Research Article

Crafting Emotions: The valence of time in narratives about the future of Europe in the Council of Europe (1949)

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Abstract

How are emotional narratives used to mobilise support for or opposition against policy ideas about the institutional set-up of European integration? This article systematically examines the first General Debate of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe in 1949, which featured as a laboratory for the rise and demise of various blueprints for European integration. This article makes a threefold contribution. First, it introduces a narrative approach that combines the valence of emotions with their temporal dimension. Second, it demonstrates how these emotionally charged narratives of hope, redemption, fear and sacrifice provide the affective glue of an emerging (transnational) emotional community that cuts through nationality and political colour. Third, taking a historical approach this article points at the need to historicise the role of emotions in European integration.

Keywords

Emotional narrative; European integration; Council of Europe; Valence; Time/history; Emotional community
The narrative turn is relatively new to the field of European studies. Moreover, in studies on European integration it has had a contemporary focus (Garcia 2017; Cloet 2017). For example, Manners and Murray (2016) have distinguished between six distinct narratives of European integration, ranging from the Nobel narrative to the Green Europe narrative. These narratives are critical to the ‘sensemaking’ and legitimacy of the European Union (EU) and its predecessors (Garcia 2017). Emotions are a distinctive feature to these narratives. As Kaelble (2001: 27) has argued that without a feeling-dimension, building a European identity is an unrealistic proposal. Building on a wide range of literature on the emotional turn in history (Plamper 2010; Frevert, Bailey, Eitler, Gammerl et al. 2014), and specifically research on the emotional and cultural aspects of the origins of the Concert of Europe in the early nineteenth century (De Graaf 2019), we could argue that emotional narratives have been utilised in earlier phases of European cooperation and integration. This historicising context highlights the way the focus on the recent history of European integration has been narrowed down far too much on technocratic, bureaucratic decision making processes, and has forgotten all about these earlier emotive strands.

While it has been argued that the process of European integration has become politicised in domestic politics after the Treaty of Maastricht (Hooghe and Marks 2009), this is not to say that the “permissive consensus” of the preceding decades was uncontested and self-explanatory. From its very start, the process of European integration has been the outcome of a complex interaction between the ideas, interests and emotions of a variety of actors, with different national backgrounds and political color. These ideas, interests and emotions have been integrated in competing narratives about the future of Europe.

As stated, some of these narratives may be traced back to nineteenth century history of the Concert of Europe, to the interwar period, or to the pressure cooking period of the and World War II. During this last period, different economic, political and ecumenical transnational networks (Lipgens 1985a; 1985b; Kaiser 2009; Kaiser and McMahon 2017) developed several blueprints that envisioned a united Europe. Ideas about the institutional set-up of European integration, including its intergovernmental and supranational blueprints, were pushed with a wide variety of emotional vocabulary.

Far from being just a rational, technocratic exercise, these blueprints for Europe were full of emotional vocabulary that provided the affective glue for the European community that was to be constructed. For example, Coudenhove-Karlergji’s Pan-Europa (1923) was an emotional pamphlet of reconciliation aimed at expanding the horizon of expectations of his contemporaries and breaking the vicious circle of hate and fear among France and Germany (Palm 2018). Moreover, the relatively unknown resistance movement of the Freiburger Bonhoeffer-Kreis with German theologians and economists developed ideas about a European order, contesting the national-socialist family-metaphor by connecting it with a different emotional vocabulary (Steehouder and Van den Berg, 2019). Yet, with the onset of the Cold War, again a new historical context enveloped the process of European integration and infused it with a particular set of emotions regarding threat, fear of revolution and dictatorial repression, for terror, and for loss of specific ‘western’ interests.

However, little is known about the way in which emotional narratives featured in the ‘era of experimentation’ of the 1940s and 1950s (Van Zon 2019: 37). In those years, several initiatives aimed at organising a lasting European peace and the economic and military reconstruction of Western Europe, such as the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (1948) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1949). Yet, in contrast to these initiatives the Council of Europe (1949) was not so much the product of governmental initiative and/or the United States’ (US) involvement, but the outcome of the Congress of Europe (1948) which was organised by several European movements and brought together over 800 participants from 12 countries to discuss the future of Europe. Moreover, it stood out by its Consultative Assembly. With the Consultative Assembly, an institutionalised forum emerged for a continuing transnational public debate about the cultural, economic and political future of (Western) Europe. While its formal powers were limited, the
Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe was a unique laboratory, a policy subsystem, for the rise and demise of various blueprints for European integration.\(^1\)

The literature has treated the Council of Europe as an ‘artificial biotope’ of a rigid debate between functionalism, federalism and unionism (see Macmullen 2004). While the Consultative Assembly did not live up to the high expectations of many federalists at the time, its presence nevertheless was ‘unprecedented and unparalleled’ (Van Zon 2019: 39). Moreover, the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe stood out for ‘staging events that produced images of European unity’ (Krumrey 2018: 114). It set a powerful precedent for political assemblies to follow.

Confronted with rising geopolitical tensions between East and West, combined with the memory of a recent past characterized by the suffering and ravage brought on by six years of war, the first debate of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe symbolises the early post-war political debates on how European cooperation should be organised.

This article examines the way in which emotional narratives featured in the ‘battle of ideas’ at the first post-war General Debate of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe in 1949. How are emotional narratives used to mobilise support for or opposition against policy ideas about the political structure of European integration? It shows that rather than detailed, technical negotiations about the institutional set-up of European integration, these early debates were characterised by competing political emotional narratives about the past, present and future of Europe.

The article makes a threefold contribution. First, conceptually, it introduces the notion of ‘time’ in the analysis of narratives. It distinguishes between the valence attached to experiences and expectations that are integrated into a particular narrative. Second, with regards to the academic field of European integration history, it demonstrates how these emotionally charged narratives provide the affective glue of a European emerging transnational emotional community, cutting through nationality and political colour. With this transnational and emotional lens, this article introduces an additional mechanism to better understand the collaborative effort of many of the (lesser) known ‘founding fathers’ of the European project in its early days. Third, taking a historical approach this article points at the need to historicise the relationship between emotions and ideas, i.e. both ideas and their associated emotional vocabulary are not static, but have to be understood against the backdrop of their particular historical context. In doing so, the article problematises the ahistorical nature of the dominant (neo)functionalist and intergovernmentalist theoretical approaches within the academic field, whilst at the same time emphasising the importance of institutions that preceded the European Coal and Steel Community such as the Council of Europe within the historiography of the EU.

The next section outlines the analytical framework for a narrative analysis that focuses on the interplay of different emotions in a particular narrative. As such, it elaborates upon how the emotional quality of narratives matter. In particular, this article presents an analytical framework that connects emotions to political ideas by means of the notion of ‘time’. It distinguishes between four types of emotional narratives, based on a different valence attached to either the past or future. This way it demonstrates that it is the particular combination of different emotions integrated in a narrative which defines the emotional quality of political ideas. Subsequently, the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe is introduced, followed by the systematic analysis of the emotional narratives of the participants in the debate about the future of Europe in 1949. In the concluding section we reflect upon the central findings of the case study and on their implications for the study of the EU as an emotional community.
EMOTIONAL NARRATIVES: CONNECTING IDEAS, EMOTIONS AND HISTORY

The emotional turn in history has led to an increased attention for the way in which emotions are spoken of throughout history, how the meaning of particular emotions has changed (Frevert, Bailey, Eitler, Gammerl et al. 2014) and how a shared emotional vocabulary and shared norms about appropriate emotional expressions contributed to the emergence of emotional communities and emotional regimes (Plamper 2010; Boddice 2014). Central to the emergence of emotional communities are emotional narratives that provide a coherent explanation of the key emotions that underpin the emotional community. Narratives aim ‘to transfer information, shape perceptions, develop targets, build coalitions and affect change’ (Weiss 2020: 106). Rather than taking a structural approach, focusing on the coherence of the narratives, this study examines the emotional characteristics of the narratives about Europe. We assume that carefully developed, intentionally and strategically used to mobilise support for or opposition against policy ideas, a convincing emotional narrative may trump institutional and material resources.

As Cox and Beland (2013) have pointed out, the valence of policy ideas (i.e. their positive or negative emotional appeal) is critical to understand why some ideas have become more prominent than others. Moreover, Miller (2019: 248) argues that emotions contribute to the power of a narrative – ‘they can add, subtract or alter meaning’. So, to understand how ideas matter, we have to explore the way in which emotions serve to constrain or enable the resonance of particular policy ideas.

In this article, we conceptualise the relationship between emotions and ideas as constitutive, i.e. two sides of the same coin. Emotions are not an addition to ideas but are an essential component for understanding their meaning (Mercer 2010: 7). Emotions without ideas have no object, and ideas without emotions lack the appeal to mobilise. Moreover, as Mercer (2010: 6) has pointed out, emotion and cognition are closely intertwined: ‘emotions influence how and what one believes, adding value to facts and capturing a distinctive way of seeing situations’.

Emotions in narratives are by definition social and cultural. They are social in that they transcend the level of the individual and enter the public realm. As such, they have a strong collective dimension. Moreover, they are cultural in that they are constructed, i.e. not static nor given. Hence, emotions should not be confused with ‘feelings’ (personal experiences) and ‘affect’ (bodily expressions) (Clement and Sangar 2018: 5). Furthermore, emotions in narratives refer to emotions as expressed in vocabulary. Emotional vocabulary includes not only emotion words such as anger, fear, hope, shame, pride, but also metaphors, ideographs or emotional beliefs such as freedom, democracy and terrorism (Miller 2019; Koschut 2018a).

A classical narrative analysis focuses on the role of different actors, such as hero, villain or victim. These roles as such already constitute strong valence. However, as Ricoeur (2002: 37) has argued: ‘time has disappeared from the horizon of the theories of history and of narrative’. Hence, in this narrative analysis, we do not so much focus on actors, but rather on ‘time’ as the structuring component of emotional narratives. According to Reinhart Koselleck (2005: 259-262), our perception of the past is limited to the ‘space of experience’, i.e. a selection of the many possibilities to interpret the past into a more or less coherent picture. Moreover, our expectations about the future are determined by the ‘horizon of expectation’. Both experience and expectation can be adjusted and mobilised to serve both support and opposition to new ideas. As such, it is critical to understand the valence attached to both. The emotional vocabulary in a narrative that connects a reflection of the past with the expectations of the future binds the individual to the community – it takes emotions beyond the realm of personal experience and morphs into an active form of persuasion. A shared horizon of time constructs a shared ‘we’ (Holden 2019).

Emotional narratives serve two purposes. First, they serve to mobilise opposition or support of particular policy ideas. Whereas, for example, a shared narrative of anger and fear might
drive politicians and societal actors to expand anti-terrorism legislation in the aftermath of acts of terrorism, a communal sense of civic hope or pride may fuel the flames of egalitarian reform for in segregated communities (Troost, van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2013). Within the context of the history of the European integration, one could mention the debate about a European army in the 1950s featured around competing emotional narratives that capitalised on fear of either Germany or the Soviet Union and (dis)trust of the Atlantic alliance (Aron 1957) as example of the mobilising effect of emotional narratives. Second, they contribute to the ‘intersubjective patterns of standardized emotional expressions that underpin collective meanings and beliefs’ (Koschut 2018b: 328) which emerge as the outcome of a process of social interaction and negotiation. As such, it is possible that a variety of emotional ‘constellations’ exist, which include or exclude, privilege or downplay particular emotions. In this process of interaction and negotiation, emotional narratives provide the building blocks for an emotional community – they provide an ‘affective glue’ in forging together constituencies for particular blueprints of European integration.

**Table 1 Coding scheme master emotion**

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<td>Negative Valence</td>
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<td>Future</td>
<td>Negative Valence</td>
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<td>Positive Valence</td>
<td>Self</td>
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<td>Other</td>
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In contrast to research that distinguishes between forward- and backward-looking narratives (Rosoux 2017), this narrative analysis examines the way in which both the past and future feature in each narrative, by analysing the emotional vocabulary that is associated with the narrative. With this narrative analysis we are focused on the emotional structure of each narrative. In other words we aim to identify the master emotion that connects the understanding of both the past and the future. This master emotion can either have a positive or negative valence and be self- or other regarding (Table 1). For example, pride is a positive self-regarding emotion and shame is a negative self-regarding emotion.

For the purpose of this article, each individual speech of a member of the Consultative Assembly during the first General Debate on the political structure of Europe, a total of 45, was analysed. These speeches were analysed with an ‘emotional discourse analysis’ as introduced by Koschut (2018b). An emotional discourse analysis focusses on the existing system and patterns of emotional beliefs in relation to the use of these emotions in speech acts and the way they resonate within society, therefore focusing on the prevalence of certain emotions rather than their frequencies (Koschut 2018b: 283). We took a three-step approach. First, for each speech we did not only look at the direct expressions of emotion (anger, fear, hope jealousy, shame, pride) but also included more indirect emotional clues such as metaphors (beacon of democracy, dark abyss, problem from hell) in relation to their projection of time (Koschut 2018b: 284-285). Second, we coded the emotional discourse of each speech in terms of valence (i.e. positive or negative) and time (i.e. forward or backward looking). Third, based on the results of the coding of individual speeches, which may encompass a wide variety of emotional vocabulary, we distinguished between four master emotions that reflects the understanding of both the past and the future of Europe in that particular narrative. Based on the results, a total of four master emotional narratives could be traced, as shown in Table 1.

In addition to emotional discourse analysis, as described above, we also included the nationality and political affiliation for each actor. This way we are able to examine whether
particular emotional narratives are associated with nationality and/or political colour, or whether these emotional narratives transcended national borders and political ideology. The latter would demonstrate that emotional narratives provide the affective glue for an emerging European emotional community that supersedes nationality and political colour.

To understand the particular setting in which these emotional narratives were constructed, we will first outline how the Consultative Assembly emerged as an emotional community that institutionalized the interaction between a transnational elite of politicians with different ideologies.

THE EMERGENCE OF AN EMOTIONAL COMMUNITY: THE CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

The early post-war political debates about the future of Europe were shaped by the shared horror of the two World Wars and the rising geopolitical tensions between the Soviet Union and the US. The ravage brought about by six years of war provided a ‘window of opportunity’ to break a vicious circle of nationalism and interstate conflict. In this post-war context, beyond the circles of government, the cause for European integration was enthusiastically pushed forward by various transnational European Movements with, as noteworthy endeavour, the joint organisation of the Congress of Europe in The Hague of May 1948.

With over 800 participants from Western Europe, this Congress had been the starting point of a public debate about the future of Europe. With the Congress of The Hague, a united Europe turned from a projection into a living reality (Van Zon 2019: 38). A sense of urgency was felt. At the Congress of the Hague, some would even speak of the ‘Emergency Council of Europe’ (Council of Europe 1999). In its concluding political, economic and cultural resolutions, the attending members of the Congress expressed the wish for a transnational political assembly to continue this debate (Guerrieri 2014). The origin of the Consultative Assembly can be traced back to this moment in history.

These efforts of the European Movements institutionalised into the Council of Europe, which was established in 1949, and initially consisted of 12 member states: Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom (UK). In addition to a Council of Ministers, the Council of Europe also created a Consultative Assembly, consisting of members of national parliament of the member states. This was a distinctive feature compared to other European integration initiatives at that time and allowed for a continuing transnational public debate about the future of Europe. While its formal powers were limited, the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe was a unique laboratory, a policy subsystem, for the rise and demise of various blueprints for European integration. Strasbourg became the centre of the debate about the future of European unity (Van Zon 2019: 38).

The Consultative Assembly provided a forum for true transnational public debate about the cultural, economic and political future of (Western) Europe. Most members were already part of existing transnational, transatlantic, religious, economic and political networks. This includes, for example, renowned political actors such as André Philip, Constantijn Patijn, and Jean Rey, who all were members of the Ecumenical Commission on European Co-operation of the World Council of Churches (Leustean 2014), or renowned politicians such as Winston Churchill, Duncan Sandys and Paul-Henri Spaak who simultaneously were member of the European Movement.

For many the Council of Europe and the Consultative Assembly heralded the beginning of a new phase in the grand debate on the future of the European continent – as a departure of the old, imperial power politics of the Concert of Europe in the nineteenth century, and of the diverging, protectionist and nationalist narrative of the early twentieth century. The public enthusiasm for the endeavour was illustrated by a public gathering of over 30,000
citizens and representative from the various European social movements preceding the opening of the Assembly on 12 August 1949 (Brugmans 1949).

On 13 August the Assembly decided to dedicate its first ‘grand debate’ to the topic of the political structure of Europe (Council of Europe 1949). So, in its fifth and sixth sitting, the 87 members of the Consultative Assembly were asked to ‘consider any necessary changes in the political structure of Europe to achieve a greater unity between the Members of the Council of Europe and to make an effective European cooperation’ (Consultative Assembly (CA), 1949, 5th sitting, p. 132). Rather than voting on a preconceived policy proposal introduced by the Committee of Ministers, the explicit aim of this debate was to find consensus through plans and amendments on a consultative report to be sent to the Committee of Ministers.

The transnational character of the assembly shaped the parliamentary procedural format. Official national delegations did not exist. Hence, official documents would be sent to individual representatives (CA 1949, 5th sitting, p. 130). Also, the representatives seated themselves alphabetically, disregarding nationality as constitutive element of the Assembly (see Van Zon 2019: 67). The official languages of the Council of Europe (English and French) served as the linguae franca for the transnational debate. However, a representative was allowed to speech in his native language, provided he would bring an interpreter or provide a consecutive interpretation of his speech in either of these official languages (CA, 1950, Rules of Procedure, rules 18 and 19).

CONNECTING PAST AND FUTURE: CONSTRUCTING A NARRATIVE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Reflecting the cleavages already visible at the Congress of Europe in 1948 in The Hague, this first debate of the Consultative Assembly revolved around three competing policy ideas of institutionalising European integration: unionism (focus on economic intergovernmental integration), federalism (focus on supranational political integration) and functionalism (focus on supranational economic integration).

Whereas the federalists strongly believed in the necessity of merging state sovereignty into supranational political and economic authorities that could govern Europe as a union, the unionists promoted an intergovernmental blueprint for Europe, based on the principle of state sovereignty. Somewhere in the middle, the functionalists adhered to a non-political economic sectoral approach of integration based on the idea that gradual integration of sectors would be an alternative that could please both federalists and unionists.3

These different blueprints of European integration often cut across nationality and political colours. For example, while the Greek Grégoire Cassimatis was a determined federalist, his fellow national Léon Maccas was keen on keeping the unionist Brits on board (Veremis and Constas 1985). Similarly, the Dutch and French socialists were divided with Hendrik Brugmans and André Philip being in favour of a federalist approach and Guy Mollet and Marinus Van der Goes van Naters in favour of functionalism (see Lipgens 1985b: 12; Heinen 1985: 357).

While the labels of ‘unionism’, ‘federalism’ and ‘functionalism’ were omnipresent to differentiate allies from opponents, the way in which they are used indicates quite some confusion about the precise meaning of those terms and their importance is questioned. Georg Bohy, a Belgian Socialist argued that ‘whether it is unionist or federal does not matter, so long as it functions efficiently’.4 With reference to the man in the street, these labels are referred to as ‘questions of pure theory’5 and ‘arguments of a more or less convincing theoretical character’.6 Rather than having to do with a rigid ideology, at this stage the different labels seem to be associated with a particular emotional vocabulary about the past and future of European integration. So, it is not about precisely defined policy positions, but the emotional vocabulary that forms the fabric of these narratives.
Table 2 Emotional narratives

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Negative Valence</td>
<td>Negative Valence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Future</td>
<td>Self: Sacrifice</td>
<td>Self: Redemption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive Valence</td>
<td>Other: Fear</td>
<td>Self: Pride</td>
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The narratives that emerge from this debate give a vivid account of an emerging emotional community that had to develop a shared emotional vocabulary from partly overlapping and competing emotions (see Table 2). They evolve around four master emotions that are distinctive in terms of the valence attached to Europe’s past and future: pride, redemption, fear and sacrifice. The interaction between these emotional narratives would inform and shape subsequent steps in the process of European integration.

Pride

The narrative of Pride projected positive emotional vocabulary associated with a glorious past to the future of the European continent and its role in the world. It emphasises the superiority and uniqueness of Europe, both as a continent and as a culture. ‘Europe cannot create itself except by reverting to the tradition which has made it great, a tradition of giving itself to the world and becoming its school-teacher’, French Socialist Jean Le Bail stated. Similarly, the British Labour representative Seymour Cocks argued that ‘Europe saved herself by her energies and the world by her example’.

References to the past served to underline Europe’s ‘greatness’ and highlight its significant contributions to the development of culture, economics and politics all over the world. This emotional narrative of Pride pointed at the shared heritage of the European people, a common social and cultural fabric that evolved ever since the dawn of Greek and Roman civilizations. The narrative tells a historical determinist story of a unique continent that witnessed an unparalleled development. This sense of pride is captured in the contribution made by the Greek Conservative Constantin Callias who reminded his colleagues that ‘all states can be proud of an old and illustrious history’. As such this Pride-narrative points at the way in which the use of emotional vocabulary served to define the nexus between European integration and the pervasive sense of western superiority, heavily imbued with ‘shadows of empire’ and colonialism (Puri 2020; Hansen 2002; Hansen and Jonsson 2016).

This historical legacy is then used to legitimise Europe’s role in the world. By expanding the space of experience to the ancient history of Europe, including a strong cultural emphasis on the transnational interaction within this history, such as those of Christianity, the Enlightenment, or great European intellectuals in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the World Wars were depicted as anomalies on the way to a new age of European cooperation. Although this emotional narrative recognised that both World Wars severely damaged this European endeavour, it emphasised the cohesive nature of the European peoples and the role they yet have to play on the world stage.

As such, national diversity was not a threat to European unity but strengthened it. The diversity was subordinate to the forces for unity which are deeply rooted in a tradition of 2,500 years of European civilization. European cooperation would become the infrastructure to enable the (cultural) cross-border interaction of the European peoples, just as in its illustrious past. Therefore, the potential transfer of sovereignty from the member states to a supranational political body was seen in positive terms: it was a rebirth. There was no doubt about popular support for this endeavour: ‘every citizen must … pledge its faith’. Jean Le Bail referred to the European Motherland which does appeal emotionally to a common European citizenship, in addition to the national Fatherland.
This Pride-narrative therefore positioned itself explicitly against the Fear-narrative. In the words of Jean Le Bail: ‘I do not like the expression: to save Europe. It seems to savour of hesitation, I dare not say of fear, but also of defeatism’.\(^{17}\)

In short, this emotional narrative assumed a certain historical linearity and determinism. With European unity, Europe will restore its place in the world. Europe’s rich history (past), materialised in a sense of cultural belonging that still exists today (present), is the unique DNA of a continent that will restore itself to greatness (future).

### Redemption

The emotional narrative of Redemption has a more negative outlook of Europe’s past. It emphasises the violent history of the European continent, especially those of the recent two World Wars. William Norton, a socialist from Ireland, uses a cynical style to paint a painful picture of Europe:

> In our time we have been treated to the wasteful pleasure of two devastating wars. ... Nobody can deny that the investment in war by Europe has yielded generous and indeed abundant dividends in the form of destruction and the impoverishment of the people of Europe ... The cemeteries of Europe today are the resting place of men and women who had talents and a passion to use those talents for the betterment of Europe.\(^{18}\)

In this emotional narrative the negative evaluation of the past is internal to Europe itself. Rather than “greatness” it emphasises the “weakness” of Europe and the need to subdue “national feelings.”\(^{19}\)

This emotional narrative calls for the destruction of the ‘archaic conception of the absolute sovereignty of States’\(^{20}\) and emphasises the need to break with the ‘old political system that is outdated’\(^{21}\) and stresses that the need for ‘a new spirit’.\(^{22}\) This new approach should be based on ‘frankness, on honesty of purpose, on truth’.\(^{23}\) It means a clear break with the past: ‘burning our boats and never going back to a policy of autarchy and isolation’.\(^{24}\) The task is to build a ‘third Europe’ after the first Europe that ended with the Reformation and Renaissance and the second Europe that ‘crashed around our ears ... with the two world wars’.\(^{25}\)

Compared with the Pride-narrative its take of the future is more careful. It highlights the fragile state of Europe and, hence, the necessity for gradual steps: ‘Europe can and must become a continuous creation, a living, moving coherent and flexible organism’.\(^{26}\) Also, in contrast to the Pride-narrative it is humbler in its relationship with others. As Lodovico Benvenuti, an Italian Christian Democrat, put it: ‘We must live with our feet on the ground – but we must use them to walk, not trample on others’.\(^{27}\)

In short, this emotional narrative emphasises a clear break with the past and appeals to the future with cautious positive valence. References to the ‘dark age of nationalism’ fit with a broader current among post-war intellectuals back then (Greiner 2018). It acknowledges the ‘long-term spiritual development and transformation of ideas’ that still has to take place.\(^{28}\) Therefore, the process of European integration that follows from this emotional narrative is gradual.

### Fear

In contrast to the emotional narratives of Pride and Redemption, the third and fourth emotional narratives evolved around a much less positive assessment of the future. The horizon of expectation of the third emotional narrative is characterised by fear, emphasising the necessity of European integration with reference to external dangers, most notably the dangers presented by the new Cold War related threats of communism, revolution, fifth columns and atomic warfare.
Like the Pride-narrative it aimed at a rebirth of Europe’s role on the world stage. As André Philip, a French Socialist and a vocal proponent of federalism, put it:

A Europe united, politically and economically, conscious of her destiny and determined to strive to unity, will play a great role in world affairs and bring peoples everywhere a message they still may need.29

Similarly, another Frenchmen, the Christian Democrat Georges Bidault felt it as the Council’s responsibility to ensure that ‘the old Europe should become the new Europe’.30

Yet, in contrast to the Pride-narrative, the narrative of Fear had a negative valence: Europe’s survival was at stake. The urgency is underlined by strong dichotomies: it was a matter of ‘life and death’31, ‘unite or perish’32, or ‘swim together or sink together’.33 In this emotional narrative Europe was powerful prior to the war, but had been severely weakened – it was an ‘easy prey for totalitarian attack’.34 André Philip points at the ‘gravest disasters and crisis’ that will overwhelm Europe if it did not unite.35

The fear of losing out did not so much concern Europe as a geographic or economic unity as such, but rather concerned the terms of this unification. Fearful of the Communist threat, the French Gaullist Gabriel Bollfrass pointed out: ‘if unity between the free peoples is not realised, unity will be imposed sooner or later by the masters of those who are no longer free’ – a clear reference to the history of national-socialist terror and the present danger of communist totalitarianism.36 Similarly, Grégoire Cassimatis feared that ‘[Europe] will unite in a different way from what we desire, with ideals which we do not accept, and for ends other than those which our peoples today aspire’.37

In addition to fear of Soviet aggression and absolute dependency on the US, a third fear referred to the point of gravity moving away from Europe, as expressed by the Turkish representative Feridun Fikri Dünsen: ‘the annihilation, or even the weakening of Europe, would mean the shattering of the whole world’.38

It painted a dark picture of death, exhaustion, weakness and annihilation to argue for the importance of European integration. The year 1952 played a pivotal role in this emotional narrative. In this year, the Marshall Plan would come to an end, seriously threatening the post-war economic growth witnessed by the various member states. The Marshall Plan ‘saved Europe’, but, at the same time, also created a false sense of stability and unhealthy economic competition between European states.39 If the European states would not agree upon serious economic integration prior to the ‘deadline’ of 1952, the economic stability of the continent could not be guaranteed. A fearful reality in which, in the words of André Philip, ‘we shall find ourselves again confronted with the necessity of restricting importation of essential raw materials, which means ... a lowering of the standard of living of the peoples’.40

In this call for saving Europe, proponents of this emotional narrative appealed to the ‘courage’ of Europeans: ‘we must dare’.41 The Dutch Social Democrat Marinus Van der Goes van Naters appealed to a ‘bond of sympathy’ to face ‘dangers which may arise’.42 And Winston Churchill, opposition leader in the UK at the time, referred to ‘the united sentiment of Europeanism’ that should revive ‘the greatest of continents which has fallen into the worst of misery’.43 Due to the feeling of imminent doom, the narrative of Fear is built around a call to action, boldness over caution and action over doubt.

Sacrifice

The fourth narrative is characterised by Sacrifice, emphasising the costs of European integration, the losses and burdens that are involved. As the Danish social democrat Frode Jakobsen put it: ‘A United Europe may not mean only pleasant things’.44 This shared emotional vocabulary of sacrifice was, however, built on different experiences. This explains why this emotional vocabulary translates into two different policy positions.
First, there were those who questioned the willingness of the public to bear the costs of European integration. In particular, the Irish vocabulary of sacrifice in relation to European integration was coloured by their fight against British oppression. The Irish Conservative Eamon de Valera questioned the willingness of the Irish people to give up their national identity and sovereignty:

For seven and three-quarter centuries we have fought to preserve our own national being and to prevent it from being destroyed, submerged or absorbed by a larger political entity. It must be obvious that it would be extremely difficult now to induce our people to reverse suddenly the whole current of their thought and history, and voluntarily to give up or seriously endanger their identity, towards the preservation of which such glorious devotion has been shown and such sacrifice endured.45

Beyond the particular Irish context, other representatives wondered as well whether public opinion was prepared for the transfer of sovereignty to supranational authority.46 Moreover, a British Labour-representative, Maurice Edelman objected to the ‘hypocrisy’ of fellow representatives who pay ‘lip-service to the cause of European unity at Strasbourg’ and ‘make economic nationalism and imperial exclusiveness the keystone of an election manifesto at home’.47

Yet, for most representatives, the sacrifices European integration entailed were really worth it: it is a ‘price to be paid’ and a ‘good investment for the future’.48 This is not to say that the sacrifices were taken lightly. Serrarens, a Catholic representative from the Netherlands, connected the sacrifices needed for European integration to those of the war:

My country … has realized that liberty is clothed in the blood of its martyrs and heroes. Let us note that the present moment is no less fraught with danger, and that the sacrifices required, though perhaps less bloody, are not less onerous.49

Also, the sacrifices were not just understood in national terms. As the Norwegian Labour representative Terje Wold pointed out, sacrifices are required ‘for some countries to the benefit of others’, curtailing sovereignty and freedom ‘especially in the economic field’.50

The Sacrifice-narrative objects to the Fear-narrative of war, of economic chaos and fear of aggression.51 These external conditions are not sufficient to unite. As the Conservative Norwegian Hermann Smitt-Ingebretsen acknowledged the ‘important obstacles of an historical, racial, religious and economic nature provide fertile ground for scepticism’.52 Highly critical of those who pursued swift and decisive change or those who forgot to include the potential doubt and unwillingness of the peoples of Europe to unity, the Sacrifice-narrative called for a gradual approach: ‘We are turning the balance of history, and that must take time … We must build stone by stone’.53

In sum, the narrative of sacrifice positions itself as being a ‘realistic’ approach to the political questions at hand. It refrains from positive emotional vocabulary, but emphasises the obstacles of integration and stresses the importance of careful long-term planning and (popular and political) consensus. Rushing the process of integration based on fear would be counterproductive and harmful to the process in the long run.

**DISCUSSION: EMOTIONAL CONTESTATION OR AFFECTIVE GLUE?**

The different emotional narratives of hope, redemption, fear and sacrifice reflect a different understanding of the past, present and future of Europe – and evaluation of its position in the world. None of the narratives, nor the particular dimensions, dominate the debate, reflecting an emotional community in the making.

The different emotional narratives do not only reflect a different temporal assessment of Europe (i.e. its past and future), but also reflect a different spatial scope. Whereas the
Pride and Fear narratives emphasise the necessity of European integration with reference to the global context (either with a positive or negative valence), the Redemption and Sacrifice narratives refer to the internal state of affairs.

This analysis sheds light on the relationship between shared experiences and the emergence of an emotional community. While the ‘great’ history of European cooperation and achievements in the distant past, and the horrors of the World Wars in the nearby past, features prominently in all emotional narratives, this shared experience does not necessarily translate into a shared emotional vocabulary. Whereas it is just an anomaly for the Pride-narrative, it is the end of an era for the Redemption-narrative.

Table 3 Emotional Narratives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sacrifice</th>
<th>Fear</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A war-torn past and an endangered future</strong></td>
<td><strong>Powerful past, but future endangered</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martyrs &amp; heroes</td>
<td>Death, weakness, annihilation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hermann Smitt-Ingebrehtsen (Nor), Eamon de Valera (Ire), Giuseppe Cappi (It), Frode Jakobsen (Den), Terje Wold (Nor), Maurice Edelman (UK), Petrus Serrarens (NL), Georges Bohy (Bel), Marc Scherer (Fr), Frederik Lee (UK)</td>
<td>André Philip (Fr), Gabriel Bollfraud (Fr), Aidan Crawley (UK), Marinus van der Goes van Naters (NL), Georges Bidault (Fr), Guy Mollet (Fr), Winston Churchill (UK), Harold Macmillan (UK), Kasim Gülek (Turk), Grégoire Cassimatis (Gr), Robert Boothby (UK), Feridun Fikri Düsünse (Turk), Herbert Morrison (UK), Walter Thomas Layton (UK)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Redemption</th>
<th>Pride</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nationalist past, fragile present</strong></td>
<td><strong>Glorious past &amp; Future</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability, evolution</td>
<td>Hesitation, fear, defeatism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thorkil Kristensen (Den), Ludovico Benvenuti (It), Arthur Sundt (Nor), Hermond Lannung (Den), William Norton (Ire), Paudelis Rozaks (Gr), James I.A. Dickson (Sweden), Paul Bastid (Fr), R.W.G. Mackay (UK), Tahsin Bekir Balta (Turk), Léon Maccas (Gr), Ludovico Montini (It)</td>
<td>Constantin Cailias (Gr), Ugo La Malfa (It), Seymour Cocks (UK), Sunt Kemal Yetkin (Turk), Jean le Bail (Fr), Georges Drossos (Gr)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The coalitions that evolve around a shared emotional narrative cut across nationality and political colour (see Table 3). Representatives of the same nationality and political colour are spread quite evenly across the different emotional narratives. Similarly, the emotional narratives cannot easily be aligned with a particular blueprint for the institutional set-up of European integration, whether unionist, federalist or intergovernmentalist. For example, the French socialists André Philip and Guy Mollet, well-known for their opposite views on European integration, share an emotional vocabulary of fear. Yet, in a more indirect way the different emotional narratives do mobilise support for particular blueprints, rather than others. The emotional narratives of Pride and Fear call for bold action and would fit well with a federalist approach. In contrast the Sacrifice-narrative, emphasising the costs involved with European integration, leans more towards a unionist blueprint for European integration. Moreover, the Redemption-narrative which highlights the need to break with a nationalist past could be tied with both a federalist and functionalist blueprint.
CONCLUSION

The early post-war years provided a critical juncture for the public debate about European integration. Both internal and external challenges pushed the issue on the agenda of all European governments, parliaments and transnational movements. It was a time of both puzzling and powering. In this context it was not just a matter of material power and institutional positions. In the uncertainty over facts and figures, there was ample room for the construction of emotional narratives to lay the groundwork for subsequent negotiations about the institutionalization of European integration.

Analysing the first debate of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, this article has presented a vivid account of the distinctive lens that emotional narratives provide for the study of the policy process. It shows how emotional narratives serve as an affective glue that transcend existing national and political cleavages.

With the analytical framework that was developed, which highlights the valence attached to experiences of the past and expectations of the future, this article has aimed at expanding the toolkit for studying narratives in European Integration. Moreover, with this framework it has emphasised the need to study the interaction between different emotions in a particular narrative. Further research, taking a longitudinal approach, needs to shed light on the temporal dynamics of emotional narratives, reflecting on their change and institutionalisation. Moreover, as Forchtner and Kolvraa (2012) have shown, a self-critical narrative about a bitter past may turn into a narrative of superiority.

At the time when European cooperation and integration, both in the Council of Europe and the EU, is far from taken for granted, this article points at the importance of investigating the long and deep history of emotional narratives as ‘the lifeblood of politics’ (McBeth 2007: 88). With the upcoming Conference on the Future of Europe, organised by the European Commission, a new opportunity arises for creating and contesting emotional narratives that provide a blueprint for redesigning Europe (European Commission 2020).

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ENDNOTES

1 Initially the Council of Europe consisted of 12 Member States: Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Turkey and the UK. The members were selected by national parliaments, only the British members were
appointed by the government (Krumrey 2018: 113). For a historical overview of the negotiations of the Council of Europe, see Wassenberg and Bitsch (2013).

2 The first four sittings of the Consultative Assembly dealt with the ceremonial opening of the Assembly and the process of setting the rules of procedure and the agenda.

3 The federalist movement was united in the Union europeenne des Federalistes (UEF), founded in 1946 by Ernesto Rossi and Altiero Spinelli, with 100,000 members from eleven countries. The most prominent unionist movements were the British United Europe Movement, founded by Winston Churchill and his son-in-law Duncan Sandys, the Ligue Europeenne de Cooperation Economique (LECE/ELEC) of the Belgian former prime-minister Paul van Zeeland, and the Conseil Francais pour l’Europe Unie.

4 CA 1949: 6th sitting, p. 278. Other participants also played down the differences between federalists and unionists, for example British Conservative Robert Boothby (CA 1949: 5th sitting, p. 172) and French Socialist Jean Le Bail (CA 1949: 6th sitting, p. 222).

5 CA 1949: 6th sitting, pp. 310-312 (Lodovico Benvenuti, Christian Democrat, Italy).


7 CA 1949: 6th sitting, p. 220 (Jean Le Bail, Socialist, France).

8 CA 1949: 6th sitting, p. 252 (Seymour Cocks, Labour, United Kingdom).

9 CA 1949: 6th sitting, p. 250 (Seymour Cocks, Labour, United Kingdom).

10 CA 1949: 6th sitting, p. 218 (Constantin Callias, Conservative, Greece).

11 CA 1949: 6th sitting, pp. 224-226 (Montini Ludovico, Christian Democrat, Italy)

12 CA 1949: 6th sitting, pp. 320-322 (Sunt Kemal Yetkin, Turkey)

13 CA 1949: 6th sitting, p. 252 (Seymour Cocks, Labour, United Kingdom)

14 CA 1949: 6th sitting, pp. 218-220 (Constantin Callias, Conservative, Greece)

15 Ibidem


19 CA 1949: 5th sitting, p.144 (Thorkil Kristensen, Conservative, Denmark); see also Hermod Lannung (Social Liberal, Denmark), pp. 274-268; 6th sitting, pp. 244-246 (Paudelis Rozakis, Liberal, Greece)


21 CA 1949: 6th sitting, p. 262 (Ronald Mackay, Labour, United Kingdom).
26 CA 1949: 5th sitting, pp. 156-160 (Léon Maccas, Social Democrat, Greece).
27 CA 1949: 6th sitting, p. 312 (Lodovico Benevenuti, Christian Democrat, Italy).
29 CA 1949: 5th sitting, p. 144 (André Philip, Socialist, France).
31 CA 1949: 5th sitting, p. 198 (Aidan Crawley, British Labour); CA 1949: 6th sitting, p. 242 (Kasim Gülek, Turkish Socialist).
32 CA 1949: 6th sitting, p. 316 (Grégoire Cassimatis, Greek Liberal).
35 CA 1949: 5th sitting, p. 138 (André Philip, Socialist, France).
36 CA 1949: 6th sitting, p. 322 (Gabriel Bolifraud, Gaulist, France).
37 CA 1949: 6th sitting, p. 316 (Grégoire Cassimatis, Liberal, Greece).
38 CA 1949 6th sitting, p. 272 (Feridun Fikri Dünsünsel, Turkey). See also, CA 1949: 6th sitting, pp. 242 & 244 (Kasim Gülek, Social Democrat, Turkey).
39 CA 1949: 6th sitting, p. 320 (Grégoire Cassimatis, Liberal, Greece).
40 CA 1949: 5th sitting, p. 140 (André Philip, Socialist, France).
41 CA 1949: 6th sitting, p. 320 (Grégoire Cassimatis, Liberal, Greece).
42 CA 1949: 5th sitting, p. 170 (Marinus van der Goes van Naters, Social Democrat, The Netherlands).
44 CA 1949: 5th sitting, p 208 (Frode Jakobsen, Social Democrat, Denmark).
46 CA 1949: 5th sitting, pp. 194 & 196 (Marc Scherer, Christian Democrat, France).
47 CA 1949: 5th sitting, p 180 (Maurice Edelman, Labour, United Kingdom).
48 CA 1949: 5th sitting, p 208 (Frode Jakobsen, Social Democrat, Denmark); CA 1949: 6th sitting, p. 280 (Georges Bohy, Socialist, Belgium); CA 1949: 5th sitting, p 148 (Giuseppe Cappi, Social Democrat, Italy).
Table 3 provides an overview of the classification of the emotional narratives of all participants in the Grand Debate. An overview of key quotes per representative has been included as supplemental material.

REFERENCES


