

Anything But Arms? Perceptions, the European Union and the Arms Embargo on China

Scott A. W. Brown
University of Glasgow

Abstract

This article examines the debate that emerged in the European Union (EU) in late 2003 and ran to mid-2005 on the possibility of lifting the arms embargo imposed on the People's Republic of China (PRC) since June 1989. It seeks to offer a more nuanced explanation of the developments in the EU's arms embargo policy towards China than has been put forward in the existing literature to date, which makes assumptions about the motivations of certain actors. To do so, it examines how the perceptions of key policymakers in the EU and two of its Member States – France and the United Kingdom (UK) – influenced their positions in the debate. The article argues that an account focusing on the variation in perceptions between actors and consequently divergent policy preferences through close process-tracing of the development of the policy facilitates a more nuanced explanation of the proceedings of the debate.

Keywords

EU foreign policy; China; Arms embargo; Perceptions

THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES THE CASE OF THE ARMS EMBARGO IMPOSED ON THE People's Republic of China by the European Union (EU) since the Tiananmen massacre in June 1989. The debate that emerged in the EU between 2003 and 2005 signalled a divergence in policy preferences among Member States and also a divergence between the EU and the United States (US) on this issue. On one side were those who favoured lifting the embargo as a means to improving relations with China, while on the other side were those who retained concerns over China's behaviour domestically and internationally and wanted the embargo to remain. The announcement of the review was followed by a lengthy debate and, although consensus to lift was very nearly reached¹ (Barsych *et al.* 2005: 61), the attempt was eventually abandoned due to a variety of factors. The purpose here is to examine whether the perceptions of key actors influenced preferences on this issue and how the debate unfolded. By focussing on two Member States – France and the United Kingdom (UK) – that had the same starting position on the policy and espoused the same reasons for the ban in the first instance, but eventually

¹ Author's interview with an EU policy official, Brussels, 28.05.2010.

I am grateful to the University Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES) and the European Commission for their financial support for fieldwork that contributed directly to this article. For comments on earlier drafts, I would also like to thank Alasdair Young, James Bilsland, John Gallagher and James Nye. Earlier versions of this article were presented at a University of Glasgow Post-Graduate Research seminar and at the UACES Student Forum Annual Conference in Bath, 29-30 April 2010. I would like to thank participants at both research events. Finally, I thank the two anonymous reviewers for their excellent feedback.

ended up on different sides of the debate, it will be possible to determine the impact of subjective perceptions on the evolution of policy preferences over time when faced with the same “objective” reality.

The case of the arms embargo is particularly interesting on two main fronts: as an example that highlights the complexity and difficulty of “EU” foreign policy-making and as an issue in the development of EU-China relations in the post-Cold War environment. Although there is now a small but growing body of literature on the arms embargo debate, this is still relatively limited. Within this, there has been little real consideration of the importance of perceptions - the study of which is already fairly well established in other areas of International Relations (IR) and its sub-discipline Foreign Policy Analysis. May-Britt Stumbaum presents perhaps the most in-depth analysis of the arms embargo debate to date, focusing on four independent variables: national parliaments, media and public opinion, business lobbies and external actors (Stumbaum 2009: 165). Arguably however, Stumbaum’s emphasis on these actors to a certain extent masks the importance of the perceptions of key policy-makers (a factor which is implicitly hinted at throughout). Nicola Casarini (2009) provides another quality contribution on the embargo by examining the impact on EU-China relations, but again perceptions are not prominent in this work. This article seeks to demonstrate that the impact of perceptions on policy was substantial and deserves greater consideration.

France and the UK are particularly appropriate Member States to focus on in relation to this issue. In their own right, they arguably remain important international actors as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), as nuclear and economic powers, and as key players within the EU, particularly in the development of foreign policy. Both were quick to criticise the Tiananmen crackdown and supported the imposition of sanctions, but later diverged on their policy towards the embargo. Significantly, both have established defence industries with noteworthy international contracts and thus potentially stood to gain from lifting the embargo. France was the strongest supporter of the move and maintained its position throughout (and also after) the debate, whilst the UK was more hesitant in its support and eventually opposed the change of policy. Thus, the two represent the “rival” positions among Member States on the embargo. In the context of this article, these are appropriate selections: whilst France and the UK were faced with the same “objective” reality, the policy preference of the latter changed over time, whereas that of the former did not. This sets up an opportunity to explore the extent to which perceptions of external reality played a role in determining their respective positions. Although the article focuses on these two actors, considerations of others will be incorporated where conducive to furthering the analysis.

The article develops as follows. The next section outlines how “perceptions” are defined and operationalised within the rest of the article. The third section examines the background of the embargo and its development over time in order to facilitate an understanding of the developing context of the policy between 1989 and 2003. The article then traces the evolution of EU-China relations to determine why lifting the embargo became a priority in 2003. Subsequently, an examination of the progression of the debate highlights the issues at play and the content of arguments, which reveal which perceptions were most salient in policy preferences. The penultimate section seeks to explain the divergence in perceptions and policies. The final section returns to the central arguments of the article: even with the eventual “non-decision” – whereby the EU and its Member States avoided making a decision, instead opting to continue working towards lifting (Stumbaum 2009: 182) – the debate itself is of significance because it indicates that divergent perceptions of China and the utility or purpose of the embargo influenced Member States’ policy directions. As such, the debate on the embargo can best be understood by highlighting the importance of the subjective perceptions held by key

players. The article also attempts to offer some insights into why the debate unfolded as it did since the existing literature addresses the content of the debate, but less so its origins.

Perceptions

Understanding how “perception” is conceptualised and utilised is necessary before any assessment of the embargo debate can be conducted. This section also explicates the concept of “perception” as an intervening variable by outlining the interaction with the independent variables and impact on the dependent variable (policy). Robert Jervis (1976: 7) argues in his seminal text *Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics* that the comparison of different actors’ perceptions of another actor is linked to their different “ways of processing [...] information, differences in pre-existing images of others or general views of the world, or differences in specific experiences”. However, Jervis does not articulate a specific definition of “perception” within his work, thus it is necessary to turn elsewhere.

Richard Herrmann defines perceptions as cognitive manifestations (interpretations) of external reality, which guide the thoughts and actions of individuals within foreign policy-making structures (Herrmann 1986: 843) - a useful basis for a definition of “perception”. However, the work of Rubén Herrero de Castro offers greater clarity in relation to how perceptions are formulated when he describes the perception process as “an integrative process whereby inputs/stimuli from operational reality are interpreted by actors as a result of the integration of those inputs and stimuli with the previous knowledge and ideas of the actor” (Herrero de Castro 2009: 26). This definition is useful as it places emphasis on the process of actors deriving information from their external reality and the fact that interpretation is filtered through a lens coloured by their prior experiences.

Based on these definitions, considerations of identity (self and others), interests, the condition of the external environment, and threat, are all rooted in actors’ subjective perceptions. Perceptions are thus distinguishable from interests and preferences as the latter are shaped and developed by continual interpretations of the external reality; in other words, they are the product of perceptions. The importance of perceptions is often taken for granted in considerations of policy-making, largely due to the dominance of “rationalist” approaches in IR, which assume a tendency for the objective, accurate formation of perceptions. Yet differing perceptions held by actors in policy-making processes are potentially influential in decisions made. It should be acknowledged that other actors – such as the public, the media, lobby groups and external actors (*e.g.* other countries) – undoubtedly have a role to play in influencing the perceptions held by key decision-makers. However, the focus here is on how the perceptions of external reality that are held influence policy outcomes - and consequently whether shifting perceptions precipitate change in policy output -, not where these perceptions originate.

Perceptions of the external reality can be considered an intervening variable that influences the direction and shape of policies. At this point, it is useful to identify the independent variables that were critical in determining the policy of the actors (*i.e.* the dependent variable). The argument is that there were two “sets” of perceptions relevant to this debate, namely the perceptions of China and the perceptions of the US, whilst policy preferences were formed as a result of calculations based on the actors’ contemporaneous perceptions within these two sets. In relation to China, this article concentrates on four main variables, which represent the issues at the heart of the debate: level of military threat (to EU or others); economic opportunity (for the Member State or the EU); importance of the EU’s relationship with China; and human rights performance (internal threat). It is conducive to explore what is meant by each of these variables in more depth to facilitate understanding of how they are examined.

The concept of military threat is straightforward: policy-makers assess the extent to which China poses a threat either to the EU, its allies or general regional/global stability. If perceptions are rationally determined, perceptions of threat could be expected to be consistent among the similarly-positioned Member States. Given that the proposal was to remove an arms embargo, if actors perceived sufficient threat (whatever they understand that to be), then supporting policy change would be unlikely. The perceived extent of economic opportunity relates to benefits to be gained from lifting the embargo, although divergence is dependent on the relative economic standings of Member States. The overall importance of the EU-China relationship may not be shared by all Member States, particularly, as will be shown, when the EU-US relationship was put under strain as a result of the debate. Human rights performance is a key variable in relation to the debate as it was human rights violations that led to the imposition of the embargo. If China's performance was perceived to have remained static or deteriorated, it would be expected that there would be little support among those holding this perception for lifting the embargo.

EU perceptions of the US are of a different nature to those of China. The US is historically a close ally of the EU. Robert Jervis (2009: 5) observes that there is a general supposition that allies understand each other well and, therefore, perceptions of the other are accurate. He goes on to argue, however, that this does not hold up to scrutiny, and misperceptions are frequent. Evidence from the embargo debate supports Jervis' argument, as France and the UK seem to have failed to perceive the potential response from the US, and how intense this would be. In relation to the first variable identified above, namely the likely political reaction to the proposal, close allies should be able to make reliable predictions about political reaction, especially when they are of democratic nature (Jervis 2009: 5). Once the debate was under way, the US expounded its opposition to the proposal. The US became involved in the debate and relayed information to its European allies regarding its position. Thus, the EU should have been able to perceive with a certain degree of accuracy the level of political opposition in the US.

The importance of these variables to each actor is subjective; there is no pre-determined hierarchy. Actors attempt to process information derived from the external environment to adapt their perceptions to match changes in this environment, but their pre-existing expectations bias this process (Jervis 1976: 145). Thus, perceptions do not always match reality. The amount of information available in a complex world also means that the capacity of actors to formulate accurate perceptions is limited, since no actor or group of actors can ever absorb all the relevant information to form perceptions that completely reflect external reality. Finally, actors do not examine variables in isolation from one another. Instead, their overall perception of the other actor's character is informed by the constellation of variables identified. This article employs three methods of acquiring data relating to perceptions: interviews with policymakers/observers/academics; discourse analysis of government documents, speeches, reports, etc.; and analysis of secondary sources, predominantly academic literature. This enables the "triangulation" of information to increase the accuracy of inferences made concerning specific perceptions.

Historical background of the embargo

Examining the events that resulted in the imposition of the embargo will provide a basis for analysing policy development and why divergence eventually transpired. The protests in Beijing in the spring of 1989 culminated in the PRC making the decision to send in the military to disperse the protesters. This decision resulted in the deaths of hundreds, if not

thousands, of unarmed protesters on 4 June 1989.² These actions were swiftly condemned by the international community. Among the fiercest critics of the massacre were the Member States of the EU³ and the US which moved quickly to impose sanctions on China and repudiate its behaviour. The EU announced its decision to impose sanctions at the European Council meeting in Madrid shortly after the Tiananmen repression (26-27 June 1989). The Council released a Declaration that condemned the killings and called on China to respect (implicitly, the Western conceptualisation of) human rights (European Council 1989).

The Declaration listed the responses to be adopted by the EU, which included promoting human rights issues through discussion with China, the suspension of high-level contacts, the postponement of cooperative projects, the reduction of cultural, technological and scientific cooperation programmes, the extension of Chinese students' visas, and the "interruption by the Member States [...] of military cooperation and *an embargo on trade in arms with China*" (European Council 1989 [emphasis added]). The statement refrained from outlining what arms or related materials are subject to the embargo, or at what level it would be enforced, leaving leeway for Member State interpretation. Nevertheless, the link between human/democratic rights concerns and the imposition of the embargo was clearly established through this declaration. It is worth noting that the embargo was not reinforced as a "Common Position" under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP, established in 1993). This would have in effect shifted the embargo from a political to a legal commitment and reduced the scope for Member State interpretations (Kreutz 2004: 46).

France was one of the strongest critics of the Tiananmen massacre, as it stirred up "collective memories of the French revolutionary past and the student demonstrations in 1968" (Stumbaum 2009: 86). Indeed, the arms embargo was added to the list of sanctions at the insistence of France (Wong 2006: 82). The UK sided with France in the condemnation of the repression at Tiananmen Square - the "handover" of Hong Kong due within a decade generated concern amongst policy-makers for the future protection of human rights once the PRC regained governing authority (Baker 2002: 48). While the two states shared similar views on the implications of Tiananmen, the significance was enhanced by different experiences. Whereas history influenced the French position, the UK's contemporary regional interests were the pressing concern. One former UK policy official indicated that Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's perceptions of the "Communists" in China, the potential implications for Hong Kong and the reaction of the British media and public strongly shaped the UK's response to the killings.⁴

France's overt concern for human rights was apparently short-lived, as it breached some sanctions within six months of their imposition. Additionally, the common European position towards China lasted only approximately ten months, when many of the sanctions were lifted (Wellons 1994: 342). The apparent common perception was that these sanctions were of limited use in effecting change within China and that progress would only be made through engagement (Wellons 1994: 343). This was much in line with the argument presented later by Clinton in the "delinkage" of human rights from China's Most Favoured Nation status in 1994. The "linkage" was itself a reaction to the Tiananmen massacre and thus the "delinkage" arguably represents a change in perceptions of the necessity of such a measure or even the current level of threat China posed to its citizens at that time. The EU's decision to lift most of the sanctions in October 1990 was apparently

² The exact number is unknown and estimates are often quite varied. The Chinese Red Cross put the death toll at an estimated 2,600 (Lui 2000: 144).

³ It is worth noting that, at this time, the EU (or rather EC) had a membership of 12. This means that, at the time of the debate in the EU, more than half the members were not present at the time of the original declaration. However, after acceding in 2004, the newest Member States played only a small role in the debate.

⁴ Author's interview with a former British policy official, London, 07.05.2010.

assisted by assurances from the PRC about future treatment of human rights, together with China's constructive role in the Gulf Crisis and in handling Cambodia (Baker 2002: 50), potentially facilitating shifts in perceptions of China's overall character.

The Member States did not immediately clarify their interpretations of the arms embargo, at least publicly. As a political declaration, there was no particular requirement for clarification, and most Member States had pre-existing national arms export controls in place. The implication was that an actual "embargo" was not imposed following Tiananmen, but rather a new political declaration on arms sales to China. In April 1997, French Defence Minister Charles Millon stated that "there is no question of going back on the decision about the arms trade" (cited in SIPRI 2004a). When Millon raised the prospects of greater cooperation with China, he was careful to note that future "cooperation will be conducted within the framework of our European and international commitments" (cited in SIPRI 2004b), which implicitly includes the arms embargo. Of note, in the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)'s evaluation, this is the clearest indication of France's interpretation of the embargo. The language, however, is arguably vague, noting that France will adhere to the (non-binding) EU embargo in its dealings with China.

The UK's position on the EU arms embargo was expounded most clearly (again, according to SIPRI) in response to a question raised in the House of Commons in March 1995 (SIPRI 2004c). This was directed at then Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Alastair Goodlad. The response emphasised that the UK prohibited weapons that could be used for "internal repression" (such as that witnessed in 1989) and that any applications for transfers were to be considered on a case-by-case basis (Hansard 1995: Col. 842-843). At this time, a brief overview was given of what items were prohibited from export to China. Notably, no references were made to dual-use technologies – that is, items with potential civilian or military application that are not much use for internal repression, but facilitate the development of high technological warfare capabilities. The significance is that it reveals that the UK was not concerned, at least at that time, about the potential implications that such technologies may have for China's military strength. In other words, there was apparently no perception of China presenting a military threat.

Although Member States would be reluctant to go against the embargo as a political commitment (Archick *et al.* 2005: 5), it was not impossible for them to do so, depending on their national arms export controls. In fact, arms transfers from France and the UK continued despite the embargo (see below). A differentiation can thus be made between the embargo as an actual barrier to arms transfers and its status as a commitment to EU norms and as a "message" to the PRC. From the interviews conducted in London, Paris and Brussels, there was overwhelming agreement that the significance of the embargo laid in its status as a symbolic reminder to China of the legacy of the Tiananmen massacre. However, the symbolic significance of the evidence was evidently waning among certain Member States prior to the emergence of the debate.

In this context, the move to lift the embargo was predicated on changing the expression of the EU's approach towards China, rather than Member States necessarily seeking to increase their arms exports. This would suggest that perceptions of the opportunities closer relations with China would offer had increased, rather than perceptions of the need to sell arms to China. At the time of its imposition, the arms sanction was seen as a necessity. The liberal democratic nations could not justify allowing weapons exports to a state which they perceived as liable to use these weapons against its own citizens. However, despite the lack of a comparable incident since then, the perception of China as a violent and oppressive regime became commonplace within Western political discourse, impacting the full spectrum of relations with China thereafter. Notwithstanding the fact that some actors seemed willing to compromise on some areas of their beliefs for the sake

of economic gains, the arms embargo remained for some time the one area that was ostensibly non-negotiable in relations with China.

The context of developing relations

Understanding how the evolution of EU-China relations led to the consideration of the lifting of the embargo is an important step if an assessment is to be made of how perceptions influenced policy. Rather than covering the development of relations in minute detail, a brief overview illustrates the context that facilitated an environment in which the prospect of lifting the embargo could materialise. The scope of the article limits the depth of this analysis, but the European Commission Communications (of 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2003) on China help illustrate the development of the EU's attitude. Notably, only the 1995 Communication makes reference to the Tiananmen massacre and the existence of the arms embargo (European Commission 1995). The subsequent Communications do note that human rights in China are still an area of concern (see in particular European Commission 2001). Nevertheless, overall, the issue is given less attention than other issues, such as the EU and China's growing importance as global actors with an emphasis on the need for greater cooperation, as well as the importance of economic issues, such as trade and investment.

The general trend in these documents was to note areas where China's human rights records had made (mostly marginal) progress and emphasise what its "next steps" should be, rather than focussing too strongly on criticising continued failings. Clearly, the issue of human rights in China did not disappear, but it can be argued that it became a less prominent aspect for the EU's focus as time passed. Several interviewees indicated that, whilst China's human rights performance remains a concern, there has been a growing recognition that other aspects of the relationship cannot be neglected, particularly as China continues to grow in political and economic weight.⁵ An apparent turning point was France's decision not to co-sponsor a resolution on China at the UN Commission on Human Rights as had been the norm (Baker 2002: 55-56), which was indicative of President Jacques Chirac's attempt at accommodating China.⁶ On the embargo specifically, one French policy official stated that, even before the debate emerged, the embargo offered little in the way of leverage on human rights issues.⁷

China's 2003 paper on its policy towards the EU, the first of its kind, helped foster better relations. The document ended by stating that "[t]he EU should lift its ban on arms sales to China at an early date so as to remove barriers to greater bilateral cooperation on defence industry and technologies" (MoFA 2003). Thus, those seeking stronger ties with China may have argued that maintaining the embargo had significant costs. From the EU's policy papers and continued engagement with China, it is evident that deeper relations were of a high priority for many European elites. The end to the embargo would be the price that the EU had to pay for increased cooperation irrespective of human rights concerns, which the Chinese leadership regarded as interference in the sovereign affairs of the PRC. Subsequent to the publication of this document, China intensified its attempts to persuade the EU to lift the embargo. At the October 2003 EU-China summit, participants

⁵ Author's interviews with a French policy official, Paris, 19.05.2010; a Spanish policy official, Brussels, 31.05.2010; an EU policy official, Brussels, 01.06.2010.

⁶ Author's interview with François Godement (European Council on Foreign Relations), Paris, 20.05.2010.

⁷ Author's interview with a French policy official, Paris, 19.05.2010.

acknowledged that discussion of the issue had occurred, but the published conclusions made no reference to the issue (Kreutz 2004: 49).⁸

Economic interest as a potential motivation for ending the embargo requires consideration. As noted above, the non-binding embargo allowed some Member States to continue with arms exports and as such may have been expected to favour removing the ban. France, despite being one of the fiercest critics of the Tiananmen massacre, never fully ceased to export arms to China. Data presented by SIPRI on French and British arms trade with China indicates that France's exports to China have consistently been the largest. In 1989, French arms exports to China were valued at US\$ 74M (3.7 per cent of France's annual total), compared to the UK's US\$ 10M (0.3 per cent). Jumping forward to 2004 – when the debate was under way – French exports stood at US\$ 88M (3.9 per cent) and the UK's had also grown to US\$ 30M (2.5 per cent) (SIPRI 2009). This suggests that the Chinese market was of comparatively less value to the UK, which transferred no arms to China between 1990 and 1997. However, transfers resumed as of 1997 under the New Labour government. Even when the UK reversed its support for the lifting of the embargo during the debate, this did not spell an end to its sales to China (SIPRI 2009).

This raises a question about the reason behind the debate, given that the embargo had actually not influenced the flow of arms from certain states to China. Further, the EU as a whole "almost doubled its arms export licences approved for China between 2002 and 2003" (Kogan 2005: 9). However, European states have avoided selling China major weapons platforms. Most of the sales have consisted of dual-use technologies with civilian or non-lethal end-use purposes (Wezeman and Bromley 2005: 440). Although China argued that trade in other areas would benefit from the lifting of the embargo (which in itself could be construed as either an incentive or a threat, if not both), its continued existence has not prevented trade in non-weapons areas from flourishing. Consequently, these factors are indicative of economic interest as a rather weak motivation for lifting the embargo, as there were relatively low levels of perceived economic opportunity, at least in relation to arms sales.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, there were never public declarations of support for lifting the embargo on the basis that it would open up a market with significant potential for European defence companies due to the ethical arguments of the anti-lifting camp (including the US). In fact, the argument pushed was that the lifting of the arms embargo was not for the purpose of increasing arms exports, a point which was put across in March 2004 debate by the High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana (*Agence Europe*, 18.03.2004). The absence of such reasoning suggests that actors may be sensitive to the perceptions of China or even of themselves held by others. The sale of French weapons to China on the basis of economic interests may have precipitated a perception of France as failing to live up to the standards expected from responsible international players. Arguably, this could have been detrimental to France's self-identity and also the current government.

However, arguments that increased arms exports were not a motivating factor were undermined by certain actors. French Defence Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie stated in February 2005 that maintaining the embargo would lead China to develop its indigenous defence industry rapidly (Shambaugh 2005: 5), an argument which was echoed by Austria's Defence Minister Günther Platter in January 2006 (*Agence Europe*, 26.01.2006). These statements not only indicate that those opposed to lifting the embargo were perhaps justified in their concerns about the motivations of supporters, but they are

⁸ After the following EU-China Summit (December 2004), the Joint Statement made reference to the EU's "political will" to continue towards the lifting of the embargo, a signal which the Chinese welcomed (Council of the European Union 2004: 2).

arguably doubly problematic on the basis that China's indigenous defence industry is regarded as somewhere between ten and twenty years behind those in Europe and the US (Shambaugh 2005: 5). Therefore, technological transfers could expedite the narrowing of the relative capability gap. This is mostly a problem for actors who perceive China's attempts to acquire certain technologies as indicative of threatening intentions: a perception which was evidently absent for some, if not most, European actors, but particularly present amongst those in the US.

In light of the above evidence, economic interests might not have been fundamental to policy preferences. The gains from lifting the embargo were relatively slim. As was suggested in one interview, in terms of arms sales there were other clients and more lucrative markets that the Member States could have opted for, such as Taiwan⁹, which would have been politically less controversial. EU companies would also struggle to compete with the prices offered by Russian rivals who have the distinct advantage that China's existing capabilities are largely of Soviet/Russian origin¹⁰ (Casarini 2007: 378). Nicola Casarini suggests that China's lobbying of the EU to lift the embargo was not predicated on the sole desire to access EU technology, but rather "European arms producers would mainly provide the PLA [People's Liberation Army] with competing bids in order to extract better deals from Moscow" (Casarini 2007: 378). US critics argued that the EU could offer superior high-end technology compared to Russia, creating the opportunity for China to accelerate its military modernisation. Nevertheless, removing the embargo would not necessarily have entailed an open season on arms transfers - a point many interviewees were keen to make. Instead, the embargo would be replaced by the Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. However, this came under constant criticism for its non-binding nature and insufficient clarity (*Agence Europe*, 19.11.2004).

EU-China relations apparently overcame the obstacle of Tiananmen relatively quickly. The rise of China - which the EU has sought to influence in a positive direction - coincided with the EU's evolving international role, an analysis of which is beyond the scope of this article. From the policy documentation, it is apparent that, within the EU, there was a desire for the EU to be more proactive in its engagement with China, which would serve to underpin the EU's new international role. It would seem that the case for lifting the embargo was a consequence of not only developments in EU-China relations - arguably at their best since the Tiananmen killings - but also China's growing influence in international affairs, the perceived importance of China by the EU collectively, and the importance ascribed to recognition as a credible international actor by the EU. The embargo stood as an obstacle to fostering closer relations through the new strategic partnership (Stumbaum 2009: 171). Further, lifting the embargo would indicate an independent European foreign policy, which was not informed by the preferences of the US (Casarini 2007: 385) - an objective consistent with the tone of the European Commission Communications.

The debate opens up

The move to lift the embargo was initiated by France and Germany¹¹ at the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) meeting on 12 December 2003. Foreign Affairs ministers were explicitly instructed by the Council to review the embargo (Austin 2005: 11). The issue was high on the agenda for the EU throughout 2004 - the will to lift the embargo was reaffirmed in December in the Presidency Conclusions - and into 2005, but

⁹ Author's interview with François Godement, Paris, 20.05.2010.

¹⁰ Technologies provided by the EU would require significant alterations to, and modernisation of, China's existing military technology, incurring significant costs for the People's Liberation Army (PLA).

¹¹ Austria, Italy, Spain and Greece also supported ending the embargo (*Agence Europe*, 27.01.2004), with Finland and the Netherlands joining this group later (Casarini 2009: 124).

failed to reach a resolution. It is still effectively hanging in limbo as a promise was made to continue working towards lifting (GAERC 2006: 9). Following the Council meeting in December 2003, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi – then Council President – justified the move on the grounds of “the will, apparently sincere of the new Chinese political class to make progress on economic issues and political rights” (cited in *Agence Europe* 13.12.2003). Thus, in light of the contemporary setting of the relationship, the embargo was the only remaining obstacle to closer relations; maintaining an arms ban on a “strategic partner” does not represent a great deal of trust. While France was the first to propose lifting the embargo, others such as Germany also favoured the move. The UK also came round to support the idea in May 2004 as confirmed by then Foreign Minister Jack Straw (Casarini 2006: 31).

President Chirac at the time stated that France “shall try to obtain the swiftest possible lifting [...] of this embargo, which is of another time, and no longer corresponds to today’s realities” (cited in *The Economist* 2010). It indicates not only the President’s willingness to support lifting the embargo, but also the fact that he perceived the conditions under which the embargo was imposed to have changed. France’s political system affords the President considerable autonomy in foreign policy-making (Risse-Kappen 1991: 487), which elevates the importance of their personal perceptions. Chirac was the key proponent of lifting the embargo in France, but was also strongly supported by Defence Minister Alliot-Marie. Internally, the Defence ministry was not united on the issue¹², but the President’s prerogative effectively meant that divergent perceptions at lower levels of government were inconsequential. According to Jean-Pierre Cabestan (2007: 138), the national governments of both France and Germany perceived sufficient improvements in China’s human rights record to render ostracising China along with the likes of Burma and Zimbabwe inappropriate due to its increasing international importance. This suggests that the perceptions of China’s human rights performance held by some actors had changed, which would lead to new perceptions regarding the importance of maintaining an embargo.

The origin of the embargo as a European Council Conclusion meant that unanimity between the Member States would be required to change the policy. Throughout the debate, the Council Secretariat and the Commission – including Directorate-Generals Trade and External Relations (Relex) whose involvement may have been anticipated given that the issue was relevant to their competences – played only minor roles. The divisions between Member States on the “appropriate” policy made involvement trickier for these institutions that were concerned about wandering into the fray. The European Parliament did attempt to make its voice heard (Stumbaum 2009: 167) despite lacking direct input in foreign policy decision-making. A vote on maintaining the embargo in December 2003 very clearly revealed the perceptions held by the majority of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs): 373 to 32 (29 abstentions) opposed the move (Kreutz 2004: 50). Ultimately however, despite the Parliament’s vociferous protestations, the debate continued as it was the Member States that would decide the outcome.

The available evidence suggests that the positions of Member States in the debate were predicated on two distinct avenues of thought. Firstly, those who supported lifting the ban were arguably driven by perceptions of interest vis-à-vis China and subsequent interpretations of the “appropriate” approach to EU-China relations. In terms of “interests”, there was recognition that ending the embargo was necessary to facilitate deeper EU-China relations (Archick *et al.* 2005: 18) and, as mentioned above, had indeed been pushed by China in its policy paper on the EU. In terms of economic considerations, the increased trade with China in certain technologies was potentially lucrative, despite protestations to the contrary. From another perspective, the UK was argued to have initially favoured lifting

¹² Author’s interview with François Godement, Paris, 20.05.2010.

the ban on the grounds that it stood to lose out in other areas of trade with China if it took an adversarial stance on the issue (Stumbaum 2009: 172). Thus, the economic factor was not restricted to the one dimension of the EU-China trade relationship. Outside of Council meetings, little reference was made to human rights conditions in China, implications for regional stability or cross-Straits relations, at least in the early stages of the debate¹³, which were picked up on by those who favoured retaining the ban.

The second avenue of thought – espoused by those who opposed the lifting of the embargo – tended to focus on the threat China posed to the human rights of its own citizens (Glen and Murgo 2007: 338), indicating different perceptions of the situation in China to those supporting the lifting of the embargo. The issues of Taiwan's security and regional stability tended to be concerns of the US (Archick *et al.* 2005: 31) rather than EU states. This was perhaps predictable because the EU had no comparable regional role as the US. However, US critics were apparently surprised that their European allies would fail to recognise the problems that lifting the embargo would cause. Additionally, the original arguments that China may yet use European weapons technologies to further oppress its own citizens were often cited by US critics. The Taiwan Strait crisis in the mid-1990s had arguably reinforced the necessity of the embargo in the US by demonstrating how China was increasing its ability to project its power across the Strait. The EU's non-involvement meant that the crisis did not reinforce such perceptions amongst its Member States. These concerns informed responses to the Anti-Secession Law (see below) in the spring of 2005 as the debate rumbled on.

As noted above, the issue of regional stability featured in the debate: allowing China access to technologies that would expedite force modernisation could potentially lead to a destabilising arms race in the region involving the likes of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. However, it was proclaimed that the embargo would not increase China's military capability. Javier Solana argued in January 2005 that the lifting of the embargo was

more a political decision than a military one [...] it simply involves putting a stop to a political decision made at a specific time in the history of China, rather than a modification of military relations between the EU and China. It does not mean increasing arms exports (cited in Archick *et al.* 2005: 19).

The adoption of the Anti-Secession Law (ASL) by the PRC in March 2005 came at a somewhat inconvenient time for supporters of lifting the embargo. The law – which affirmed that “[t]he state shall never allow the ‘Taiwan independence’ secessionist forces to make Taiwan secede from China under any name or by any means” (*China Daily* 2005) – was perceived by some in the EU and US as evidence of China's hostile intentions towards Taiwan. The basis for this was the inclusion in the law of an assertion that the PRC would “employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity” (*China Daily* 2005). The law emphasises that peaceful means must be exhausted or independence declared by secessionist forces before such recourse – language which, Austin (2005: 16) states, has never before been officially adopted with respect to Taiwan. However, the mere inclusion of the force provision reinforced existing perceptions of the threatening nature of China.

The ASL effectively ended the chances of the EU being able to take a decision by June 2005. The EU had dispatched a delegation to Washington headed by Annalisa Giannella – selected by Javier Solana – in a bid to persuade the US to drop its opposition. Their arrival coincided with the introduction of the ASL, and the delegation found itself on the defensive in what became an embarrassing situation for the EU.¹⁴ Consequently, the EU's

¹³ As the debate progressed, there were more frequent calls for China to give a “positive signal” on human rights that would ease the lifting of the embargo, although formal conditionality was not implemented.

¹⁴ Author's interview with an EU policy official, Brussels, 28.05.2010.

arguments were not taken into account by policy-makers in the US, for whom the issue - as actors in the EU saw it - became intensely emotional.¹⁵ Giving Beijing the answer it wanted would be untenable in the political climate at the time, yet proponents did not want to damage relations with China by taking it off the table altogether. Thus, the “non-decision” was presented - the EU would continue to work towards lifting the embargo at some unspecified time in the future. Developments in the EU-China relationship had created a permissive environment allowing for consideration of lifting the embargo by some actors. However, this evaporated when the US disapproval and China’s actions (passage of the ASL) led to a shift in considerations of the “appropriateness” of lifting the embargo at that time.

Explaining policy divergence

This section identifies the key factors that, in the first instance, led to policy divergence within the EU and explain why ultimately no firm decision was taken. It is important to stress that, since the embargo remained, this section is focused on how perceptions led policy preferences to shift over time and on what role they played in determining the course of the debate itself. This section also examines to what extent the French and British policy-makers’ perceptions of the independent variables influenced their policy preferences and the direction of the debate. The argument presented is that, although the actors were faced with the same “objective” reality, their subjective perceptions led them to different priorities and policy preferences. Furthermore, their perceptions of the US position on the issue contributed to the protracted debate.

It is apparent that there was little real concern for either the UK or France regarding the potential military threat posed by China, as both had been selling arms to China prior to the announcement of the review of the embargo. The arguments presented in relation to this are that the lifting of the embargo would not lead to China developing its military capabilities any quicker than when the embargo was in place. The US emphasised the potential threat to regional stability if the embargo was removed, but evidently failed to convince either the UK or France of this. That is not to say that the EU actors disregarded the US arguments over China’s future intentions, but rather the implications of removing the embargo. The introduction of the ASL could be argued to have shifted perceptions on this matter somewhat. However, the evidence suggests that, instead, it merely shifted perceptions of the political opposition in the US, and the Member States recognised that further attempts to lift the embargo would be futile.

Of greater relevance for both France and the UK was the perceived economic opportunities presented by lifting the embargo for their own national interests and the EU as a whole. However, the perceived advantage was not from potential arms sales to China, but rather the benefits that closer relations (which China had made contingent on the removal of the arms embargo) would bring. The perception of future economic opportunity was more evident in France; in particular, Chirac’s personal position exemplified this. In the UK, the concern was that failure to support removing the embargo would lead to the UK missing out on those opportunities. The absence of a perception of threat - noted above - meant that the perceptions of economic opportunity had a greater role in the formation of policy preferences.

China had become a much more important economic partner for the EU throughout the 1990s. Over time, perceptions in France and the UK came to reflect this. In France, the influence of Chirac’s perceptions on the shape of policy was evident: his pro-China stance contributed to France pursuing the lifting of the embargo. In the UK, the change of

¹⁵ Author’s interview with an EU policy official, Brussels, 04.06.2010.

government in 1997 seems to have prompted a reassessment of the appropriateness of the embargo, not least since arms sales to China resumed in this year. Alternatively, it could be construed that the cost of maintaining the embargo had changed for Member States: economic interests (greater trade and investment opportunities) may outweigh the benefits of maintaining the embargo (China's military is expanding anyway; little improvement in the area of human rights). Given that increasing interdependence with China has affected the whole of the EU, it may be expected that policy preferences would change in the same direction if actors are pursuing economic interests in a rational manner, even when they do not stand to gain by the same amount. Further, economic relations with China – including arms sales – have not evidently suffered as a result of the embargo remaining in place. While there was undoubtedly an element of economic interest at work in the debate, the perceptions of other factors in combination resulted in divergent preferences on the issue.

Since France was responsible for the imposition of the arms embargo, it is arguable that there was a perception that France should take on the responsibility of reversing the policy to promote closer EU-China relations. Alternatively, this approach could be considered the “rational” approach given that it may potentially diffuse costs and reduce the risk (e.g. being chastised by other actors) by “sharing the burden” with other actors (Wong 2006: 9). It is evident that France only achieved this to a certain extent in respect to its arms embargo policy, thus perhaps raising questions about France's ability to influence EU foreign policy (a discussion which is beyond the scope of this article), particularly when the other states usually considered key in EU foreign policy matters – Germany and the UK – were also supportive of France's position prior to the UK reversing its position. One reason suggested by both an interviewee¹⁶ and Rath (2006: 51) for Blair's pursuit of lifting the embargo was that the idea of being on the “losing side” of the EU3 in the relations with China would be damaging not just for economic interests, but also for the UK's self-perceived identity as an important actor in Europe and a partner of China. The adoption of the ASL appears to have shifted Blair's perception of China and the implications that continued support would have, particularly for transatlantic relations. The UK would assume the Presidency of the Council in July 2005, and Blair would not want to pursue lifting under such circumstances.

The extent to which China's human rights performance was perceived as an important issue was of critical importance to the debate. As the embargo was a response to perceptions of human rights performance in the wake of the Tiananmen killings, it could be expected that this would indeed feature in discussions. However, the evidence suggests that perceptions of human rights performance mattered little to France and the UK compared to the perceptions of economic opportunities and the importance of developing relations with China. While France perceived some marginal improvement in China's human rights performance, thus opening up potential for a reassessment of the necessity of the embargo, the importance of human rights to the UK's policy preference was essentially non-existent (Rath 2006: 56), as the perceived importance of other factors outweighed any such concerns substantially. However, understandings of the EU's interests in relation to China were evidently not shared by all Member States, some of which saw promoting human rights and in some cases maintaining strong links with the US as more important.

Critics of the proposed lifting argued that there had been little improvement on human rights performance, noting that some Tiananmen demonstrators remained incarcerated. Those supporting the end of the embargo argued that its symbolic component was now largely irrelevant: the eradication of all other sanctions and the apparent failure to actually affect change in China's human rights practices had eroded the rationale for maintaining

¹⁶ Author's interview with François Godement, Paris, 20.05.2010.

the embargo. Critics stressed the importance of retaining the embargo to remind China of the implications of Tiananmen and also to limit China's access to technologies that would enhance its ability to oppress citizens. There were frequent references to the dangers to Chinese citizens, indicating that critics did not accept arguments that lifting the embargo would not result in more weapons sales to China.

As stated previously, perceptions of the US as a critic of the proposal also influenced the debate. One interviewee indicated that, at the time, Chirac perceived the US as a "weakened" international actor as consequence of the disputes surrounding the invasion of Iraq. This created an environment in which discussing this move was feasible.¹⁷ The weakened US would be unlikely to strongly oppose the move. However, this was a misperception of the situation. The UK, having sided with the US in relation to Iraq, did not share this perception, which contributed to the hesitancy of the UK to support the lifting of the embargo. However, other pressures, including the economic opportunities (or lack thereof in case it did not support the lifting), were eventually perceived as a more important issue for the UK.

When the first steps were taken towards reviewing the embargo, there was no attempt by the EU to inform the US. Although there was by no means any requirement to do so, given the turbulent nature of US-China relations, such a move may have curtailed the public debate. There were no arrangements for such dialogue to take place at the time, such as an EU-US strategic dialogue on Asia. Those were subsequently established as a consequence of the embargo debate (Pangratis 2006), although they are now practically defunct. The lack of such interaction at the time meant that the perceptions held by key actors in the EU regarding the US position were not the result of processing information provided by their ally, but were rather based on their own estimations of the potential responses of US policymakers. Even in the absence of these structures, the fact that EU actors did not make moves to inform the US is indicative that they did not correctly perceive the likely response of the US.

The apparent explanation for Blair's initial alignment with the pro-lifters was a result of a misperception of just how strong US opposition, particularly in Congress, really was. The initiation of the East Asian Security Act – a bill which would impose economic sanctions on European firms from countries that supported lifting the embargo – was a clear indication of the resolve amongst US policy-makers. Ultimately, the Act did not garner sufficient votes as a consequence of successful lobbying on the part of American businesses concerned about the potential for the Europeans to take reciprocal action (*Agence Europe* 16.07.2005). Even so, the mere attempt to pass such an act seems to have been influential. Interviewees indicated that, before the Act failed, there was acceptance amongst European policy-makers that the attempt to lift the embargo was dead in the water.¹⁸

The complication of the US vociferous opposition was compounded by China's passage of the ASL, which served to reinforce the arguments of opponents of lifting the embargo. Given the UK's impending assumption of the Presidency of the European Council in July 2005, it was apparent that the UK – particularly Blair – would not be prepared to continue the attempt to lift the embargo in the face of such strong opposition. In the case of the UK, it is worth considering the importance of the issue in the first place. If the issue was not perceived as highly important (as suggested by the time it took for the UK to voice support), then the perceptions and, subsequently, the preferences in relation to the embargo were more susceptible to external influence, particularly when other interests (perceived to be more important, such as relations with the US) became entangled with the issue. The passage of the ASL and other European actors recognising the futility of

¹⁷ Author's interview with an EU policy official, Brussels, 01.06.2010.

¹⁸ Author's interview with François Godement, Paris, 20.05.2010.

pursuing the issue further at that stage offered the UK a way to limit damage in both its relations with the US (by no longer angering policy-makers there) and the EU (by avoiding breaking consensus or appearing too Atlanticist).

The UK's policy position is interesting as it essentially varied twice over the course of the debate. Although New Labour had resumed the export of certain arms technologies to China, this did not precipitate automatic support for an end to the embargo. Indeed, the UK took its time before openly supporting the end to the embargo. Then, in March 2005, the UK switched to opposition. This article argues that the UK's reluctance to support the embargo was not simply deference to the US position, which had been explicated prior to the UK announcing that it would support lifting the embargo. The US made it clear to the UK that it wanted it to oppose the move, which initially the UK refused to do (*Agence Europe* 21.01.2005). Kayte Rath (2006: 54) argues that the UK had resisted US pressure and attempted to act as a bridge between the US and the EU until the passage of the ASL, which made this untenable and offered a way out for the UK.

The non-decision of the EU can be viewed to have been consequential of the perceived importance of a variety of factors. While the divergence in French and British policies has been examined so far in this section, other factors were also present as can be seen from previous sections: the fact that other Member States perceived some level of potential "threat", the requirement for intergovernmental consensus on lifting the embargo, the benefits of maintaining the embargo over costs, and normative considerations of the EU's role as an international actor. Another compounding factor was the recent rejection of the EU's Constitutional Treaty referendum in late May 2005 by the French public. Following this, French officials accepted that they had lost the ability to influence EU policy at that time and were in "defensive mode" in Europe.¹⁹ The complexity of the combination of these factors, in addition to divergent perceptions of the key issues, made reaching a decision particularly difficult.

The policy divergence between 1989 and 2003 in relation to the arms embargo can be seen as having significant implications in terms of the content of the debate that unfolded. The existing literature has tended to take the reasons why the debate emerged in the first place for granted, an issue which this article has attempted to redress. Divergence in perceptions amongst key actors in the EU's policy-making process has been argued to constitute a key intervening variable in terms of shaping national conceptualisations of the impact of the embargo on security, economic and human rights issues in the EU's relationship with China. Further, there were evidently misperceptions of the US position on the embargo, which led to the drawn-out nature of the debate. These conclusions reinforce the point of treating perceptions as subjective phenomena. On the basis of rationalist expectations of perception formulation, these divergences would not be anticipated, given that the actors involved were faced with the same "reality" of China.

Conclusion

The foregoing analysis has indicated that perceptions mattered to the arms embargo debate on several fronts. At the national level, particularly in the case of France, the positive perception of China held by Chirac seems to have been particularly important in changing the position of the country on the embargo, leading to the debate in 2003 onwards. In the UK, there was a weaker emphasis on the importance of the relationship with China, but support for the embargo was determined by a lack of concern over human rights. The eventual reversal of support for the embargo was partly influenced by the US opposition, but also by perceptions of China itself shifting relatively quickly following the

¹⁹ Author's interview with François Godement, Paris, 20.05.2010.

passage of the ASL. The debate at the EU level amongst Member States demonstrated divergent perceptions of China and subsequent understandings of national and European priorities vis-à-vis China and the appropriateness of maintaining the arms embargo. Additionally, the misperception of the US position on the issue for an extended period of time contributed to the duration and content of the transatlantic debate.

The subjectivity of perceptions evident even within a single state or policy-making institution suggests that whose perceptions change, in what direction, and why, matter for policy outcomes. Additionally, if the person occupying a position of considerable influence changes, then the perceptions of the new incumbent will not necessarily be the same as their predecessor's. This opens up the possibility of divergence in policy as their perceptions informed their interests and policy preferences in relation to other actors. While the existing literature on the debate – such as Stumbaum (2009) and Casarini (2006, 2007, 2009) – has analysed the dynamics of the debate from various perspectives, they have generally taken 2003-2004 as their starting point and not looked back to examine the origins of policy divergence. The analysis in this article has demonstrated the importance of perceptions to the emergence and development of the debate.

References

- Agence Europe (various). *Europe Daily Bulletins*. Brussels: Agence Europe.
- Archick, K., Grimmet, R., and Kan, S. (2005). *European Union's Arms Embargo on China: Implications and Options for US Policy*, RL32870, updated 27/5/2005. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.
- Austin, G. (2005). *The 1989 China Arms Ban: Putting Europe's Position to Congress*. London: The Foreign Policy Centre.
- Baker, P. (2002). 'Human Rights, Europe and the People's Republic of China', *The China Quarterly*, 169 (1), pp. 45-63.
- Barsych, K., Grant, C., and Leonard, M. (2005). *Embracing the Dragon: The EU's Partnership with China*. London: Centre for European Reform.
- Cabestan, J. (2007). 'The Role of France in Sino-European Relations: Central or Marginal?', in D. Kerr and F. Liu (eds), *The International Politics of EU-China Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Casarini, N. (2006). 'The Evolution of the EU-China Relationship: From Constructive Engagement to Strategic Partnership', *Occasional Paper no. 64*. Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies.
- Casarini, N. (2007). 'The International Politics of the Chinese Arms Embargo Issue', *The International Spectator*, 42 (3), pp. 371-389.
- Casarini, N. (2009). *Remaking Global Order: The Evolution of Europe-China Relations and its Implications for East Asia and the United States*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- China Daily (2005). 'Anti-Secession Law adopted by NPC'. Available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-03/14/content_424643.htm (updated on 14 March 2005), accessed on 25 January 2010.
- Council of the European Union (2004). '7th EU-China Summit 8th December 2004 Joint Statement', 15065/04, (Presse 337), Brussels.
- Economist, the (2010). 'The EU and Arms for China', *Charlemagne's Notebook*. Available at http://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2010/02/eu_china_arms_embargo (updated on 1 February 2010), accessed on 3 February 2010.
- European Commission (1995). 'A Long-Term Policy for China Europe Relations', COM(1995) 279 final, Brussels.

- European Commission (2001). 'EU Strategy towards China: Implementation of the 1998 Communication and Future Steps for a more Effective EU Policy', COM(2001) 265 final, Brussels.
- European Council (1989). 'EU Declaration on China - Presidency Conclusions', 26-27 June 1989, Madrid.
- General Affairs and External Relations Council of the European Union (2006). 'Press Release -2771st Council Meeting 11-12 December 2006', 16291/06 (Presse 353), Brussels.
- Glen, C. and Murgo, R. (2007). 'EU-China Relations: Balancing Political Challenges with Economic Opportunities', *Asia Europe Journal*, 5 (3), pp. 331-344.
- Hansard (1995). 'Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs: Arms Sales', Written Answers to Questions, 6th Series, H.C. Deb. Vol. 257 Col 842-3, Friday 31 March 1995; Official Report. London: House of Commons.
- Herrero de Castro, R. (2009). 'Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Relations: A Matter of Perceptions, Images, Objectives and Decisions', in N. Fernández Sola and M. Smith (eds), *Perceptions and Policy in Transatlantic Relations: Prospective Visions from the US and Europe*. London: Routledge.
- Herrmann, R. (1986). 'The Power of Perceptions in Foreign-Policy Decision Making: Do Views of the Soviet Union Determine the Policy Choices of American Leaders?', *American Journal of Political Science*, 30 (4), pp. 841-875.
- Jervis, R. (1976). *Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Jervis, R. (2009). 'Alliances, Perceptions and Current Frictions', in N. Fernández Sola and M. Smith (eds), *Perceptions and Policy in Transatlantic Relations: Prospective Visions from the US and Europe*. London: Routledge.
- Kogan, E. (2005). 'The European Union Defence Industry and the Appeal of the Chinese Market', *Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie 1*. Hamburg: Landesverteidigungsakademie.
- Kreutz, J. (2004). 'Reviewing the EU Arms Embargo on China: The Clash between Value and Rationale in the European Security Strategy', *Perspectives: Review of International Affairs*, 22 (1), pp. 43-58.
- Lui, A. (2000). 'Looking Back at Tiananmen Square', *Peace Review*, 12 (1), pp. 139-145.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2003). 'China's EU Policy Paper', Beijing, October 2003. Available at <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/ceupp/t27708.htm> (updated on 13 October 2003), accessed on 4 October 2009.
- Pangratis, A. (2006). 'The EU-US-China Triangle Panel Discussion', Available at <http://www.eurunion.org/News/speeches/2006/060404ap.htm> (updated on 4 April 2006), accessed on 4 February 2010.
- Rath, K. (2006). 'The Challenge of China: Testing Times for New Labour's "Ethical" Dimension', *International Public Policy Review*, 2 (1), pp. 26-63.
- Risse-Kappen, T. (1991). 'Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies', *World Politics*, 43 (4), pp. 479-512.
- Shambaugh, D. (2005). 'Lifting the EU Arms Embargo on China: An American Perspective', Discussion paper prepared for the CSIS/SWP "China's Rise: Diverging US-EU Approaches and Perceptions" Conference, Berlin, 28-29 April 2005.
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2004a). 'The European Union Arms Embargo on China'. Available at <http://archives.sipri.org/contents/expcon/euchiemb.html/view?searchterm=UK%20arms%20embargo%20China> (updated on 16 January 2007), accessed on 1 March 2010.
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2004b). 'The European Union Arms Embargo on China II'. Available at <http://archives.sipri.org/contents/expcon/euchifra.html> (updated on 7 September 2004), accessed on 1 March 2010.

- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2004c). 'UK Interpretation of Arms Embargo against China'. Available at <http://archives.sipri.org/contents/expcon/euchiuk.html> (updated on 7 September 2004), accessed on 1 March 2010.
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2009). *SIPRI Arms Transfer Database*. Available at <http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php> (updated in 2009), accessed on 22 January 2010.
- Stumbaum, M. (2009). *The European Union and China: Decision-Making in EU Foreign Policy towards the People's Republic of China*. Munich: NOMOS/DGAP.
- Wellons, P. (1994). 'Sino-French Relations: Historical Alliance vs. Economic Reality', *The Pacific Review*, 7 (3), pp. 341-348.
- Wezeman, S. and Bromley, M. (2005). 'International Arms Transfers', in *SIPRI Yearbook 2005: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*. Oxford: OUP.
- Wong, R. (2006). *The Europeanization of French Foreign Policy: France and the EU in East Asia*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
