions and individuals… and in turn, their cumulative effects upon that structure’ yet is unable to investigate such effects due to its persistent critical belief that no theory ‘is independent of men or has a growth of its own’, which by implication resists all attempts at analytical rigour.4 Critical constructivism also remains guarded over attempts to generate empirical case studies,
or any outcome-related analysis, preferring to concentrate not on outcomes but on the broader cultural formation of outcomes.

Is it possible to access a research programme that reconciles the best of both constructivist sub-sets? One suggestion is the constructivist-culturalist approach begun in the 1970s known as ‘strategic culture’. Strategic culture has existed on the margins of constructivist development, but represents no less powerful an approach to understanding the discursive qualities of culture in explaining actor identity, preferences and behaviour required by critical theorists while simultaneously retaining enough of a positivist orientation to satisfy the empiricist demands of conventional constructivists. This, combined with a wide degree of epistemic latitude gained from the critical constructivist camp, allows strategic culture to bring its empirical approach to case studies to augment investigations on the socialising and agential qualities of identity and interest development of a given actor. Strategic culture presents us with a formidable, accessible research programme that can reap the benefits of the present constructivist divisions by permitting a critical overlap from the best of both sub-sets.

This article has three brief aims: to further explore the qualities of the strategic culture research programme, particularly its theories regarding identity and interest inference. Second, based on a review of its characteristics, to then suggest areas of application in which this research programme by thrive; especially striking is the process of identity and interest formation currently occurring within the European Union. Finally, to outline the contours for research designs that could operate within the strategic culture remit to further examine how culture produces outcomes. Due to its relative obscurity, the article aims to introduce theorists to the strategic culture research programme; it does not therefore provide empirical analysis regarding European integration but rather a conceptual analysis regarding the rule of culture and concept as causal in interest formation. This article suggests that strategic culture has the capacity to contribute new understandings to the debate on E.U. identity formation because it utilises a definition of identity that finds its roots in the deeper sociological precepts of ‘selfness’ rather than instrumental precepts of structurally-determined ‘actoriness’. From this foundation, strategic culture than makes culture the central variable in generating behavioural responses, made possible thanks to its abiding focus on ‘the importance of culture in explaining strategic policy outcomes’.

To clarify, strategic culture suggests that preferences representing the national interest arise from a cultural substratum of identity and may be enacted as policy outcomes, revealing an approach that clearly accord[s] ‘identity’ a causal impact, an impact which in this analysis will be examined at both the national and supranational level of policy formation. A strategic culture-based approach prioritises culture as the explanatory variable behind policy outcomes and suggests that EU preferences are negotiated in something of an intergovernmental-supranational hinterland, where the tension between national and supranational policy making is due to the unwieldy nature of the Union project itself but also to the critical absence of a discernable EU-level identity. EU-level preference formation, lacking a collective identity from which to spring, currently represents a collection of individuated forms of national self-reference of separate European states rather than the collective interests representative of the EU as a collectivised unit. Thus while some few EU preferences may arise within a genuinely supranational milieu (e.g. external trade in services or goods, air space, cross-border environmental issues, non-strategic goods), strategic culture approaches suggests that the majority of unit-based interests – emanating from national identities – are exported or ‘uploaded’ to the EU level in a manner consonant with national identities rather than an overarching EU identity. National preferences that impinge directly upon national interests and the wider sense of the national self are unlikely to be formulated as EU preferences simply because the area of competence is itself national. Areas such as energy, defence, national security, foreign policy, the Common Agricultural Policy, judicial cooperation, national tax, order publique, health and safety, education, immigration and development funding represent policy areas that continue to reflect national prerogatives rather than Community preferences.

In order to explore the potential of strategic culture in examining EU identity and preferences, a number of points must be made. First, in due deference to the culturalist-constructivist research programme, such an approach must accept the basic understanding that political agents including the European Union and its member states are socially constructed by the collective meanings, interpretations and assumptions that have contributed to their existence. As such, the milieu of EU outcomes, from decisions made within the Council of the European Union to legislation initiated within the European Commission, is not only given meaning but actively instantiated by the
underlying cultural context from which these outcomes emanate. As will be explored, the cultural context of Europe continues to operate as a national rather than a supranational environment, rendering the EU as merely one of a number of agents acting within the environment of European policy making and rarely providing a clear base for collective preference formation. Strategic culture-based approaches imply that determining the source of EU preference formation will be problematic, if as Kaelberer argues, ‘[f]or the foreseeable future, a European identity will most likely remain weaker than the respective national identities’. The EU is not a ‘natural or organic association’; the only base for EU preferences indigenous to the EU is still largely institutional and instrumental.

2. Strategic Culture

Strategic culture has operated within a constructivist-culturalist structure for more than three decades. The first explicit reference to strategic culture originated in the letter phases of the Cold War period, during the various attempts to describe the nuclear capacity of the Soviet Union in terms of its cultural proclivities from which nuclear tactics and strategies emerged, rather than in material terms alone. The report written in 1977 for the RAND organisation by Jack Snyder suggested that an ideational reference point was necessary to encapsulate both cultural and material elements. Strategic culture was the term first coined by Snyder to define ‘the sum total of ideas, conditional emotional responses and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of a national strategic community have achieved through instruction and imitation and share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy’.

The process is simple enough: the national ‘culture’ of contextualised decision-making is socially and constitutively conditioned (via ‘instruction and imitation’) to produce ‘responses and patterns’ in the form of policy decisions within the nuclear, and later military environment. With the passing of the Cold War, strategic culture developed from a single definition regarding the cultural components of nuclear strategy to a culturalist issue area encompassing broader concepts of security and eventually the arena of policy formation. By the 1990s, strategic culture had transformed into a research agenda drawn upon by cultural theorists and security specialists alike, to explore the connections between unit identity and behaviour.

From the 1970s onwards, three separate generations of strategic culture have contributed understandings to the all-important credo of context as both constitutive and causal. Snyder represented the first generation, arguing that the nexus of attitudes, beliefs and values had ‘achieved a state of semi-permanence that places them on the level of ‘culture’ rather than mere ‘policy’’. Strategy, he argued, could be understood as a contextualised form of culture in which national characteristics were not amorphous forces but imperatives affecting the perception, choice and policy behaviour of any given nation state. The second generation included theorists such as Bradley Klein, Robin Luckham and Charles Kupchan who focused more explicitly upon various typologies of cultural conceptions and behaviour and redefined the concept of strategic culture accordingly. Klein defined strategic culture as ‘the way a modern hegemonic state depends on the use of force to secure its objectives’ by examining the blend of military and socio-cultural power during Cold War America and the types of declaratory or operational strategies. Luckham continues this theme by examining the role of cultural values disseminated through the media to create an armaments culture and suggests that hegemony may be equally effective as a class-based structure by which legitimacy for such a culture is constructed and justified.

More recently, the debate Johnston-Gray debate has raised the profile of the strategic culture and secured it a footing within the constructivist research programme. Here, the arguments of Alastair Johnston regarding the need for a more positivist epistemology and a clearer appreciation of
culture as ‘distinct among conflicting explanations for strategic choice’ battle the ideas of Colin Gray who desires a more discursive appreciation, in which culture gives meaning to behaviour as an external variable but is irreducible from agents as ‘we, our institutions and our behaviour are the context’. The Johnston-Gray debate reveals the contours of the split in constructivism and the broader positivist-post positivist divide, but as a research programme, strategic culture is unwilling to remain unreconciled. Theorists adopting a strategic culture approach have the ability to make use of the definition of culture as constitutive and discursive, qua Gray alongside the positivist methods of Johnston. The result is that discursive understandings are reconciled with explanations featuring ‘testability, researchability and methodological sophistication’.

The third generation shifted the focus once again, concentrating upon the methods by which both culture and strategy are understood and applied, encapsulated in the 1996 monograph edited by Peter Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security. The case studies by Jeffrey Legro, Elizabeth Kier, Thomas Berger and Alexander Wendt inter alia reveal how organisational, military and political cultures work in top-down fashion, engendering ‘the set of basic assumptions, values, norms, beliefs and formal knowledge that shape collective understandings’. Equally, the cases demonstrate that culture operates in bottom-up fashion, illustrating that “[s]tate interests do not exist to be ‘discovered’ by self-interested, rational actors; rather, interests as a form of pre-defined cultural preference are constructed through a process of social interaction”. Katzenstein clarifies the third wave of strategic culture by arguing that ‘defining’ the national interest as presupposed ideational preferences, rather than ‘defending’ it as a pre-given, exogenous trait ‘is what is required of current approaches’ and indeed highlights the overriding approach of the third generation of strategic culturalists.

Within the arena of international politics, the process of contextualised decision-making has not changed. What has altered - thanks to the impact of strategic culture - is the understanding that swathes of culture visibly impact upon decision-making in a way that consequently affects policy and now demands attention as a behavioural variable. Strategic culture brings to IR not just a ‘willingness to consider other aspects of state policy…which may be influenced by culture’ but a broader research project investigating how culture operates in determining the ‘grand strategies’ of states, and the political, economic, social and diplomatic methods of ‘attaining state objectives’.

Two questions arise at this point. First, how is culture per se understood to operate from a strategic culture standpoint? In the most recent text on the development and use of strategic culture, Glenn et al. enquire as to whether culture should be treated as ‘merely an intervening variable that may influence behaviour’, or as an ‘independent variable that may explain particular strategic decisions’ which themselves are seen as dependent variables? The focus of this article is that while culture clearly operates discursively and dependently to instantiate both cause and effect, both actor and structure may studied more rigorously if culture is treated as an independent variable that precedes and thus predisposes actions. Predisposed actions can include the formation of interests, the construction of policy decisions and types of actor behaviour, all of which emanate from a cultural substratum and are enacted ‘strategically’.

The second question refers to the most helpful level of analysis for strategic culture approaches. Clearly, strategic culture represents an endogenous approach to the domestic social, political, economic and military orientations that constitute the culture of a given state actor. For strategic culture to function effectively with regard to EU preference formation, a similarly endogenous approach would be required to investigate whether the EU possesses a framework of such subjective orientations equivalent to an EU-level ‘culture’, complete with points of self reference that generate interests. The suggestion is that two endogenous substrata of self reference currently exist at the level of the EU: a ‘thin’ EU identity comprising largely of procedural and substantive norms engendered via the increasing juridical, socio-political mandate of the EU unit, and a ‘thick’ nation-state identity that has from the beginning been exported to the EU level in the form of national characteristics, negotiating styles and policy preferences. If, as we are led to believe, the EU is evolving to operate as a unit with externally apparent features of statehood including sovereignty and policy formation, then the endogenous characteristics of that unit (such as they are) along with the characteristics of its constituent parts must be examined for their ability to predispose actions. Strategic culture endorses an endogenous treatment as a key
part of its research programme. The dilemma in tackling the EU is its multi-level endogenous environment.

The strategic culture research programme illustrates two additional points. First, culture itself exists as both a concept and methodology. Culture, in its array of discourses, symbols, societal and temporal reference points, values, traditions and beliefs provides a richly complex backdrop that instantiates individual actors and affects their collective interaction. The research programme must however concede that there is significant opposition to culturalist approaches. As the largest dependent variable set available, it is a fair question to ask how cultural theorists are expected to derive constitutive and/or causal connections between variables that arise from a contextual environment, while simultaneously attempting to examine these variables independently and treat them empirically. With an inbuilt bridging capacity that acknowledges this dilemma, strategic culture may ‘provide the context in which actors operate, thereby constituting and giving meaning to material factors’, it also advances the need, qua Johnston, for a rigorous approach in establishing the connections between self-reference (identity), preference (interests) and policy decisions. To this end, theorists like Jacobsen must be commended for their argument that ‘culture requires its due, even if in the… exercise of converting it into terms congenial to a positivist agenda’ while theorists like Ted Hopf must be congratulated for successfully attempting it.

Equally, conventional constructivists should eschew the ‘freezing’ tendencies of their methods in favour of ‘specifying their dependent variable with more care’ while critical constructivists ‘who decry the danger of systematising interpretative methods’ should strive to establish a more useful epistemological location of the ‘middle-ground’. Strategic culture operates on the understanding that both the context of culture and the methodology of utilising it in theory can operate in both constitutive and causal ways, depending on the discursive or positivist approaches adopted for a given case study. The constitutive operation of culture as determined by Gray arises from the understanding that actors are innately and reciprocally linked to their own environment. Equally, however, causal processes examined by Johnston arise from the implication that culture visibly and discernibly ‘predispos[es] collectivities toward certain actions and policies rather than others’. In both cases, culture operates as an environment that may indirectly or directly affect preference and policy choice. To pinpoint this process and lend additional practicality to the Gray-Johnston debate, a streamlining approach is required to focus an otherwise unworkably broad process of cultural predispositions, by limiting oneself to a limited number of areas of cultural self reference for a given actor, which visibly contribute to interest choice and policy construction in the accomplishment of a specific national goal.

The second point illustrated by the approach of strategic culture is the concept of strategy itself. Defined ‘as the consideration of various possible courses of action to establish the most advisable method of attain[ing] a stated objective’, strategy as a choice may appear simpler than culture as a governing framework. In practice however, the operation of strategy relies upon a host of equally contextualising factors in order to determine this choice. Understood as ‘a course of action’, strategy operates in linear fashion to link a culturally-derived context of assumptions, beliefs and attitudes that exists before a decision is made with both the decision itself, as well as the goal by which the decision is reached. A strategic course of action that involves or invokes culture may be pursued on any level of analysis, either individual nation-state actors or sui generis collectivities like the EU. Culture clearly operates within the strategic methodology of achieving an objective by connecting intentions to decisions via a process that draws on the actor’s sense of self and the preferences that are subsequently perceived to be in the actor’s interests.

3. Ideas, Identity and Preference Formation

Culturalist theories that focus upon identity as the primum mobile of state choice and action operate on the socialised and ideational base established under the ensign of constructivism provide answers to many reified presuppositions found within the mainstream canon. They do so by suggesting that ideas, in the form of norms, culture and identity also actively inform interest, assist the formation of policy, and thereby articulate various facets of the state unit itself. As Checkel argues, ‘actor identities and interests do not simply regulate behaviour… Norms are no longer a superstructure on a material base; rather, they help to create and define that base’. In this way, constructivism, assisted by deeper culturalist epistemologies like strategic culture is
The axiom of constructivist-culturalist research programmes is that beliefs and ideas are causal. Ideas, norms and beliefs ‘do not float freely’, but rather are directly implicated in the consequential formation of unit preferences and in turn, of actor policies. Accordingly, the successful understanding of ideas at work in domestic characteristics enacted in policy relies upon determining their strategic use and linear deployment. While Risse-Kappen argues that ideas constitute a unit such as the EU and may be found in the ‘nature of its political institutions, [its] state-society relations, and the values and norms embedded in its political culture’ it is also important to exercise rigour in tracing the development of ideas, norms and values in their upward impact on society and the political elite. As suggested above, one must define a specific preference area (e.g. humanitarian norms), within an equally focused interest enacted in a given policy (e.g. humanitarian intervention). Keohane and Goldstein illustrate the process which with many are tacitly familiar, but which now requires a more explicit reminder: Ideas influence policy when the principled or causal beliefs they embody provide road maps that increase actors’ clarity about goals or ends-means relationships, when they affect outcomes of strategic situations in which there is no unique equilibrium and when they become embedded in political institutions.

More than other culturalist research programmes, strategic culture hews to the belief that ‘culture (at least in the realm of strategy) can be rescued from its traditional status as a residual variable’ but only because of its methodological commitment to investigate a particular idea at work in the culture of a given national unit that visibly demonstrates that ‘certain enduring attitudes, assumptions and beliefs that are shared by the collective … lead to a particular interpretation [and choice] of material conditions.’ To avoid examining on policy outcome as a predisposed result of innumerable cultural causes (possibly producing a ‘like-unlike’ scenario) theorists must adhere to such streamlining techniques. Assisting in this streamlining is an explicit understanding of the dialectical relationship between the constitution of identity and the definition of a series of interests. Hopf argues that ‘[i]n telling you who you are, identities strongly imply a particular set of interests or preferences with respect to choices of action in particular domains, and with respect to particular actors.’ Actors are constituted by the range of self-reference and self-interest, generally formed endogenously (if reaffirmed exogenously) which then promote intra-unit commonality as well as inter-unit differences at the structural level. As ‘collective identities appear to define the range of (economic and political) choices which actors regard as in their interest’, all forms of national self reference (identity) are crucial in determining both the forms of statehood and methods of statecraft at work in the host of modern nation-state units, and the constitutive and causal forces of their identity-based preferences within a given policy environment. The dialectical relationship at work between the identity-interests-policy triad clearly functions to fashion the multi-level framework of national units and EU institutions into an operable whole. The very function of the EU as a supranational project driven by intergovernmental imperatives is driven by the precept that self interests are ‘shaped by beliefs collectively held by policymakers and political elites (strategic culture)’ and by the administrative framework that straddles Brussels, Strasbourg and national capitals to comprise the ‘organisational culture’ of the EU. From this perspective, strategic culture is highly conducive to analyses that focus on ideational frames of domestic self reference, while capable of providing powerful explanations regarding the identity-based perceptions and ensuing preferences constituted in the form of national policy.

4. Ideas and EU Preference Formation

The next point to consider is the methodology of preference formation and its dual role as an emanation of collective self reference and a precursor to policy decisions. Here, researchers confront a dilemma. The EU arguably possesses increasing singularity in both its sovereignty and its policy formation, consolidating its role as an actor of some singularity. As such, one could certainly apply strategic culture to determine the ‘grand strategies’ currently pursued by the EU in its various policies, while also determining the specific link betwit preferences and policies. However, strategic culture has until now dealt with national state units, and has yet to tackle with any rigour the supranational unit of the EU. The tenets of the research programme suggest that of the two units, nations not supra-units possess the upper hand in informing both the identity and preferences enacted in policy.
Is it possible for strategic culture to treat the EU unit in the same ways as national units, regarding too as '[a]n integrated system of symbols (e.g. argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors) which acts to establish pervasive and long lasting preferences'?\(^2\) Is the EU in possession of a contextualising framework capable of generating forms of supra self reference from which collectively-generated can emerge? Undoubtedly, Europe as a whole possesses a strong cultural foundation, continental in ilk.\(^4\) As argued by Kaelberer, the 'cultural tradition of antiquity, feudalism and the uniformity of the medieval period, the experience of the Reformation, Renaissance, Enlightenment, nation state formation and the industrial revolution are all common experiences of Western Europe beyond individual nation states.'\(^4\) Equally however, this same history is also largely actualised through the component parts of discrete national units that comprise that same common experience, effectively leaving broader forms of pan-European self reference common, but still diffuse and nebulous. The attempts of EU policymakers to construct a super-stratum through projects of monetary union and citizenship have conspicuously failed to capitalise on this rich continental sub-stratum of categorically European cultural norms, social values and political traditions. What remains is the vital sense of Europe as continental, cultural, socio-political entity distilled into the various European nation states, each representing a portion of characteristics identifiable as European and which may arguably represent an operable European identity but not yet an EU-level identity.

The identity of the European Union appears undeveloped and consciously instrumental as a supranational form of self reference while simultaneously dependent upon the vibrant cultural forms of unit identities garnered from European states by which it is instantiated. Arguing that the EU possesses increasing singularity in its sovereign scope by constructing a common currency or promoting foreign policy testifies merely to its role as an actor and the attribute of actorness. The role of the EU as an international actor may be a functional attribute of its external operations but it cannot speak to any internal, socio-cultural formations of a deeper, more instantiating nature. Simply put, while one may identify the EU as an actor, identifying with it in a way that instantiates its human contents with both tangible and intangible characteristics and affective connections is far more complex. While theorists persist in applying the concept of the 'EU’s (international) identity interchangeably with the notion of the EU’s “international role”, actorness in the functional sense is not synonymous with identity in the sociological sense.\(^4\) The EU is indeed a policy area with strong normative content affecting the procedural rules by which it defines itself and a variety of perceptions by which it defines non-EU others. The normative processes of Europeanisation also arguably ‘consists of constructing systems of meanings and collective understandings, including [basic] social identities’.\(^4\) While this may suggest that the EU environment represents a potential locus for the creation, articulation and enactment of collective identity it has yet to fully reach that point at either the cultural or civic level.

Currently, European nation states possess not only the monopoly in generating both affective and effective forms of identities and normative roles, but do so in a way that affects their underlying interests and their strategic behaviour in policy choices. In contrast, while the EU possesses a normative index including democracy, the rule of law, liberty, human rights, the prevention of violence, regional cooperation, such ‘core norms’ are not only deeply embedded in the civilisation identities of each national unit in some fashion, but due to their commonality do not link causally to a clearly EU identity or explain predispositions regarding preference choice. While core norms provide a framework for determining the connection between identity and foreign policy, at the EU level, these norms remain unspecific as to how ‘these more general normative commitments and identity-related aspects predispose EFP in certain ways.’\(^4\)

5. Strategic Culture Research Designs

Constructing a research design within strategic culture must take care to acknowledge its three-pronged history outlined above as well as some of the potential tautologies that lie within its oft ill-defined remit. Clearly, defining the terms sets the groundwork for the research design by determining the contours of a given actor’s conception and deployment of strategic culture. As suggested by David Jones, the strategic culture of a given actor like the United States or the former
Soviet Union operates on three levels, from the broadest macro cultural level incorporating a nation’s ethnic, historical and geographical features to the intermediary level of its economic and political features, to the micro level of its military institutions.46

Research design focusing for example on British strategic culture therefore need to begin with a deep contextual base that can conceptualise how British geographical features have connected to its historical developments, how these serve as explanations for political and economic characteristics which then produce a given mindset among public and elite alike responsible for specific understandings in the use of civil-military forces. The theorist would then utilise variables emerging from each level as national identifiers all of which ‘can stand as separate explanations in themselves’ for a cultural context that predisposes interest and policy choice.47 The resultant behaviour discernable within a specific policy decision that makes distinct and reference to one or a number of the variables found on these three levels to justify the policy is the end result of this type of research design.

Both Jones and Johnston espouse this approach to strategic culture research designs, arguing that a broad context understood as culture produces specific variables that can be charted, examined for their behavioural content and ultimately linked to interest choice and policy decisions. More powerfully, a research design inspired principally by Johnston encourages theorists to concentrate on the linear and causal links between culture and strategic behaviour, in contrast to the holistic approach of Gray in which strategic culture embodies a more all-encompassing context responsible for possible strategic behaviour.48 The current suggestion is that while the variable of culture continues to find its feet as an analytic category within mainstream IR, a research design that makes room for rigorous empirical testing based on ‘a distinction between cultural/ideational and materialist variables’ is a good beginning.49

There are goals and caveats attached to such a research design. Goals include fostering an understanding that culture provides actors with ‘discerning tendencies not rigid determinants’50 and that such tendencies may be charted as ‘variables [that] cause or explain outcomes’ which ‘give meaning to material factors’ present as part of the same behavioural outcome.51 Culture is understood to possess ideational, symbolic and material components. Traditionally strategic culture has dealt with behavioural outcomes that make use of culture to explain strategic choices of a military nature. However, just as the state itself is now rivalled by new sui generis actors like the EU, so actor strategy can concern policy choices not necessarily focused on the use of force. The culture of the EU is found in the totality of its ideas, responses and combined behaviour of its component units within a highly institutionalised environment blending deep national preferences with daily collective compromise. The research design that investigates how the EU uses its culture strategically must focus upon national and supranational levels to determine - inter alia – internal and external role perceptions, agreed norms and values and the base of collective interests that typify its emergent culture and are enacted strategically. Such a research design must accept that while decisions focused on material factors may be taken in the most rational of manners, the EU is driven by a profusion of disparate ‘national tendencies that derive from historical experience’ which effectively ‘cancel[s] out the notion of a universal assumed rationality.’52 Strategic culture fosters an additional understanding that actor type is not a central requirement. Any type of collective qualifies, so long as theorists can demonstrate that the strategic culture of a given collective like the EU possesses ‘attitudes, assumptions and beliefs that are shared by the collective and which will lead to a particular interpretation of material conditions’ discernable as policy choice.53 Above all, strategic culture research designs must demonstrate the nature and centrality of actor style in strategy. If working with the EU collective, theorists must recognise that if national styles regarding preference formation appear to be uploaded as part of the process of Europeanisation, then strategy in the form of EU interest formation (which contains both national and collective cultures) will be deployed strategically in a national-supranational amalgam.

The caveats too are clear. Theorists have to contend with a broad array of variables to determine ‘the existence of a unique and persistent strategic culture that will [be seen to] affect strategic choice’ whilst struggling to isolate the key variable by which an actor’s strategic culture verifiably explains one, or even a series of choices.54 More broadly, research designs constructed under the aegis of strategic culture benefit from a richly inter-disciplinary approach but risk being hampered by the necessarily broad inclusion of factors that may be material as well as cultural in ilk, and dealing with outcomes which ultimately may be unfalsifiable. While Johnston remains
an advocate of a deep approach that emphasises policy behaviour as proof of the multi-layered strategic culture specific to a given actor, it is clear that there are other ‘non-strategic culture variables’ that serve as explanations for such choices. For theorists dealing with culture as a variable, these are not new challenges. What is innovative is the attempt provided by strategic culture to construct a research design that can make use of a given cultural context such as socialisation and institutionalisation and apply it to emerging new actors. Lastly, EU-focused research designs of a strategic culture ilk need to contend with the thorny issue of identity. The complicated nature of EU collective policy speaks volumes not of a lack of identity and absence of common interests, but an overabundance of national styles competing in uploaded environs to determine the salient qualities of a given EU preference. National cultures take the form of both identity and preference; culture can and indeed must be treated as an independent variable that influences the preference formation of national, and possible supra-national units. This in turn influences policy decisions and behaviour, because of the ideational dynamic that drives this equation and understand the ideas and beliefs are causal. What must be added to forthcoming research designs is the empirical analysis gleaned from process of Europeanisation: integration, decision-making, inter-institutional communication, the multilaterialisation of European political culture, to make clear that culture and identities are not merely present but causally central. Strategic culture research has the responsibility to demonstrate verifiably that identity acts as a force of ‘self ordering’ ‘call[s] forth particular social structures and functions and values’ at both national and supra-national levels.

6. EU vs National Interest Formation

Currently, strategic culture seems better able to explain actor rather than supra-actor preferences. The role of defence and foreign policy formulation as perceived by individual nations demonstrates the continuing strength of national preferences to determine rather than be determined by supranational preferences. For instance, modes of British national self reference regarding the policy of defence differ according to the cultural context within with defence is understood in each country. The role and identity of defence in Britain has traditionally been associated with ideas of naval supremacy, the geographic inviolability of the British Isles, a minimalist but dedicated approach to the army and a commitment to foreign policy as an exclusively national practice of regional and imperial proportions. Despite its post-colonial transitions, concepts of British defence remain largely indistinguishable from national security and are explicitly linked to sovereign understandings regarding the practice of policy formulations. Explained via the strategic cultural approach, the ‘strategic vision’ of defence in Germany is radically different due to the ‘renunciation of the use of military power for achieving national policy objectives in 1945’. While British defence interests are lodged firmly in a culture of security as an active force of a decidedly Atlanticist ilk, West German defence preferences have until recently emanated from ‘a culture of reticence’ focusing on ‘multilateralism, institution-building and supranational integration’. Post-war British political culture predisposed the British state to a gradualist attitude regarding the Europeanisation of defence policy as a possibly collective rather than exclusively state competence. In contrast, post-war German political culture resulted in a swift and radical constitutional reorientation in which defence become thoroughly civilianised in the Cold War period and strongly Europeanised after reunification.

The tension generated by the simultaneous attempt to retain and replace core British and German defence identities presently affects the method by which British and German defence preferences operate at EU level within the context of the ESDP. Domestic orientations have found themselves drawn into both a European community and an the multilateral framework of the EU entailing ‘the development of democratic institutions and economic interdependence, combined with an international organizational setting’ that not only has the power to coerce ‘norm breakers’ but also to generate rudimentary ‘narratives of mutual identification’. In this way, strategic culture illustrates how a given national ‘political culture provided a system of beliefs, values, attitudes, which established guidelines for the political behaviour of… governmental authorities’ to produce both traditional and radical effects upon collective self reference and preference. Concepts of defence and foreign policy represent an especially fertile area in which national political culture can be used strategically to determine strategy itself. Accordingly, the perennial sense of detachment and singularity located in British defence policy is readily
compared to post war German defence policy in which unilateralism was largely renounced in favour of institution-based multilateral cooperation and indeed both are readily explained in terms of preference-inferred identity impacting upon policy. The change wrought by the EU is to induce or even compel the export of a vast array of national preferences to the supranational sphere, an activity in which all twenty five member states must upload or externalise their ‘domestic institutions, interests, norms and identity onto the wider international arena’. At present, the EU record on collective decision making remains patchy. This is particularly the case in the area of foreign policy and especially so during times of crisis. As Jørgensen argues, ‘in the event of severe crisis situations, the multilateral EU common foreign policy systems short-circuited and replaced by, once again, the major European players’ and the knee-jerk reaction continues to be a national one. Because EU foreign policy is currently an area of shared and frequently disputed competence, it is thus unsurprising to observe national preferences sharply articulated. More importantly, EU level preferences are of a decidedly subsequent nature, made possible only by prior national level agreement; the ESDP as an example was only initiated successfully after a series of shared understandings was identified between Britain and France, and to a lesser extent, Germany.

Things are changing however. EU competences are increasing, its power structure is deepening, its membership is widening and its mandate expanding. While the ‘overarching political structure’ of the EU does not (yet) equate to a constructed superstate, the processes of political, economic, defence and policy integration arguably represent ‘the key appurtenances of statehood’. The central question is whether the EU possesses the full extent of such attributes of statehood, most notably, the ability to generate formative modes of collective self reference (identity), from which emanate identifiable actor preferences (interests) that ultimately influence and guide policy. According to the precepts of most constructivist-culturalist approaches including strategic culture, the EU arguably possesses ‘something of the character of the administrative-bureaucratic mode of state formation’ and can formulate some measure of supranational preferences. Can we now assume that the EU operates as a single actor with strong powers to increase its burgeoning ‘appurtenances of statehood’? Gaining access to the ‘context that surrounds and gives meaning to [the] strategic behaviour’ entailed in defining preferences means examining both component national units and the EU unit, but the supervenient processes by which the two are mutually constituted.

While strategic culture assists most effectively in determining the largely nation-based linearity of identity-inferred interests and their impact upon policy, it must be recognised that this methodology applies equally to describe the supra-national community of the EU itself. The all-important context that gives meaning to unit preferences also ‘gives meaning to strategic behaviour’ that arises when those preferences converge collectively to generate preferences and policy decisions. The methodology of strategic culture also implies that the EU itself is now effectively an area of strategic culture: its norms, procedures and institutions form a policy community complete with policy resultant behaviour that represent an equally valid site of context in which culture is employed strategically to determine outcomes. Accepting the EU as the newest arena of strategic culture means conceding that it too may be in possession of an identity structure with the capacity to subsequently infer preferences. Equally implicit is the understanding that any identity-set generated at the collective level will function in much the same way as national identities, namely ‘as an axiomatic basis for the derivation of legislation and executive action’ within the environment of policy formation.

As argued above, the present EU identity appears less reflective of traditional sociological descriptions of identity and more an index of accepted norms guiding institutions and policies in various competences. Because the goals of states are transmitted upwards to a wider milieu, one can conceive, as does Wolters, of ‘milieu goals’ as objectives which certainly emanate from the national preferences of a group of units and which may not of themselves necessarily engage with a broader sense of EU identity but by virtue of deploying a range of preferences, will ultimately have the effect if not the objective of ‘shaping conditions beyond… national boundaries’. Uploaded national preferences will gradually add to the present base of procedural norms, rules and expectations and expand to produce a more substantive identity that reflects not just external EU actorness as a global operative but internal European norms, values and traditions as a supranational representative of national preferences. Culturalist research programmes in general
readily espouse the idea that ‘political culture provide[s] a system of beliefs, values, attitudes, which establish[] guidelines for the political behaviour of… governmental authorities’. Strategic culture in particular must be in the position to analyse an EU expanding from instrumental actor-ness into a nexus of multiple identity formation from which the strategic use of an identifiably EU-level political culture (rather than merely European culture writ large) can be discerned. Ascertaining the ‘strategic culture’ of the EU entails locating a series of recognisably EU-based symbols, discourses and norms that have visibly emerged from a much broader panoply incorporating history, civilisational ideologies, social traditions, political norms and cultural ideas. This is clearly possible, and conforms to the requirement that ‘strategic culture refers to collectives, whether military organisations, policy communities or entire societies’ in which, qua Johnston, it is possible to locate ‘continuities and discernible trends across time and contexts’. While it cannot be disputed that the ‘extractive capacity of the EU’ to generate an identity amongst its citizens and its political elite is as yet undeveloped, the EU has expanded in a largely irreversible manner into the social and political life of its recently increased population. Where the socio-cultural and political ethos of Europe has long been a ‘de facto aspect of daily life’, the EU is itself is increasingly becoming a ‘social fact’. However, strategic cultural analyses of the EU require deeper recognition of the endogenous roots of power and authority at work in Europe by investigating ‘how the formative experiences’ of the EU unit, along with ‘its evolving cultural characteristics shape [its] strategic interests’ in a way that is visibly supranational rather than a form of uploaded national interests. Further research is required however. Within the research programme of strategic culture, there is at present a rather instrumental link between behaviour an attitude which requires further calibration in order to discern the quality and quantity of the effect of culture upon preference choice. Discerning EU preferences in competences of particular sensitivity (e.g. energy, defence, immigration, foreign policy) requires sharpening the perimeters in which these issue areas feature as modes of national self reference in each European state, and then tracing the visible connections between these national modes and their transformation via bilateral diplomacy and into multilateral forms that guide, constrain or justify subsequent EU-level preferences. Poore is correct to argue that a sharper ‘identification of those images and symbols that shape how a polity conceives of national security [or any national issue] may be required in order to ascertain a societal strategic culture’. However, when operating at the EU level the key is to begin with societal strategic culture as principally causal in the preference choice of a given polity like the EU, not to conclude with it.

7. Strategic Culture: Future Category of Analysis?

What contribution do culturalist research programmes like strategic culture make to our understanding of IR theory? Constructivist-culturalist approaches including strategic culture are arguably ‘staging a dramatic comeback in social theory and practice’ to the extent that the ‘interdisciplinary content for these concepts is in full swing’ by participants at either end of the battlefield who ‘seem genuinely convinced that the stakes are far from negligible’. Strategic culture promises assistance to social scientists by enabling transitions from ontological stasis to broader epistemological possibilities, not by ‘eliminat[ing] the classical factors used for explaining and understanding international relations’ but aiming for a ‘richer’ appreciation of traditional motives by illustrating their role ‘as aspects of the social construction of human agency in a culturally full international society’. The way in which political cultures as traditionally unit-based forms of political expression are now Europeanised into a supranational context cannot be explained by realpolitik strategic behaviour alone. The presence and impact of ideas as self reflective components of strategic choice that informs that first constitues and causally affects that behaviour must be examined. From the endogenous perspective espoused by strategic culture, EU preference formation generally reflects the common traits and norms of its component state identities rather than a deeply collectivised unit generating its own identity set and corresponding preference. A research programme like strategic culture that regards ideas and context as central to explanations of preference-based outcomes in a manner whereby the internal characteristics of the nation-state must be used in explanations of national and supranational development and is clearly a timely necessity within IR. While under-examined in mainstream studies, the ‘influence that contexts
exert upon the interpretation that individuals and collectivities make of their interest and, consequently, their choices’ promises to expand the realm of political behaviour into that of socialised, culturalised ideas cannot be ignored, even if it is difficult to pinpoint. Strategic culture offers an enlightened methodology capable of utilising its historical and civilisation underpinnings in a way that explains both established units and a rising new power structures like the EU.

Notes

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7 See for example Articles 30 and 39 (3) of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community.


10 J. Garnett had focused upon the idea of strategic studies as an ideational element of a larger strategic framework as early as 1975; this early developments are found in his article ‘Strategic Studies and its Assumptions’ in J. Baylis et al (eds.), Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies, New York, Holmes and Meier Publishers.


12 Snyder, J. (1977), op. cit., p.5.


63 Jørgensen, K.E. (2004) ‘European Foreign Policy: Conceptualising the Domain’ in Carlsnaes, W., H. Sjursen and
B. White, Contemporary European Foreign Policy, London, Sage Publications, p.38
76 Poore, S. (2004), op. cit., p.45. As Scharfstein argues, if context is ‘that which environs the object of our interest and helps by its relevance to explain it’, then the cultural context of Europe and the various salient characteristics of its emergent political culture as represented in the EU is the obvious multi-variable environment from which to evaluate both the development of EU identity and its ability to construct preferences that constitute visibly supranational interests. (Scharfstein 1989: 1).