Which Rules for the Global Order? The Global Dimension of the Russian-EU Relationship – The Case of International Crises

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Abstract

Both the European Union and Russia have demonstrated aspirations to shape the international order on a global level. The EU has been the most prominent exponent and promoter of a solidarist vision of the International Society (IS), whereas the Russian Federation has belonged to the proponents of a pluralist international order. This article therefore analyses how both actors have attempted to reconcile their respective visions of the IS and what the consequences for the global order have been. It argues that rules and norms have formed the core of the IS and have directly influenced the international order. Three major international crises (Iranian, Middle Eastern and Kosovo) have been chosen as case studies. The selected crises have touch upon crucial rules and norms: the use of force, the scope of non-military coercion, the non-intervention principle, human rights and the inclusion-exclusion issue. The extent of cooperation between Russia and the EU in particular crises has varied. Both actors have been able to overcome some of their differences and reconcile their positions. However, it seems that the differences between Russia and the EU regarding the rules and norms of the IS have been too broad to allow for a common normative base of an emerging global order. Despite general agreement on common interests, the detailed content of norms and rules has remained the source of disputes and has slowed down (or has even made impossible) the practical application of a common approach. Therefore, Russian-EU relations in a global dimension should be expected to prolong the process of emergence of a post-unilateral international order, rather than provide a basis for it.

Keywords

Russia; European Union; International society; International crisis

IN THE EARLY 2000s, CONSIDERABLE OPTIMISM REGARDING THE RELATIONS BETWEEN the European Union and Russia dominated, with the notion of 'strategic partnership' eagerly used. Nonetheless, the development of the relationship turned out to be far from expected, not to mention the inability of parties to fill the so-called 'common spaces' with practical cooperation. The relationship was also filled with serious tensions, such as on the occasion of the Georgian war. However, it has not discouraged politicians and experts, as well as academics, from treating Russia and the EU as natural partners in dealing with global challenges, from regional conflicts to weapons of mass destruction proliferation through climate change. This approach has gained new ground along with the project of 'Partnership for modernisation' between Russia and the EU, advocated by President Dmitri Medvedev, and with the issue of co-operation in the sphere of international security governance coming to the fore.

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One of the challenges of dealing with the Russian-EU relations arises from the fact that they take place within both the European Regional International Society (ERIS) and the *global* International Society (IS). Within the ERIS, the EU and Russia enjoy different statuses. The EU represents the core of a *regional* International Society. Russia occupies a liminal position – remaining outside core institutions (the EU and NATO), whilst being a member of the OSCE and the Council of Europe and asserting a European identity (Stivachtis and Webber 2011: 106). Within the *global* International Society, Russia and the EU are key and more equal actors. The EU is the most prominent exponent and promoter of a solidarist vision, whereas the Russian Federation belongs to the proponents of a pluralist IS. At the same time, both actors have rejected US unilateralism and the attempts at replacing the *global* IS with American hegemony (Hurrell 2007). The Russian-EU interaction within the framework of the *global* International Society has not received as much scholarly attention as their relationship within the European Regional International Society (Aalto 2007, Sakwa 2011, Stivachtis and Webber 2011). Nevertheless, it is of crucial importance for both actors' participation in global governance, as well as for the shape of a post-unilateral international order.

Of the three building blocks of the International Society concept – common interests and values, common rules and norms, common institutions – it is norms and rules that offer the most promising insight into the Russian-EU relationship within the *global* IS. Norms and rules that are supported and replicated by its members and respective institutions remain the core of the International Society (Bull 2002). They are the most reinterpreted and reconstructed element of the IS. At the same time they cannot be separated from power and actual policy behaviour of a particular actor. The relationship between norms and power remains a complex and multidirectional one, with one element taking no precedence over the other (Hurrell 2007). Thus, the agreement on common rules defines the scope of possible cooperation between Russia and the EU within the *global* IS. It also enables to assess to what extent the Russian-European consensus may serve as a foundation for the emerging global order.

The norms and rules are most openly challenged in the very moments of international crises. They force states to define their attitudes, since the necessary search for consensus in the process of crisis management leads to the reproduction (and reinterpretation) of the constitutional principles of the IS (Clark 2007). As Russia and the EU have strived to participate in the process of crisis management and have put forward their own solutions (especially after the shock of the Iraq war of 2003), selected international crises have been chosen as empirical evidence for the purpose of this article. Three case studies illustrate Russia's and the EU's practical approaches to the rules and norms of the *global* International Society: the Iranian crisis, the Kosovo independence crisis and the Middle Eastern (understood in terms of the Israeli-Arab conflict) crisis. Each of them posed a serious challenge to global governance and, at the same time, none has involved any massive use of force.

The main claim of the article is that the differences between Russia and the EU regarding the rules and norms of the International Society have been too broad to allow for a common normative approach with regard to an emerging global order. The very interpretation of norms and rules has remained the source of disputes and has slowed down, or even blocked, the emergence of such a common approach. Thus, the Russian-EU relationship in a global dimension should be expected to prolong the process of emergence of a post-unilateral international order, rather than provide a normative basis for it.

The article begins with a presentation of the place of Russia and that of the EU within the *global* International Society against the backdrop of the current state of the IS. The main part analyses Russian and EU approaches towards selected norms and rules of the IS:

regarding the circle of decision-makers (*i.e.* who is entitled to deal with the crisis), referring to the use of force and the use of non-military coercion; concerning the limits of sovereignty and membership within the IS. The final section presents the broader implications of the EU's and Russia's approaches to the norms and rules of the International Society.

Russia and the EU in the contemporary *global* International Society

This section aims to present the scholarly debate on the place occupied by Russia and the EU within the contemporary *global* IS. The section begins by presenting current themes in the debate on the post-Cold War IS and follows with the debate on the place of Russia and that of the EU within it.

The state of the global International Society

The post-Cold War International Society is distinguished by internal contradictions. On the one hand, the beginning of the 1990s seemed to bring a new consensus with the former Third World joining the Western core and its vision of an IS, albeit to some extent as a result of 'coercive socialisation', and more in the economic sphere than with regard to the liberal order as a whole (Hurrell 2007: 211-214). On the other hand, several trends have gone against this new consensus – the ultimately failed 'American Empire' project (which would replace a *global* IS with hegemony), the emergence of non-Western centres of power (that challenge solidarism as creating too 'thick' an IS) and the *regionalisation* of the IS (happening to the disadvantage of the *global* IS). The tensions between solidarism and pluralism have led to the attempts to reinvent the IS in a restricted shape, comprising (mostly) Western democracies (Clark 2007: 187). The picture gets even more complicated with the inclusion of mechanisms of governance beyond the state (Hurrell 2007: 291-292).

However, despite claims of some radical critics (*e.g.* Dunne 2001), these internal tensions have not made the *global* IS disappear. Although Western march towards solidarism has been blocked by other actors, a simple retreat to pluralism seems impossible, due to such factors as complexity of global governance, identity politics and struggle for recognition, the need for socialized power, global inequality and demands for justice (Hurrell 2007: 292-298). As a result, the international order (understood as *patterns of governance and institutionalisation in world politics* and the ability of a society of states to 'provide a practically viable and normatively acceptable framework for global political order in an era of globalization') remains in flux and unfinished (Hurrell 2007: 1-2). As this new international order has to depend to a significant extent upon the type of relations between major powers, Russia's and the European Union's ways of engagement with the IS, as well as their bilateral relationship in a global dimension are of crucial importance.

The post-Cold War crises have revealed these unfinished processes of the formation of a new international order and at least some of them may be considered turning points in the evolution of the IS (to name among the most consequential NATO's war in Kosovo in 1999 or the American war against Iraq of 2003). The crises used in this article as case studies have not involved any massive use of force; however, their influence on the fundamentals of the *global* IS has remained significant.

The Iranian crisis (2003-present) has been triggered by the development of a nuclear program by Tehran and by the concealment of certain activities from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The crisis unfolded in two stages: the first comprised the years 2003-2006, and the second followed immediately and continues until the present. The resumption of the uranium enrichment process by Iran marked the turning point and

the onset of stage two. Formally, Iran has remained a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has declared its actions to be exclusively a way of guaranteeing the right to civilian nuclear power. Practically since 2003 there exists a risk of the use of force against Iran, either by the United States or by Israel.

The Kosovo crisis (2003-2008) has had its roots in the 1999 war, which, led by NATO under the banner of the protection of Albanian residents of the Serbia's province of Kosovo, did not bring about an ultimate resolution. Kosovo has become a protectorate of Western countries in practice independent from Serbia, although some countries still regard Kosovo as a part of the Serbian state. From 2003 onwards, the UN has attempted to resolve the situation in Kosovo on a permanent basis. However, it has not been until the fiasco of the negotiations between the Serbs and the Albanians (originally kicked off in 2006) that the Kosovo crisis moved to the open phase (Balcer *et al.* 2008: 19). The main sticking point turned out to be the idea of internationally overseen independence of the province, which was envisioned by the plan proposed by the UN negotiator Matti Ahtisaari. The crisis has been put to an end by the unilateral declaration of Kosovo's independence, supported by majority of Western states.

The notion of Middle Eastern crisis is limited in this article to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which entered a new phase with the second *intifada*, begun in the year 2000. In 2002, there emerged a new peace initiative known as the Quartet, which included representatives from the UN, the EU, the US and Russia. A so-called 'Roadmap for Peace', which envisaged the creation of the Palestinian State was presented on 30 April 2003, but the majority of the proposed ideas intended to normalize the situation fell flat. Other factors accelerating the conflict dynamics included the death of Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and the election of Mahmoud Abbas as the President of the Palestinian National Authority, Israel's unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, Hamas's victory in the 2006 elections, the 2007 Annapolis Conference, the civil war between Hamas – controlling the Gaza Strip – and Fatah controlling the West Bank and the Israel's war against Hamas of 2009.

Russia and the EU in the global International Society

The places that Russia and the EU have occupied in the *global* International Society have reflected the nature of actors, their power and the above-presented current state of the IS. The European Union, although far from being a unitary actor and being rather weak in terms of hard power, has remained at the core of the Western-led solidarist IS. Russia, on its part, has remained at the margins of the global solidarist IS, even despite a resurgence in power since the mid-2000s. At the same time, the influence of both actors on the post-Cold War order has been limited by their inability to match the US predominance.

Russia has been treated as being a part of the *European* IS[1] and as a representative of one of the 'competing universalisms' during the Cold War. Nevertheless, it has not been at the centre of IS studies. Within the post-Cold War IS, Russia has been placed on the margins, presented as striving to 'adapt' to the global Western-led institutions of the IS (Buzan 2004: 238) or being in 'quest' for the IS (Aalto 2007: 460). Even in the main question of its article on Putin's project, Browning asks to what extent Russia can be integrated into an IS of shared (*i.e.* Western) norms, suggesting an adaptive and passive role of Russia within the IS (Browning 2008: 5). Averre points at Russia as undergoing a 'slow and uneven process of adjustment towards acceptance of common rules' (Averre 2008). The predominant reason for such assessments seems to be the overall decline of Russia after the end of the Cold

[1] 'Russia was half way European anyway, and had made it into European international society by the early eighteenth century' (Buzan and Little 2008: 9).

War (MacFarlane 2003; 2006). Concerning Russia's vision of the IS, it is rooted in history and culture, and can be summed up as 'statist, traditional and conservative' (MacFarlane 2003: 206; 2006). Russia perceives the international order through a Westphalian lens, as being pluralist and based on sovereign equality (Stent 2008: 1098), although, at the same time, Moscow has found such a vision increasingly difficult to apply in practice.

The challenge of analysing the EU's place within the *global* International Society is double-edged. On the one hand, the EU remains the core of the European Regional International Society, much more advanced in terms of 'thickness' than the *global* IS (Stivachtis and Webber 2011). The EU has also attempted to extend its own model of political development to remaining parts of Europe. On the other hand, the EU is far from being a unitary actor with one identity, since the complex character of the Union includes differences among particular Member States and institutions at the EU level. Bearing this in mind, inter-subjective 'common denominator' may still be found, reflected in key documents adopted at the highest level and actions undertaken by the EU (which, if not supported by all members, are at least not blocked by opponents). Notwithstanding the above, the European Union has remained at the core of the *global* International Society and has advanced an ambitious normative and practical global solidarist agenda, comprising free market economy, human rights, multilateralism, environment, humanitarian intervention and mechanisms of global governance. Despite often serious differences, the EU, along with the US, has been an engine of the post-Cold War transformation of the IS and the centre of debates on its future.

The positions of Russia and the EU towards the rules and norms of the *global* International Society

This section analyses Russia's and the EU's interpretations and applications of particular norms and rules in the framework of dealing with selected international crises. It should be stressed that neither Russia nor the EU has been able to play a primary role in the process of crisis management, as their activities have to be put against the backdrop of American primacy.

The circle of decision-makers within the International Society

The issue of which actors are entitled to, and at the same time responsible for, dealing with international crises, reveals Russia's and the EU's approach to the norms and rules referring to the circle of decision-makers within the International Society. Three aspects are to be analysed: the attitudes towards the US predominance and its unilateral approach to crises; the notions of multilateralism (in terms of institutions and actors engaged); and the readiness to pursue unilateral actions in the process of crisis management (which implicitly reveals the understanding of consensus by each actor).

In general, Russia and the EU have preferred a multilateral approach to crisis management and have denounced unilateral actions, rejecting American attempts to establish an hegemonic order (notwithstanding some internal differences within the EU, with, for example, Britain allowing for it). As the *European Security Strategy* indicates, 'no single country is able to tackle today's complex problems on its own' (EU 2003: 2). At the declaratory level, Russia and the EU have formally supported the existing secondary institutions of the IS, accepting the primacy of universal mechanisms, especially of the UN Security Council (ESS 2003: 10; Rossiyskaya Federatsiya 2008). However, their practices in crises have revealed certain ambiguities with regard to norms and rules. As particular crises unfolded, new informal bodies were created, with Russia and the EU becoming their active participants and supporters, defending its exclusive position with regard to

'newcomers'. Besides, when both actors faced a deadlock in the process of crisis management, the temptation to address the challenges unilaterally increased, leading to undertaking actions outside multilateral cooperation.

In each of the analysed crises, Russia and the EU have firmly rejected any US monopoly on providing the solution, striving to establish a multilateral framework for dealing with the crisis. Regarding institutions that should be included, preference for informal seems obvious. In the Iranian case, three multilateral forums have been involved in the process of tackling the crisis: the UNSC, the IAEA and the so-called P-6 (permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany). The latter became a major arena of decision-making, with the UNSC and the IAEA playing important, albeit supportive and sometimes rubber-stamping roles. The European Union itself has been represented at two levels: with France, Germany and the UK being parties to the P-6 and the EU High Representative on CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) serving as a key intermediary between the International Society and the Iranian government. The Kosovo crisis offers additional insight into the Russian and EU interpretations of the rules referring to a decision-making circle. The UNSC remained a formal place of dialogue and, as the only institution, had generally recognised authority to accept a worked-out solution.[2] However, the substantive dialogue was gradually moved towards a smaller circle comprising Russia, the US and the European Union (with the latter remaining deeply divided on the Kosovo issue), thus making the crisis more of a regional, rather than global, issue. The main opposition towards the Kosovo independence was voiced by Russia, which blocked the adoption of UNSC resolutions (as it threatened to veto them, the West decided not to put them up for voting). The Western states employed a variety of forums to convince Russia to Kosovo's internationally supervised independence: the Contact Group (France, Germany, Russia, the US, the UK, Italy), followed by the *troika* (with negotiators on behalf of Russia, the EU and the US). The Middle Eastern Peace Process has revealed similar tendency for Russia and the EU to opt for informal decision-making, with the UN Security Council being treated as a rubber-stamp on decisions taken in the more limited circles. Starting from 2002, Russia and the EU have been parties to the Quartet (which also included the US and the UN).

Regarding the actors which should participate in decision-making processes, Russia and the EU have, in most cases, defended their privileged positions. Russia and the EU have perceived the decision-making circle as closed and exclusive, despite some talks taking place within other multilateral forums, such as BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China), the G-20 or G-8. In general, such approach is demonstrated by the protracted debate on UNSC reform, with Russia and France and the UK declaring its support, but in effect blocking any weakening of its position. This stance has been most obviously revealed in the Iranian crisis, during the run-up to the fourth round of sanctions in first half of 2010. Both Russia and the EU rejected the Iran-Turkey-Brazil deal of May 2010 that copied earlier agreement worked out by Russia, France and the US.[3] At the beginning, Russia very cautiously welcomed the deal, warning that it may not fully satisfy the demands of the International Society addressed towards Tehran (Tait 2010), and the day after Moscow supported the Western-proposed fourth set of sanctions (Lederer 2010). The European Union has also not

[2] At the beginning of the process of the regulation of Kosovo status, UNMIK (United Nations Mission in Kosovo) played a key role, being endorsed by the UNSC. In 2005 the UNSC appointed Matti Ahtisaari as a main negotiator and decided to start direct negotiations between Serbs and Albanians. With the failure of the latter in March 2007, the UNSC was to approve the solution, proposed by the Ahtisaari Plan (see Balcer *et al.* 2008: 62-63).

[3] The agreement in fact repeated the details of the September 2009 agreement, with Iran agreeing to give away its enriched uranium in exchange for fuel for experimental reactor. Russia and France were key participants of the deal. It happened despite the fact that Russia did not oppose Brazil-Turkey initiatives when taken up by both states in the end of April 2010 (and even just before the deal by President Medvedev in his talks with Brazil President).

given up its pressure on Iran, perceiving Tehran's deal with Ankara and Brasilia as an attempt to delay sanctions.

Despite a declared preference for multilateralism, both Russia and the EU have demonstrated the willingness to act unilaterally. In the Kosovo crisis, when the *troika* failed in striking the compromise between Serbia and Kosovo at the end of 2007 (Balcer *et al.* 2008), the West decided to put an end to the crisis by way of recognising Kosovo's independence in February 2008. When faced with a deadlock in the crisis solution process, the EU was ready to take over responsibility for the crisis solution and to limit the circle of decision-makers. Russia also decided to pursue unilateral action, in the framework of the Middle Eastern crisis. Moscow departed from the common stance adopted by the Quartet and in 2006 decided to establish diplomatic contacts with Hamas. In subsequent years, Russian officials, including the president, visited Hamas leaders and received them in Moscow (Katz 2010; Trenin 2010). Unilateral sanctions against Iran, applied by the EU have demonstrated the limits of multilateralism on the part of the EU. The European Union has prioritised responsibility to prevent WMD proliferation over its commitment to multilateralism, going beyond the agreement within the 'Six' (compare Santini 2010). The EU's stance demonstrates its readiness to complement consensually agreed sanctions with further going steps. Against this backdrop, the opposition towards unilateral Western sanctions imposed on Iran has been a repetitive theme among Russian leadership. In May 2010, when negotiating new sanctions, the Russian Foreign Minister warned against unilateral American sanctions, declaring that, given UNSC sanctions, nations should not face any additional sanctions (*VOA News* 2010). Denying any extra-territorial character to Western sanctions has been an additional concern for Moscow. Russia has kept on criticising the West after the European Union joined in the unilateral widening of sanctions against Tehran (*BBC News* 2010). Moscow has stressed the need to maintain the unanimity of the 'Six' and the role of consensus in dealing with Iran.

The use of military force

Whether military force should be used as a way of crisis management lies at the heart of every international order. Contrary to the Kosovo crisis of 1998-1999, the Iraq crisis of 2002-2003 or the Georgian crisis of 2008, none of the crises analysed in the article represents a case of actual use of military force. Nonetheless, in each case, the possibility of the use of force both by members of the International Society and by parties to the crisis has been constantly present and remained a source of disagreement. Thus, it is necessary to compare the attitude of Russia and the EU towards norms and rules regulating two issues: to what extent and under which conditions military force may be applied by parties and the IS in a crisis; and to what extent military pressure (*i.e.* the threat of use of force) may be applied by the IS in a crisis.

The general positions of Russia and the EU seem not too distant from one another. Concerning the use of force by the International Society, both Russia and the EU have rejected the application of military force to solve any of discussed crises. In the Iranian crisis, the US has allowed the use of force[4], whereas both Russia and the EU rejected even a limited use of force as a way of solving it. Moscow has based its whole approach towards the crisis on a premise that it cannot be solved by force and has to be dealt with using

[4] In the case of the Iranian crisis, the use of force could not be excluded, as the US has not wanted to refrain from the military threats, perceiving it as a necessary mean of pressure on Tehran. The probability of the use of force seemed to be at its height twice: in 2003 after the end of the first phase of the Iraq War and in 2007, even despite the talks on the second round of sanctions going on at that time. The risk of the use of force decreased suddenly in December 2007, with the report of US intelligence community claiming Iran withheld its military programme in 2003. However, the possibility of military strikes against Iranian nuclear infrastructure has not disappeared completely.

political-diplomatic means (MID RF 2007). In the third set of sanctions (resolution 1803 of 3 March 2008) Russia managed to push through a paragraph claiming that any further steps will be of peaceful character (Churkin 2008). The need to look for a solution within the framework of dialogue was also stressed in a G-8 resolution in 2009. The European Union adopted a similar stance, rejecting the use of force. The EU's actual engagement in the crisis has been motivated by the willingness to propose an alternative to the American way of dealing with serious international crises (as demonstrated in Iraq). The EU has not made the non-use of force a crucial issue (as Russia has often done). Nevertheless, throughout the whole period of the crisis, the EU has opposed the use of force. The Middle Eastern crisis has posed a serious challenge for Russia and the EU. Although both actors have not assumed the possibility of the International Society enforcing any solution by military means, the parties to the crisis (especially Israel and Hamas, to a lesser extent the Palestinian Authority) have been ready to use force to push their vision of peace settlement through. Numerous declarations by Russia and the EU have indicated the condemnation of the resort to the use of force by all actors engaged. The most violent episode of the crisis[5] occurred in the years 2008-2009, with the Israel war against the Gaza Strip. Russia condemned the use of force and opted for a withdrawal of Israeli forces as soon as possible, *inter alia* by supporting the UNSC resolution 1860 (MID RF 2010). The EU took similar steps, among other things condemning the use of force and proposing ceasefires in order to provide humanitarian help (Runner 2008).

In the Kosovo crisis, contrary to the earlier period of 1998-1999, the probability of the use of force by the International Society or parties to the crisis remained low, despite the fact that the crisis touched upon crucial principles of sovereignty and self-governance. Serbia was not ready to defend its position with military force and Russia was not willing to support any resort to military force. The biggest challenge for the EU was the possibility of the eruption of tensions in Kosovo itself on behalf of non-state actors (in 2004 Kosovo Albanians staged violent protests, opting for formal independence). Given the above, the Kosovo independence crisis has not clarified Russia's or the EU's approach to the use of force (contrary to the crisis of 1999).

Regarding the use of military pressure as a tool of International Society, the approaches of Russia and the EU have been differentiated. Russia not only objected to the use of force as such, but also rejected the US military pressure on Iran (in the form of force deployment in the Persian Gulf), claiming that such pressure might lead to the actual use of force (Groshkov 2007b). In the run-up to the fourth round of sanctions in early 2010, Russia once again rejected any possibility of the use of force, as well as interrelated threats, declaring any statements referring to the use of force unacceptable (*Itar-TASS* 2010). The EU, to some extent, has refrained from criticising US military pressure, thus indirectly tolerating the threat of the use of force. In the Middle Eastern crisis, none of the parties has been ready to debate possible military action that could enforce a solution and, as a result, has not referred to it. Similarly, in the case of the Kosovo independence crisis, neither Russia nor the EU considered the need to put military pressure on the parties of the crisis.

Coercion: political and economic pressure

As the use of non-military coercion (understood in terms of political and economic pressure, and mostly reflected in the form of sanctions) is much more common in the process of crisis management than the use of force, it is necessary to analyse the approach of Russia and that of the EU to the norms and rules regulating this sphere of the International Society. Two key issues stand out with regard to the non-military coercion applied by the IS: the purpose of coercion (*i.e.* whether is it a way to punish a member of

[5] Israel's war against Lebanon in 2006 is not included, as it goes beyond the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

the IS or an incentive to make it obey the rules) and the scope of coercion (*i.e.* how far the IS may go in applying pressures and sanctions). It should be noted that both Russia and the EU have been rather sceptical towards coercion as such, proposing to solve crises with the help of positive incentives and of more cooperation (compare EU 2003, 2008; Rossiyskaya Federatsiya 2008). Nevertheless, in the course of the Iranian, Middle Eastern and Kosovo crises, both actors have resorted to coercive measures in order to impose a solution on the parties.

The approach of particular actors to the purpose and justification of coercion indirectly indicates how far the competences of the International Society may reach in the process of crisis management and what role the IS should adopt.

Russia's general approach is highly sceptical towards the use of coercion by the International Society as a way of punishing its members. This approach has been most clearly revealed in the Iranian crisis. As the Russian Foreign Minister put it, when deciding about support for sanctions, Moscow had assessed the character and reality of an Iranian threat (Lavrov 2006). Russia has insisted that any sanctions must be proportionate to the threat for non-proliferation regime. Such an approach means that Russia has rejected sanctions as a way of making Tehran less assertive in its foreign policy (Groshkov 2006a). During the run-up towards a second round of sanctions, the secretary of the Russian Security Council at the time, Igor Ivanov, explicitly stated that sanctions could not be used for other purposes than guarantying non-proliferation and could not serve as a way of interfering in domestic affairs (*Newsru.com* 2007). When commenting on the third resolution, Russian foreign minister Lavrov repeated that any actions within the UNSC were directed at supporting the IAEA in its efforts to clarify the Iranian nuclear programme, should correspond to Iran's behaviour and keep open the possibility for talks with Iran (Lavrov 2008). Russia justified its support for this resolution, claiming that it was a political signal towards Iran, making cooperation with the IS necessary (Churkin 2008). Therefore, in summing up, for Moscow, pressure has been the way of bringing a party back to the negotiating table, rather than punishing it for its past incompliance with demands of the IS (MID RF 2007; Strokan' 2006).

The European Union's stance towards the purpose of coercion has been more nuanced. In the first phase of the Iranian crisis (till 2006), the EU chose a conciliatory path. The EU leading states (the UK, France and Germany) attempted to limit the playing field for the crisis to the IAEA, opposing the handing over of the Iranian *dossier* to the UNSC (Moussavian 2008; Rynning 2008). Throughout the crisis, the EU has pursued a double track-approach, attempting to balance coercive measures towards Iran with offers of cooperation. The EU has offered long-term engagement, including cooperation in the sphere of nuclear energy, hydrocarbon energy cooperation, political dialogue, support for Iran's integration with international economy and technology cooperation (UNSC 2007; Santini 2010: 471). The EU only referred to the Iranian nuclear programme, without mentioning any other aspects of Iran's domestic or foreign policy. A similar preference for non-coercive measures was demonstrated by the EU during the Kosovo crisis. When attempting to convince Serbia to agree to the Ahtisaari Plan, the EU suggested an offer of prospective membership for Belgrade.

The content of norms and rules related to the scope of acceptable non-military coercion is another challenge for the members of the International Society. The EU has been ready to go much further with political-economic pressure than Russia. The European position is revealed in the ESS, which perceives a broad array of ways to tackle WMD proliferation: 'Proliferation may be contained through export controls and attacked through political, economic and other pressures while the underlying political causes are also tackled. […] Regional conflicts need political solutions but military assets and effective policing may be

needed in the post conflict phase' (EU 2003: 8). The EU points out that states that reject principles of International Society 'should understand that there is a price to be paid, including in their relationship with the European Union' (EU 2003: 10), but this document does not elaborate on how much coercion the EU is ready to accept. Russia opposed such types of sanctions that, according to Moscow, would push Tehran too much and face it with an ultimatum, thus becoming counterproductive (Lavrov 2006).

In the first phase of the Iranian crisis (2003-2006) both Russia and the EU aspired to limit this coercion. Both actors opposed handing over the Iranian nuclear dossier to the UN Security Council, preferring to keep it within the IAEA framework, which resulted in a lower profile and less pressure respectively. Russia supported EU efforts during that period to convince Iran to back down and make some concessions with regard to its nuclear programme. The positions of Russia and the EU, and their respective attitudes towards the rules of coercion, began to differ after handing over the issue to the UNSC in mid-2006 (which was the result of Iran's resuming the nuclear enrichment process).

Russia's posture towards the scope of pressure can be characterised as a general unwillingness towards applying sanctions and a preference for limited pressure. Russia has made it clear that diplomatic dialogue should be preferred over political pressure (with the example of Putin's visit to Tehran in October 2007). Moscow has opted for a compromised effect, which would result from Iranian consent, rather than overt pressure (for example, by preventing the mention of Iran in the NPT Review Conference final document in 2005 and by proposing enriching fuel for Iran on Russian territory). Although, overall, Russia has supported four sets of sanctions against Iran (1737 in December 2006, 1747 in March 2007, 1803 in March 2008 and 1929 in June 2010), in each case Moscow has prolonged the process and has managed to water down Western-proposed content. The Iranian defiance of UNSC demands has not changed Russia's approach significantly. Russia has insisted that any sanctions should be limited to the framework of the non-proliferation regime and should not include political pressure (which has implied reluctance towards sanctions on banks or the energy sector). As Deputy Minister Ryabkov put it, '[w]e find the term "paralyzing sanctions" completely unacceptable. Sanctions should follow the aim of strengthening the regime of nuclear nonproliferation' (Nowak and Lederer 2010).

By offering tangible incentives, the EU has simultaneously declared its readiness to go further with sanctions: 'the EU has led a dual-track approach, combining dialogue and increasing pressure' (EU 2008: 7). The European Union has been more eager to support far-reaching ways of coercion. In the face of continuing Iran's defiance, the EU employed tougher rhetoric and called for stronger sanctions (although finally it has not managed to push through all of its proposals). The measures that have constantly been supported by the European states included *inter alia* broad spectrum of ban on trade with Iran and measures against investments in Iranian energy complex. The EU's position evolved over time and has been influenced by the conviction that up-to-date measures are too limited and in a too narrow way target the Iranian nuclear programme, which is why the EU proposed broadened sanctions: 'If, instead, the nuclear programme advances, the need for additional measures in support of the UN process grows' (EU 2008: 7).

Another illustration of the EU's distance towards applying coercive measures is provided by the Middle Eastern crisis. Although the EU has been unwilling to put significant political and economic pressure on Israeli and Palestinian side, it has nevertheless attempted to enforce at least some basic principles of the solution of the crisis. The EU agreed to restrict trade of goods produced in the Occupied Territories, although did not put economic sanctions on Israel (Yacobi and Newman 2008: 187-189).

Given the need for compromise, the sanctions adopted by the UNSC reveal the scope of coercion that is acceptable to both Russia and the EU. The content of sanctions evolved

along with the continuing Iranian defiance of the demands of the IS. For example, the first set of sanctions was to be withdrawn in the case of Iran's compliance with the demands of the IAEA within the 60 day-deadline. Russia also successfully insisted that entry bans for the persons connected with the Iranian nuclear programme should be excluded, claiming it would make dialogue more difficult. Yet, it is possible to point out the basic norms and rules of coercion that have been agreed among the members of the *global* IS. Firstly, they have been related to the Iranian nuclear programme, including the embargo on export and import of items, materials and equipment that could be used in the programme. These provisions of the UNSC resolutions have not raised any serious disputes between Russia and the EU (UNSC 2006). Secondly, the sanctions have been related to the individuals working on the Iranian programme. The EU insisted on the inclusion of a travel ban for them, whereas Russia only suggested vigilance, which found its way in the final versions of the UNSC resolutions in 2006 and 2007. Only the 2008 resolution introduced a ban for selected individuals, the list of which was broadened by the 2010 resolution. The third component of the sanctions has comprised the freezing of the financial assets of individuals and entities related to the Iranian nuclear programme. Whereas the norm itself has not been controversial, the scope of its application has been the subject of disputes (UNSC 2006). Subsequent resolutions broadened the lists of individuals and entities being the object of the sanctions. Fourthly, Iran has been faced with an embargo on Iranian arms export (UNSC 2007). However, the issue of arms import by Iran has been much more controversial. Whereas particular resolutions called upon states to exercise vigilance with regard to the sale and transfer of weapons to Iran (UNSC 2007), it has only been the fourth round of sanctions (UNSC 2010) that introduced such an embargo. Russia's objection (next to China's) towards too broad a scope of sanctions has been the main reason for such a late introduction of the ban. The fifth element of sanctions has comprised trade and financial issues. Here, it has also been due to Russia's unwillingness to directly punish Iran that initial sanctions called only for restraint on the part of UN members when entering new commitments (UNSC 2007). The scope of these sanctions has been broadened only in the 2010 resolution, including the ban on Iranian commercial activities in uranium mining, production and the use of nuclear materials and technologies, as well as a ban on the provision of financial services for entities suspected of contributing to proliferation activities (UNSC 2010). The sixth part of the sanctions included the inspections of cargoes of selected Iranian companies that could have been involved in proliferation activities (UNSC 2008, later broadened to all cargoes in UNSC 2010). The EU had proposed such measures during earlier negotiations over sanctions, but they had not gained Moscow's support.

The limits of sovereignty and membership within the International Society

The scope of state sovereignty has been one of the most disputable issues within the post-Cold War International Society. The domination of solidarism implied the changing notion of sovereignty, adapted to broader cooperation among IS members. The issue of sovereignty has coalesced with the problem of membership. The West has aspired to set a new 'civilisation standard' and exclude states that do not fulfil Western-defined criteria of governance and 'responsible' behaviour in the international arena, branding them as 'pariahs' or 'rogues' (Hurrell 2007: 67). Thus the membership, and belonging rights, would become conditional. Although Russia and the EU have on the surface supported the universal character of the *global* IS, the practices of both actors have revealed different attitudes. The EU has been ready to limit sovereignty and introduce at least some extent of conditionality, whereas Russia, on its part, has perceived the IS as a hierarchical one, composed mainly of great powers, in which small states have a limited say.

Each of the crises referred to different aspects of the sovereignty-membership nexus. The norms and rules concerning state sovereignty have been the subject of a large controversy during the Kosovo crisis, with the challenge for the *global* IS being how to reconcile the principles of national self-determination, state sovereignty and territorial integrity. The EU itself has been deeply divided on the issue of whether Kosovo should be granted independence. Nevertheless, it not only recognised Kosovo, but offered significant financial aid and sent the EULEX mission, which in effect replaced the UN mission. The European Union perceived the legal situation around Kosovo as lagging behind the international reality on the ground and opted for the primacy of the norm of national self-determination. The EU definitely managed to reconcile its internal disputes in December 2007, supporting the end of talks and concluding that the only way to defuse the crisis was to implement the Ahtisaari plan and grant Kosovo independence under the supervision of the international community (d'Aspremont 2007). In practice, it meant that, despite internal tensions and disputes, the EU decided to opt for the principle of national self-determination, treating it in this particular case as superior over sovereignty or territorial integrity.

To the contrary, Russia's position was clear-cut. Engaging in the Kosovo crisis, Moscow gave primacy to the norms of sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Russian approach was based on the UNSC resolution 1244 of 1999, which, ending NATO's war against Serbia, treated Kosovo as a part of the latter. Russia regularly emphasised the need for bilateral talks between Belgrade and Prishtina, and as a consequence, objected to the proposal of the solution presented by Martti Ahtisaari. In Moscow's opinion, the ending of the Kosovo-Serbian negotiations without results and the subsequent submission of the Ahtisaari Plan to the Security Council in 2007 had been 'premature'. The symbolic strengthening of Russia's position came in *The Review of Russian Foreign Policy*, published by the MFA at the end of March 2007. It argued against the acceptance of Kosovo independence, declaring that 'the creation of independent Kosovo threatens the European stability' (MID RF 2007: 33-34). Throughout the crisis, Russia has attempted to make the West (or at least the EU) change its mind by threatening to use its veto right in the UNSC - in the end, none of the resolutions proposed by the West was put up for voting, due to Russia's objections. Moscow perceived the need to continue dialogue until a compromise and without any deadlines, and saw the UNSC approval as necessary for any solution to be internationally valid. Russia's intent was to prevent the implementation of any solution which would encroach on the territorial integrity of Serbia.

Beside the dispute on the hierarchy of norms referring to sovereignty and self-determination, Russia and the EU have differed with regard to the consequences of the Kosovo crisis. Moscow has stressed that the preference given to the principle of national self-determination has universal character, which could be applied to other similar cases. The EU has defended the particular and specific character of the Kosovo crisis, implying the situational character of the hierarchy of norms. EU representatives claimed that Kosovo had been an exceptional case and as such had not constituted a precedent for the *global* IS.

In the case of the Iranian crisis, Russia has spoken and acted against any exclusion, claiming that all states should have the same security guarantees under the NPT regime and access to technologies. When debating the first round of sanctions in late 2006, Moscow's representatives stressed the need for keeping 'all channels of communication with Iran' open and rejected the projects of the resolutions that, in their opinion, failed to do so (Groshkov 2006b). The opposition towards labelling Iran as being part of an 'axis of evil' has also remained an important component of this policy (MID RF 2007). One of Moscow's arguments was that any drastic pressure may cause a harmful response from Iran, for example in the form of a withdrawal from the NPT (Blinov 2006b). The EU has

taken a much more nuanced approach. It has not supported the US position, which would throw Iran out of the International Society. Nevertheless, it has still perceived the Iranian regime as untrustworthy, semi-authoritarian and prone to human rights violations and pointed at the need of the state to regain international confidence (Santini 2010: 470-471).

The Middle Eastern crisis has not been such a clear-cut case for Russia and the EU. Whilst they have treated the Palestinian National Authority as an *in spe* member of the IS and have declared their support for a Palestinian state, differences occurred with regard to the Hamas issue. Having won a popular parliamentary election in the Palestinian Autonomy in 2006, Hamas has not been recognised as a legitimate player by the outside powers. The West, and subsequently, the Quartet (comprising the UN, the US, the EU and Russia) has kept on perceiving Hamas as a terrorist organisation. However, in a rather surprising move, Russia has decided to strengthen its bargaining position. Moscow has abandoned the hitherto united front and has invited the leadership of Hamas in March 2006, which has been followed by the establishment of regular diplomatic contacts with it. Interpreting Russia's behaviour in terms of rules of IS borders reveals Moscow's unwillingness to stay behind Western powers in drawing the borders of the IS and deciding whom to include or exclude. The EU has been caught between the tough US posture, rejecting any contacts with Hamas, the need to support the Quartet's unanimity and Russia. However, despite some doubts regarding an at least partial recognition of Hamas, the EU has not decided to support the broadening of IS borders, perceiving Hamas' terrorist activities as a crucial obstacle.

Conclusion: prospects for Russian-EU cooperation within the *global* International Society

Russia and the EU have been among most active and most important actors in the presented cases of international crises. Both have aspired to leave their mark on the process of crisis management and crisis solution. The analysis of the norms and rules of the International Society that they have supported and applied allows us to assess the extent to which Russia and the EU are able to cooperate in global security governance. It also allows for the assessment of the potential of both actors and their relationship to serve as the building blocks of an emerging post-unilateral order.

The cases presented in the article have revealed both the closeness of the Russian and EU positions and the difficulties to overcome. Russia and the EU have answered the question of who has the right to deal with crises in a similar way. While accepting multilateralism and the primacy of the UNSC in dealing with crises, both actors have nevertheless recognised the privileged role of informal 'great power clubs', such as the P-6 or the Quartet. At the same time, despite a declared commitment to multilateralism, neither Russia nor the EU has been interested in widening the circle of global decision-makers and both have protected their exclusive position. The main difference between Russia and the EU with regard to the rules on the circle of decision-makers boils down to the point of under which conditions a unilateral solution may be pursued, as both players applied such one-sided measures.

Both Russia and the EU have rejected the use of force as a way of solving international crises, either by the International Society or the parties to the crisis, and have been far from ready to apply military force themselves. Nevertheless, the EU has been less critical towards the threat of the use of force as a way of coercing participants in a crisis to change their positions.

The differences between Russia and the EU have been quite obvious with regard to the non-military coercion and political pressure that could be put on members defying the

International Society demands. In general, both actors have been quite reluctant towards the use of coercion, perceiving it as a means of last resort and demonstrating a preference for positive incentives. However, when it has come to the application of political and economic pressure, Russia and the EU have differed. The EU has been ready to go much further with coercive measures, whereas Russia has attempted to limit the political and economic pressure put on particular IS members. Although with time the Russian position has evolved, and Moscow has moved closer to the original EU position, accepting coercion of a broader scope, the EU itself has also gradually changed its policy, accepting the need for tougher sanctions. This lack of coherence has resulted in the EU's unilateral political and economic pressure, contested by Russia.

With regard to the issue of sovereignty and membership of the International Society, the positions of Russia and the EU have been hard to reconcile. Russia has understood the notion of sovereignty in traditional terms, whereas the EU has been ready to apply 'conditionality tests' for full membership of the IS and has not perceived sovereignty as absolute.

As the norms and rules promoted by Russia and the EU in particular crises demonstrate, the extent of cooperation between Russia and the EU has varied. Both actors have been able to overcome some of their differences and reconcile their normative positions. However, it seems that the differences between Russia and the EU, regarding the rules and norms of the IS, have been too broad to allow them to promote a coherent vision of the international order. The detailed content of norms and rules has remained the source of dispute and has slowed down (or even made impossible) the practical application of both actors' visions. As Russia has been able to block some sanctions, it has been Moscow that defined the upper limits of the intrusiveness of norms and rules. However, later on, the EU has attempted to restore its voice by putting unilateral sanctions. Until now, the Russian-EU relationship in a global dimension has prolonged the process of emergence of a post-unilateral international order, rather than provided a basis for it. On that basis, it seems doubtful that the Russian-EU relationship could serve as a normative 'building block' of a future global order.

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