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The EU-Senegal mobility partnership: from launch to suspension and negotiation failure

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Abstract

This article focuses on the negotiations that the European Commission, with the formal support of France, Italy and Spain, opened with Senegal in 2008 for a mobility partnership agreement. Mobility partnerships, as defined by the Commission in 2007, are a new EU (multilateral) instrument for managing migratory flows into the Union. The negotiations with Senegal were indefinitely suspended in 2009 and are now widely considered as having failed. This article sets out to identify the factors that contributed to the suspension of talks. It shows that failure can be attributed to a complex web of factors originating in the specific Senegalese, European and Senegal-EU political landscapes and jointly contributing to an unfavourable cost-benefit calculation by the French and Senegalese parties to the negotiation, to an unclear and awkward negotiating strategy on the part of the European Commission and to incoherent, EU and Senegalese, foreign policies. This, in turn, points to the complex task of concluding multilateral agreements on issues as politically sensitive, for both parties, as migration.

Keywords

INTRODUCTION

European migration cooperation has come a long way since the Maastricht Treaty. At the time, member states of the nascent European Union (EU) proclaimed that coordination in this field was of common interest and agreed that collaboration would proceed on an intergovernmental basis. Since then, successive treaty changes have consolidated this area of cooperation as one of the core EU policy domains. Moreover, the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 has established the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers as co-legislators in this policy sector and co-decision is now the ordinary legislative procedure (see Takle 2012). Academic interest in European migration cooperation has grown throughout the years to an extent that they now address the very latest developments. For instance, an emerging research agenda has investigated the origin, structure and outlook of EU mobility partnerships (Chou 2012, Lavenex & Stucky 2011, Parkes 2009).

Presented in 2007 by the Commission as a new instrument for managing migratory flows into the EU, mobility partnerships are agreements concluded between certain member states and a third country, with the Commission as an additional signatory. The agreement contains two components: a declaration from participants that signals their mutual interest to pursue closer cooperation (the political), and a list of activities concerning a range of migration-related issues such as integration, human trafficking, borders and fraudulent travel documents (the programmatic). At the heart of this new instrument is the notion of "circular migration". According to the Commission (2007), the mobility partnership should enable "circular migration" between the signatories whereby their nationals would be able to enter, exit and return with few restrictions. In the pilot phase, the EU signed a mobility partnership with Moldova (in 2008), Cape Verde (2008), and Georgia (2009).

At the time of writing, the EU has completed the pilot phase of the mobility partnerships and is preparing to enter the next. In its June 2011 conclusions, the European Council called on the central institutions to initiate negotiations with third countries "willing and able to engage constructively on these matters" and stated that "[such] dialogues should

begin as a matter of urgency" (European Council 2011) . In the re-launch of the Global Approach to Migration (and Mobility), the Commission advocated the mobility partnership as the main framework to organise cooperation with countries of the Arab Spring (Commission 2011). This article seeks to contribute to studies of contemporary European migration cooperation by shedding light on the failed negotiations for a mobility partnership with Senegal, which the Commission, with the formal support of France, Italy and Spain, approached in 2008. Attempts to revitalise the talks in 2009 have not succeeded and political attentiveness to an EU-Senegal mobility partnership has since diminished. What has contributed to the suspension of the diplomatic negotiations? To our knowledge, there are no published studies that have looked into the failed negotiations for the EU-Senegal agreement, whereas the other mobility partnerships have received attention (Kunz, *et al.* 2011). We address this gap in the literature and highlight lessons the case offers to studies on the external dimension of EU migration cooperation.

This article opens the negotiation black-box for an EU-Senegal mobility partnership and identifies the factors that contributed to the suspension of talks. We begin by describing the research design. Next, based on information provided by interviewees, we discuss what the EU-Senegal mobility partnership could have entailed in terms of projects and activities envisaged for the pilot phase if negotiations had been successful. This overview is used to draw out general trends concerning the range of migration activities proposed and serves as the starting point for interpreting the interview data. We present the main empirical findings in the subsequent sections. Beginning with a discussion of the Senegalese domestic debate on emigration, we then move towards a consideration of the EU-Senegal relationship and, finally, the broader EU policy context and the emergence of the mobility partnership instrument. This presentation structure is designed to facilitate avoidance of an EU-centric account of the developments (i.e. the argument that the factors leading up to negotiation failure were exclusively European), instead demonstrating that there was incoherence and reluctance on both the Senegalese and European sides.

The findings show that, interestingly, the two key negotiating partners – France and Senegal – entered the discussions with an at best ambivalent commitment to a successful outcome. Although the two states initially appeared to welcome the Commission's initiative, the lack of an explicit "value-added" aspect to an EU-Senegal mobility partnership for both France and Senegal, and the Commission's inability to reverse their cost-benefit calculations through a well-thought out negotiation strategy, led to the suspension of the discussions. Interestingly, what are often described as incoherent foreign policies – on both the Senegalese and the EU sides – seem to have been used by both France and Senegal to "passively stall" the process without ever posing a clear "no" to the Commission. We discuss these different interpretations of the root causes of the negotiation failure and draw out implications for future research in the final part of this article.

RESEARCH DESIGN: APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

This article presents results from a study that began in early 2009. At the time, we were drawn to the strong political attention given to EU mobility partnerships and the corresponding "gap" in the academic literature. The agreements with Moldova and Cape Verde had been concluded, but we learned that the one with Senegal had stalled and was eventually abandoned during the course of that year. Given that the mobility partnership was the most ambitious project the EU had undertaken to date to enable "circular migration" with neighbouring developing countries, our research interest was triggered by the negotiation suspension: what happened? What are the factors that account for this outcome?

This research is structured as an exploratory case study (Yin 2009: 29) because there was no existing data concerning the diplomatic negotiations over a mobility partnership between the EU and Senegal at the time. We adopt the position that explanation is possible through interpretation (Weber 1968) and our analysis is undertaken inductively. We nonetheless aim to contribute to the wider literature on EU foreign policy and therefore we consider some potential explanations in the next section as a starting point to organise and interpret the interview material. In the concluding section, we discuss our findings in light of these potential explanations to draw out the broader lessons for studies of EU foreign policy.

Our objective is to offer an account of the proposed EU-Senegal mobility partnership from initial launch to the current negotiation suspension and the complex web of factors leading to its non-adoption. To do so, the methods are documentary analysis (of official EU texts, treaties and so on) and interviews with actors involved in the talks or who had direct knowledge of these developments due to their institutional positions. We carried out 20 interviews in Brussels and Dakar between August 2009 and May 2010 with: EU officials in the Commission directorates-general (DGs) Development (three officials) and Home Affairs (four), and the Council of Ministers (five); European diplomats in Dakar (five); and Senegalese officials in the ministries of Youth and Foreign Affairs (three).

Four sets[1] of questions were prepared in advance as a general guide for the interviews and were revised in preparation for the next as new information emerged. Interviews were semi-structured in order to capture respondents' reflections on the factors they perceived as responsible for the suspension in talks. Anonymity was given to all interviewees because of the strong sensitivity surrounding the negotiation failure, especially from those based in Dakar. Interview data is referred to throughout this article using a simple code (FR for French, ES for Spain, SEN for Senegal, SW for Sweden, IT for Italy, DEV for DG Development, JLS for DG Home, and CGS for the Council General-Secretariat) and interview dates are provided.

We recognise that there are limitations to findings from a single case study and have sought to improve robustness in the following ways: 1) after reading back the transcript(s) on the day of interview, we individually identified the factors responsible for the failed negotiations before a full discussion; 2) the authors independently approached some officials and carried out interviews at different times; and 3) we cross-checked the contextual questions against the Commission's evaluation of the mobility partnership, which was being completed at the start of our interviews (European Commission 2009). As the reader will notice, whilst our research design is a single case study, the findings also shed light on the Cape Verdean case as interviewees often compared the two when trying to explain why talks with Senegal did not succeed. We begin the presentation of our findings with a discussion of the likely contents of the proposed EU-Senegal mobility partnership.

THE EU-SENEGAL MOBILITY PARTNERSHIP: WHAT WOULD IT LOOK LIKE?

The exact contents of the proposed activities to be carried out under an EU-Senegal mobility partnership during the pilot phase have not been publicly disclosed. However, we learned from our Senegalese interviewee involved in the talks that the agreement discussed with Senegal was in many ways similar to the one agreed with Cape Verde (SEN01 18 August 2009). This was confirmed by the Commission officer responsible for drafting the mobility partnership for Senegal (JLS01 15 September 2009). According to this Commission official, minor changes were made to accommodate the Senegalese migration patterns and population (we note some of the changes in the next sections). Therefore, we examine the EU-Cape Verde agreement and specifically its annex, which lists the activities to be carried out (Council of Ministers 2008).

The proposed activities in the EU-Cape Verde mobility partnership are divided into six sections: 1) monitoring and developing an awareness of migration flows; 2) employment, management and facilitation of legal migration and integration; 3) mobility and short-stay visas; 4) links between migration and development, diaspora, money transfers; 5) asylum and immigration; and 6) the fight against illegal migration. In the main, the activities envisaged aim at strengthening existing cooperation between Cape Verde and the European partners (at least ten out of 28 activities are an explicit continuation of ongoing cooperation) (see Table 1). The emphasis is placed on improving the capabilities of the Cape Verdean authorities to manage migratory flows and to harness the potential of its widespread diaspora. In terms of the overall range of migration issues mentioned, the spread is comprehensive: they address irregular and legal migration, as well as migrant integration, awareness-raising and visa facilitation.

Table 1: Activities proposed in the EU-Cape Verde mobility partnership

Initiated by	Involving	Existing/New	Activities
Unclear (likely EU)	CV, EU	New	Draw up and regularly update detailed migration profile (1)
Portugal	P, CV (EU + MS)	Existing	Extension of CAMPO (*Centre de Apoio ao Migrante no País de Origem*) activities (2)
Portugal	P, CV	Existing	Circular migration: admission of certain categories of workers (2)
Portugal	P, CV	New	Bilateral cooperation between the Portuguese IEFP (Institute for Employment and Employment Training) and the CV institute (2)
Spain	ES, CV (EU + MS)	New	Schools/workshops to better integrate apprentices into CV labour market; special attention for business initiatives by women (2)
France	F, CV	New	Open up certain number of professional activities to CV (2)
All MS	MS, CV, EU	Existing	Promote academic mobility between the University of CV and other EU HEIs (2)
CV + MS	CV, MS	New	Initiate dialogue on treatment/integration of TCNs (2)
Luxembourg	L, CV	New	Study possibility of setting up temporary circular migration (2)
Luxembourg	L, CV	Existing	Develop/strengthen "Migrating with open eyes" programme (2)
Luxembourg	L, CV	New	Twinning between partner universities (2)
Commission	EU	Unclear	Recommendation to Council to obtain negotiating directives for a facilitation agreement for short-stay visas (3)
Portugal	P, CV	New	Set up a Common Visa Application Centre in Praia (3)

[Table 1 continued on next page]

[Table 1 continued from previous page]

Initiated by	Involving	Existing/New	Activities
Portugal	P, CV, EU, ES	Existing	Continue support for the Instituto das Comunidades; through the "DIAS de Cabo Verde" project (P), "Mobilising Cape Verdean Skills Abroad" programme (ES) (4)
CV + MS	CV, ES, P	New	Strengthen CV health institutions (4)
France	F, CV	Existing	Extending the co-development programme to CV (4)
Unclear (likely EU)	CV	New	CV ratify and fully implement the Geneva Convention (5)
Portugal	P, CV	New	Give technical assistance/expertise to establish asylum system (5)
Unclear (likely EU)	CV	New	CV ensure implementation of UN Convention against organised crime, smuggling of migrants, people trafficking; comply with international obligations regarding rescue at sea (6)
Unclear (likely EU)	Frontex, CV	Existing	Addition of activities in Frontex operational agreement with CV (information exchange, risk analysis, training and RTD); increase cooperation in joint return operations (6)
Frontex, CV	Frontex, CV	Existing	CV national police to implement the "Frontex Common Core Curriculum for Border Guard Basic Training" (6)
EU, MS	CV, Europol	New	Establish police cooperation between CV and Europol; exchange of information on smuggling and trafficking of migrants (6)
Commission	EU, CV	New	Recommendation to Council to obtain negotiating directives for a readmission agreement on the basis of Article 13, Cotonou (6)
Portugal	P, CV	New	Strengthen CV capacities at border control (set up systems for recording exits/entries; introduce biometrics in travel documents; detect document fraud; awareness campaigns on trafficking) (6)
Spain	ES, CV	Existing (some new)	Continue "Seahorse" project; improve maritime security through CV staff training and better telecommunications (6)
Spain	ES	New	Strengthen National Red Cross Society in CV (6)
Spain	ES, CV	Unclear	Reinforce CV Ministry of Defence capacity (improve ICT) (6)
France	F, CV, Frontex	Existing	Fight against drug and people trafficking; improve document detection; Frontex border control activities (6)

Notes: Cape Verde (CV), Spain (ES), France (F), European Union (EU), Luxembourg (L), member states (MS), Portugal (P). We have since seen the detailed scoreboard the Commission maintains to update progress; but we provide a first reading of the annex based on the publicly available document.

The two longest sections are the second and sixth, with ten activities each (with some 40 per cent being existing activities and 60 per cent new). Here, examining the scale of the

projects, we see that the activities are more limited in scope under section two than in six. For instance, six activities are broadly bilateral programmes between an *institute* (either in the higher education or employment sector) from a participating member state and the Cape Verdean counterpart. The only proposed activity that can be considered multilateral is the one concerning initiation of a dialogue between the signatories on treatment and integration of third-country nationals; but the formulation suggests weak commitment as it proposes "to explore the possibility of developing, within the appropriate fora, a dialogue" (Council of Ministers 2008: 10). Similar caution is exhibited in the three projects proposed for circular migration: France proposed to "open up certain number of professional activities [sic]", Luxembourg offered to "study the possibility of setting up an initiative on temporary circular migration", and Portugal proposed to "promote the admission of certain categories of Cape Verdean workers … particularly on a temporary basis" (ibid).

By contrast, those activities suggested under section six (the "fight against illegal migration") seemed to have a potentially wider impact when implemented. To begin, the participation of EU agencies such as the European borders agency (Frontex) and the European law enforcement agency (Europol) suggests greater coordination based on existing expertise. Moreover, the singling out of these established agencies could also be interpreted as being more multilateral, at least for activities in this section, because they allow other member states not participating in the mobility partnership to contribute indirectly via either Frontex or Europol. It is also in section six that we see the second (of two) Commission initiative in the mobility partnership. The Commission proposed to obtain mandates from the Council to proceed with negotiating a readmission agreement based on Article 13 of the Cotonou Agreement. Finally, there is a clear commitment to the activities outlined in this section expressed through the frequent use of "will" in the descriptions. For instance, Spain "will contribute to sea patrol and surveillance operations against illegal migration flows with Cape Verde and will offer air resources and training courses for pilots and maintenance staff" (Council of Ministers 2008: 14).

So what do the actual activities proposed under an EU mobility partnership with West African countries tell us? Firstly, they are a mixture of existing and new activities. Hence, for the participants to endorse the mobility partnership, they must find that subsuming current activities, along with some new ones, under the mobility partnership umbrella represents some "added value". We may thus ask: could the failure to conclude successfully the talks for an EU-Senegal mobility partnership be attributed to the lack of "value-added" for some of the participants? After all, the mobility partnership, at least according to the official statement, is a voluntary mechanism for the negotiating parties. To be sure, "value-added" could refer to a wide range of considerations; for instance, material (e.g. financial assistance), programmatic (improved coordination), symbolic (political value), or even normative (it is the "right" thing to do). We do not exclude the possibility that it could be the absence of multiple "value-added" elements that ultimately contributed to the negotiation suspension in the Senegalese case. The basic assumption is that the *less clarity* in terms of what an EU mobility partnership may offer, the *more likely* that the initial interest expressed will wane as the discussions progress. If our findings concur with this "cost-benefit calculation", we may conclude that the failure to adopt an EU-Senegal mobility partnership lends support to a "rational-choice" model.

Secondly, we see that 17 of the 28 proposed activities are *direct* initiatives (versus joint) from a single EU member state. Most noticeably, in the case of the EU-Cape Verde agreement, the member state – Portugal – with the strongest bilateral ties with Cape Verde advanced the greatest number of activities: seven in total. This suggests that Portugal, Cape Verde's former colonial power, endorses this arrangement and perceives that their relationship could benefit as a result. It is commonly known that EU member states maintain special relationships with their former colonies and these ties are important determinants in how the Union cooperates with these third countries and

regions (Gibert 2011b, Mayall 2005). Therefore, another question we may ask is: could the suspension in negotiation talks between the EU and Senegal be attributed to (any) reluctance from France, Senegal's previous colonial power? If so, when was this "hesitation" expressed? And to what extent was it conveyed to Senegal or, indeed, to the other participants? Following the conventional wisdom that colonial ties are "conduits" for third countries to access the EU policy/diplomatic arena, we assume that they are more likely to maintain this relationship by adopting a common position. This likelihood may increase, we speculate, if the "value-added" of the mobility partnership remains ambiguous or absent as the talks evolve.

Thirdly, EU agencies are present in the very early stages of the mobility partnerships. In this instance, we observe Frontex succeeding in advancing its own initiative. Whilst incorporating the Frontex proposal to advance cooperation with the Cape Verdean national police suggests operational pragmatism, its "presence" is also highly symbolic: it indicates the priority that the EU and its member states seemingly assign to external border control. This is even more the case when seen in light of the caution expressed in introducing circular migration schemes that would enable temporary labour migration for selective groups of workers. Moreover, by referring to Article 13 of the Cotonou Agreement as the framework for a readmission agreement, the European partners are asking Cape Verde to accept not only their own citizens, but also stateless persons and third-country nationals. These activities all point to the role of "gate-keeper" for migratory flows into the EU that Cape Verde is expected to play. This leads us to the question: could the suspension of the negotiations be attributed to Senegal's reluctance, or, indeed, unwillingness, to play the role of Europe's "gate-keeper" at the *multilateral-* level? These are some of the questions we asked our interviewees and their responses are presented in the next three sections. Yet before doing so, it is useful to consider briefly possible explanations as the first step towards interpreting the rich empirical observations gathered from interviews.

We know from the existing literature that there are several potential explanations for the failed negotiation for an EU-Senegal mobility partnership. In addition to the straightforward "cost-benefit calculation" mentioned above, we may consider the "incoherent EU foreign policy" thesis, which underlines inconsistencies in the EU's foreign policy due to the organisation's specific multi-level governance model, with member states and EU institutions favouring different interpretations of the policy (Smith 2004). In the case of EU migration cooperation, Guiraudon (2000) and Lavenex and Kunz (2008) have found evidence to support this thesis in the form of organisational competition between the different ministries (i.e. interior, development and foreign affairs) responsible for migration-related issues. We may also consider whether the failure to conclude the mobility partnership was the outcome of the EU following its "standard operating procedure" of "one-size-fits-all" (Börzel & Risse 2004)/"our-size-fits-all" (Bicchi 2006) in its foreign policy. Examining the "external dimension" of EU migration cooperation, Boswell (2003) has shown that the EU approached third countries with a pre-determined programmatic content/approach without prior consultation. These three potential explanations will guide our analysis and we discuss them more extensively in the concluding section, once we have explored in turn the Senegalese, joint EU-Senegal and European migration scenes and policies.

"EMIGRATION VS. RETENTION" IN SENEGAL'S DOMESTIC DEBATE: REVEALING THE EMBEDDED CONTRADICTION

According to Commission interviewees, one of three key factors in the EU's decision to approach Senegal and engage Cape Verde in talks for a mobility partnership is that both countries have a "high awareness" of migration issues (DEV01a 8 September 2009; JLS01). This "awareness" stems from their established tradition of emigration. In the Cape Verdean case, for instance, it was estimated that 37.5 per cent of the population

were living abroad in 2010, and remittances constituted 9.1 per cent of the GDP in 2009 (World Bank 2011: 34, 87). Senegal's emigration tradition is reflected in the existence of a *Ministère des Sénégalais de l'Extérieur*, a separate ministry dedicated to its diaspora, whose remittances also play an important role in the national economy. For example, the total Senegalese remittances sent via formal channels have increased greatly during 2001-2010: from USD305 *million* to USD1.16 *billion* (Cisse 2011: 227, World Bank 2011: 217). The importance of remittances and the domestic debate about emigration, according to Senegalese officials (SEN01, SEN02 2 October 2009), prompted Senegal to accept the EU's invitation to negotiate a mobility partnership.

The Senegalese domestic debate over how to best address emigration was highly contentious and divisive. Whilst the departure of many young Senegalese remains a concern for both the political leadership and civil society, the attitude of the current government towards this issue appears to be somewhat ambivalent.[2] For example, elected for the first time in 2000, President Wade had designated fighting against youth emigration and increasing youth employment as political priorities. The 2006 plan known as *Retour vers l'Agriculture* (the Reva Plan) sought to address the twin objectives through a rehabilitation of the national agricultural sector. The idea was that the creation of attractive employment in this sector would encourage Senegalese youths to stay.

This official anti-emigration position, however, conceals a very complex relationship between the Senegalese diaspora, domestic politics, and national economic development. According to one of our European interviewees based in Dakar, this "anti-emigration" platform was part of a "double-discourse" in the absence of clear solutions to a highly complex issue (FR01 9 October 2009). Speaking rather frankly, this interviewee insisted that "[Senegalese] illegal emigration was not just criminal but also very political". This interviewee went on to say that whilst emigration drained Senegal of its youngest work force, it also offered an escape door to an angry and frustrated youth and thus indirectly solved one of Senegal's deepest political problems (FR01). This remark prefaced a discussion on the role that the Mourides, of which President Wade is a member, presumably had in enabling the unauthorised immigration of young Senegalese.

The Mourides are a Muslim brotherhood founded in Senegal, where they continue to have very strong following. Although the Mourides officially do not have a political agenda, they are known to have influenced the political and social scenes before Senegal became independent in 1960 (Diouf 2001). According to our French interviewee, the Mourides encouraged and facilitated emigration through their existing business and trade networks (FR01). The reason for this, it was explained, is because the Mourides sought to become a key-player on the migration issue, and more specifically, as the one who could "increase" and "decrease" the flows of unauthorised Senegalese immigration to the EU (FR01). In so doing, they could benefit from particular ties to Senegal's diaspora and the political and economic leverage gained (Foley & Babou 2011). We interpreted the reference to the Mourides in the context of EU-Senegal talks for a mobility partnership as indicating that there are strong "vested interests" domestically to retain control of migration regulation.

In diplomatic discussions, such vested interests could not easily be conveyed (even if they are considered "appropriate"), and we found that the general confusion surrounding the migration portfolio in the Senegalese government obviated such a discussion. In addition to the Ministry of Senegalese Abroad, the ministries of the interior, of foreign affairs, of sports and youth, and several specialised departments (in charge of refugees and displaced persons, of relations with Senegalese diaspora etc.) within the presidency are all reportedly involved in migration cooperation. According to a Commission delegate in Dakar, the involvement of such a large number of governmental actors created considerable confusion in identifying an interlocutor for the mobility partnership discussions (EC01 8 September 2009). To address this problem, the Commission sent a letter to President Wade requesting the appointment of a committee to oversee the

discussions; this committee has been set up, but is essentially informal and has no real decisional powers (EC01).

This institutional complexity is not, however, specific to migration issues and is recognised as a regular feature in President Wade's governing methods. The reason for this is that Wade, in the face of opposition within his own party, has designated special advisors, whose portfolios overlap with those of the ministers and state secretaries. Such institutional complexity, interestingly, has not systematically emerged as an obstacle in Senegal's relations with third parties, notably with the other member states of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference after President Wade took control of the state agency in charge of relations with the organisation and named his son as its head (Dahou & Foucher 2009: 21-22). On the contrary, such an organisational arrangement gives President Wade the power to hasten agreement and cooperation on an issue if he so wishes. The observation that Wade did not designate one of his many special advisors to take the lead on the proposed EU-Senegal mobility partnership is significant: it can be read as a covert strategy to stall the negotiations indefinitely. Yet recourse to a "veiled" strategy is puzzling in light of Senegal's initial acceptance to discuss the possibility of a partnership. We unpack the complex relationship between the EU and Senegal in the next section to show how the invitation from Europe, one of Senegal's major aid donors and political partners, was one that could not be refused outright.

SENEGAL'S RELATIONSHIP WITH EUROPE

EU-Senegal relations: grounded in development and trade

Relations between the EU and Senegal are as old as the Union itself. In the Rome Treaty (part IV), the Union elaborated its "special relationship" with the then European dependencies that would shortly become independent and are referred to as the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. Senegal – as part of French West Africa – was amongst the pioneers. The 1963 Yaoundé and 1973 Lomé Conventions institutionalised the special relationship, which largely consisted of preferential trade arrangements and development cooperation. Migration came late into the EU-ACP relations but ascended quickly to the top of the agenda.

In the Cotonou Agreement, which regulates the EU-ACP relationship until 2020, migration is given a full article. Article 13 identifies poverty, difficult living and working conditions, lack of training opportunities and unemployment as causes of ACP *emigration*. Emigration is seen as a major constraint in the efforts to improve overall regional development (paragraph 4, Cotonou Agreement 2000 and 2005). In Article 13, the signatories also define commitments to address the return of irregular migrants: all parties are to "take back" their nationals found to be residing without authorisation and are committed to do so "without further formalities". As noted earlier, Article 13 also provides a legal framework for concluding separate bilateral agreements between the parties that would address the readmission of third-country nationals and stateless persons.

Whilst migration has rapidly risen to the top of the EU-ACP agenda, the relationship remains dominated by trade and aid concerns and policies. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that comparatively more recent issues entering the EU-ACP agenda – such as human rights, good governance and migration – have largely been treated within a framework of development and aid (Gibert 2011a).

The development perspective, according to a Senegalese interviewee, also informed how the EU approached Senegal in talks for a mobility partnership. "International partners tend to pre-write their own programmes without consulting Senegal, which they consider a 'beneficiary', not an active partner" (SEN01). This strategy, our Senegalese speaker

explained, was a "non-starter" for a real partnership; "as often with these issues, Europe came with a finished project" (SEN01). We know from existing studies that the tendency by European officials to present a "joint cooperation" document in a state of near finality to non-EU partners is a "standard operating procedure" in the migration field (Boswell 2003, van Selm 2002). The "technique" has backfired in other instances (Boswell 2003), and we found that to be the case for Senegal as well. Several Commission officials singled out the lack of in-depth engagement with the Senegalese prior to Commission missions as responsible for the negotiation failure (DEV02 23 September 2009, DEV03 23 September 2009).

Considering the development context, we also asked the interviewees if Senegal could expect to receive additional funding for its participation in an EU mobility partnership, and responses were inconclusive and ambiguous. For instance, whilst a Commission policy officer based in Brussels pointed out that some funding in the ninth and tenth European Development Funds (for 2000-2013) would be used to address migration issues in the development context (JLS01), the Commission delegate based in Dakar stated that the "value-added" for Senegal would not be financial (EC01). At the same time, several European diplomats in Dakar told us that Senegal could anticipate additional funds, especially from the EU, for signing the mobility partnership (IT01 18 September 2009, FR01). We interpreted these remarks to indicate that discussions for the additional funding to be allocated through the mobility partnership programme had not been "concluded" by the negotiating partners when the talks were suspended. Moreover, whilst the Senegalese authorities were clearly eager to avoid jeopardising their relations with the European Union – which represent EUR315.8 million in grants for the period 2008-2013 – by rejecting outright a mobility partnership, whatever additional funding, if any, was discussed during the negotiations clearly did not outweigh the perceived disadvantages of the proposed migration agreement.

Finally, continuing with questions concerning the "value-added", we asked the interviewees if the mobility partnership offered symbolic or political value to the Senegalese. It is on this point that the interviewees clearly differentiated between the two West African countries. For Cape Verdeans, according to a Commission officer, the "added-value" of the mobility partnership was "essentially political" (DEV01b 22 October 2009). "The mobility partnership is de facto part of a broader special relationship", this speaker elaborated, the Cape Verdean "foreign minister at the time was very pro-European and eager to negotiate a special partnership" (DEV01b). In the Senegalese case, there were no clear efforts made on the part of the EU to indicate that the conclusion of a mobility partnership might strengthen Senegal's political ties and advantages in its relations with the EU. The same interviewee regretted that no European Commissioner had travelled to Senegal before or during the negotiations (DEV01b). In light of vested domestic interests to retain migration competence and, as will be discussed next, preference for bilateral cooperation, we conclude that the ambiguity or absence of "added-value" of the mobility partnership served as a catalyst to the suspension of negotiations.

Migration cooperation with Europe: largely bilateral undertakings

Despite the EU's growing role, a great deal of cooperation between Europe and Africa continues to occur at the bilateral level. This applies to many policy areas, and is the case for migration in spite of the above-mentioned developments. As we have shown in the earlier brief discussion of the EU-Cape Verde mobility partnership, a large portion of the proposed activities are continuations or extensions of existing schemes. In this section, we consider those in place between Senegal and three EU countries – France, Spain and Italy – that have signalled their interest in participating in the discussions (JLS01). According to our Italian interviewee based in Dakar, these projects formed the basis for the proposed mobility partnership (IT01). Our aim is to interrogate what the

proposed agreement may have offered to all parties in light of the ongoing arrangements and the EU's competence in the migration field.

France, Spain and Italy are the three top European destinations for emigrating Senegalese and, over the last years, they have sought Senegal's cooperation in managing migratory flows from the country and Africa. Amongst the three, France remains the destination of choice. In 2004, 45 per cent of Senegalese heading to Europe went to France, where they represent the largest sub-Saharan African migrant population (Borrel 2006, Lessault & Beauchemin 2009). Our French interviewee said that France had been negotiating an arrangement (*Gestion concertée des flux migratoires*) that would manage migration from and through Senegal (FR01). Consisting of three pillars, the set-up concerns professional migration, illegal migration and development. At the time of the interview, an agreement had been reached on 108 professions for which France will grant work permits to qualified Senegalese applicants (FR01). This arrangement binds the Senegalese government to accept the return of Senegalese overstayers, which, this interviewee stated, is estimated to be 1,000-1,500 every year (FR01). Lastly, under this set-up, France has agreed to sponsor development projects aimed explicitly at creating employment in Senegal to stem emigration (FR01).

Whilst France is often equated with Europe for many emigrating Senegalese (Fall *et al.* 2010), Spain has become an important destination in recent years. For instance, Spain hosted 13 per cent of the Senegalese heading to Europe in 2004 (Eurostat results quoted in Lessault & Beauchemin 2009). After the incidents at Ceuta and Melilla (Lavenex & Kunz 2008), Spain began to develop extensive bilateral migration cooperation with Senegal. According to our interviewee, Spain launched a scheme (*Les jeunes dans les fermes agricoles*) aimed to encourage young Senegalese to work in Spanish farms for a season and then return (ES02 17 September 2009). Whilst the results were disappointing,[3] our Spanish interviewee stated that Spain was determined to pursue the project further (ES02). The reason for continuing is that similar return patterns had been observed in the early period of Spain's arrangements with Morocco that had since improved (ES02).

In the field of illegal migration, Spain also has extensive cooperation with Senegal. A formal agreement in which Senegal will assist in preventing illegal migration and accept the return of under-age nationals was concluded at the time of the interview (ES02). Within the Frontex[4] framework, Spain worked with Senegal in patrolling the West African shore. Our interviewee was quick to point out how successful this collaboration was: not one Senegalese pirogue had landed in the Canary Islands between July 2008 and July 2009, and only 140 Senegalese had arrived via The Gambia and Mauritania (ES02). These figures must be compared with some 32,000 who had arrived between July and September 2006 (Carling & Hernandez-Carretero 2011: 43). Given the results, it is hardly surprising that Spain was very interested to engage Senegal in an EU mobility partnership; according to a Commission official, Spain was the EU member state pushing forward this initiative (DEV01b).

Spain's enthusiasm to *multilateralise* migration cooperation with Senegal is not shared, as we learned from interviewees, by France (EC01, IT01, FR01). As our French interlocutor put it, "there was no added value in it, either for Senegal or France. The mobility partnership was not innovative and would just integrate policies that already exist" (FR01). This remark is rather significant in light of the tutelary relationship that France has with Senegal, its former colony. A favoured ally, Senegal was the largest recipient of French overseas aid and its third largest trade partner in West Africa in 2008 (Agence Française de Développement in Anon 2009: 4-5). This privileged relationship is expressed through other means including, for instance, the presence of a key – albeit now closed – French military base in Senegal; the French embassy in Dakar is said to be one of its largest in the world. The often cordial interactions between the Senegalese and French leaders further lend support to this impression.

Interviews confirmed that, at the same time, France did not actively block these discussions. It seemed to have adopted, interestingly, a strategy of passively resisting progress. "France will be happy to take part in the mobility partnership if Senegal is willing […] and makes concrete proposals", our French interviewee stressed, but "France […] does not wish to take the lead on this and will stay behind the EU" (FR01). France's decision to take a backseat is in stark contrast to the role that Portugal took on in the EU-Cape Verde mobility partnership. The Commission representative in Dakar pointed to the difference: Portugal actively promoted the candidacy of Cape Verde for an EU mobility partnership (EC01). The reason for the French position, as we learned from a Commission policy officer, is that France was negotiating its own *Pacte pour l'Immigration* with Senegal when the Commission came forward with considerations for an EU mobility partnership (DEV01b). According to this interviewee, "the timing may indeed have been bad; there may have been some confusion there and the Senegalese authorities may have had the feeling that they were linked" (DEV01b). Beyond this timing issue, France tends to practise "Europeanization" *à la carte* in its Africa policies. In other words, France will agree to multilateralise and move a policy to the European level when it has an interest in doing so, i.e. when it needs the EU's political legitimacy or financial means. However, when a policy is satisfactory at the bilateral level, as seems to be the case for migration cooperation with Senegal, there is no reason, in France's view, for such a multilateralisation to take place (Gibert 2011b: 190).

Finally, despite being the second EU destination of choice for Senegalese emigrants (36 per cent in 2004), Italy has no formal agreement with Senegal. According to our Italian interviewee, the existing migration cooperation with Senegal had been informal and *ad hoc*, and it concerned the readmission of Senegalese citizens illegally present in Italy (IT01). Whilst Italy decided to participate in talks for an EU mobility partnership, this delegate pointed out, it also knows that "the Senegalese authorities clearly prefer dealing with migration issues on a bilateral basis" (IT01). This statement brings us back to the issue of the added-value of the mobility partnership *vis-à-vis* the "sum" of bilateral agreements it effectively gathers. To explore this perspective further, we now turn to the EU context and what the Commission could offer to Senegal in this regard.

EU MOBILITY PARTNERSHIPS AND CONTESTED SUPRANATIONAL COMPETENCE IN MIGRATION

The mobility partnerships emerged from very particular policy and institutional contexts that suggest a new reflection on the close connection between migration and development (Chou 2006). This reflection is best seen in the 1999 Tampere Conclusions, which declared that the EU would apply a "comprehensive approach" to migration cooperation. More specifically, the "comprehensive approach" would address the "political, human rights and development issues in countries and regions of origin and transit" (European Council 1999: paragraph 11). Endorsing this new approach, the European Council tasked the Council and the Commission with ensuring coherence between the internal and external policies of the EU (foreign policy, development, migration and so on), which had, at the time, been formulated independently.

EU policies, however, are also tied to a specific, frequently short-term or election-centred, reading of member states' national policy priorities. For migration-related matters, this often translates into strong preferences for instruments demonstrating – at least on paper – that the European governments are in control of their borders. Chou (2009: 547-550) argues that this tension was manifest in two distinct dimensions of the "comprehensive approach": the "repressive" and the "progressive". The repressive dimension encompasses measures seeking to "maximise" EU preferences at the expense of migrants, sending and transit countries (e.g. visas and return clauses). By contrast, the progressive dimension corresponds with measures establishing legal or authorised

routes for migrants seeking entry to Europe (temporary and circular labour migration schemes that would avoid a "brain drain" from sending regions).

The co-existence of repressive and progressive rationales is certainly not unique to the Union; this divide structures national regimes because respective measures seek to regulate different stages of the migratory cycle (entry, mobility, and return) and to accommodate different policies (domestic vs. foreign or development). At the same time, whilst the EU's "comprehensive approach" ostensibly aims for a more balanced approach to migration, there exists in practice a bias towards measures that enable member states to "control" flows. This tipping of the balance is partly a consequence of the ongoing EU efforts to remove its internal borders ("free movement of persons"), which has meant unhindered intra-EU migration but led to a significant tightening of external borders, and partly of the limited competence the EU has in adopting pan-European labour migration measures.

Member states have repeatedly emphasised that labour migration, and especially "volume", is an area of national competence (Council of Ministers 2004: paragraph 3, 2009, Geddes 2008). Whilst the Commission has attempted to develop this policy domain through green papers and consultation, the member states have shown very little interest. Therefore, the only measures concerning labour migration adopted at the EU-level at the time of writing are the Blue Card (for highly-skilled migrants) and the scientific visa (highly-educated). The Commission had put forth a proposal for a seasonal worker directive, but it remains in the "pipeline" as several national parliaments have issued "reasoned opinions" on its violation of "subsidiarity" (House of Lords 2010). Hence, even if the Commission had wanted to liberalise temporary migration schemes between the EU and Senegal, it did not have the regulatory competence to do so.

The EU, as we learned from interviewees, has approached Senegal for more strategic reasons. According to three Commission policy officers, the geographical location of Cape Verde and Senegal was the *second* decisive factor, after the above-mentioned importance of emigration in both countries, in their being chosen as candidates for the agreement (DEV01a, DEV02, DEV03); and the *third* factor is their relative political stability in a highly destabilised region.[5] Senegal and Cape Verde have, as members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),[6] removed border controls against ECOWAS citizens (the protocol on free movement of persons). In considering the two countries, the EU sought their participation as the "gate-keepers" of migratory flows throughout the western part of the ECOWAS territory. As the former Commission Desk Officer for Senegal put it, the two countries had "something to offer the EU member states in exchange" (DEV01b).

Yet there are differences in the specific "gate-keeping" roles that Cape Verde and Senegal are expected to play that can be attributed to the history, nature and perception of their emigration patterns. According to 2009 World Bank figures, the Cape Verdean population is about half a million compared to more than 12 million Senegalese. Several Commission interviewees said that Cape Verde was an "easy case" for the EU because an agreement to facilitate mobility of Cape Verdeans would apply to very few (DEV02, DEV03). An Italian interviewee went even further, pointing to the different perception of Cape Verdean migration, seen as either already, or at least partially, circular and more economically successful (IT01). The mobility agreement "with Cape Verde was effectively about facilitating the Cape Verdeans' mobility, especially business people" (IT01). By contrast, the same interlocutor stated, "the mobility partnership with Senegal would clearly be about regulating 'flow', the return of Senegalese 'overstayers' and other West Africans" (IT01). A Senegalese official did not, however, perceive any stark differences in terms of role expectation. Expressing concern that the EU was seeking direct bilateral cooperation rather than through the established regional framework (i.e. ECOWAS), this speaker was critical of Cape Verde's decision to conclude the agreement without prior consultation with other ECOWAS states (SEN01).

This final remark brings us to the "legal" nature of the proposed mobility partnership, namely, the extent to which it binds the signatories to their commitments. One Senegalese interviewee argued that, whilst the agreement clearly imposed legal obligations, the EU's duties, and thus the political counterpart that Senegal could expect, were much less obvious (SEN01). For this interviewee, "the term 'partnership' is in itself legally ambiguous. Why is such an agreement needed when the current bilateral agreements give actors the opportunity to adapt cooperation to specific national needs and realities?" (SEN01). Others pointed out that Senegal feared that the mobility partnership would considerably increase the constraints linked to the management of migration to Europe and reduce the flexibility of current arrangements (EC01, ES02, IT01, FR01, DEV01b). Offering an altogether different perspective, an official in the legal service of the Council General-Secretariat noted that the mobility partnership is "quite experimental in the legal sense" (CGS01 18 September 2009). Because "the Commission also signs", this speaker pointed out, "this in effect binds the rest of the member states [and] a lot of them are not aware of this" (CGS01). This statement fittingly points to the three characteristics of the negotiations for an EU-Senegal agreement: ambiguous, complex, and uncertain. It is highly likely that the Senegalese authorities perceived this and had a clear preference for the well-known and, in their view, more flexible bilateral arrangements. In the next section, we offer a more systematic interpretation of the above findings and show how they point to three different types of explanation for this negotiation failure.

CONCLUSIONS

The article set out to offer an explanation to the failed discussions for an EU-Senegal mobility partnership. We have attempted here to map the complex web of interests and interactions that exist between these different actors with regard to migration and shown how, taken together, they account for the indefinite suspension of the negotiations. The overview of the contents, based on the current mobility partnership between the EU and Cape Verde, revealed that, at least initially, the agreement served as a common platform for activities that pre-existed at the bilateral level. This begged the question both of its "value-added" as opposed to the simple sum of bilateral migration arrangements between the EU member states and the West African partner, and of the European countries' interests in entering such a partnership and subsuming their bilateral cooperation within a European multilateral framework. Moreover, a close reading of the EU-Cape Verde mobility partnership agreement – and we know the one with Senegal was to be very similar – underlined a clear emphasis on controlling illegal migration and on a "gate-keeper" role for the West African partner. This seemed, once again, to point to potential disagreement with the Senegalese who may have had a very different understanding of what such a partnership should entail and what benefits they might draw from it. The proposed contents of the mobility partnership thus already seemed to carry considerable room for disagreement and misunderstanding.

The unravelling of the information and perspectives shared by our Senegalese and European interviewees, however, provides a far more complex and nuanced understanding of the talks between the EU and Senegal and of their failure. Our interviewees underlined the importance and sensitivity of the emigration issue in Senegal and insisted that this could account for the negotiation failure – the added value of a mobility partnership had to be considerable for the Senegalese authorities to take the political risk of a potentially unpopular agreement. Our interviews with various European and Senegalese actors, however, confirmed that in the negotiation process, no such political or financial added value was invoked. Not only that, but there was a clear perception, on the Senegalese side, that a multilateral arrangement replacing the existing bilateral activities would add an undesirable level of rigidity to migration cooperation with Europe. This perception no doubt originated in Senegal's long cooperation experience with the complex EU machinery, in the limited room for

manoeuvre that the Commission has on migration issues – clearly observable, from the Senegalese side, from the very start of the talks – and in the legal ambiguity of the mobility partnership. It seems likely that the Senegalese authorities sensed this ambiguity and complexity on the European side and considered it best to maintain migration cooperation at the existing bilateral level. For Senegal, it can be inferred, the current bilateral arrangements were seen to be more flexible and advantageous than the multilateral "unknown".

It also appears quite certain that Senegal's cost-benefit calculation enjoyed the silent but strong assent of France, the former colonial power and one of the EU member states concerned. France clearly had little appetite for multilateralising cooperation on an issue where it had only just concluded a new bilateral agreement and wished to keep it there or, generally, for multilateralising relations with one of its privileged partners in West Africa. Two of the mobility partnership's major actors thus appear to have quickly assumed that the costs of the mobility partnership would outweigh its benefits.

The above findings also point to the absence, on the EU's part, of a clear negotiation strategy and to the Commission's incapacity to reverse initial French and Senegalese, negative perceptions of the mobility partnership. Some of our interviewees, and a historical overview of EU-Senegal cooperation, pointed to the EU's tendency routinely to consider Senegal as a blindly grateful beneficiary of EU aid. There thus seems to have been little effort, on the part of the Commission or its leadership, to engage the Senegalese authorities early on so as to create a greater sense of ownership, or to propose genuine, political and/or financial "value-added" in exchange for the partnership. Our research thus confirms previous studies pointing to the EU's tendency to systematically push forward "one-size-fits-all" or "our-size-fits-all" models in its relations with third countries, and the obvious limits – here, an outright failure – to such an approach (Bicchi 2006, Börzel & Risse 2004, Boswell 2003).

Finally, explanations pointing to an incoherent foreign policy also have their place in our interpretation of the negotiation failure for an EU-Senegal mobility partnership. We should point out two important qualifications, however. The first is that this applies to both sides of the negotiation – the EU and the Senegalese. While the lack of visibility and of leadership on the EU side no doubt contributed to Senegalese perceptions of an ultimately disadvantageous agreement, the European negotiators also underlined that the same absence of leadership and multiplicity of institutional actors on the Senegalese side helped stall the process. Moreover, and this is the second qualification, it seems likely that this foreign policy incoherence was eventually used by France and Senegal to block the process. Posing a vocal "no" to the EU was delicate – and this no doubt explains why both France and Senegal agreed to enter the negotiation, in addition to a genuine curiosity and initial feeling that the agreement may offer some advantages. Using a bureaucratic blocking strategy, on the other hand, was both an effective and diplomatic way of expressing their opposition to, or lack of interest in, the mobility partnership. President Wade thus made no particular effort to clarify the division of labour amongst the different Senegalese actors responsible for the migration portfolio, whilst France took a backseat in the negotiation process, knowing that its refusal to take on its traditional leadership role would not only complicate matters on the European side, but also clearly signal to the Senegalese partners the lack of French enthusiasm for the partnership. Inconsistent foreign policies here were both a cause for the negotiation failure and a means, in the hands of reluctant actors, to suspend the negotiation indefinitely.

Our findings thus suggest that there is no single model that could have captured and offered an explanation to the failed negotiations based solely on domestic and/or supranational factors when there are bilateral and multilateral tensions that may tip the balance in favour of or against the successful conclusion of the talks. The challenge for those interested in extrapolating a parsimonious model lies not only in isolating the independent and intervening variables, but also in sequencing them convincingly.

A more interesting, and perhaps fruitful, research avenue is to investigate whether any lessons are "learned" from the negotiation failure and are being applied to the current preparations for the next phase of the mobility partnerships. We saw "learning" occurring when interviewees began reflecting on the failed discussions and were attempting to explain why that had been the case. For instance, whilst keen to defend the EU's approach, a Commission policy officer conceded that if the EU had not already formally proclaimed that a mobility partnership was imminent between the Union and Senegal the negotiation failure could have been avoided at such an early stage (JLS01). This interviewee remarked that the Commission "learned" that informal and low-key discussions with the partners are "musts" before any official declaration of intent is made (JLS01). Certainly, it could be interpreted that this "lesson-drawing" (Rose 1993) is "instrumental" learning and is informing the overall approach the EU adopts towards engaging third countries. At the same time, studies could be designed to investigate "learning" within the Commission, which now has more systematic coordination across its units. More interestingly, perhaps, is to examine whether the EU's partners have acquired lessons of their own and are "learning" to work with this multilevel entity in a sensitive policy area.

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[1] A set of contextual questions and three sets according to the affiliations of the interviewees.

[2] Senegal has a very young population, with an estimated 53.3 per cent being under 20 years old and 63.3 per cent reported to be under 25 years of age (Fall, *et al.* 2010: 5).

[3] The first application of this scheme brought 700 Senegalese women to work on Spanish farms; only 240 returned and the rest remained in Spain illegally. Two smaller trips with an average of forty women followed; half returned to Senegal from the second cohort and all from the third. Spain focused on women for reasons of empowerment and also because it believed that they have stronger family ties and, hence, are more likely to return (ES02).

[4] The Frontex agreement is "operationalised" largely by participating member states. For example, in this particular instance, Spain provides two to three shuttles, a plane, a helicopter, boat and manpower (Guardia civil and the Spanish police); Frontex contributes 20-30 per cent, Italy and Luxembourg provide planes on an *ad hoc* basis (ES02).

[5] Senegal and Cape Verde have indeed remained remarkably stable since their independence in, respectively, 1960 and 1974. The transition from the one-party state of the immediate post-independence era to multiparty politics occurred relatively smoothly and the two countries are put forward as models of successful electoral democracies by the international community, which saw them as peaceful havens in an extremely unstable region better known for its coups and civil wars. Both countries have also reached higher levels of development than their West African neighbours. Their relative stability and prosperity have naturally attracted refugees and migrants from the rest of the region who were fleeing their countries' instability, violence and poverty and who settled in Cape Verde and Senegal on a longer-term basis (Bouilly & Marx 2008, Carling & Åkesson 2009: 148).

[6] ECOWAS is one of Africa's most integrated regional organisations; it has 15 member states (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo).

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What underlies public attitudes towards the constitutionalization of the EU? Evidence from Britain

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Abstract

This article analyses the factors underlying public attitudes in Britain towards recent attempts to provide the EU with a constitution. In the context of the incremental constitutionalization of the EU, this article represents a detailed assessment of attitudes in a traditionally Eurosceptic country. It builds upon insights from existing strands of work analysing public opinion on EU-related issues. The impact of economic interests, national identity, party cues and political sophistication are assessed using data from a single-country and a cross-national survey. The data are analysed using binary logistic regression estimation. The main findings are that both party 'cues' and national identity play an important role in underpinning public opinion. These findings hold up when general support for the EU is accounted for. There are mixed findings in relation to the socio-demographic factors. The findings provide important clues as to what structures public opposition towards further political integration.

Keywords

INTRODUCTION

The recently-ratified Lisbon Treaty represents the latest stage in the constitutionalization of the European Union (EU), building upon previous treaties such as the Single European Act, Treaty of European Union, Nice and Amsterdam. This process has proceeded by way of "informal incrementalism and semi-permanent reform, rather than explicit public endorsement and a 'constitutional moment'" (Christiansen and Reh 2009: 2). After the popular rejection of the original Constitutional Treaty in two referendums in 2005 and its subsequent discarding by the EU, a revised treaty was finally agreed by the heads of government and state at Lisbon in October 2007 and the ratification process by each member state started afresh. Irrespective of referendums held in individual member states, the issue of the constitutionalization of the EU goes well beyond the document that is the Lisbon Treaty or its ill-fated predecessor, the Constitutional Treaty. It is an on-going and, therefore, a *dynamic* process that "is legal as well as political" (Shu 2008: 428). However, while it has been argued that "a European constitutional order exists at least in the legal sense", it is also "safe to claim a political constitutional vacuum" (Shu 2008: 443). Indeed, this process has suffered major setbacks in recent years, including the negative verdicts delivered via referendums in France and the Netherlands in 2005, and earlier defeats visited on the Maastricht and Nice treaties in Denmark and Ireland, respectively.

Such negative verdicts delivered in this fashion are among the most prominent features of the current era of "constraining dissensus" which characterises citizens' attitudes towards the integration process, representing a clear shift from the preceding era of "permissive consensus" (Hooghe and Marks 2009: 5). While there are still variations in the nature and extent of party-based and popular Euroscepticism across member states, in this era of "constraining dissensus" citizens' opinions have arguably become more important as they play a significant part in legitimising major steps in the integration process (Shu 2008: 432). As Hooghe and Marks observe: "Elites, that is, party leaders in positions of authority, must look over their shoulders when negotiating European issues" (2009: 5). While the factors underlying popular verdicts on the constitutionalization process in countries that have held referendums on the Constitutional Treaty or Lisbon Treaty have been analysed in depth (Hainsworth 2006; Ivaldi 2006; Quinlan 2009;

O'Brennan 2009), there has been less focus on countries where no referendum was held even when there was strong evidence of public opposition.

Britain was one such member state where there was no explicit public endorsement either of an EU constitution or the Lisbon Treaty. We therefore analyse, using survey data, public opinion towards the latest stage in this constitutionalization process in a Eurosceptic country traditionally wary of moves aimed at further political integration. Using multivariate analysis, the article assesses the relative impact of economic interests, group identities and political 'cues'. It uses data from two cross-sectional surveys. The article proceeds as follows. First, the domestic political context is reviewed and trends in public opinion discussed. Second, the relevance to this analysis of existing theoretical approaches and empirical insights is discussed and a series of hypotheses specified. Third, the data sources used - British Social Attitudes and Eurobarometer surveys - and measurement of variables are discussed. Fourthly, the results from the multivariate analysis are presented and discussed. Finally, conclusions are drawn and the advantages and limitations of the research acknowledged.

PARTY POSITIONS AND PUBLIC OPINION IN BRITAIN

In Britain, traditionally one of the most Eurosceptic states, there has been stronger opposition to efforts at political integration – 'deepening' as opposed to 'widening' - compared to that found in other member states, with developments at the EU level having major ramifications for domestic politics (Forster 2002; Spiering 2004; Baker *et al.* 2008). However, opposition towards political integration is not just a feature of attitudes within the British electorate: mainstream political elites have taken up opposing positions on this question, which is not always a common occurrence in other member states. Similarly, the major parties have been divided over the merits of the EU having some form of constitutional document, with the Conservatives strongly opposed and Labour and the Liberal Democrats more in favour. To some extent, the issue of constitutionalizing the EU has also engendered disagreement within the major parties, a recurrent feature of the European issue in British politics before and since membership in 1973.

Opinion polls conducted up to 2006, which asked about the desirability of an EU constitution and then a Constitutional Treaty, tended to show "that a majority of British people intended to vote 'no' rather than 'yes'" in a future referendum on this question (Baines and Gill 2006: 463). While polling data shows that public opinion has on balance been opposed to voting 'yes' in a referendum, how does this compare with cross-national opinion towards an EU constitution? Aggregate-level data on public attitudes is available from the Eurobarometer surveys. Figure 1 provides a comparison of 'net' support (the percentage supporting an EU constitution *minus* the percentage opposing it; a positive 'net' score indicates that more people were in favour than were against) for an EU constitution. First, we provide an average for the EU-15 members prior to the 2004 enlargement. Second, we give the average for the post-enlargement EU-25 countries. The first question was asked between 2002 and 2007 (represented by the *continuous* black lines), while the second question was asked between 2005 and 2006 (represented by the *dashed* black lines).

Figure 1: Public opinion towards an EU Constitution, 2002-2007

Source: Eurobarometer surveys. 'Don't know' responses excluded. Weighted data.

After initially high levels of support during 2002, from late 2003 onwards Figure 1 shows a steep decline in the proportion favouring an EU Constitution, which occurred both in Britain and across the EU-15 countries, although the drop in support was more precipitous in Britain. Moreover, from spring 2004 the difference in levels of support between the two time series widened and persisted for the remainder of the period. Similarly, there is a clear differential in net support between Britain and the EU-25 countries for the second question, though the gap is narrower than before. More specifically, during 2002 and in spring 2003 there was overwhelming net support for an EU constitution in Britain and across the EU, with net scores of around 65-75 per cent in both cases. In Britain, net support dropped sharply to around 55 per cent in autumn 2003 and then to around 30 per cent in spring 2004; subsequently, it fell further to net scores of 20 per cent and under. This considerable decline in support for a European constitution clearly reflected the growing politicisation of the 'Constitutional Treaty' issue in domestic politics, particularly in 2004, the year of European Parliament elections, as Eurosceptic MPs and sections of the popular press became increasingly strident in their demands for a referendum (Baker and Sherrington 2005). Across the EU-15 countries, net scores fell but not as sharply as with British public opinion; net support never fell below the 40 per cent mark and even recovered slightly in 2006 and 2007.

As well as the evidence from Eurobarometer surveys, Figures 2 and 3 chart over-time data for a question on an EU constitution referendum asked in the British Election Study's (BES) Continuous Monitoring Surveys (CMS). The CMS collected attitudinal data from monthly cross-sections of samples of the British electorate from April 2004 onwards through internet polling. Data relating to a question on a treaty establishing a constitution for the EU is available from early 2005 through to early 2007. First, the data in Figure 2 chart the overall proportions who would respond 'yes' or 'no' in a referendum on a treaty establishing a constitution for the EU (excluding those who were unsure or said they would not vote in a referendum). Second, taking into account the party political divisions noted already, Figure 3 charts the proportions responding 'yes' for

supporters of each of the three main parties. Figure 2 shows that, across the surveys from 2005 to 2007, a majority of public opinion would have voted 'no' in a referendum held on an EU constitution. There is some minor fluctuation in scores, particularly during 2005. The average scores across the CMS surveys are as follows: 'yes' – 31.9 per cent; 'no' – 68.1 per cent.

Figure 2: Public opinion towards a referendum on a constitution for the EU, 2005-2007

Source: BES Continuous Monitoring Survey. Excluding those who responded 'undecided' or 'will not vote'. Weighted data. Question: "When a referendum is held, will you vote 'Yes' or 'No' on the question 'Should the UK approve the treaty establishing a constitution for the European Union?'"

In Figure 3, there is a stark difference in levels of support between, on the one hand, supporters of the Conservative Party and, on the other, supporters of Labour and the Liberal Democrats. While support amongst Conservative Party supporters stays in the 10-20 per cent range, much higher proportions say 'yes' amongst Labour and Liberal Democrat supporters (consistently in the 40-60 per cent range). Averaged across the CMS surveys, the average proportions responding 'yes' are as follows: Conservative supporters: 11.3 per cent; Labour supporters: 50.8 per cent; Liberal Democrat supporters: 56.4 per cent. Clearly, the divisions between the major parties on this question were replicated amongst their supporters within the wider public.

Figure 3: Public opinion towards a referendum on a constitution for the EU by political party supported, 2005-2007

Source: BES Continuous Monitoring Survey. Weighted data. Question: "Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat or what?"

EXISTING STUDIES OF PUBLIC OPINION AND THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS

Existing studies examining public opinion towards these different aspects of the integration process have demonstrated the influence of three groups of explanatory factors - economic interests, group identities and political 'cues' (MacLaren 2006; Hooghe and Marks 2005, 2004; Carey 2002; Gabel 1998; Anderson 1998). In this section we discuss: first, findings from existing studies examining which factors influence public attitudes on the specific issue of the constitutionalization of the EU in other member states; and, secondly, insights from analyses of public opinion in Britain concerning membership or specific EU-related questions. We use these findings to specify a set of hypotheses. Some hypotheses can be tested using both surveys while some are only testable using one or other of the surveys (shown in parentheses).

Economic interests

One of the earliest areas of attention for studies investigating the sources of public opinion towards the EU was the material interests and economic wellbeing of its citizens. Those studies examining the impact of economic interests often used aggregate-level analysis to assess the relationship between fluctuations in national economic performance and support for the EU. Better national economic performance corresponds to higher levels of support for the integration process (Ciftci 2005; Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Dalton and Duval 1986). More recently, studies have investigated the determinants of opinions towards the EU using individual-level factors relating to citizens' relative position in the labour market, such as their educational attainment and occupational status. It is believed that the integration process creates valuable

opportunities for those citizens with higher levels of human capital. Consequently, those who could materially benefit from the integration project would be supportive of the EU, while those who perceive that their economic security could be adversely affected would be opposed (Gabel 1998; Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996).

Evidence from studies of voters' choices at recent referendums on the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands and on the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland shows the role played by economic factors. Key factors affecting voter choice in the Irish referendum in June 2008 included social class and level of education (Sinnott 2008). Specifically, those with lower socio-economic status tended to be less favourable in their attitudes. In an analysis of voting patterns in the French referendum of May 2005, Hainsworth observed that education "proved to be a dividing line with those voters having the lowest educational qualifications opting strongly … for a No vote and vice versa" (2006: 108). Furthermore, wider socio-economic fault-lines, based upon occupational classification and level of income, also underpinned voting behaviour (Hainsworth 2006: 108). As Schmidt observed in relation to France, the referendum on the Constitutional Treaty "became the opportunity to question the free market basis of the EU … in which the EU was portrayed as the Trojan Horse bringing in the forces of globalisation, destroying French *services publics*, and undermining the welfare state" (emphasis in original) (2006: 187). Conversely, in Britain the thrust of the opposing arguments regarding the economic impact of the Constitutional Treaty was that its ratification would bring about greater social protectionism and further outside interference, in the form of regulations emanating from Brussels, in Britain's economic affairs (Schmidt 2006: 199). This implies that the issue of the constitutionalization of the EU is closely related to both concerns about the content of existing legislation and those regarding "the future of the integration process and its impact on individuals' lives" (Shu 2008: 434).

However, analyses of public opinion in Britain concerning the impact of economic considerations on attitudes towards membership or other EU-related questions has provided mixed evidence. Existing research into attitudes towards the single currency in Britain has shown that "economic calculations are not important factors in shaping support for a single currency" except when socio-economic status is measured by level of qualification attained (Gabel and Hix 2005: 74). In contrast, Scheve (1999) showed that both income and educational attainment are associated with support for the single currency in Britain. Moreover, in relation to membership of the EU, Clements (2009) showed that level of education has a powerful impact on support for British membership over time and Evans (1995) found that those of a lower socio-economic status were less favourable towards the integration process in Britain.

Based on the weight of evidence from existing findings in relation to economic interests we specify two hypotheses. To the extent that the issue of the constitutionalization of the EU is perceived as consolidating and advancing the existing market-orientated basis of the integration process, then we expect that those who have benefited the most already – those with higher socio-economic status – will be more supportive: *Hypothesis 1*: Those with higher levels of educational attainment are more likely to support the constitutionalization of the EU (BSA and Eurobarometer); *Hypothesis 2*: Those in a non-manual occupation are more likely to support the constitutionalization of the EU (BSA and Eurobarometer).

National identity

Increasingly, studies have emphasised the role of identity in structuring attitudes towards the integration process (Garry and Tilley 2009; Carey 2002). Identities connect individuals to social groups and the wider world, shaping social interactions and perceptions of threat from 'out groups'. Those with strong loyalties towards their nation are expected to be more opposed to the integration process. These attitudes may be

framed by perceptions that significant aspects of national culture and heritage are under threat from the EU (McLaren 2002;). As McLaren has observed, opposition towards the integration process involves "fear of, or hostility towards, other cultures" (2002: 553). In particular, recent studies have found that having an exclusive national identity (i.e. feeling exclusively British or French) underpins opposition towards the EU (Hooghe and Marks 2004, 2005). Research has suggested that identity affected how Irish citizens voted in the Lisbon Treaty referendum of 2008 (Sinnott 2008). O'Brennan observed that "the identity dimension emerges as crucial in explaining the outcome of the Lisbon Treaty referendum (2009: 270). What is a common feature amongst Irish and British citizens is their greater propensity for having an exclusivist conception of national identity compared to those in other member states (O'Brennan 2009: 269).

The importance of identity in shaping public attitudes in Britain with regards to EU questions has been demonstrated in existing research. Banducci *et al.* found that identity was more important for explaining attitudes towards the single currency in those countries *outside* of the Eurozone (including Britain) compared to those within (2009: 576). Further, Gabel and Hix found that individuals with an exclusive identity (i.e. British, Welsh or Scottish) were less supportive of membership of the single currency than those with a European identity (2005: 75). In relation to support for British membership of the EU, Clements (2009) found that those individuals with higher levels of British national sentiment were less likely to be favourable.

Although we expect economic interests to inform citizens' attitudes towards the 'constitutionalization' of the EU, this process involves crucial questions about further *political* integration. As a result, we expect this question to place concerns about national sovereignty at the centre of debate, as compared to membership or policy-specific issues where the prospect of economic benefits may offset worries about further powers being transferred to the EU at the expense of the member states. As Shu argues, while "voters' attitudes towards the membership are economically oriented, their opinions on the treaties tend to focus more on political and cultural concerns" (2008: 435). In Britain particularly, concerns over political sovereignty have often been central to debates over British relations with the EU both prior to and since membership. As a result, we expect that national identities and political cues will be particularly important to understanding public attitudes on this question.

Specifically, we expect that citizens with a non-European identity (British, English, Scottish, Welsh, etc) are more likely to oppose the constitutionalization of the EU because they perceive this as threatening their nation's political autonomy and culture heritage. Also, we expect that, when offered the choice of expressing a multiple identity, those who profess an exclusive national identity will be opposed for similar reasons. In Britain, the political elite has traditionally been divided over their country's role in the integration process and divided too over the constitutionalization of the EU. Following Hooghe and Marks (2005), we expect that in such circumstances exclusive national identities may be more powerful factors in shaping public attitudes. In relation to these two aspects of national identity, we expect that: *Hypothesis 3*: Those who do not have a European identity are more likely to oppose Britain signing up to an EU constitution (BSA); *Hypothesis 4*: Those who have an exclusively national identity are more likely to oppose Britain signing up to an EU constitution (Eurobarometer).

Political cues

The third set of factors shaping public attitudes towards the integration process concerns 'cues' and 'proxies', involving public opinion being mediated by domestic political factors (Sanchez-Cuenca 2000; Anderson 1998). Research into the underlying sources of opinion towards the EU has increasingly given "attention to cognitive short-cuts, contextual factors, and elite cues, each of which helps a person respond to a survey

question about an issue that is seldom on his or her mind" (Hooghe and Marks 2005: 426). On a relatively complex matter like relations with the EU, citizens can 'read-off' their opinion from existing considerations, such as the political party they support (Carrubba, 2001). Additionally, where levels of information on a particular issue are low, party cues may assume greater prominence in informing public attitudes (Gabel and Hix 2005: 69). Partisan identifiers can use their party's declared position on an EU-related issue as a 'proxy' for their own opinion. On complex issues relating to the EU, political parties and their elites are thought to have a strategic ability to 'lead' their partisans towards a particular position (Flickinger 1994; Evans and Butt 2007). Of course, it should be noted that existing research has also examined the reverse pattern, whereby partisans 'lead' their party towards a position on the integration process (Steenbergen *et al.* 2007).

Studies of voting behaviour in the referendums in France and the Netherlands in 2005 and Ireland in 2008 on the issue of the EU's constitutionalization have provided mixed evidence concerning the role of partisanship in shaping political choice (Hainsworth 2006; Ivaldi 2006; Quinlan 2009; O'Brennan 2009). In the Irish referendum there was no clear relationship between party preference and support for or opposition to the Lisbon Treaty (O'Brennan 2009: 271). This was largely because the majority of political elites were in favour of the Lisbon Treaty whereas those opposing it "were not established political parties but rather activist groups and movements" (O'Brennan 2009: 262). Moreover, on this issue there was a "disconnect" between party leaders and their grassroots members (O'Brennan 2009: 271).

In relation to EU membership, Clements (2009) shows that the relationship between partisan alignments and attitudes in Britain changed over time as the parties changed their approaches to the integration process. With respect to the single currency, the Conservative Party has been strongly opposed to losing the Pound while Labour and the Liberal Democrats have been broadly in favour of Britain joining. Gabel and Hix (2005) found that being a Labour Party identifier was positively related to support for British membership of the single currency while identifying with the Conservative Party was negatively related. We expect that political 'cues' will be key explanatory factors because there is a clear split on the European constitution issue between mainstream parties. Additionally, we expect elite cues to be important since this is a relatively complex issue for citizens, as was the single currency, who may rely on the views of trusted opinion leaders (Whiteley 2001). We expect that Conservative supporters will be opposed to the constitutionalization of the EU in response to their party's robust opposition to Britain's signing up to both the Constitutional Treaty and its replacement, the Lisbon Treaty. *Hypothesis 5*: Conservative Party supporters are more likely to oppose Britain signing up to an EU constitution than those who support Labour or the Liberal Democrats (BSA).

Political engagement

Scholars of public opinion on EU-related issues have also emphasised other factors such as knowledge of and interest in EU or domestic politics (Gabel and Hix 2005; Karp *et al.* 2003), assessments of incumbent governments (Ray 2003) and satisfaction with democracy and political institutions (Karp *et al.* 2003; Anderson 1998). Public attitudes towards the EU have often been associated with a lack of knowledge and understanding about the workings and aims of the EU in general as well as on particular policies or institutions. Britain has often been cited as a country where the electorate is, on the whole, particularly ill-informed about EU matters and what membership entails for Britain (Geddes 2003: 214).

Beyond the existence of an 'information deficit' in more Eurosceptic states such as Britain, this lack of knowledge and awareness about the EU has been associated more widely with negative attitudes towards the EU. Previous studies have shown that when

citizens lack knowledge of the potential benefits and costs of a decision relating to the EU they are more likely to take a position *against* the proposed change (Gabel and Hix 2005: 68; see also Karp *et al.* 2003). With regards to the 'constitutionalization' of the EU, there is evidence that political knowledge was a key factor influencing voting behaviour in the Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty. Those citizens with higher levels of knowledge were more likely to be in favour of the Lisbon Treaty (Sinnott 2008). We expect that those who have less knowledge about EU affairs are more likely to be opposed to an EU constitution, as has been argued in relation to other issues, such as attitudes towards the Euro (Huhne 2001: 65-73). We expect that: *Hypothesis 6:* Those who are less objectively knowledgeable about the EU will oppose the constitutionalization of the EU (BSA and Eurobarometer); *Hypothesis 7:* Those who perceive themselves to have less understanding of how the EU works will oppose the process of constitutionalization (BSA and Eurobarometer); *Hypothesis 8:* Those who perceive themselves to have less involvement in EU-related matters will be opposed to the constitutionalization of the EU (Eurobarometer).

Domestic political evaluations

Views towards EU-related issues can also be 'mediated' by other attitudes and perceptions pertaining to issues and institutions within domestic politics. Since member state governments are primarily responsible for negotiating treaty documents and play an important role in negotiating the issue of constitutionalization of the EU on behalf of their country, we expect citizens' appraisal of their government to have an impact in shaping their attitudes on this issue. Accordingly, the British government has negotiated and supported the two recent documents – Constitutional Treaty and Lisbon Treaty - associated with the constitutionalization process. We expect that citizens who tend not to trust the national government and those who feel they have little or no say in their democratic system will oppose the process of EU constitutionalization. We expect that: *Hypothesis 9:* Those who feel they have less say over what government does in their country are more likely to oppose the constitutionalization of the EU (BSA); *Hypothesis 10:* Those who do not trust their national government are more likely to oppose the constitutionalization of the EU (Eurobarometer).

General support for the integration process

As already discussed, the ongoing constitutionalization of the EU raises profound questions and debates over the present and future direction of the integration process. Accordingly, we expect that public attitudes regarding the constitutionalization process are likely to be linked to attitudes regarding the future relationship between Britain and the EU, i.e. general or 'diffuse' support for the EU. Again, this is based on findings from existing studies (Gabel and Hix 2005; Banducci *et al.* 2009). We expect that: *Hypothesis 11*: Those who have negative assessments of Britain's membership of the EU, or want to reduce the EU's powers or withdraw from it, are more likely to oppose the constitutionalization of the EU (BSA and Eurobarometer); *Hypothesis 12:* Those who tend not to trust the EU are more likely to oppose the constitutionalization of the EU (Eurobarometer).

Control variables

Finally, we employ controls for gender and age group. Banducci *et al.* observe that: "Past studies have shown that age and gender affect diffuse support for the EU. These factors may also directly influence support for specific EU integration policy even when controlling for diffuse support" (2003: 695). Including these socio-demographic controls may help to reduce the likelihood of the estimates being affected by omitted variable bias. Details on how the independent variables are measured are provided in the Appendix.

DATA AND METHOD

In order to examine the impact these factors have on public opinion towards the constitutionalization of the EU we use data from two surveys, the British Social Attitudes survey 2005 (BSA) (National Centre for Social Research 2007), and one measuring cross-national attitudes, Eurobarometer (Eurobarometer 64.2 2005). The BSA series represents a nationally-representative cross-sectional survey of the adult population undertaken annually since 1983 (total *n*=4,268), which asks an extensive range of core questions about political choice, attitudes and values. It also collects information on a wide range of classification variables on individual and household circumstances (see Park, 2007). The BSA 2005 Survey - the fieldwork was undertaken between June-September 2005 using face-to-face interviews - carried several items on Britain's relations with the EU. We use the second edition of the dataset released for general usage in October 2007.

To provide a more detailed and robust analysis, we use data from the Eurobarometer surveys. Using the Eurobarometer survey enables the analysis to be more robust and builds existing research into public attitudes in Britain towards EU-related issues which used evidence from national and cross-national surveys (Gabel and Hix 2005). It also allows us to examine the impact of explanatory variables of theoretical interest not available in the BSA survey. Standard Eurobarometer surveys are conducted twice-yearly in the member states (and in official candidate countries) and have been running since 1973. The surveys target the adult (aged 15 years and over) populations of the member states and the interviews are carried out face-to-face. Specifically, we use data from 'Eurobarometer 64.2: The European Constitution, Globalization, Energy Resources, and Agricultural Policy', the data for which were collected during October-November 2005. We use the second edition released on 28 March 2008. The standard Eurobarometer sample size for Britain is considerably smaller than that for the BSA surveys. The usual number of respondents for Britain in each Eurobarometer comprises around 1,000 cases (in this case *n*=1,021; as well as interviewing a separate sample of around 300 cases in Northern Ireland - not used in this analysis).

DEPENDENT VARIABLES

The first dependent variable is a question asked in the BSA 2005 survey referring to vote intention in a referendum on a proposed 'European constitution'. It was asked of a sub-sample of respondents (*n*=2,096) (the BSA surveys take the form of a split-sample format, with several versions of the standard questionnaire) and is worded as follows:

> How do you think you would vote in a referendum on the proposed new European constitution? Would you vote in favour of Britain adopting the new constitution or against? IF 'would not vote', PROBE: If you did vote, how would you vote?

For the second dependent variable we use a question from Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005), which asks respondents whether they are for or against the EU having a constitution but not in the context of voting in a referendum. The question is worded as: "What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it. For; against; don't know. A European Constitution". Since we are interested in examining attitudes towards the constitutionalization of the EU, we argue that the use of the two questions referring to an EU constitution captures the essence of the debate.

It is worth examining the distribution of responses to the dependent variables. For the BSA question, Table 1 shows that opinion was divided. Over half of the respondents did not want Britain to adopt the constitution (55 per cent) and around one fifth were in favour (19 per cent). What is also interesting is that a sizeable minority – 26 per cent – had no opinion or were undecided on the issue. When those responding 'don't know' are excluded, 75 per cent are against and 24 per cent are in favour. The same question was asked in the BSA 2004 survey and the (weighted) distribution of responses is very similar: in favour – 20 per cent; against – 56 per cent; don't know – 24 per cent (National Centre for Social Research 2006). Similarly, the breakdown of responses (weighted percentages) to a question about the EU constitution in the British Election Study 2005 post-election survey was as follows: yes – 21 per cent; no – 47 per cent; undecided – 27 per cent; will not vote – 5 per cent (question wording: "There will be a referendum next year on the new European Union constitution. Will you vote 'Yes' or 'No' on the question, 'Should the United Kingdom approve the treaty establishing a constitution for the European Union?'").

Table 1: Whether Britain should adopt an EU constitution or not, BSA Survey 2005

	(%)	(%)	Unweighted base
Adopt the constitution	19.0	24.0	382
Not to adopt the constitution	55.0	75.0	1,161
Don't know	26.0	-	554
Total	100.0	100.0	2,097

Source: British Social Attitudes Survey 2005; weighted (rounded) percentages.

Table 2 shows responses to the question from the Eurobarometer survey (we employ the longer-running item used in Figure 1) We can see that a greater proportion (40 per cent) is in favour of an EU constitution, with 32 per cent against and more than a fifth of respondents unsure (22 per cent). When the 'don't knows' are excluded, 59 per cent support an EU constitution and 41 per cent are against. When posed in more general terms, and outside the context of expressing a political choice in a national contest, there is higher support for an EU constitution. The dependent variables take the values of 1 and 0, whereby the category of 1 represents support for an EU constitution. 'Don't know' responses are excluded from the analysis. As the dependent variables are dichotomous measures, binary logistic regression analysis is used.

Table 2: Attitudes towards an EU constitution in Britain, Eurobarometer 64.2 2005

	(%)	(%)	*Unweighted base*
For	46.0	59.0	*463*
Against	32.0	41.0	*333*
Don't know	22.0	-	*225*
Total	100.0	100.0	*1021*

Source: Eurobarometer 64.2, 2005; weighted (rounded) percentages.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

In this section we present the logistic regression estimates from the two sets of models based upon the BSA and Eurobarometer surveys and discuss the main findings. Table 3 reports the results from Models 1 and 2 using data from the BSA 2005 while Table 4 shows the results for Models 3 and 4 based upon data from the Eurobarometer study. For clarity of presentation, we report the parameter coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses). A full set of estimates (including model fit information) is available on request. Models 1 and 3 are estimated with the EU attitudes variables omitted and Models 2 and 4 are estimated with it included.

Table 3: Binomial logistic regression of vote choice in a referendum on Britain adopting an EU constitution

	Model 1	Model 2
	B (SE)	B (SE)
Gender	.09 (.14)	.02 (.15)
Aged 30-49 years	-.08 (.18)	.02 (.20)
Aged 50-64 years	-.54* (.21)	-.27 (.24)
Aged 65 and over	-.19 (.24)	.22 (.27)
A-Level or equivalent	-.62*** (.19)	-.48* (.21)
CSE or equivalent	-.86*** (.20)	-.73*** (.23)
No qualifications	-.83*** (.25)	-.51 (.28)
Manual occupation	-.07 (.15)	.03 (.17)
Economic activity - other	-.77 (.41)	-1.17** (.44)
Supports Conservative Party	-1.49*** (.19)	-1.02*** (.20)
Supports Liberal Democrats	-.52** (.19)	-.31 (.21)
Supports other party	-1.09** (.41)	-.83 (.47)
Supports no party	-.71*** (.22)	-.80** (.26)
Other identity	-1.34*** (.36)	-1.02** (.39)
Integration process	-	4.17*** (.31)
Knowledge of EU	-.47 (.26)	-.19 (.30)
Political efficacy	-.80*** (.25)	-.61* (.29)
Constant	2.27*** (.48)	3.70*** (.55)
Weighted N		
Nagelkerke R Square		

Note: ***=$p \leq .001$; **=$p \leq .01$; *=$p \leq .05$; standard errors in parentheses. Reference categories: aged 18-29 years; degree or higher qualification; non-manual occupation; supports Labour Party. Source: BSA Survey 2005

The control variables have little impact in Models 1 and 2, so being male or in one of the older age groups (compared to those aged 18-29 years – the reference category) has little explanatory power net of the other variables. There are mixed results for the two indicators of socio-economic status. Education – measured in terms of the highest qualification achieved - has a powerful impact in both models, even when general attitudes towards the integration process are controlled for. In Model 1, having no

qualifications or a qualification below degree level has a negative relationship with wanting Britain to adopt an EU constitution (with all dummy variables being statistically significant - the reference category consists of those with a degree or higher qualification). This provides support for Hypothesis 1. Having a CSE or equivalent and A-Level or equivalent qualification is negatively related to support for an EU constitution (compared to the reference category). In Model 2, having no qualifications is no longer statistically significant, but the other two education variables remain so and all variables retain the negatively-signed relationship. Occupational status has little impact in either model (providing meagre support for Hypothesis 2), with the exception of the 'other' category (consisting of those unemployed, still in full-time education, or otherwise 'economically inactive') which is negatively-related to wanting Britain to adopt an EU constitution and is only statistically significant in Model 2. The reference category is those in non-manual occupations. To some extent, socio-economic status differentiates between positive and negative attitudes in Britain towards an EU constitution; while level of education has a strong impact in both models, occupational status performs relatively poorly as a predictor variable.

In terms of the attitudinal factors, having a European identity has a strong impact in both Model 1 and 2, compared to those with a non-European identity (such as feeling British, English, Scottish, or Welsh). This confirms the expectation outlined in Hypothesis 3 and shows the importance of group identities for questions which tap into the EU's perceived influence on the political sovereignty and cultural heritage of its member states. The dummy variables measuring party support have a strong impact in Model 1 net of other explanatory variables. As expected in Hypothesis 3, supporting the Conservative Party has a strong and negative relationship with Britain adopting an EU constitution, compared to the reference category of Labour Party supporters (which clearly fits with the trend data charted in Figure 3). Interestingly, aside from Conservative partisans, all three other categories of party support also exhibit negative relationships with favouring Britain signing up to an EU constitution. Perhaps surprisingly, this includes supporters of the Liberal Democrats, traditionally the most pro-EU mainstream party in British politics. Clearly, Liberal Democrat partisans appear less supportive of particular EU initiatives than its leaders and MPs are. All party support variables are statistically significant in Model 1. In Model 2, however, when controlling for general predisposition towards the integration process, only the Conservative Party variables retain statistical significance (and at the most demanding level), confirming Hypothesis 5.

In Model 2, general attitudes towards the integration process have a powerful impact, as would be expected, supporting Hypothesis 11. It has the largest impact of any of the coefficients and shows the need to control for the effect of support for membership or integration in general when assessing the determinants of public attitudes for specific EU-related issues. In addition to partisanship and identity, there are interesting results for political knowledge and efficacy, as shown in Table 3. Political knowledge of EU affairs has no statistically significant impact in either Model 1 or 2, and shows a negative relationship with the dependent variable, contrary to what was outlined in Hypothesis 6. Political efficacy has a strong impact in Model 1 and some effect in Model 2, though at a less demanding level of significance. The relationship in both models is negatively-signed, which does not support the expectation of Hypothesis 9. Overall, Model 1 and Model 2 show that socio-economic status and attitudinal factors discriminate between opinions towards Britain adopting an EU constitution, controlling for other factors. Some hypotheses are confirmed by the estimates reported in Table 1 and some show findings contrary to expectation. Including a general measure of attitudes towards the integration process does reduce the statistical impact of some variables but in the context of a more rigorously-specified model. The results from the estimations using Eurobarometer data are shown in Table 4 (Model 3 without general support for EU membership and Model 4 with this variable included).

In terms of the socio-demographic control variables, gender has no impact in either Model 3 or 4. Age grouping has some effect: specifically, the older age groups exhibit a negative relationship with Britain signing up to an EU constitution compared to those in the youngest age group (though these variables are significant at the least demanding level). Interestingly, the education variables - measured as the age a respondent finished full-time education - have little impact compared to their strong effect in Models 1 and 2 (providing little support for Hypothesis 1). This could conceivably result from this being a less sensitive measure of educational attainment compared to the level of qualification obtained by an individual. This represents the standardised Eurobarometer measure for education. Also, occupational status (measuring whether an individual is in manual work, self-employed or not in work compared to being in a non-manual occupation) does not have a statistically significant impact in either Model 3 or 4. Again, this does not uphold the expectation outlined in Hypothesis 2. Socio-economic status, as measured by two standard indicators, does not really contribute to our understanding of attitudes towards an EU constitution based upon evidence from the Eurobarometer survey.

The political and attitudinal factors show stronger results. In particular, having an exclusive national identity has a strong negative relationship with supporting an EU constitution, although the effect is slightly reduced when controlling for attitudes towards EU membership in Model 4. This provides confirmation for the expectation contained in Hypothesis 4 and also underlines insights from existing studies (Hooghe and Marks 2005). Similarly, respondents' degree of trust in the EU has a strong impact in Model 3 and the relationship is positively-signed, so greater trust is related to support for an EU constitution (which confirms Hypothesis 10). Interestingly, this relationship holds even when EU membership evaluations are added in Model 4. In contrast, trust in national government has no impact in Model 3 or 4, providing little support for Hypothesis 10, though the effect is negatively-signed so that less trust relates to less support for an EU constitution. Level of understanding of the EU has an impact (but at the least demanding level of statistical significance) in Models 3 and 4, with those reporting a greater understanding of EU matters more supportive of Britain adopting an EU constitution. This finding provides some support for Hypothesis 7. In contrast, perceived involvement in EU affairs does not have a statistically significant effect in Model 3 or 4, though the relationship is in the expected direction (see Hypothesis 8).

When general support for EU membership is included (Model 4), the results do not change markedly. Those variables with the largest impact, namely level of trust in the EU and possessing an exclusive national identity, retain their strong effect. As would be expected, a favourable attitude towards EU membership is strongly – and positively - related to support for an EU constitution, with the largest impact of any variable in Model 4. This tends to confirm findings from other studies which have included a general measure of support as a predictor variable (Gabel and Hix 2005; Banducci *et al.* 2009).

Table 4: Binomial logistic regression of attitudes in Britain towards an EU constitution, Eurobarometer 64.2 2005

	Model 3	Model 4
	B (SE)	*B (SE)*
Gender	-.23 (.19)	-.33 (.20)
Aged 30-49 years	-.30 (.31)	-.36 (.33)
Aged 50-64 years	-.79* (.34)	-.72* (.35)
Aged 65 and over	-.83* (.37)	-.87* (.38)
TEA aged 17	.92* (.38)	.94* (.39)
TEA aged 18	.37 (.33)	.33 (.35)
TEA aged 19	.47* (.24)	.25 (.25)
Manual occupation	.35 (.28)	.49 (.29)
Self-employed	.00 (.43)	.27 (.45)
Economic activity - other	.41 (.27)	.46 (.28)
Exclusive national identity	-1.30*** (.22)	-1.07*** (.24)
EU membership	-	1.67*** (.29)
Trust in government	-.25 (.24)	-.47 (.25)
Trust in EU	1.63*** (.28)	1.24*** (.30)
Understanding of EU	.49* (.20)	.54** (.20)
Involvement in EU	.73 (.46)	.25 (.49)
Constant	.60 (.43)	-.05 (.47)

Note: ***=p≤.001; **=p≤.01; *=p≤.05; standard errors in parentheses. Reference categories: aged 15-29 years; TEA - aged 20 and over; non-manual occupation.

Overall, the results from the second set of model estimations based upon Eurobarometer data show some interesting results for attitudinal factors, in particular national identity and EU-related appraisals. Caution is needed, though, as the variables were operationalised in different ways due to differences in item content and measurement in the two surveys used. Moreover, standard Eurobarometer surveys carried out in Britain are based upon much smaller representative samples consisting of around 1,000 people, compared to the larger sample sizes obtained for the BSA surveys.

CONCLUSION

This study set out to examine attitudes towards recent attempts to constitutionalize the EU, a process that, in recent years, has experienced serious setbacks and become politically contentious across the member states. As the time series evidence showed, opinion in Britain was much less favourable compared to EU member states as a whole and support declined sharply from late 2003 onwards. Within public opinion, there were clear differences amongst supporters of the main British political parties. Attitudes were then analysed using evidence from two long-standing survey series and a range of hypotheses were tested building upon insights from research into public opinion and the EU. While we tried to specify similar models - survey resources permitting - we were also able to test the impact of key factors in a political context in which both political and national identities are thought to be more potent as individual-level predictors because of concerns generated by deeper political integration. This is even more germane to the British case because of persistent elite-level strains and stresses, both within and between parties, over relations with the EU. In such a context, the role of elite 'cues' is heightened. The important role played by political proxies on this issue underlines findings from other cross-national studies (e.g. Anderson 1998). The evidence from the BSA survey clearly showed that party political affiliation and national identity play a strong role even when controlling for general support for EU membership. The results from the analysis of Eurobarometer data, moreover, highlights the strong impact of having an *exclusive* national identity, as well as other political evaluations, such as trust in the EU.

Taken together, the findings from the two surveys demonstrate the utility of using multiple sources (Gabel and Hix 2005), particularly so as differently-worded questions about similar EU-related issues are administered on cross-national and single-country surveys. The results from these surveys, though, need to be interpreted in the context of how they differ on certain aspects of content and methodology. With these constraints in mind, the findings from this analysis both build upon and extend insights from studies of public attitudes on other EU-related questions; they also provide some key indicators about the individual-level characteristics in Britain structuring opinion towards major initiatives furthering the integration process. While no national referendum was forthcoming in Britain on attempts to provide the EU with a constitution, there is still the need for further research into public attitudes in those member states where popular consent for further political integration, and for specific initiatives pursuant to that end, is unclear. Evidence from a cross-national survey undertaken for the 2009 European Parliament election (European Election Study 2009) demonstrates large majorities in favour of referendums being staged in future to ensure popular backing for major EU treaty amendments (80 per cent in the UK and 65 per cent across the EU-27 agree that referendums should be held).

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APPENDIX: MEASUREMENT OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Education

BSA: We use a measure of an individual's highest qualification as our indicator of educational attainment. We construct dummy variables to distinguish between those with a degree qualification or higher, those with A-Levels or equivalent, those with GCSEs or equivalent, and those with no qualifications. Those with a degree or higher qualification are the reference category.

Eurobarometer: We used a measure of the age at which a respondent finished full-time education (TEA – terminal education age). We construct dummy variables to represent those whose TEA was 17 years or under, 18 years, 19 years, and 20 years and older. Those whose TEA is aged 20 years and older are the reference category.

Social class

BSA: For the measure of social class we create dummy variables to represent categories of occupational grade (non-manual occupation, manual occupation, and other economic activity – comprising those unemployed and 'economically inactive'). Those in non-manual work are the reference category.

Eurobarometer: This measures whether an individual is in a manual occupation, non-manual occupation, self-employed, or not in work (comprising those who are unemployed or 'economically inactive'). Those in non-manual work are the reference category.

National identity

BSA: We use a question asking about a respondent's identity and create a dummy variable to distinguish between those individuals who have a European attachment (scored as 0) and those who have another identity (scored as 1). The BSA survey did not ask a question which enabled respondents to express a multiple identity (i.e. European and British).

Eurobarometer: We use a dummy variable measuring whether an individual has an exclusive national identity (scored as 1) compared to those who have a composite identity (i.e. both European and national) or a solely European identity (scored as 0).

Party support

BSA: For the measure of party support, we construct a series of dummy variables for which party a respondent feels closer to (Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrats, other party, no party). Labour supporters are the reference category.

Eurobarometer: no measure available.

Political engagement

BSA: We operationalise political engagement by using a 'domain-specific' measure (Alvarez and Brehm 2002: 36) based upon a scale of five items which tests respondents' knowledge of EU institutions and processes. Higher scores indicate greater levels of knowledge of the EU.

Eurobarometer: We use two items which ask specifically about an individual's political engagement with EU politics (self-assessed level of understanding about the EU and self-assessed level of involvement in EU affairs). Both items are scored from 0 to 1 with higher scores representing higher understanding and greater involvement

Domestic political evaluations and political efficacy

BSA: We construct a scale (ranging from 0 to 1) which measures an individual's perceived level of political efficacy in domestic politics, with higher scores denoting greater self-assessed efficacy.

Eurobarometer: We construct a dummy variable measuring whether respondents tend to trust or tend not to trust their national government (scored as 1 if they do, 0 if not).

General support for the EU

BSA: Respondents are asked about Britain's long-term relations with the EU and given five response options (ranging from 'leave the EU altogether' to maintaining the 'status quo' through to 'work for a single EU government'). We construct a scale ranging from 0 to 1 with higher scores denoting favourable views of the integration process.

Eurobarometer: Respondents are asked if they think EU membership is 'a good thing', 'a bad thing', or 'neither good nor bad'. We construct a scale ranging from 0 to 1 with higher scores denoting favourable views of their country's membership.

Eurobarometer: We construct a dummy variable measuring whether respondents 'tend to trust' or 'tend not to trust' the EU (scored as 1 if they do, 0 if not).

Control variables

BSA: Gender is coded as 1 for male and 0 for female. Age range is coded into four groups: 18-29 years old; 30-49 years old, 50-64 years old, and 65 and older. Those aged 18-29 years are the reference category.

Eurobarometer: As above except the youngest age group is coded as 15-29 years, reflecting a difference in the age range of the adult sample.

<center>***</center>

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Reforming the Stability and Growth Pact in Times of Crisis

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Abstract

It is a commonplace that the mechanisms established in the stability and growth pact are blunt instruments. They are highly politicised as both the establishment of infringements and possible sanctions are subject to votes in the EU Council. The financial crisis of 2009/10 has dramatically altered the financial situation of many EU member states and has also shown the need for new regulatory instruments to enforce budgetary discipline in the Euro zone. Figures on the EU member states' budget debts from 1999 to 2010 support this argument empirically. We discuss the current reform proposals and show that the introduction of a reversed qualified majority is likely to strengthen substantially the position of the European Commission to sanction non-complying member states. This becomes possible because decisive players in the EU Council will be closer to the position of the Commission.

Keywords

"The fate of a country cannot be left in the hands of experts alone!" Christine Lagarde 2010, former French Finance Minister (Associated Press 2010, Sep 28)

INTRODUCTION

The European Union's Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) serves to support a balanced macroeconomic development within the Union and sound fiscal policies in the member states.[1] From a theoretical point of view, its establishment can be described as a self-imposed constraint to which the member states commit themselves (Fourcans and Warin 2007; von Hagen 2010). They agreed to stick to the well-known reference values and appointed the European Commission as a guardian provided with agenda-setting power (Lindbeck and Niepelt 2006). Further, they established a catalogue of ever stricter sanctions once the SGP is violated. However, it is widely acknowledged that the SGP is a blunt instrument due to the absence of an automatism for sanctions. Rather, the enforcement of its rules used to be subject to decisions by a qualified majority in the EU Council, which gave room for manoeuvre and political discretion.

Not surprisingly, the ongoing financial crisis has triggered a political debate on the efficiency of the SGP's rules and how to improve the existing regulatory instruments to enforce budgetary discipline better in the European Union. Certainly, the financial crisis and the EU member states' budgetary policies are two distinct albeit intertwined matters. While in some member states sound fiscal policies were upset by events in the banking sector, e.g., in Ireland, in others the financial crisis 'only' aggravated an already problematic situation of public budgets – most prominently in Greece (Featherstone 2011). But, whatever the causes, the crisis has certainly been a catalyst for a debate which has led to the reform of the SGP.

In this debate, the introductory quote from the former French Finance Minister Lagarde represents one extreme, according to which the enforcement of the pact should remain subject to political discretion. At the other extreme, the European Commission asked for far reaching reforms and launched a total of six proposals for regulations and directives which were finally adopted in November 2011. The core of these SGP reforms is the introduction of a Reversed Qualified Majority (RQM) in the EU Council. The goal of this

article is to show that this part of the reform is especially apt to render the SGP more efficient than its previous setup.

To this end, the article proceeds as follows: we start by briefly introducing the SGP. Using a simple spatial model, we show on a theoretical basis why member states did not have to fear sanctions under the previous rules governing the SGP. We then show empirically that violations of the deficit and debts criteria from 1999 to 2010 were daily fare (Fingland and Bailey 2008) and that in fact true sanctions were never enforced. As a next step, we demonstrate the effect of the reversed majority in theoretical scenarios using the spatial model already introduced. Subsequently, we develop an index from several budgetary and political indicators that enables us to map the preferences for sanctions of the Euro zone members. Thereby, we are able to highlight the practical relevance of the RQM in empirical scenarios. Although the reform does not create a real automatism for sanctions, the Stability and Growth Pact will likely become less subject to political discretion. This is good news, given that the excessive deficits and debts, as in the cases of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Italy or Spain, are a threat not only to their own stability, but to all the member states sharing the Euro.

THE STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

In this section we first describe the Stability and Growth Pact in brief and with a focus on the Excessive Deficit Procedure. We then take an analytical view of the SGP which is informed by previous analyses of Council decision-making. This enables us to evaluate the likelihood of an adequate enforcement of the past rules – which seems to be rather low. The theoretical reasoning is confirmed by the numerous infringements of the reference values by member states over the last 10 years which are in stark contrast to the actual number of procedures.

Legal basics

The SGP consists essentially of two pillars, commonly referred to as the 'preventive' and the 'corrective' arms. The first pillar establishes the rules that govern the surveillance of budgetary and macroeconomic developments in the member states (Article 121 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)). The second pillar establishes the 'Excessive Deficit Procedure' (EDP) that comes into play once a violation of one or both of the reference values has been observed or if there is a high probability of such a violation. The functioning of this mechanism is laid out in Art. 126 TFEU (ex Article 104 TEC), which is further specified by Regulation (EC) No 1467/97.[2] Our focus is on the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDF) as an exemplary case. In short, this procedure consists of four stages that imply ever stricter obligations on member states which do not comply with the references values (see Figure 1). This procedure may ultimately lead to deposits or fines. It is important to note that whenever the Council takes a vote in the course of the procedure, it has to do so on a proposal from the Commission by a qualified majority, excluding the member state in question. As Figure 1 shows, the Council has to take four votes to adopt sanctions in the form of deposits or fines before they come into effect.

Figure 1: The Excessive Deficit Procedure

Theoretical considerations

The problem particular to the Excessive Deficit Procedure lies in the fact that any member state judging other members may be in the dock another day. This reduces the incentive for a proper enforcement, which in turn gives rise to look at things from a broader perspective. When establishing the principles of the Stability and Growth Pact, the member states committed themselves voluntarily to certain policy goals, procedures and possible sanctions to maximise collective utility (Brennan and Buchanan 1985). However, these rules are not sufficiently specific to be directly applicable (Fischer *et al.* 2006). This may either be due to their inability to agree on sufficiently specific rules or information asymmetries on how the procedure would work in practice (see Hix 2002 for an account of how this led to the alternation of the codecision procedure). Or, knowing that they have limited knowledge of possible future states of the world, the member states consciously decide to conclude an incomplete contract (Schuknecht 2005). But, whatever the reason, part of the contract is to delegate the supervision of the rules to an agent, namely the European Commission. In this role, the Commission makes proposals to the Council in case of non-compliance with the policy goals. As such, the Commission has a considerable influence for two reasons. First, by initiating the EDP a shaming effect occurs. Second, it can confront the Council with a take-it-or-leave-it option which allows for two possible outcomes: either the status quo (if there is a blocking minority) or the Commission's proposal (if there was a qualified majority in favour). The Commission – assuming that it takes an extreme position in terms of compliance with the SGP – will thus propose whatever makes the pivotal member state indifferent between the status quo and its proposal (see e.g. Tsebelis 2002: 248 for this logic with respect to EU legislative procedures).[3]

As introduced above, any sanction has to be approved by a qualified majority. Thus, to block a Commission proposal, a coalition of member states that holds approximately 26 per cent Euro zone votes in the Council or that represents 38 per cent of the population is sufficient.[4] As the member state in question may not vote in the procedure, the exact

blocking minorities depend on the number of votes and the population of the excluded member. To illustrate the consequences of these voting rules, we distribute the 16 voting member states of the Euro zone equidistantly into a one-dimensional space (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: Degrees of escalation in the EDP

Member states on the left-hand side of the space prefer a weak enforcement of the SGP, while member states more to the right are in favour of stricter sanctions. The Commission as the agenda-setter is assumed to be in an extreme position always favouring a strict enforcement.

So far, decision-making in the Council has been analysed from essentially three angles, each of which has added to our particular understanding of the dynamics leading to the policy output produced under the Stability and Growth Pact. First and foremost, we consider the literature employing spatial models to explain the outcome of legislative procedures in the EU. This includes most prominently the works of Tsebelis (2002) from which we learn about the importance of agenda-setting and taking into account the positions of the decisive governments in analyses of EU decision-making. Our model rests on such logic by considering the agenda-setting power of the European Commission in the Excessive Deficit Procedure and the positions of the governments. However, in Tsebelis's stylised models, the actual voting weights of the governments are not considered. Rather, he regularly assumes that a Qualified Majority can be formed by five out of seven Council members which are equally powerful. Yet, for our analysis, voting weights are important, as the next body of literature points out.

Second, there is a body of literature on voting power in the Council which takes power indices as the starting point to analyses of the a priori voting power (VP) of individual governments, i.e. on the likelihood of being pivotal in an n-player game (Brams and Affuso 1976; Mann and Shapley 1964; Riker and Shapley 1968). The focus of the voting power approach differs from ours in two respects. The overall goal of VP analyses is to make probabilistic statements. We, on the other hand, using empirically informed positions and thus not considering all coalitions equally likely to form, seek to make statements on the outcome of the EDP in particular. Second, the prime interest in VP approaches is the presumed power of individual players over a large range of votes taken, regardless of their concrete policy positions. In opposition to that, our explanatory variable is the policy output produced under the EDP and how this will change given the altered voting rules. However, the VP literature points at the importance of the government's voting weights when analysing decision-making in bodies with weighted votes such the EU Council. We therefore consider the votes and the population of each member state when we try to identify which government is decisive.

Finally, there is a body of literature on cleavages in the EU Council, i.e. on the lines along which coalitions are likely to form (such as 'left vs. right' or 'north vs. south'). The empirical contributions are either based on government voting behaviour in past legislative decision-making (e.g. Hagemann and Hoyland 2008; Hosli *et al.* 2011) or based on their party-political composition as documented in party manifestos (e.g. Veen 2011). With respect to roll-call data from the EU Council, such data is not available to the public for votes taken on the Stability and Growth Pact. With respect to party manifestos, this policy area is too specific to derive conclusions from rather broad party manifestos. Yet, we learn that particular cleavages do exist and that ideological positions should be considered. This is why we construct an index from which we can deduce the governments' presumed positions in the EU Council, as we outline further below. By mapping the governments into the one-dimensional issue space, we can later identify possible cleavages between member states who oppose and those who favour a stricter enforcement of the EDP (cf. the 'Analysis' section).

For now, we aim to show the effect of the past voting rule in order to contrast it with the newly established RQM later on. To this end, we develop four distinct theoretical scenarios from the model which allow for identifying the pivotal players. Where exactly the pivots are located depends on how the member states are arrayed in this theoretical exercise. In the first scenario (left-hand side of Table 1), the largest member (Germany) is in the dock and all the other member states are arrayed by decreasing voting weight from left to right – the larger a member state, the less it will favour a strict enforcement of the SGP (see Irlenbusch and Sutter 2006). In this scenario and given the definition of the qualified majority, players 1 and 2 in Figure 2 represent France and Italy, which may form a blocking minority using their population share of more than 50 per cent. Given such an extreme preference order, no strict sanctions would be adopted. In the second scenario (right-hand side of Table 1), in which the smallest member states want to help Germany to avoid sanctions (the smaller a member state, the less it favours a strict enforcement), a blocking minority against a Commission proposal is formed by nine member states which accumulate 50 votes (48 out of a total of 184 Euro zone votes suffice to prevent the formation of a QMV in favour of strict sanctions). In the third and fourth scenarios (Table 2), the smallest Euro zone member (Malta) is in the dock and the blocking minorities again comprise either the two largest (now Germany and France) or the nine smallest member states. Under these extreme preference constellations, the pivotal member states are either players 2 or 9. Now, no matter what the empirical preference constellation (i.e. which of the numbers 1-16 on the line represent which of the member states) and which member state is under scrutiny – the pivots will always be between players 2 to 9 under the old voting rules. For now, we keep this theoretical finding in mind, as it will later be contrasted with first the theoretical and second the empirical setup under RQM.

Table 1: Voting in the Euro zone (Scenarios 1 and 2 – Germany in the dock)

		Scenario 1	votes	cum	population	%	cum		Scenario 2	votes	cum	population	%	cum
lax enforcement (weak measures)	1	France	29	29	64,105,125	25.86	25.86	1	Malta	3	3	412,614	0.17	0.17
	2	Italy	29	58	60,090,430	24.24	50.10	2	Luxemburg	4	7	491,702	0.20	0.36
	3	Spain	27	85	45,853,045	18.50	68.60	3	Cyprus	4	11	801,622	0.32	0.69
	4	Netherlands	13	98	16,481,139	6.65	75.25	4	Estonia	4	15	1,340,274	0.54	1.23
	5	Greece	12	110	11,262,539	4.54	79.80	5	Slovenia	4	19	2,053,393	0.83	2.06
	6	Belgium	12	122	10,741,048	4.33	84.13	6	Ireland	7	26	4,517,758	1.82	3.88
	7	Portugal	12	134	10,631,800	4.29	88.42	7	Finland	7	33	5,325,115	2.15	6.03
	8	Austria	10	144	8,356,707	3.37	91.79	8	Slovakia	7	40	5,411,062	2.18	8.21
	9	Slovakia	7	151	5,411,062	2.18	93.97	9	Austria	10	50	8,356,707	3.37	11.58
	10	Finland	7	158	5,325,115	2.15	96.12	10	Portugal	12	62	10,631,800	4.29	15.87
	11	Ireland	7	165	4,517,758	1.82	97.94	11	Belgium	12	74	10,741,048	4.33	20.20
	12	Slovenia	4	169	2,053,393	0.83	98.77	12	Greece	12	86	11,262,539	4.54	24.75
strict enforcement (strong measures)	13	Estonia	4	173	1,340,274	0.54	99.31	13	Netherlands	13	99	16,481,139	6.65	31.40
	14	Cyprus	4	177	801,622	0.32	99.64	14	Spain	27	126	45,853,045	18.50	49.90
	15	Luxemburg	4	181	491,702	0.20	99.83	15	Italy	29	155	60,090,430	24.24	74.14
	16	Malta	3	184	412,614	0.17	100	16	France	29	184	64,105,125	25.86	100.00
		sum	**184**		**247,875,373**	**100.00**			**sum**	**184**		**247,875,373**	**100.00**	

Blocking minority (percentage of votes)	26.09	QMV (percentage of votes)	73.91
Votes required for blocking minority (without Germany)	**48**	Votes required to achieve QMV (without Germany):	**136**
Population for blocking minority (without Germany)	38%	Euro zone population quorum (without Germany)	62%

Table 2: Voting in the Euro zone (Scenarios 3 and 4 – Malta in the dock)

	Scenario 3	votes	cum	population	%	cum %		Scenario 4	votes	cum	population	%	cum %
1	Germany	29	29	82,062,249	24.90	24.90	1	Luxemburg	4	4	491,702	0.15	0.15
2	France	29	58	64,105,125	19.45	44.36	2	Cyprus	4	8	801,622	0.24	0.39
3	Italy	29	87	60,090,430	18.24	62.59	3	Estonia	4	12	1,340,274	0.41	0.80
4	Spain	27	114	45,853,045	13.91	76.51	4	Slovenia	4	16	2,053,393	0.62	1.42
5	Netherlands	13	127	16,481,139	5.00	81.51	5	Ireland	7	23	4,517,758	1.37	2.79
6	Greece	12	139	11,262,539	3.42	84.93	6	Finland	7	30	5,325,115	1.62	4.41
7	Belgium	12	151	10,741,048	3.26	88.19	7	Slovakia	7	37	5,411,062	1.64	6.05
8	Portugal	12	163	10,631,800	3.23	91.41	8	Austria	10	47	8,356,707	2.54	8.59
9	Austria	10	173	8,356,707	2.54	93.95	9	Portugal	12	59	10,631,800	3.23	11.81
10	Slovakia	7	180	5,411,062	1.64	95.59	10	Belgium	12	71	10,741,048	3.26	15.07
11	Finland	7	187	5,325,115	1.62	97.21	11	Greece	12	83	11,262,539	3.42	18.49
12	Ireland	7	194	4,517,758	1.37	98.58	12	Netherlands	13	96	16,481,139	5.00	23.49
13	Slovenia	4	198	2,053,393	0.62	99.20	13	Spain	27	123	45,853,045	13.91	37.41
14	Estonia	4	202	1,340,274	0.41	99.61	14	Italy	29	152	60,090,430	18.24	55.64
15	Cyprus	4	206	801,622	0.24	99.85	15	France	29	181	64,105,125	19.45	75.10
16	Luxemburg	4	210	491,702	0.15	100.00	16	Germany	29	210	82,062,249	24.90	100
	sum	**210**		**329,525,008**	**100.00**			**sum**	**210**		**329,525,008**	100.00	

strict enforcement (strong measures) ... *lax enforcement (weak measures)*

Blocking minority (percentage of votes)	26.09
Votes required for blocking minority (without Malta)	**55**
Population for blocking minority	38%

QMV (percentage of votes)	73.91
Votes required to achieve QMV (without Malta):	**155**
Euro zone population quorum	62%

The SGP in Practice

When considering actual violations in terms of the reference values, several member states were constantly running deficits beyond three per cent and/ or the 60 per cent debt criterion even before the actual crisis – most prominently Germany and France between 2002 and 2005 (Eurostat 2012a). Consequently, the Commission has initiated deficit procedures on a regular basis. Ever since the introduction of the Euro in 1999, 36 excessive deficit procedures have been launched, three of which ended as early as the very first stage with only a Commission report being issued (Eurostat 2012b). Only two member states, Sweden and Estonia, have never been subject to a deficit procedure, while Portugal is the front-runner with three procedures. At the beginning of 2012, 23 procedures were pending, i.e. of the 27 Member States, only four were not under scrutiny. Turning to the individual procedural steps (cf. Figure 1), the Council abided by the Commission's recommendation to approve the existence of an excessive deficit in every single case. Thus, at this stage, the Council does not see any margin of discretion for itself towards the Commission. It should be noted though, that it is hardly possible to argue credibly against such a Commission proposal, given that the reference values are clearly stated.[5]

In the next two procedural steps, the Council did not always follow the Commission's proposal. In 2003, France and Germany were able not only to accumulate a blocking minority against the Commission's proposal for a decision on inadequate means and to issue notice. They also managed to convince the Council to hold both procedures in abeyance. For both these actions the Commission took the Council to the European Court of Justice (Case C-27/04). Following the ruling, the strategic situation between the Commission and the Council has not improved: the Commission is the only actor which can initiate a procedure and propose sanctions. Any such proposal may not be altered by the Council as attempted by Germany and France. On the other hand, the Council can freely decide (or not) to adopt the Commission's proposal (Heipertz and Verdun 2010: 169). The treaty simply did not create any sort of automatism for sanctions, as the Commission had argued before the Court.

Empirically, all procedures have either been formally abrogated or been held in abeyance – independent of the member states' size. But, as illustrated above, the occurrence of substantial sanctions crucially depends on where the pivotal member state stands. In the procedures observed empirically so far, the right-most pivot has agreed only to issue notice, but not to sanction in terms of deposits or fines. However, given the numerous violations of the reference values, it becomes obvious that the existing mechanism is to a large extent subject to political discretion (Leblond 2006; Alves and Afonso 2007; Beetsma and Debrun 2007) and that the SGP itself has not forced member states fundamentally to alter their budgetary policies (Bofinger and Ried 2010: 203; de Haan *et al.* 2004; Fatás *et al.* 2003).[6]

Overall, this evidence from the past as well as the actual situation of several heavily indebted member states leads us to the conclusion that there was and still exists a fundamental problem of compliance with the SGP rules. Because member states have – not least due to the financial crisis – seen the need to reform the SGP, several reform proposals have been on the agenda since 2010. They are introduced in the next section.

The financial crisis as a catalyst

Regarding the overall dynamics of the reform of the SGP, we observe that the whole process is largely driven by several major events. One important consequence was that the dramatically increased deficits in 2009 led to higher interest rates and therefore increased costs for the governments to refinance themselves (Hodson 2010: 226; Verdun 2008 and 2009).[7] By 2010, this brought the topic of public deficits to the top of

the agenda of the regular EU summits as well as to those of the extraordinary crisis summits convoked to prevent a Greek state bankruptcy. It is very important to note that it was *neither* the general concern for high deficits and debts *nor* the fact that the EU Commission subsequently opened Excessive Deficit Procedures (EDP) against most of the member states that led to these intensive debates. Additionally, it would be misleading to assume that the market mechanisms (e.g. high spreads) are apt to resolve the problem. Rather, the extraordinary crisis summits were necessary because Greece was no longer able to assure the markets that it could manage its debt on its own. It was then that the massive intervention of all the other EU member states and the EU institutions, plus the International Monetary Fund (IMF) became vital.

The EDP therefore has a preventive function to avoid member states getting into this situation. Nevertheless one has to consider that the member states come under pressure in considerably different ways. Ireland came under pressure because of the huge losses of Irish banks during the financial crisis, while Greece had faced public budget deficits even before the introduction of the Euro. The conclusions then must also be different. Whereas the Irish case refers to the regulation of financial actors (Quaglia *et al.* 2009) and the amount of risks they are allowed to take (Basel III regulating own funds and the question of how large the balance of a single institute should be compared to the size of the national economy), the Greek case refers precisely to the inefficiency of the SGP in respect of avoiding excessive deficits and the consequences.

RECENT REFORMS

In May and June 2010 the European Commission published two communications in which it announced plans for regulatory proposals. The actual legislative proposals which became known as the 'sixpack' were launched on 29 September 2010 (see Table 3) and came into effect on 13 December 2011 (Official Journal 2011).

Table 3: Overview on amended or new regulatory means

	Proposal number	Subject matter	Legal basis TFEU	Final act	Remarks
Stability and Growth Pact	COM (2010) 526 final	Surveillance of national budgets and economic policies ('preventive' arm)	121 (6)	Regulation 2011/1175 OJ L 306 23.11.2011, p. 12	Amendment to Council Directive 1466/97
	COM (2010) 522 final	Implementation of the excessive deficit procedure ('corrective' arm)	126 (14), para 2 / 136	Regulation 2011/1177 OJ L 306 23.11.2011, p. 33	Amendment to Council Regulation 1467/97
	COM (2010) 524 final	Specifies sanctions in the 'preventive' and 'corrective' arms	136 / 121 (6)	Regulation 2011/1173 OJ L 306 23.11.2011, p. 1	new
	COM (2010) 523 final	Budgetary frameworks	126 (14), para 3	Directive 2011/85 OJ L 306 23.11.2011, p. 41	new
Excessive Imbalance Procedure	COM (2010) 527 final	Prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances	121 (6)	Regulation 2011/1176 OJ L 306 23.11.2011, p. 25	new
	COM (2010) 525 final	Enforcement measures to correct macroeconomic imbalances	121 (6)	Regulation 2011/1174 OJ L 306 23.11.2011, p. 8	new

Three of the legislative acts are more directly connected with the existing SGP framework and focus on budgetary politics and the Excessive Deficit Procedure. A fourth proposal deals with an improved comparability of national budgetary frameworks. The last two acts establish a new procedure to monitor and sanction macroeconomic imbalances in the Euro zone ('Excessive Imbalance Procedure'), which is comparable to the reformed Excessive Deficit Procedure.

The preventive arm (COM (2010) 526 final) provides for the introduction of a so called 'European Semester', which is a phase of economic policy coordination starting in January of each year and ending in July. To this end, it is envisaged that member states forward 'Stability Programmes' (Euro zone members) and 'Convergence Programmes' (non-Euro zone members) to the European Commission in mid-April (as opposed to the prior submission at the end of the year). The programmes are supposed to contain medium-term budgetary strategies. By mid-July, both Council and Commission should have commented on the programmes so that national governments can take into account possible suggestions in their national budget cycles. In the event of "persisting

or particularly serious and significant deviations from prudent fiscal policy-making (…)" (COM (2010) 524, Art. 3), the Commission proposes to impose the payment of an interest-bearing deposit of 0.2 per cent of GDP for Euro zone members. This is a newly introduced sanction which is supposed to function as an early warning.

Regarding the corrective arm of the SGP, Regulation 2011/1177 amends Council Regulation 1467/97 on 'Speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure'. The procedural innovation is to impose a sanction in the form of a non-interest bearing deposit of 0.2 per cent of GDP as soon as a member is placed in excessive deficit. This sanction is transformed into a fine once a decision has been taken in accordance with Art. 126 (8) TFEU, i.e. once the Council has approved "inadequate means". This means that sanctions in the form of a fine can be applied much earlier than used to be the case. The idea to cut structural funds which the Commission had proposed in its communications (COM (2010) 367: 9-10) – just as the German government did – was not held up. At the heart of these legislative acts is the introduction of a reversed majority. Contrary to the existing provisions, the Council now has to *block* sanctions proposed by the Commission with a qualified majority, rather than *approve* them with a QMV (see Figure 1, step 4). This has far reaching consequences as we demonstrate in the next section.

## ANALYSIS: THE EFFECT OF THE REVERSED QUALIFIED MAJORITY

Theoretical scenarios

Concerning the set of new instruments mentioned above, we believe that the reversed qualified majority is the most important one. The introduction of this voting rule is a substantial improvement compared to the status quo ante where true sanctions had to be approved by a qualified majority – which has never happened to date. The exact nature of sanctions is of minor importance, be they interest or non-interest bearing deposits or fines – if no effective action is taken by the member state. What is more important is *whether a decision* under the reversed majority *will be taken at all*.

We now apply the spatial logic from above and the same fictitious preferences of the 17 Euro zone members to the reversed majority. In the first scenario, Germany is subject to an EDP. We assume that the larger the member state, the more it will oppose a strict enforcement of the SGP (see Table 1, first scenario). To form a QMV against a Commission proposal, 136 votes and 62 per cent of the population are required. In this case, the eight largest member states have to agree. In the second scenario, where the smallest member states are most sceptical towards a strict enforcement, a QMV requires the consent of the 15 largest member states because only this super-coalition meets the vote and the population criteria. In the third and fourth scenario, where Malta is in the dock, the same holds true (see Table 2).

In this purely theoretical exercise, the leftmost blocking pivot under all possible preference constellations is now member state eight. Recall from Figure 2 that previously, the two largest member states were able to block a Commission proposal. Therefore, outcomes are likely to be much closer to the European Commission's presumed ideal point (see Figure 3). The latter can thus propose stricter measures than under the old system, whereby a better enforcement of the SGP becomes possible – at least theoretically. Finally, the analysis of the QMV and the RQM voting rules shows that the likelihood of a sanction against any member state is completely independent of its size. Consequently, the incentives to adopt the RQM were identical for small and large member states from this perspective. So far, we conclude that the RQM will in fact make a difference, no matter what the nature of the governments' empirical positions.

Figure 3: Degrees of escalation EDP under the reversed qualified majority

Empirical scenarios

The above abstract scenarios were meant to illustrate the effect of changes on voting rules. We now turn to an empirically grounded evaluation of the voting rules. To this end, we plot the member states' presumed positions towards the enforcement of the SGP into the one-dimensional space.[8] While from a collective perspective, a strict enforcement of the SGP may be preferred by all member states, we assume that the individual member states that are less willing to sanction other member states are the more likely to themselves be subject to an EDP. To attribute positions to member states, we constructed an additive index consisting of economic and political indicators which affect a member state's attitude towards the SGP. The following indicators make up the index:[9]

- Debt and Deficit: The public debt and annual deficits are the two reference values that may trigger an EDP. The higher the public debt and deficits, the more likely a member state will be subject to sanctions and the more likely it will vote against a strict enforcement.

- Average annual interest rates: The interest rates of government bonds are essentially determined by market expectations about a member state's solvency. We chose 10-year bonds and employ them as a medium-term predictor of a member state's future financial situation that influences voting behaviour.

- Aging-related expenditures in terms of GPD (European Commission 2009): This indicator describes the predicted change in age-related expenditures of the member states until 2060. The higher the costs from an aging population, the greater the need for adjustments in the long run in order to avoid sanctions (see Beetsma and Oksanen 2007, 2008).

- Violations of the deficit criterion: This factor simply counts the number of years in which a member state violated the deficit criterion since its entry into the Euro zone. We assume that the more often a member state violated the deficit criterion in the past, the more likely it will vote against sanctions.

- Commission recommendations (European Commission 2011): The European Commission prepares comments on the 'Stability Programmes' submitted by the member states to the Council. These recommendations describe whether the proposed measures to consolidate national budgets are sufficient and evaluate the likelihood that these self-defined goals will be met. We used these assessments as a measure for potential future conflict between the European Commission and the member state. The values range from 1 for compliance with the SGP, e.g. Luxembourg, Finland and Estonia, to 5 for those states which actually receive transfers in order to avoid a state default, e.g. Greece, Ireland and Portugal.

In Figure 4, the index is directly transformed into positions located in our one-dimensional space. The leftmost member state is Greece (not shown because it is under scrutiny and may not take part in the vote), followed by Portugal and Ireland. At the other extreme, Estonia, Finland, Luxemburg and Germany are the member states that might support a strict enforcement of the SGP.

Figure 4: Degrees of escalation in the EDP with member state positions

When sanctions against Greece are at stake, the remaining Council members accumulate 201 votes. According to the past voting rules, it took either 53 votes OR 38 per cent of the population represented to block a Commission proposal. In this configuration, Spain, in the centre of the policy space, is pivotal. Now, the new voting rule requires 149 votes AND 62 per cent of the population represented to block a Commission proposal. In this setting, Austria is pivotal - a member state much closer to the Commission's presumed ideal point than Spain. The Commission could therefore propose measures that are much stricter and still prevail. Picture another scenario: If Spain was subject to an EDP, Italy was previously pivotal, while under the new voting rule, Austria is again pivotal. In sum, in any empirically grounded constellation, the pivots move considerably to the right of the space. Substantially, this implies that those member states that generally prefer a stricter enforcement of the SGP become pivotal. Namely, those are Estonia, Finland, Luxembourg, Germany, Austria and the Netherlands, which, given the location of the other member states, broadly corresponds to a north-south cleavage.

Now, would the altered rules have made a difference before the financial crisis?

Figure 5: Degrees of escalation in the EDP with positions from 2008

Figure 5 illustrates the effect of the RQM with positional data from 2008. Here, we simply re-calculated the index for the time period from 2005-2008, i.e. before the beginning of the financial crisis. Already before the crisis, Greece was the member state which according to our index should be least favourable towards sanctions. In this scenario, it is also the member state under scrutiny. Under the old rules, Belgium would have been pivotal in supporting (or avoiding) sanctions proposed by the Commission against Greece. Under the new rules, France would have been pivotal in 2008. This move of the pivotal member state implies that stricter sanctions would have been possible already in

The logic of the EDP is viable for transfer to the proposed 'European Semester', where the member states lay down their medium-term budgetary strategies. The fact that the documents have to be submitted earlier will be an advantage. However, it remains to be seen how much additional information these strategies will provide to make the national budgetary policies more transparent. Considering possible EU sanctions in case of significant deviations from prudent fiscal policy-making, these sanctions would also be subject to a Council vote with a RQM and hence the same considerations about the efficiency of the new sanction regime would apply.

CONCLUSION

At the time of writing, the debates and negotiations about the rescue of highly indebted member states are ongoing and speculations about further catastrophes are still growing. Generally, the introduction of the reversed majority is an important innovation, as it raises the hurdles for member states seeking to obstruct the EDP and the sanctions proposed by the Commission. Therefore, the chances for the application of sanctions will increase – rendering the SGP more efficient – as sound budgetary policies and long term stability are in the interest of all member states. We demonstrated that the introduction of a reversed majority substantially increases the likelihood of the European Commission being able to sanction member states effectively. More concretely, we identified Estonia, Finland, Luxembourg, Germany, Austria and the Netherlands as the member states which may ensure that future Commission proposals will not be blocked.

Finally, at the summit of the European Council on 8/ 9 December 2011, the Heads of State and Government of the Euro zone members decided that the scope of the reversed qualified majority in the Excessive Deficit Procedure should be further enlarged

(European Council 2011: 4): While the six-pack adopted in November 2011 only foresaw a RQM for the imposition of sanctions, it shall now apply for all decisions in the EDP (see Figure 1, steps 1-3). This further highlights its relevance and the governments' willingness to commit themselves to stricter rules.

* * *

[1] The theoretical foundation can be found in the idea of an "Optimum Currency Area" (Mundell 1961); see Heipertz and Verdun 2010 for a discussion of the SGP and its evolution from an integration theory perspective.

[2] Regulation (EC) No. 1467/97 was substantially amended by Regulation 2011/1177 (OJ L 306 23.11.2011, p. 33) in November 2011, as we outline below.

[3] In the following we refer to the Council's decisions in the later part of the EDP (issue notice and to impose sanctions) which only apply to the current 17 Euro zone members.

[4] The Nice definition of the qualified majority applies until 2014 and until 2017 respectively (Art. 238 (3) TFEU together with the "Protocol on Transitional Provisions"). For the 'regular' QMV the vote threshold, defined as 255 out of 345 votes, is approximately 74 per cent of the votes. For votes which do not include all Council members, which is the case in the corrective branch of the SGP, the same ratio applies. In addition, 62 per cent of the population have to be represented. The blocking minority is the inverse of both criteria. Note that to block a Commission proposal either criterion will suffice.

[5] For the issue of the submission of wrong figures see Gordo and Nogueira 2007.

[6] This claim can further be based on the assessment that the member states, in several instances, in fact did not lower their deficits and debts below the critical values though they had committed themselves to do so. For instance, in 2003 the Commission clearly stated on behalf of Germany "that the action taken by the respective government in response to article 104(7) recommendation has proved inadequate and recommends the Council to decide accordingly". In the case of France the Commission states that "[...] no effective action has been taken in response to the recommendations addressed under article 104(7) [...]".

[7] The Greek-German spread on 10-year bonds for instance reached a maximum of 973 basis points on 7 May 2010.

[8] See Blavoukos and Pagoulatos (2008) for a similar approach. Chang (2006) also tries to identify member states that may form alliances.

[9] The index is created with data from the six year period from 2005 to 2010. The individual indicators are normalised between 0 and 1 to avoid a bias stemming from the measurement level. In addition, we assume that more recent figures are more relevant than past ones and therefore we weight the figures by year: figures from earlier years enter the index to a lesser degree than those from more recent years.

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But Why Would They Do That? European External Governance and the Domestic Preferences of Rule Importers

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Abstract

After having shown that the current European External Governance framework would fail to predict or explain the transfer of European environmental standards for the automotive industry towards the People's Republic of China, the article proposes a revised framework which includes new assumptions regarding the domestic preferences of rule importers. The case study highlights the central explanatory role of the Chinese domestic preference in the rule transfer process. It also shows that the Chinese decision, although primarily motivated by considerations of effectiveness, was also influenced by the greater legitimacy of the Euro emission standards.

Keywords

INTRODUCTION

European External Governance (EEG) has been developed as an attempt to "move beyond a traditional, intergovernmental account of EU foreign policy" (Schimmelfennig and Wagner 2004: 657). The initial research agenda was particularly broad, since it included the study of multi-level governance, the explanation of the sectoral variety of governance modes, the study of the transformative effects of European governance on Member States' policies (Europeanization) as well as on the policies of non-EU states (Schimmelfennig and Wagner 2004). Over time however, EEG came to refer "exclusively [to] the transfer of given EU rules and their adoption by non-member states", as opposed to European internal governance which is primarily concerned with the formation, adoption and domestic implementation of such rules (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004: 661).

Research on external governance revealed the existence of an important analytical distinction between the transfer of European rules towards countries engaged in accession negotiations (future EU Member States) and towards countries deprived of membership prospect: whereas relations between the EU and candidate countries were mostly governed by the external incentive mode of rule transfer, which became known as "governance by conditionality", the transfer of specific policies towards the EU's immediate neighbourhood can be seen as representing a "purer" mode of external governance, since the EU could not rely on enlargement to "buy-off" third countries and impose somehow unilaterally its system of rules (Lavenex 2004).

After reviewing the European External Governance literature, we shall see that the current approach has been developed and tested on the basis of case studies in which power asymmetries were insufficiently controlled for, which allowed European rules to be transferred regardless of the third countries' domestic preferences. In this contribution, I argue that, under a symmetrical power distribution, rule transfer is likely to result from the correspondence between the properties of the rules in competition and the domestic preferences of the rule importer.

In order to test the proposed revision of the EEG framework, a case study will be conducted on the adoption by the Chinese government of European environmental standards regulating the emissions of gaseous pollutants for light-duty vehicles. Throughout our investigation, we shall be guided by the following two questions: first, why did China decide to import a foreign rule rather than to define its own national rule; second, since there existed several rules to import, why did China select the European rule rather than any other rule.

EEG AND COMPETING EXPLANATORY MODELS

The researcher trying to answer the aforementioned questions is confronted with a flurry of loosely differentiated theoretical approaches, all of which aim at explaining what is essentially the same phenomenon: the propagation over time and space of similar ideas, policies or practices. Each sub-discipline has given in to the temptation of coining its own approach, resulting in a confusing inflation: emulation, hybridisation, learning, convergence, transfer, harmonisation or diffusion form a long but non-exhaustive conceptual list, in which boundaries are permeable and redundancies legion. The following sections aim at presenting the most widely used of these approaches and at justifying the selection of European External Governance as a theoretical framework for this research.

Alternative explanatory models

At this stage, it is necessary to consider alternative explanatory models and to justify the choice of EEG as a framework for this article. I suggest selecting alternative explanations on the basis of two criteria: the degree of theoretical formalisation and the number of academic followers. This leaves us with three potential candidates to account for the Chinese decision to adopt European environmental standards: policy transfer, lesson-drawing and the diffusion approach.

The *diffusion approach* was initially developed as an attempt to conceptualise policy changes at the federate level within the US federal system, based on the assumption that policy changes made in one state were likely to be taken into consideration by neighbouring states in their policy-making procedures. As a result, the diffusion literature adopted a structural approach which sought to highlight patterns of policy-making (Marsh and Sharman 2009). By contrast, the notion of *policy transfer* emerged in the 1990s in British academic circles as an answer to the predominantly American reflection on policy diffusion. Defined as "a process in which knowledge about policies administrative arrangements, institutions, etc. in one time and/or place is used in the development of policies administrative arrangements and institutions in another time and/or place" (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996: 344), the policy transfer approach departs from considerations of intentionality and seeks to identify the institutional channels via which transfer takes place and the "transfer agents" promoting them (Stone 2004). Finally, *lesson-drawing* is yet another form of policy-making emphasising the desirability and practicality of transferring foreign experiences and practices. In this context, the decision to import certain rules "depend upon a subjective definition of proximity, upon epistemic communities linking experts together, functional interdependence between governments, and the authority of intergovernmental institutions" (Rose 1991: 6).

Although this article falls short of restoring the tremendous internal and sectoral diversity within these three approaches, I believe that none of them offers a fully satisfactory explanatory model to tackle the case at hand. First, these approaches can hardly be distinguished from one another, so that it is nigh impossible to disentangle among them and say where one approach ends and where the next starts. In addition, the determinants leading to one rule being either transferred, diffused or simply learnt from abroad are broadly unknown. On this basis, James and Lodge (2003) question the added-value of the concept of "lesson-drawing" with regard to traditional accounts of rational policy-making in which learning plays a role. They also strongly criticise the transfer literature and recommend to "us[e] alternative theories focusing more directly on the effects of learning processes" (2003: 190); second, choosing among these approaches amounts to accepting the implicit trade-off between agency-based and structure-based approach and between methodologies centred on pattern-finding or process-tracing (Marsh and Sharman 2009: 274-278). As explained by the same authors, the extreme heterogeneity of the field may well come at the expense of our

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understanding of diffusion and transfer mechanisms and therefore calls for "a process of standardisation" (2009: 269) or, at least, for some degree of consolidation within an overarching framework.

The EEG approach: the long-searched overarching framework?

EEG is interested in the conditions under which rule transfer processes are effective – with effectiveness defined as the extent to which the EU rule is selected, adopted and implemented by non-EU states. Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009: 800-805) put forward three competing explanations. According to the institutionalist explanation, external modes of governance reflect internal EU institutional arrangements. These institutionalist path dependences between internal and external governance modes may be explained by the increase in legitimacy and/or in effectiveness that derives from the reliance on internal EU institutional templates. The power-based explanation primarily emphasises asymmetrical interdependence and hypothesises that strong asymmetries in favour of the EU lead to hierarchical modes of governance, whereas more balanced forms of interaction based on symmetrical interdependence tend to generate less hierarchical modes of governance. In the domestic structures explanation, external governance reflects third countries' domestic structures and capacities. As such, it is similar to the first institutionalist explanation, but considers that external governance mirrors third countries' rather than EU's internal governance. This mirroring can be explained by functional necessities linked with third countries' constitutional orders or administrative capacities.

The main added-value of the EEG approach (particularly in the revised version proposed in this article) is that it puts forward a framework in which both structural factors (such as sectoral trade interdependence, market structures or institutional contexts and policy networks) and agency (federal and regional government units, private actors) play an equally important explanatory function. EEG also allows to combine the two aforementioned methodologies: on the one hand, individual causes can be traced precisely from one location to another, thus allowing to investigate the path and particular reasons leading to rule transfer in specific instances (process-tracing); on the other hand, EEG does not preclude the testing of broad explanatory hypotheses, such as for example, the question of whether power asymmetries or certain rule properties are more conducive to rule transfer (pattern-finding).

The question remains of whether the Chinese dragon is not too big a case for the still relatively young EEG approach. I suggest that taking this leap is both logical and necessary. It is logical since the framework's purpose is to investigate rule transfer from the EU towards non-EU countries deprived of membership prospect, without any reference as to the geographical position or power position of the non-EU country considered[1]. Through fine process-tracing on the basis of case studies conducted on immediate EU neighbours, explanatory mechanisms have been suggested: it is the logical continuation of these studies to see whether the same mechanisms apply when considering non-EU countries located further away. Finally, this leap is also a necessary one since the initial mechanisms suggested by process-tracing are possibly influenced by the geographical location and power distribution which characterised the case studies led so far. Moving in the direction of genuine pattern-seeking requires testing the suggested mechanisms on new countries, which are not placed in a situation of asymmetric interdependence with the EU. In many respects, this case study on the Chinese importation of EU environmental standards can be seen as a crucial test of the generalizability of EEG explanatory hypotheses, which will decide whether EEG will remain a regional theory of European influence in its neighbourhood or a more general theory of rule transfer.

Main findings of the EEG approach

Since its coining in 2004, EEG has experienced a steady growth in the specialised literature. A special edition of the *Journal of European Public Policy* (September 2009) gathered seven contributions which already tackled a variety of policy areas as well as of policy targets. These articles highlighted the sector-specific character of external governance modes and shed additional light on rule transfer mechanisms towards countries deprived of membership prospects, thereby strengthening the validity of the analytical differentiation operated between external governance and the conditionality-based approach towards candidate countries. Nonetheless, the question of which variables lead to effective rule transfer remains largely unanswered. Initial findings suggest that hierarchy is most conducive to effective rule transfer, but both Youngs (2009) and Freyburg *et al.* (2009) identify differentiated effects of hierarchical governance on rule transfer in the field of democracy promotion and good governance most prominently between rule selection/adoption and rule application. Similarly, Knill and Tosun (2009) provide evidence that hierarchy is most likely to lead to effective rule transfer in the field of environmental policy. At the same time, they show that reluctance from the part of non-EU states can impede the effectiveness of the rule transfer and thus predict the increasing reliance on more horizontal forms of external governance.

In more sensitive areas of cooperation, Barbé *et al.* (2009) show that the selection of the EU rule depends on its perceived legitimacy and on the ability of the EU to offer incentives to third countries. Finally, Dimitrova and Dragneva's (2009) study of EU rule transfer towards the Ukraine underlines the centrality of dependence and interdependence patterns between the Ukraine and the main governance providers of the region. Their conclusions speak unambiguously in favour of the power-based explanation, since EU rule transfer is showed to be effective when interdependence is concomitantly high with the EU and low with Russia.

Shortcomings of the current framework

Most findings are derived from comparative studies led on countries which, given their size, economic profile or geographical location, are in a situation of asymmetrical interdependence towards the EU. It is for instance disputable that general patterns of rule transfer can be inferred from the relationship between the EU and its three Western neighbours (Norway, Iceland, Switzerland).[2] Other studies focus on rule transfer towards the countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) which, for most of them, do not have any membership prospect. In addition, there is a higher degree of cultural and political heterogeneity, as well as institutional practices that frequently diverge from European ones. Relations between the EU and these countries therefore constitute a purer instance of external governance, from which general patterns of rule transfer are more likely to be inferred. Yet, interaction between the EU and the ENP countries is also characterised by asymmetrical interdependence, which explains the frequent complaints that the cooperation agenda reflects European interests rather than truly common interests (Bicchi 2006).

In the current EEG model, power relations are circumscribed to one governance mode (hierarchy) and to one explanatory hypothesis (power-based). However, power asymmetries potentially impact the dynamics of rule transfer whatever the mode of governance and whatever the explanatory hypothesis tested. In other words, network and market governance may occur in the shadow of hierarchy (Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2008) just as rule transfer may take place on the basis of the institutionalist or domestic structure explanation in the shadow of power constraints. This calls for additional research based on a design allowing a tighter empirical control for power asymmetries.

From a conceptual perspective, the deliberate choice for a structural approach also led proponents of the EEG approach to somehow downplay intentionality. Yet, if one considers that rule importation is a policy decision, taken by an actor on the basis of a specific set of interests and motives, it becomes necessary to introduce a new set of explanatory variables so as to take into consideration the domestic preference of the rule importer. The absence of control for power asymmetries in the existing EEG case studies may explain why the preferences of the rule importers were not included in the model, since the EU was able to export its norms, whatever the preferences held by third countries, by mobilising its overwhelming economic power. Nevertheless, when the power distribution is more symmetrical, third countries can be expected to interrupt or reverse rule transfer if their interests are no longer best served by the importation of a foreign rule.

TOWARDS A REVISED EEG FRAMEWORK

To overcome these shortcomings, I suggest a revised EEG framework in which power becomes a new independent variable, thus allowing for tighter empirical control. In addition, the proposed revision includes new assumptions on the domestic preferences of rule importers, based on previous research on the Europeanization of Central and Eastern European countries.

Controlling for power asymmetries

There exists a large body of literature pointing to the role of power relations and of coercion in rule transfer processes. The notion of coercive isomorphism put forward by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) is an attempt to conceptualise changes in institutional settings brought about by external pressures, be these from international organisations or from powerful foreign states. Henisz *et al.* (2004) also suggest distinguishing between direct international coercion when the choice of governments is influenced as a result of interaction with powerful external actors, and indirect international coercion, whereby such actors intervene in domestic political struggles by lending their support to a particular domestic actor against another.

Whether exercised directly or indirectly, there are three channels via which coercive isomorphism can occur. First, rule transfer can be imposed as a result of geopolitical power pressures, because of acute differences in capabilities endowment between two actors. One example would be the imposition of stricter air security regulations by the United states on smaller Central American countries in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. Second, rule transfer can result from sectoral power dynamics, when a foreign country can mobilise sectoral capabilities or expertise to impose its rules upon another country, irrespective of the geopolitical power distribution. EU conditionality can be seen as falling within this category, since the EU's ability to impose its rules on the basis of this mechanism depends on third country's sectoral dependency on access to the European single market. Finally, rule transfer can be imposed by a coalition of rule exporters mobilised against a single rule importer (or against a weaker coalition of rule importers). A negative example would be the refusal of a large coalition of developing countries to include the so-called Singapore issues in WTO negotiations, despite urging pressures from the US, Europe and Japan.

In this article, I shall consider only the first two channels of coercion, thereby excluding the coalitional power distribution. This decision is motivated by the nature and functioning of the international organisation involved in the case at hand: although the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe did play a role as a platform for discussion and exchanges among technical experts, the relevant working party (WP29) is

not a decision-making body in which a coalition of EU Member States could force the adoption of their rules upon non-EU states. Besides, the Chinese are indeed participants in the WP29, but they are not actively involved in its activities (UNECE 2002: 6). If we use these distinctions to classify the existing EEG research, we can observe that the case studies were conducted under an asymmetrical geopolitical power distribution, with some degree of variation in the sectoral power distribution (*see* Table 1). Controlling effectively for power asymmetries requires that we find cases located in the top left hand corner of the table (shaded in grey).

Table 1: Typology of power distribution

		GEOPOLITICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION	
		symmetrical	*asymmetrical*
SECTORAL POWER DISTRIBUTION	symmetrical	Rule transfer from the EU to a geopolitically powerful third country in a policy field where the EU does not enjoy any sectoral power advantage.	Rule transfer from the EU to a geopolitically weaker third country in a policy field where the EU does not enjoy any sectoral power advantage.
	asymmetrical	Rule transfer from the EU to a geopolitically powerful third country in a policy field where the EU enjoys a sectoral power advantage.	Rule transfer from the EU to a geopolitically weaker third country in a policy field where the EU enjoys a sectoral power advantage.

Conceptualising the domestic preferences of rule importers

In their three Europeanization models, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) include assumptions on rule importers' preferences which prove very useful to complement the EEG approach: in the External Incentive model, third countries import a rule because they want to benefit from an incentive set up by the rule exporter; in the Social Learning model, they opt for the most legitimate rule available (logic of appropriateness); in the Lesson Drawing model, they select the most effective rule available to solve a particular policy problem. From these three models, I infer three different preferences on the part of third countries, corresponding to three different mechanisms of rule transfer (*see* Table 2).

Table 2: Third country's preferences, rule transfer mechanisms and corresponding EU rule properties

Typology of third countries' preferences	Rule Transfer mechanism	Corresponding EU rule property
Incentive-driven	The third country chooses the rule associated with the highest reward or with the lowest sanction	Rewards and sanctions associated with the rule
Value-driven	The third country chooses the most legitimate rule	Legitimacy
Solution-driven	The third country chooses the most effective rule to solve a domestic policy problem	Effectiveness

Proposed revision and operationalisation of the model

In the revised EEG framework proposed in this article, rule transfer is a function of the power distribution, of the comparative properties of the rules in competition as well as of the specific preference held by the importing country. When power is controlled for, rule transfer is expected to result from the **correspondence** between the third country's preference (what the norm importer wants) and the comparative rule properties (what the rules have to offer).

Operationalisation of the variables

The power distribution can be determined by looking at a series of indicators both at the geopolitical and sectoral level. In the traditional IR literature, relevant geopolitical indicators include the country and population sizes, the economic weight expressed in GDP, GDP per capita or economic growth, the possession of natural resources, the military budget or the availability of nuclear weapons, the quality of human capital or the control of advanced technologies. Sectoral indicators should give a representative account of the power relations at the level of the policy field within which the rule to be transferred is located. For instance, if the rule under scrutiny is a technological standard for mobile telephony, one may obtain a faithful picture of power relations at the sectoral level by considering the ownership of the technology (patent), the number of companies operating with the technology and the number of clients using the technology in the rule exporting and rule importing countries. For both series of indicators (geopolitical and sectoral), a differential can then be defined (for example 50 per cent): if the difference between both sides is inferior to 50 per cent, the power distribution qualifies as symmetrical; if that difference exceeds 50 per cent, the power distribution can be regarded as asymmetrical.

The comparative properties of the various rules in competition define the **policy offer**, whose determination requires that we first identify the rules available for selection. Once the various rules in competition have been identified, it is necessary to determine their comparative properties in the three areas defined by the EEG approach and in the Europeanization literature: the rules' reward-and-sanction system, the rules' legitimacy and the rules' effectiveness. The reward-and-sanction system can be derived from the

compliance mechanism set up by the rule exporter. Examples of reward-and-sanction system include market access or financial penalties. The rules' legitimacy can be assessed on the basis of two criteria: the domestic resonance (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005) and the universality or singularity of the rules in competition, meaning the extent to which the rules aim at solving a problem in a general and potentially universal (and hence, replicable) way or the extent to which the solution advocated is tailored to the needs of the country where the rule was first developed[3]. The rules' effectiveness refers to their problem-solving prospects, which can be apprehended by taking a look at the rules' stringency, at their track records in tackling a given policy problem, at the conditions under which they can deliver the expected results and at the associated adoption costs.

Finally, the preference of third countries in the rule transfer process is defined by the interaction and confrontation between key political, economic and civil-societal players (Moravcsik 1993, 1997). This interaction gives us the **policy demand** at the national level, which is then defended by states' representatives at the international level. The determination of the third country's preference in a given policy area therefore requires that we identify the relevant domestic players whose individual preferences are likely to influence the national preference. This policy demand is frequently laid down in strategic documents or position papers, thereby providing the revealed preferences of the third country.

THE TRANSFER OF VEHICLE EMISSION STANDARDS TO THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

The Chinese automotive market has four main characteristic features. First, despite its large population, China still has one of the world's lowest per capita vehicle populations (21 vehicles per thousand inhabitants), which is about the same number as the US in 1913 (Gallagher 2003). With the progressive rise in standards of living and the increased demand for mobility, the potential of the Chinese market is considerable: were China to match the US number of per capita vehicle, Chinese streets would accommodate an additional 900 million cars (Zhao 2006).

Second, the Chinese automotive industry is highly fragmented and virtually deprived of R&D capabilities. There are more than 150 registered manufacturers today and this scattered landscape results in major scale inefficiencies (Russo *et al.* 2009: 2).

Third, the Chinese government progressively encouraged foreign car makers to enter its market in the form of joint ventures. *Volkswagen*'s first contacts date back to 1978, which eventually led to the establishment of *Shanghai Volkswagen* (1985) and *FAW-Volkswagen* (1991)[4]. Shortly after, *Citroen* developed a joint venture with *Second Auto Works* (1992). To date, a total of 22 foreign car producers have developed joint ventures with Chinese companies.

Fourth, the Chinese production is nigh exclusively targeted to satisfy the rapidly growing domestic demand. In 2009, China became the world's largest automotive market, with annual sales reaching 13,64 million units. From these 13,64 million units, only 420,800 (3 per cent) were imported[5] – but, thanks to the many joint ventures, foreign brands hold a firm 66 per cent of the domestic market (Russo *et al.* 2009: 3). In parallel, Chinese car exports in 2009 represented a mere 2.7 per cent of the domestic consumption (369,600 units)[6].

The European vehicle emission control system and its adoption by China

The Community's action to define an emission standard for light-duty vehicles dates back to a directive in 1970, which has been amended on many occasions in order to decrease the legally acceptable threshold of gaseous pollutants: in 1991 (passenger cars) and 1993 (light trucks), Euro I standards were adopted and replaced by Euro II standards in 1996. These initial standards were further lowered by a directive in 1998 (Euro III and IV) and by two regulations in 2007 and 2008 (Euro V and VI) which repealed and replaced the 1970 directive. Currently, the EU is in the transition period between the Euro IV and Euro V regimes[7].

The first Chinese legal act in the field of environmental protection was a 1979 law – however, the first national standards for vehicle emissions were not adopted before 1983. As the total number of vehicles increased, the Chinese government introduced the European emissions control system for light-duty vehicles in 1989 and for heavy-duty vehicles in 1993 and a more stringent legal framework was set up in 1995. From 1999 onwards, China then started to define national emission standards which systematically mirrored the Euro standards (*see* Table 3).

Table 3: Chinese emission standards for light-duty vehicles

Chinese standard	Date of entry into force	Region of entry into force
CHINA I, based on EURO I	January 2000	Nationwide
CHINA II, based on EURO II	August 2002	Beijing
	March 2003	Shanghai
	September 2003 (diesel) July 2004 (gasoline)	Nationwide
CHINA III, based on EURO III	December 2005	Beijing
	October 2006	Guangzhou
	January 2007	Shanghai
	July 2007	Nationwide
CHINA IV, based on EURO IV	January 2007 (diesel) March 2008 (gasoline)	Beijing
	June 2010	Nationwide

Source: By the author on the basis of the relevant Chinese legislation, available online in English translation at: http://www.lexadin.nl/wlg/legis/nofr/oeur/lxwechi.htm#Environmental%20Law (last accessed 15.01.2013).

The current EEG framework applied to China's adoption of the Euro standards

The introduction of European emission standards into Chinese national law provides a challenging case for the current EEG approach, since none of the three explanations would have predicted the selection of the EU standard by the Chinese authorities.

The power-based explanation can easily be discarded since the power distribution, be it at the geopolitical or at the sectoral level, is characterised by a degree of asymmetry to the benefit of the Chinese side. Indeed, most geopolitical power indicators show that the power distribution between the EU and China is at best symmetrical or, more likely, asymmetrical to the detriment of the Europeans. In addition, the brief analysis of the automotive market in China has shown that the EU does not enjoy a sectoral power

advantage, while China does, for both static and dynamic reasons: first, Chinese car makers do not export towards the Single Market, whereas it is vital for European car companies to be present on the Chinese market; second, the Chinese market is the world's most rapidly growing market and offers the most attractive prospects of development in the coming decades.

The domestic structures explanation appears equally unconvincing because the EU standards adopted in 1989 introduced far-reaching commitments which did not "resonate" in the administrative and regulatory culture of the time. For instance, the EU standards could not be implemented under the administrative and judiciary system prevailing at the time. A series of institutional and legal reforms was therefore indispensable: creation and staffing of an environmental state agency at ministry level in 1998, training of judges and civil servants, development of monitoring capacities, scientific research and expertise.

Finally, the institutionalist explanation carries little explanatory power, since it implies the existence of joint agencies or policy networks within which the comparative merits of the EU rule can be conveyed. However, the observation of the current architecture of EU-Chinese relations shows that there are few such networks: the only relevant sectoral dialogue occurs in the broad framework of the Working Group on Enterprise, Industrial Policy and Regulation, whose plenary meetings are held once a year and have a particularly broad agenda, which does not create many opportunities for processes of socialisation between Chinese and European experts of the emission system. Discussions at the technical level are also crucially dependent on the broad foreign policy climate and Working Group meetings have been cancelled in the past[8].

THE REVISED EEG FRAMEWORK APPLIED TO CHINA'S ADOPTION OF THE EURO STANDARDS

The revised EEG model, by integrating new explanatory variables to take into consideration the domestic preferences of rule importers and the comparative properties of the various rules in competition, is better able to account for the Chinese decision to import EU emission standards.

Determining the Chinese domestic preference (policy demand)

Among the most influential players in the literature on domestic preferences formation are the central government, the legislature, the judiciary branch, the decentralised administrative authorities, private interests, civil society and the international community – however, not all of them are relevant in the case at hand. Indeed, car emissions have become a matter of international concern rather recently and it seems unlikely that international pressure played a role in the Chinese decision to emulate EU standards, whether in 1989 or later[9]. Similarly, the importation of European standards cannot be attributed to the activism of Chinese civil society organisations given the persistence of obstacles to the constitution of intermediary bodies between the party-state and the citizens (Zhang 2003). In fact, access to courts for environmental damages has long been denied to citizens and often remains theoretical today, especially against state-owned polluting companies[10]. Finally, given China's constitutional arrangements[11], neither the legislature nor the judiciary can be considered as domestic players liable to influence significantly the definition of Chinese domestic preferences.

The central government (especially the Standing Committee of the Communist Party) is traditionally the most influential player in Chinese politics[12]. In the case at hand, the preference of the central government is unambiguously solution-driven. Indeed, with sixteen of the world's twenty most polluted cities located in China, China is acutely

confronted with the external costs of local air pollution: premature deaths, increased costs of health care, insurance, hospitalisation, environmental damages to properties and to cultural heritage (World Bank and State Environmental Protection Agency 2007). Pollution also affects more severely the most vulnerable populations (elderly, children, socially deprived), thus contributing to sharpen social inequalities and tensions within the country (Gan 2003). The central leadership is well aware of the repercussions of environmental problems on economic growth, public health and social stability (Economy 2003, 2004 – as well as Deputy Minister Pan Yue's interview). Local authorities are traditionally important players in domestic Chinese politics and are moreover constitutionally co-responsible for public health issues. Given the extent of policy failure and the potential dangers for national cohesion however, the local level accepted all directions given by the central leadership. Besides, the technical character of the standards did not lend itself to a major political brawl between national and local authorities[13].

Finally, the automotive industry is directly concerned by the importation of far-reaching emission standards which would place additional burden on production. There is evidence that the industry initially reacted with caution, if not with reluctance, to the government's plans to import emission standards, since the latter required to develop cleaner technologies for which there was no clear domestic demand (Zhao 2006). Yet, the central government was able to overcome this initial reluctance using well-designed fiscal incentives as well as promises of technology transfer from Western car makers (Gallagher 2003, 2006b).

Identifying the standards in competition (policy offer)

When China was in the process of developing a regulatory framework to control emission from light-duty vehicles, there were two standard providers to emulate: the European Union and the United States. In the United States, the Clean Air Act amendments of 1990 defined the so-called Tier I standards (1994-1999), which were further sharpened by the Tier II standards (2003-2009). Whereas the Tier 1 inaugurated a system rather akin in its functioning to the Euro standards, with the regulatory body setting up an emission cap for all vehicles belonging to a given weight category, the new emission control system created by the Tier 2 standards differed quite extensively in that it abandoned the strict linkage between the emission cap and the vehicles' weight. Instead, 8 permanent and 3 temporary certification levels (the bins) were instituted and car manufacturers were free to produce vehicles that fit into any of the bins provided that they meet an average mono-nitrogen oxides target for their entire fleet[14].

Comparing standards' effectiveness

Comparing both standards' stringency is a less straightforward undertaking than it appears since they do not cover exactly the same gases, are set for different vehicle categories and are expressed in different units. Yet, if we focus on the emission caps for passenger cars regulating the emissions of carbon monoxides (CO), of mononitrogen oxides (labelled NOx) and of particulate matters (PM), it appears that the US Tier 1 standards are more stringent than their first European counterparts (*see* Table 4). Euro II standards defined a stricter CO cap for gasoline emissions but otherwise both standards set rather comparable emission limits, with one difference however: NOx were not included in the first two European standards. Overall, it is therefore not possible to argue that EU standards were imported based on their superior stringency[15].

Table 4: EU and US emission standards for passenger cars in place at the time of the Chinese importation decision

	US Tier 1	EURO I	EURO II
Year of adoption	1991	1991	1994
Year of entry into force	Phase-in 1994 to 1997	1992	1996
CO diesel	3,4a (*2,11*); 4,2b (*2,61*)	2,72	1,0
CO gasoline	3,4a (*2,11*); 4,2b (*2,61*)	2,72	2,20
NOx diesel	1,0a (*0,62*); 1,25b (*0,78*)	-	-
NOx gasoline	0,4a (*0,25*); 0,6b (*0,37*)	-	-
PM diesel	0,08a (*0,05*); 0,10b (*0,06*)	0,14	0,08 to 0,10
PM gasoline	-	-	-

EU standards are expressed in grams per kilometre, US standards in grams per mile, with the gram per kilometre conversion between brackets. (a) 50,000 miles / 5 years; (b) 100,000 miles / 10 years.

Similarly, the examination of both standards' track records (Table 5) reveals *ex post* that CO and NOx emissions decreased by relatively similar rates in the EU and US for the period 1990-2008. The Chinese authorities could therefore expect that both standards would equally contribute to solving their domestic problem.

Table 5: Change in CO and NOx emissions (US 1990-2008; EU-27 1990-2007)

	CO	NOx
Percent change 1990-2007 EU- 27	*-56,6%*	*-35,6%*
Percent change 1990-2008 United States	*-53%*	*-36%*

Sources: US Environmental Protection Agency (2010: 7), Our Nation's Air – Status and Trends Through 2008 and European Environmental Agency (2009: 25), European Community Emission Inventory Report.

In order for standards to deliver the expected effects, it is necessary to run tests so as to measure the pollutant emissions from engines. Both the EU and the US standards are associated with specific measurement procedures[16]: whereas no major criticism has been levied against the US testing procedure (which has even been emulated by Australia), the European Union Driving Cycle has been shown to be poorly devised, allowing engine manufacturers to exploit technical weaknesses and engage in strategic

"cycle beating" behaviours – meaning that the engine could be designed so as to achieve a certain level of emissions under test conditions, whereas real-life emissions were significantly higher. In 2000, the EU changed this procedure but the New European Driving Cycle did not fully suppress cycle-beating[17].

Finally, adoption costs did not intervene decisively given the comparable levels set by both standards which required a similar effort in greening engine technologies; the adoption costs would not have been higher with one standard than with the other. Besides, the structure of the Chinese market renders the cost argument less compelling: through their joint ventures, Chinese companies imported greener technologies from and largely shared the adoption costs with their European and North-American partners.

Comparing standards' reward-and-sanction systems and legitimacy

The reward-and-sanction mechanisms set up by the EU and US are strictly similar: both standards condition market access. Therefore, market conditionality can only be seen as the rule property conducive to the exportation of the EU standards if we can show that the Single Market exerts more attraction on Chinese carmakers than the North-American market. Yet, empirical observations speak against this assertion: first, as far as current exports are concerned, Chinese-branded cars are quasi-absent from both the EU and US markets – in fact, China mainly exports trucks and most of its production is sold in the Middle-East, Southeast Asia and Africa; second, as far as future exports are concerned, the Chinese authorities consider the US market as more important for both strategic and symbolic reasons, based on the assumption that if they can compete in the US, they can compete anywhere (Perkowski 2006: 26).

As far as domestic resonance is concerned, the fact that Euro I and II were expressed using the metric system (which is also used in China) whereas the US Tier was expressed in the US customary units seems to have granted a moderate advantage to the European standards[18]. In addition, the voluntary standards were introduced in 1989 and the compulsory standards in 2000, which left a decade for the Chinese authorities to get acquainted with the particularities of the European system and simultaneously increased the cost of switching to the US system[19].

The European emission control system is also a potentially universal mechanism, since it sets up a rigid emission limit, which needs to be respected by all vehicles belonging to a certain weight category. When importing the Euro standards in 2000, the Chinese authorities knew from the on-going discussions on Euro III and IV that this system would be kept. By contrast, discussions about the Tier 2 system in the late nineties indicated that the initial rigidity of the Tier 1 would be abandoned in favour of a more flexible bin system allowing car makers to continue selling large and dirty vehicles as long as their entire fleet meet an average NOx target. The Tier 2 system can therefore be regarded as a standard tailored to the singularities of the US domestic market, where a significant part of the consumers traditionally hold a preference for larger, more powerful and less environmentally-friendly cars. The universality or singularity of the standards can also be assessed by looking at their geographical diffusion: on the one hand, the Euro standards are promoted by a United Nations specialised agency (the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe[20]) and have been emulated by countries as diverse as India, Russia, Turkey, Thailand, Argentina, Brazil, Australia or Peru; on the other hand, the Tier 1 and 2 emission standards for light-duty vehicles have not been adopted beyond the two immediate neighbours of the United States (Canada and, partly, Mexico).

Finally, the longstanding presence of European companies in China contributed to tip the balance in favour of the European standard. Indeed, *Volkswagen* entered the Chinese market comparatively early[21] and used to claim over 50 per cent of the market until the

late nineties, meaning that the company enjoyed a dominant position when the Chinese government had to decide which standard to import[22]. Similarly, French foreign direct investments in the Chinese automotive sector are ancient and led to the constitution of a joint venture six years before the first Sino-US rapprochement (Hubler and Meschi 2001). Since both VW and Peugeot were domestically subject to the EU emission control system, the joint ventures rendered EU standards more familiar and more acceptable to the Chinese policy-makers before US companies could do so[23].

CONCLUSION

This article is an attempt to apply the European External Governance approach to new countries located beyond the immediate periphery of the European Union and which are not placed in a situation of asymmetric interdependence towards the EU. This case study reveals that the EEG framework, in its current formulation, cannot account for the Chinese decision to import the European rather than the North-American emission control system for light-duty vehicles. The very selection of the European rule could not have been predicted by any of the three explanations of the current framework. In order to address these shortcomings, this article puts forward a revised EEG framework which takes into consideration the domestic preferences of the rule importer next to the comparative properties of the various rules in competition. Under a symmetrical power distribution, it is expected that the rule imported will be the rule endowed with the best comparative properties in the area most valued by the third country (correspondence hypothesis).

The decision to import foreign standards becomes a rational policy decision when analysed through the lens of the revised EEG framework. Indeed, the Chinese decision to import foreign standards can be seen as resulting from the central government's eagerness to tackle a burning domestic policy problem for which no satisfying domestic policy solution existed (solution-driven domestic preference). Given the extent of domestic policy failure, the Chinese government had a vital interest in adopting a foreign rule that would decrease effectively local air pollution. Yet, the comparison between the two available rules which the Chinese authorities could draw inspiration from (Euro I and II and US Tiers) partly invalidates the correspondence hypothesis since, although both rules offer good problem-solving prospects, the US Tier standard has a slight comparative advantage which however did not lead to its selection. In other words, despite its solution-driven preference, the Chinese government imported a rule which was effective, but which was not the most effective policy alternative available. In addition to considerations of local agency, the Chinese choice can be explained by the previous acquaintance with and the greater legitimacy of the Euro emission standards.

Finally, the case study led in this article deals with an instance of bilateral rule transfer from the EU towards a powerful non-EU state. Yet, one of the lessons of the case study is that bilateral rule transfer is likely to be influenced by the outcome of multilateral rule transfer, occurring in global governance institutions such as United Nations agencies. In the case at hand, it would be interesting for instance to see why the UNECE promotes the EU rather than the US rule. Additional research is needed in this direction, particularly to see whether a different conceptual model is required at the multilateral level (Rousselin 2012).

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[1] Besides, the countries on which the EEG approach has been tested so far already include a significant degree of variations on these two parameters (for example, Moldova and Russia).

[2] Indeed, these are small countries, economically developed, with largely compatible political cultures and institutional practices. Should the domestic political consensus evolve, these countries could easily and rapidly become EU members. When dealing with them, the EU is therefore nearly dealing with itself in what might be more accurately labelled "semi-external governance".

[3] The underlying idea is that, the more general and universal the rule, the less it can be suspected of serving the particular interests of the country where the rule was first developed. In this sense, it is similar (but not identical) to what Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005: 19) refer to as the "international rule consensus".

[4] The final authorisation for the first joint venture came from Chen Yun himself, one of the Eight Immortals of the Communist Party in charge of economic affairs, which shows the level of involvement of the central leadership (Ziyang 2009: 102).

[5] Numbers provided by the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers, quoted in "China's Auto Exports Down by 46%", in *China Car Times*, 15.02.2010.

[6] Ibid. Chinese-branded cars are considered here; in fact, many components of the US or European cars are already manufactured in China.

[7] Euro V standards apply since September 2009 for the type approval of vehicles and since January 2011 for the registration and sale of new types. Euro VI will enter into force for the type approval of vehicles as of September 2014 and for the registration and sale of new types as of September 2015.

[8] For instance, the Working Group meeting was cancelled by the Chinese side in 2009, after President Nicolas Sarkozy received the Dalai Lama during the French presidency of the European Union.

[9] Only when China faced a credible threat of sanction (as was the case before the Beijing Olympics) did Chinese policy makers pay attention to international pressure.

[10] *See* the interview "The Chinese Miracle Will End Soon" with Pan Yue, China's Deputy Minister of Environmental Protection, published in *Spiegel* 03.07.2005.

[11] The 1978 constitution rejects the idea of separation of power and puts forward the notion of democratic centralism under which all branches of government and all administrative units are answerable to the National People's Congress (at the central level) and to Local People's Congresses (at the decentralised level) and hence to the Communist Party.

[12] There exists a numerous literature on this aspect. One of the most vivid accounts is the first-hand testimony by former Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang (2009).

[13] Interview with a Chinese official from the Chengdu Environmental Protection Administration.

[14] The NOx fleet average is fixed at 0,07 g/mi and corresponds to the fifth certification level. Consequently, US car makers can offset the NOx emissions from vehicles belonging to dirtier bins by selling enough vehicles certified to greener bins.

[15] The opposite argument, according to which the EU rules were chosen precisely as a result of their lesser stringency, does not seem very convincing. Indeed, the difference in stringency between both standards is rather limited – from a numerical perspective, EU and US standards are quite comparable, with the US standard being only slightly more far-reaching. Consequently, choosing the European standard would not have resulted in a major gain of flexibility for the Chinese side. On the contrary, were the Chinese to privilege flexibility over stringency, then we would expect the selection of the US standard, which offers the advantage of fixing an average target rather than a cap, thereby allowing producers to continue selling a larger variety of car models.

[16] The Federal Test Procedure 75 for the US Tier standards and the EU Driving Cycle for the Euro standards.

[17] See European Environment Agency (2004), *Ten Key Transport and Environment Issues for Policy Makers*, EEA Report 3/2004.

[18] Interview with a Chinese official from the Chengdu Environmental Protection Administration.

[19] It should however be noted that path dependence does not constitute a fully satisfactory answer, since it does not explain why EU standards were first introduced in 1989.

[20] Via UNECE Regulation 83. Even though China refused to sign the UNECE 1958 Agreement because it included provisions on mutual recognition, it later became a party to the 1998 Agreement on Global Technical Regulations, which foresees the extension of UNECE regulations on a voluntary basis.

[21] Twelve years before General Motors, which established its first joint venture in 1997 with the Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation, and more than fifteen years before Ford, which established its first joint venture in 2001 with Chang'an Motors.

[22] The presence of VW on the Chinese market is such that China has been labelled "the second mother-market" or "Volkswagen-Republic" – see *Financial Times Deutschland*, 'WM und GM in China: das grosse Duell um die Volkswagen-Republik', 26.04.2010.

[23] Interview with an official from the European Commission. The argument is deemed "moderately important" by the Chinese interviewee. In my understanding, the "first-mover" argument cannot be invoked in support of EEG's hierarchy hypothesis given the absence of power asymmetries: German engineers and French industrialists could certainly present and explain the European standards to their Chinese counterparts within joint ventures, but VW and Peugeot staff had no leverage to force the adoption of their standards upon the Chinese central leadership. Instead, the strategy chosen was to provide technical advice to Chinese decision-makers. For VW, this was for instance done within the framework of a specially established unit called "Homologation, Standards and Lobby" (Saikawa 2010: 186).

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Student mobility and European Identity: Erasmus Study as a civic experience?

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Abstract

From its inception, the Erasmus student exchange programme has been promoted by the European Commission as a "civic experience" that instils or enhances a European consciousness among participants. Recent scholarship on European identity has made similar claims about the civic significance of foreign study, yet the empirical basis for these claims remains a subject of debate. This article unpacks the logic of the civic view of Erasmus and submits the individual assumptions to empirical investigation. Based on a survey of more than 2000 respondents from 25 EU countries, this study has the advantage of being both larger and more multinational in composition than the major previous studies. The data largely support the logic of the civic view of Erasmus, demonstrating the intercultural nature of the sojourn abroad, providing compelling evidence that the Erasmus experience contributes to attitudinal changes about Europe among participants, and highlighting significant differences between the Erasmus students and those who do not study abroad when it comes to levels of support for the EU and extent of identifying as European.

Keywords

INTRODUCTION

Created in 1987, the Erasmus programme is the largest programme for student exchange in the world and the most popular framework for student mobility in the European Union (EU).[1] Its objective is to promote and facilitate mobility in higher education.[2] In addition to preparing European students to work in an increasingly transnational economy, from its inception Erasmus has also been promoted by the European Commission as a "civic" exercise aimed at "forg[ing] a European consciousness" (Papatsiba, 2006: 99). The idea is that intermixing students of different nationalities instils or enhances a sense of European identity among participants and serves as a path to creating truly European citizens (EU, 1987a, 1987b, 1997, 1998; Prodi, 2002; Figel, 2006, 2007).

Apart from the Commission's claims about Erasmus's civic potential, there is a solid theoretical basis to expect students who spend part of their studies in another European country to develop a European identity and a shared sense of community. Social communication theory (Deutsch, 1953; Deutsch *et al.*, 1967) as well as social psychology's contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954; Amir, 1969; Stephen, 1985; Hewstone and Brown, 1986) and common in-group identity model (Gaertner *et al.*, 1993; Gaertner and Dovidio, 2012) all highlight the significance of transnational and intergroup contact as mechanisms for identity-formation and reducing intergroup bias.

Influenced by these theories, in recent years a number of authors have depicted foreign study sojourns in general, and Erasmus participation in particular, as a means of enhancing European identity and producing self-identifying European citizens with a stake in European integration (Fligstein, 2008; Green, 2007; Bruter, 2005). While the causal mechanisms of this transformative view of Erasmus participation are not always made explicit, the view rests on a number of fairly consistent, theoretically-derived assumptions. Distilled, the logic is that Erasmus students use their sojourn abroad to engage in meaningful contact with other Europeans, they become more aware of and interested in Europe and other Europeans as a result, and ultimately they self-identify as European. Following Papatsiba (2005), who uses of the term "civic" to describe precisely this rationale for the Erasmus program, I refer to this as the *civic view* of Erasmus.

There have been several empirical studies indicating that Erasmus participants do tend to identify as European (King and Ruiz-Galices, 2003; Sigalas, 2010a; Van Mol, 2011). However, a debate has recently emerged as to whether foreign study *causes* European identity (King and Ruiz-Galices, 2003; Van Mol, 2011) or whether students who are *already* European identifiers and supporters are more likely to choose to participate in Erasmus in the first place (Sigalas 2010a, 2010b; Van Mol, 2011; Wilson, 2011).[3]

Rather than attempting to establish the direction of causality between Erasmus study and European identity, this article instead provides an empirical analysis of the theoretically-derived assumptions underlying the civic view of Erasmus study. By design, this study *asks whether* (rather than *assumes that*) Erasmus students do, in fact, engage in meaningful contact with other Europeans during their sojourn abroad; whether they indeed become more interested in Europe and other Europeans as a result of their sojourn; and whether, compared with students who do not spend a part of their university studies abroad, they are more likely to self-identify as European and hold favourable attitudes toward the EU and European integration. The findings are based on survey responses from more than 2000 university students from 25 EU countries, making this study both larger and more multinational in composition than the major previous studies (Wilson, 2011; Sigalas, 2010a, 2010b; King and Ruiz-Galices, 2003).[4] Analysis of the data demonstrates the extensive transnational interaction that occurs during the sojourn abroad, provides compelling evidence that the Erasmus experience contributes to attitudinal changes about Europe among participants, and illuminates significant differences between the Erasmus and sedentary students when it comes to levels of support for the EU and extent of identifying as European. By synthesizing existing studies and contributing new data and analysis of both the experience of Erasmus students while abroad as well as students' attitudes about the EU and sense of their own European identity, the article contributes to a growing scholarly literature about the significance of educational exchange in promoting European attachment and identity.

The article proceeds in four sections. Part one outlines the theoretical underpinnings of the civic view of Erasmus and summarises what we know about the programme from previous studies. It also further explains the rationale for this new study and describes the research design. Part two evaluates, in turn, the assumptions on which the civic view of Erasmus is based. It examines the evidence that the Erasmus sojourn is, in fact, an exercise in significant cross-border interaction; that Erasmus participation indeed impacts students' interest in and Europe and other Europeans; and that Erasmus students do, in fact, feel more "European" than do non-mobile students. The section also considers foreign language ability as an additional aspect of the Erasmus experience that may impact identity. Part three disaggregates the data by nationality to make some cross-national comparisons. Part four discusses some methodological considerations and points to some promising avenues for future research.

ERASMUS AS A CIVIC EXPERIENCE?

It is widely accepted that – to endure – a well-functioning political system must be underpinned by "diffuse support" from the underlying population (Easton, 1965). The term is variously refers to a general sense of *loyalty*, *attachment*, *goodwill*, *we-feeling*, and *trust* in the political community (*see* e.g. Miller, 1971). Back in 1970, Lindberg and Scheingold, drawing on Easton, could plausibly assert that that European public opinion was characterised by a "permissive consensus" in favour of the European project. But events in recent years have made it increasingly difficult to sustain the notion that there exists a tacit reservoir of support for the integration project. Indeed, some scholars now talk of a "constraining dissensus" emerging in EU politics (Down and Wilson, 2008; Hooghe and Marks, 2009). As a result, renewed attention has been focused on the importance of enhancing what one edited volume calls "civic resources" in the EU – such

as trust, a shared identity, and solidarity – in order to overcome the political and economic crises the EU has faced in recent years (Karolewski and Kaina, 2012).

Following Karolewski and Kaina's (2012) and Papatsiba's (2005) use of the term "civic", the concept of a "civic experience" here denotes an experience that fosters a sense of shared European identity or promotes a sense of European consciousness. It is clear from Commission documents and speeches that Erasmus has long been viewed as a civic experience (EU, 1987a, 1987b, 1997, 1998; Prodi, 2002; Figel, 2006, 2007) and not just as pre-professional training, even though the economic rationale for Erasmus has been advanced most prominently.[5]

This civic rationale for student mobility rests on a belief that, by bringing together students of different nationalities, the Erasmus program would promote a sense of European identity and create a constituency for European integration among future elite.[6] According to a 1996 Commission green paper, student mobility would bring with it "a growing European consciousness instilled through greater awareness of others as a result of exposure to new cultures and societies" (cited in Papatsiba, 2006: 101). More recently, Ján Figel, then-Commissioner for Education, Training, Culture, and Youth, praised Erasmus for its role in creating "truly European citizens" who act as "ambassadors of European values" (Figel, 2007). Indeed, the program's civic objective was encapsulated in the very motto used to promote it: "bringing students to Europe, bringing Europe to all students."

By the logic of this civic rationale, Erasmus is intended (and expected) to be a *transformative* experience for its participants. Indeed, the civic success of the programme could be said to rest on the extent to which Erasmus alumni were characterized by certain attributes: an awareness of and interest in other European countries and people (and perhaps in the EU itself); an affective attachment to some notion of "Europe"; and a tendency to identify as a European.

To date, the most thorough and largest (*n*>1000) empirical examinations of the Erasmus experience have been those assessing how well the program meets its material objectives (Maiworm, Steube, and Teichler, 1991; Teichler and Maiworm, 1994; Maiworm and Teichler, 1996; Jahr and Teichler, 2002; Bracht, Engle, Janson *et al.*, 2006). Thus, they focus on students' academic experience abroad and their transition from university into employment. These survey projects and the secondary literature that emerged from them describe a host of details about the academic aspects of Erasmus study. They also provide insights into how Erasmus study relates to future employment and subsequent mobility.[7] Large studies have also explored the barriers to student mobility, with the aim of making Erasmus more inclusive and accessible to students from various socio-economic backgrounds (Vossensteyn *et al.*, 2010).

In contrast to the wealth of scholarship on the academic and economic aspects and impacts of Erasmus study, there have been relatively few studies investigating the civic aspects of the program, namely whether – or how much – Erasmus study affects participants' European attachment and identity. Even absent conclusive empirical evidence, several works on European identity have nevertheless argued – on theoretical more than empirical grounds – that Erasmus participation is a means of enhancing European identity and support for the EU. Fligstein writes that the international contact that Erasmus students experience abroad "ought to make them more European" (2008: 181). Green describes Erasmus (and other EU educational exchange programs) as "[a] significant EU project meant to enhance the sense of Europeaness felt by its citizens" (2007: 47). Bruter describes the objective underlying the development of Erasmus and other exchange programs: "to propose a new 'Social Contract' to European citizens, and to develop a new mass European identity rather than let citizens be mere 'consumers' of the economic benefits associated with Europe" (2005: 73-74).

Empirical work (most of which has been published subsequent to these works) provides only mixed support for these claims, however (King and Ruiz-Galices, 2003; Sigalas, 2010a, 2010b; Van Mol, 2011; Wilson, 2011). To understand the debate about Erasmus as a transformative experience, and what this article contributes to that debate, it is necessary to look at both the theoretical basis for such claims and to examine the existing empirical evidence.

Mechanisms of European identity-formation: Theory and evidence

Underlying any civic claims about Erasmus's role in European identity-formation is the constructivist view that collective identities in general, and political identities in particular, are not fixed but malleable. This view is rooted in scholarship on national identity formation that depicts these identities as modern creations (Mosse, 1975; Weber, 1976; Colley, 1994; Deutsch, 1953; Gellner, 1983; Anderson, 1991; Hobsbawm, 1992; Hobsawm and Ranger, 1992). In contrast to essentialist notions of national identity (Smith, 2000), in the constructivist logic of identity formation there is nothing particularly sacrosanct or exclusive about national identities. Instead, they are seen as the historical by-product of structural changes in modern societies (Gellner, 1983; Anderson, 1991) or even conscious manipulation of political symbols by elites (Hobsbawm, 1992; Hobsawm and Ranger, 1992). Under analogous circumstances, there is nothing to prevent the emergence of a European identity.

From this point of departure, with the increasing institutionalisation of the EU (Stone Sweet *et al.*, 1998), the subject of European identity has become an important area of EU scholarship. Recent works have examined the role of the Commission in fostering European identity (Shore, 2000) and the nature and implications of European identification (Green, 2008; Fligstein, 2010). In a more normative sense, others have argued the *need* for European identity, making the case, for example, that it is the prerequisite for more extensive, democratic political integration (Laffan, 1996: 95-99; Decker, 2002). The question then becomes: if political identities are constructed, how is (or can) *European* identity be constructed? Deutsch's theory of social communication and social psychology's contact hypothesis and common in-group identity model provide insights into this process of community-building and group identity.

Writing in the 1950s and 1960s, Deutsch and other 'transactionalists' emphasised the importance of 'social communication' as a means of identity-formation, both within the nation-state (Deutsch, 1953) and within transnational 'security communities' (Deutsch *et. al.,* 1967). By 'social communication' or 'transactions', Deutsch and his colleagues referred to the development of sustained and wide-ranging face-to-face interactions across different groups. What is important for the emergence of a shared identity is the creation of permanent networks that bring ordinary people together in a multitude of ways. Through increased interaction – social communication – trust and ultimately a sense of community were built.

Theories from social psychology also emphasise the potentially transformative significance of social interactions. The contact hypothesis suggests that, under certain conditions, direct personal contact between 'in-group' and 'out-group' members can have a transformative effect on the attitudes of group members toward members of the other group (Allport, 1954; Amir, 1969; Stephen, 1985; Hewstone and Brown, 1986).[8] The common in-group identity model goes even further, suggesting that interaction between groups can not only reduce intergroup bias, but actually cause group members to recategorise themselves as a single group ("we") rather than categorising themselves as two separate groups ("us" and "them") (Gaertner *et al.*, 1993: 3).

To the extent that Erasmus participation indeed promotes cross-border interaction and meaningful relationships across national groups, there are, thus, good theoretical

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reasons to believe that it may be linked with attitudinal and identity change. Indeed, it is precisely this logic that underlies scholarly claims about the civic effect of Erasmus. Those who make the broadest claims about the transformative aspect of Erasmus highlight intercultural contact in a way that echoes both social communication theory and the contact hypothesis. For example, on the subject of Erasmus participation, Green writes that, "[l]eaving the bounds of one's local homelands, perhaps for the first extended stay or first time on one's own, meeting new friends, and experiencing other cultures—these are very likely to expand the sense of the individual's 'home space' from the national boundaries to the continental" (Green, 2007: 48). Likewise, for Fligstein, what is important about Erasmus is the "opportunity to interact" with other European students: when students go abroad and form friendships with other Europeans, they recognise the commonalities they share, boundaries between in-group and out-group are blurred, and ultimately they "[see] themselves more as Europeans and less as having merely national identity" (Fligstein, 2008: 139).

But while this interpretation of Erasmus participation as a civic experience has significant theoretical grounding, it has been only weakly verified by empirical evidence. Most of the empirical studies have been surveys exploring the relationship between Erasmus participation and European identity or attachment to the EU,[9] although the findings are not in agreement. Some studies find a correlation between Erasmus study and European identity while others dispute this claim.

Russell King and Enric Ruiz-Gelices (2003) surveyed 475 students from British universities and found that students who spent a year studying in continental Europe were more pro-European and held a more European identity than students who did not study abroad. More recently, Christof Van Mol (2011) surveyed 1054 mobile students, 798 "future mobile students" (who definitely want to study abroad), 786 "potential mobile studies" (who may want to study abroad), and 248 non-mobile students from across Europe. He found that mobile students were most attached to Europe, followed by future mobile students, then potential mobile students, and lastly by non-mobile students, who were least attached of all. When asked if they considered themselves citizens of Europe or considered themselves European, the same pattern emerged across the various groups. Both the King and Ruiz-Gelices and Van Mol studies therefore concluded that a foreign study sojourn was positively correlated with civic outcomes such as identifying with Europe, European attachment, or an increased sense of "belonging to a European cultural space" (King and Ruiz-Galices, 2003).

However, two recent studies have found just the opposite. Emmanuel Sigalas surveyed 161 British students who studied in continental Europe, 241 continental Europeans who studied in Britain, and 60 British students who did not study abroad, to investigate whether studying abroad impacted students' European identity (2010a) or level of support for the EU (2010b). In both cases, he found the foreign study experience had little impact on the dependent variable in question. Wilson (2011) surveyed 99 Erasmus students (mostly British students studying in France and French students studying in the UK) and 145 control students (mostly British students studying in the UK) to investigate whether foreign study made students more pro-European. Like Sigalas, his conclusion was that it did not.[10]

Without wishing to minimise the importance of these previous studies, it is clear that the question of whether Erasmus study is transformative, in a civic sense, is far from settled. For one thing, existing empirical studies differ significantly in their conclusions: some support the transformative view of Erasmus study (King and Ruiz-Galices, 2003; Van Mol, 2011), while other studies do not (Sigalas, 2010a; 2010b; Wilson, 2011). Apart from that, it is premature to draw conclusions about the transformative nature of Erasmus study from the existing literature for several reasons. First, the large-*n* studies are largely silent on precisely the variables that theory tells us are important for identity change – those related to the (supposedly) intercultural nature of the Erasmus experience itself. Additionally, many of the large-*n* studies do not compare Erasmus

students with students who did not study abroad, so it is not always possible to tell whether, or to what extent, Erasmus students are different from other university students.

The studies that *do* focus on the civic aspects of Erasmus are also limited in several important ways. First, most draw conclusions about the effect (or lack of effect) of Erasmus study on identity or attitudes on the basis of relatively small sample sizes. For example, Sigalas generalises about the attitudes of "non-Erasmus students" on the basis of survey responses from 60 from British students, at a single university, who did not study abroad. Wilson's findings about Erasmus students' support for the EU is based on responses from 99 Erasmus students. More importantly, most of the studies are limited in national scope, based primarily on surveys of British students or students studying in the UK. This is problematic, not only because of the lack of representativeness of the sample, but more importantly because British attitudes towards Europe are often well outside the norm (Spiering, 2004; Risse, 2002: 204-206).

Research design

This study attempts to remedy some of the deficiencies of the current literature by identifying the core, theoretically-derived assumptions about Erasmus study – e.g. that Erasmus students engage in meaningful contact with other Europeans, become more interested in Europe and other Europeans as a result, and self-identify as European – and investigating whether empirical evidence supports these claims. The data set analysed here is both large and multinational (2011 students representing 25 EU nationalities), thus avoiding some of the problems associated with works based on small sample sizes or primarily on British students. The subjects fall into two groups: 1041 Erasmus students and 970 university students who studied only in their home country. For brevity, the latter group is referred to as *non-mobile* students. The study focuses on the social aspects of the Erasmus experience that are overlooked by existing large-*n* studies, examining how much cross-cultural interaction occurs during the sojourn abroad, whether the sojourn makes Erasmus students more interested in Europe and Europeans, and the extent to which Erasmus students support and feel attached to the EU and identify as Europeans.

The survey was conducted online during the academic year 2010-11. Five universities were initially targeted for the survey, in Toulouse (France), Bremen (Germany), Bologna (Italy), Malaga (Spain), and Norwich (UK). The countries represent the largest sending and receiving countries for Erasmus students (EU, 2010),[11] and the specific universities were chosen because they have cooperative arrangements with the author's home institution, which – it was hoped – would encourage support from university administrators and faculty.[12] The survey was offered in five languages – English, French, German, Italian, and Spanish – chosen to make the survey accessible to as many students as possible. Not only are these the languages used in the countries targeted for the survey, but speakers of these five languages comprise a plurality of students in tertiary education within the EU and they are the most commonly-learned foreign languages in Europe (Eurostat, 2010: 263).

The target group was current university students, aged 18 or older, from EU member states. Between November 2010 and June 2011, 2740 participants meeting these criteria completed the survey. By design, the survey was brief; as an earlier pilot survey indicated an extremely high proportion of incomplete surveys among those whose completion time exceeded ten minutes. The average completion time of this survey was just over seven minutes, with 84 per cent of the surveys completed in 3-15 minutes.

To avoid analytical complications, respondents were excluded from the dataset if their foreign study experience took place outside of the EU or outside of the Erasmus

framework.[13] The non-mobile group was limited to EU nationals who had never studied outside their home country. After these exclusions, the remaining dataset of 2011 respondents consists of 1041 Erasmus students and 970 non-mobile students. Four nationalities (German, Italian, French, and Spanish) are represented by more than 80 respondents each, and a total of 25 EU nationalities are represented in the dataset. The gender distribution of the sample is 46 per cent male and 52 per cent female (the remainder did not indicate a gender) and the mean respondent age is 22.8 years.

UNPACKING AND EVALUATING THE LOGIC OF CIVIC ARGUMENT

As outlined in the introduction, the purpose of this article is to provide an empirical evaluation of the core assumptions made in the literature of Erasmus study as a civic experience: namely that Erasmus students engage in meaningful contact with other Europeans, become more interested in Europe and other Europeans as a result, and self-identify as European. Each assumption will be explored in detail in this section.

Cross-cultural interaction in the Erasmus sojourn

As discussed in part one, social communication theory and the contact hypothesis provide good theoretical grounds to expect that social interaction among students may lead to attitudinal change. But do we actually find that Erasmus students engage in significant cross-cultural interaction during their sojourn, as the civic view of the programme assumes?

The question of *with whom* mobile students are likely to interact is, in fact, the subject of debate. Neil Fligstein writes that Erasmus "[s]tudents who go abroad often get a good experience of the local culture of the host country and have the opportunity to mingle with young people from these other societies. Their experiences ought to make them more European[…]" (Fligstein, 2008: 181) However, Elizabeth Murphy-Lejeune (2002) found that mobile students she interviewed – about one-third of whom were Erasmus students – only rarely interacted extensively with students from their host country. Instead, they often associated primarily with their co-nationals, or their "ethnic group" to use her term. "Relying on the ethnic group," she writes, "is first and foremost a method for the recreation of a primary relation around the native culture, a kind of 'home away from home'" (Murphy-Lejeune, 2002: 184). However, the cultural isolation of this formation ultimately led many of the students in her study to reach out to other groups as well. Moving beyond the "ethnic group", most students found it far easier to connect with an "international group" of other visiting students than to break into the "native group" of host-country students.

In the Erasmus group surveyed for this study, the vast majority reported socialising in an "international group", with a small minority reporting that they socialised primarily within their own "ethnic group" and an even smaller minority reporting that they socialised primarily with the "native group" of host-country students.

Table 1: Socialisation by nationality whilst abroad (%)

Whilst abroad did you socialize primarily with…	
co-nationals	13
host country nationals	10
other nationalities	78

Source: Author's data.

It is theoretically possible that the 78 per cent of Erasmus students reporting that they socialised primarily with other nationalities while abroad also socialise with other nationalities even in their home country. If this were true, it would undercut the assumption that an Erasmus exchange provides a *unique* opportunity to interact extensively with other Europeans. This does not, however, appear to be the case. Indeed, only 10 per cent of Erasmus students reported that they socialised with other nationalities as much (or more) prior to studying abroad. It therefore seems safe to conclude that an Erasmus sojourn constitutes a unique source of intercultural contact for the vast majority of participants.

What more can we learn about the nature of that intercultural contact from the survey data? It is possible, by looking at students' reported language use while abroad, to establish whether students socialised primarily with speakers of their same native tongue (for example, Irish students with British students, Austrians with Germans, etc.). Based on the fact that only 15 per cent reported speaking primarily their native language, this is clearly unlikely. In fact, use of at least one foreign language on a regular basis was the norm for Erasmus students during their sojourn. Somewhat surprisingly, only 40 per cent reported speaking primarily the host country language outside the classroom. This means that 45 per cent of Erasmus students socialised in neither their host country language nor their native language, but in some other language. More than three-quarters of those students reported that they socialised in two third-country languages (neither their native tongue nor the host country language) and nearly a quarter reported socialising in three or more third-country languages.

Scholars investigating the contact hypothesis in the context of a study abroad experience have tended to focus on visiting students' degree of integration into the host society (Stangor, Jonas, Stroebe, and Hewstone, 1996: 674). Interestingly, this sort of integrative experience was extremely rare for the Erasmus students surveyed. In fact, only 7 per cent of Erasmus students reported both socialising primarily with host country nationals *and* speaking primarily the host country language. Nevertheless, the data clearly indicate that the Erasmus sojourn was indeed an intercultural experience, as is often assumed. Indeed, taken together, the data paint a picture of the Erasmus experience as one where students socialise in a multi-national, often multi-lingual group, and only very rarely cluster in insular national groups.

Given the non-integrative nature of the Erasmus sojourn, the contact hypothesis would not predict significant attitudinal change between native and visiting students. However, the transnational interaction that appears to characterise the Erasmus sojourn may indeed nevertheless be conducive to the formation of a broader European identity, as the civic view of Erasmus suggests.

Foreign study and attitudinal changes about Europe

At the heart of the transformative view of the Erasmus program is the belief that a sojourn studying abroad changes students' attitudes about Europe. But the existing empirical evidence is mixed. To assess attitudinal change, this survey asked students to indicate whether, and to what extent, studying abroad made them feel more European and made them more interested in Europe, other Europeans, and the EU.

As can been seen in Table 2, virtually all Erasmus students reported that studying abroad made them more interested in other European countries (91 per cent) and other European people and cultures (93 per cent), and a solid majority of them became more interested in the EU (66 per cent) and felt more European (73 per cent) as a result of studying abroad.

Table 2: Attitudinal change after studying abroad (%)

As a result of studying abroad...	
Are you more interested in the EU?	
To a great extent	23
to some extent	43
slightly	24
not at all	10
Are you more interested in other European countries?	
To a great extent	57
to some extent	34
slightly	7
not at all	2
Are you more interested in other European people and cultures?	
To a great extent	60
to some extent	33
slightly	6
not at all	1
Do you feel more European?	
To a great extent	24
to some extent	49
slightly	21
not at all	6

Source: Author's data.

Of the students reporting a greater interest in Europe, other Europeans, and the EU, the majority were not motivated to study abroad by these particular interests. Indeed, when asked about their reasons for studying abroad, 42 per cent of Erasmus students reported being motivated by a desire to learn about another country or culture, and a mere 2 per cent were motivated by some sort of European impulse (to experience Europe, learn more about the EU, feel more European, etc.). Thus, it seems safe to conclude that studying abroad induced additional interest in Europe *even among students who were not consciously predisposed to it*.

The finding that Erasmus study increases participants' interests in these various aspects of Europe supports the assumption that Erasmus participation leads to attitudinal change. And even the relatively lower proportion of students whose interest in the EU increased to "some extent" or more can be viewed as corroboration for the Commission's claims that Erasmus creates a constituency for European integration, given the extremely low proportion of students (less than 2 per cent) initially motivated to study abroad by an interest in the EU. Finally, the fact that 73 per cent of students reported that studying abroad made them feel more European must be taken as an indication of significant attitudinal change. While a longitudinal study that measured students' attitudes prior to and again after foreign study would more conclusively establish the *extent* of attitude change, these findings suggest that Erasmus study is indeed a transformative experience.

Are Erasmus students more 'European' than non-mobile students?

It is clear from the data presented above that – at least according to their own self-assessment – Erasmus study led to a significant degree of attitudinal change among the participants of this study, making students more interested in various aspects of Europe and leading them to feel more European. This section looks more closely at students' feelings and attitudes toward Europe and the EU. Specifically, it evaluates the assumption that Erasmus students are more likely than non-mobile students to support European integration, feel attached to the EU, and identify as European.

The data presented in this section indicate that Erasmus students overwhelmingly feel supportive of the EU and identify as European according to several measures, and they do so to a greater extent than non-mobile students. For each variable analysed below, a chi-squared (x^2) test was used to determine the probability that variation in the two groups' responses was the result of chance. This p-value is reported along with the major findings in each case. Typical survey analyses report the findings as statistically significant when $p<0.01$ or $p<0.05$. As we shall see below, however, almost all tests in the present analysis resulted in p-values much smaller than this (often less than 0.0001), leading to very high confidence that the numerical disparities represent genuine differences in the populations of Erasmus and non-mobile students.

The first comparison is of the pro-European attitudes of the two groups of students. These attitudes were measured in two ways. First, students were asked to report their *favourability* toward the EU and toward the idea of European integration using a 5-point Leikert scale, where 1 means "very unfavourable" and 5 means "very favourable." Second, students were asked to indicate their level of *attachment* to the European Union, to their country, and to their village, town or city – a formulation used in several Eurobarometer (EB) surveys (Eurobarometer, 2007a: section 2.2 and p. 26 of the technical specifications; Eurobarometer, 2007b: section 2.2; Eurobarometer, 2008a: section 1.1).

For both questions, there was a statistically significant difference in the responses of the two groups ($p<0.0001$), with the Erasmus students reporting higher levels of both favourability and attachment to the EU. As Table 3 indicates, 72 per cent of the Erasmus group reported being favourable to the idea of European integration (a score of 4 or 5), compared with 60 per cent of the non-mobile students; 73 per cent of Erasmus students reported being favourable to the EU, compared with 57 per cent of non-mobile students.

Table 3: Favourability toward the European Integration and the EU (%)

	ERASMUS	NON-MOBILE
Favourability toward European Integration		
unfavourable (1-2)	8	14
neutral (3)	21	27
favourable (4-5)	72	60
mean response	3.99	3.64
Favourability toward the EU		
unfavourable (1-2)	8	13
neutral (3)	19	31
favourable (4-5)	73	57
mean response	3.99	3.58

Source: Author's data.

In the same vein, Table 4 shows that 71 per cent of Erasmus students reported feeling "very" or "fairly" attached to the EU, compared with 56 per cent of non-mobile students. While Erasmus students reported attachment levels significantly higher than the general European population, as measured by Eurobarometer surveys 65 (50 per cent reported feeling "very" or "fairly" attached), 67 (53 per cent attached), and 68 (49 per cent attached), the non-mobile students were only slightly more attached than the Eurobarometer respondents.

Table 4: Attachment to the EU (%)

	ERASMUS	NON-MOBILE
very attached	18	12
fairly attached	53	44
not very attached	26	35
not at all attached	4	9

Source: Author's data.

While a majority of students – both mobile and non-mobile – reported feeling favourable to European integration, there is a marked, and statistically significant, difference between the Erasmus group and the non-mobile group. The Erasmus students are clearly more favourable and attached to the EU, a finding that may be explained by material interests. After all, the European integration process has normalised, facilitated, and even subsidised intra-European study. The adoption of the European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System (ECTS) clarifies credit-transfer procedures, making it easier for students to apply work completed during foreign study sojourns toward their home-university degrees. The single market principle of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality has been successfully applied to students, with the result that universities cannot charge additional fees to students from other EU member states. Furthermore, Erasmus students receive grants to defray the additional costs of studying abroad. In short, because of the EU, students find it much easier to experience foreign study today than in the past. Erasmus students, in particular, benefit directly as a result.

Next we turn to the question of European identity. Eurobarometer data over time demonstrates a majority of Europeans identify, to some extent, as Europeans. It has also been shown that younger and better educated people are more likely than older and less educated people to identify as European (Dogan, 1993, 1994; Howe 1995; Hix, 1999: 147; Citrin and Side, 2004; Green, 2007; Fligstein, 2008; Eurobarometer, 2008: 34). There is reason to expect, therefore, that a greater proportion of respondents in the sample – composed entirely of university students aged 35 or younger – would report feeling attached or identifying as European than respondents from the general population, as measured by the Eurobarometer (EB) survey. As Table 5 shows, this was indeed the case.

But the critical question, of course, is whether Erasmus students identify as European more readily than their non-mobile counterparts, as Commissioners (Prodi, 2006; Figel, 2006, 2007) and scholars (Fligstein, 2008; Green, 2007; Papatsiba, 2006; Bruter, 2005) alike have asserted. In short, is Erasmus linked with students' sense of "belonging to Europe" (King and Ruiz-Gelices, 2003: 238)?

To measure students' European identity, the survey included two identity-related questions, both borrowed from the Eurobarometer survey. The first asked whether respondents often, sometimes, or never think of themselves as not only their nationality, but *also* as European. The second asked whether, in the near future, respondents

expected to see themselves as their nationality only; their nationality first, then European; equally their nationality and European; European first, then their nationality; or European only.

Comparing the two groups of students reveals modest differences in the responses of Erasmus and non-mobile students to the identity questions (*see* Table 5). By both measures, the Erasmus group reported a greater level of European identification. In terms of identification frequency, 44 per cent of the Erasmus students reported "often" thinking of themselves as European, compared with 33 per cent of the non-mobile group. In terms of extent of identification, nearly half of the Erasmus students reported that, in the future, they see themselves as European at least as much as they see themselves in terms of their nationality, compared with about one-third of the non-mobile students. While the magnitudes of these differences are modest, their statistical significance is nevertheless very high, with $p<0.0001$ for both questions.

Table 5: European identification (%)

	ERASMUS	NON-MOBILE	EB62	EB64	EB66
Think of yourself as not only your nationality, but also as European?					
often	44	33	--	17	16
sometimes	49	53	--	38	38
never	8	14	--	42	43
In near future, do you see yourself as…					
only nationality?	4	7	37	--	--
nationality then European?	51	58	48	--	--
equally nationality and European?	32	26	7	--	--
European then nationality?	12	6	4	--	--
only European?	2	3	3	--	--

Source: Author's data, Eurobarometers 62, 64, 66.

The assumptions of the civic view – that Erasmus students would be more favourable and attached to the EU and would more likely identify as European than non-mobile students – is unequivocally borne out by the survey data. However, we must interpret these findings with care and, specifically, refrain from making causal inferences where they cannot be supported. While it is possible that Erasmus students possess these "European" attributes *as a result of their Erasmus participation*, it seems equally plausible that students who identify as European are precisely the ones who choose to study abroad (Sigalas, 2010a). It is also conceivable that there is a pro-European identity bias inherent in the Erasmus selection process. That is, in cases where there are more students interested in foreign study than there are Erasmus stipends to support them, students who convey a more European outlook may prove more successful as applicants.[14]

Multilingualism as a facilitator for European identity

Related to the question of whether Erasmus students identify more readily as European in the present is the question of whether they are more likely identifiers in the future. This was not a main area of inquiry in the survey, but analysis of the language skills reported by Erasmus and non-mobile students provide an oblique insight into the question.

Indeed, those who have taken an interest in European identity sooner or later stumble against the problem of identity formation in a multilingual polity. The use of so many languages in Europe is one often-cited barrier to the development of a European identity (Kraus, 2008; Bakke, 1995: 10-11). Put crudely, how can individuals develop a sense of collective identity if they cannot communicate with one another? Certainly social communication theory and the contact hypothesis alike presume the ability to interact meaningfully. In an EU with twenty-three official languages – not to mention the dozen or more additional languages which are spoken throughout the EU without having the status of official working languages – the ability to speak foreign languages is almost a prerequisite for the type of meaningful cross-cultural interaction stressed by both social communication theory and the contact hypothesis.

The 2002 Barcelona European Council made language learning a part of the Lisbon Strategy and established the objective that all Europeans should speak two languages in addition to their native language (Barcelona European Council, 2002: 19). Recent surveys have found, however, that barely a quarter of Europeans could, in fact, do so (Eurobarometer, 2006: 9; Eurostat, 2009). We might reasonably expect young people, especially university students, to fare somewhat better than the general population in language ability.

In open-ended questions, the survey asked respondents to list their native languages as well as the languages they speak with native, fluent, moderate, and "a little" proficiency. As expected, the university students as a whole reported better language abilities than the general population. In terms of meeting the Lisbon Strategy's foreign language objective, virtually all of the students in this sample (96 per cent) reported being able to speak conversationally in two languages besides their native language. There was surprisingly little variation across fields of study in the percentage of students meeting the Lisbon Strategy objective. Rates varied from 91 per cent of business and management students to 98 per cent of language students. Any suggestion that science students are less proficient at foreign languages is strongly refuted: science and technology students had a 97 per cent success rate at meeting the Lisbon Strategy objective.

The data not only show that university students outperformed the general population in foreign language competence, but also that Erasmus students outperformed non-mobile students when it came to speaking foreign languages. As Table 6 summarises, students from the Erasmus group reported speaking more languages and speaking them better than students from the non-mobile group, and with a p value of <0.0001 the difference is statistically significant. While a similarly high number of students from both groups reported meeting the Lisbon Strategy objective (speaking two foreign languages conversationally or better), 78 per cent of the Erasmus group reported speaking a *third* foreign language conversationally or better, compared with 39 per cent of the non-mobile control group. In terms of fluency, a somewhat higher proportion of Erasmus students than non-mobile students claimed fluency in at least one foreign language (81 per cent of the Erasmus group versus 66 per cent of the non-mobile control group). But again, the real differences appear when we look at reported ability in additional foreign languages. The proportion of students from the Erasmus group reporting fluency in two or more foreign languages is four times higher than the proportion from the non-mobile control group.

Table 6: Foreign language ability (%)

	ERASMUS	NON-MOBILE
Fluent in at least 1 non-native language	81	66
Fluent in at least 2 non-native languages	25	6
Conversational or better in at least 1 non-native language	100	100
Conversational or better in at least 2 non-native languages	98	95
Conversational or better in at least 3 non-native languages	78	39
Conversational or better in at least 4 non-native languages	26	7
Mean # of languages (incl. native), conversational or better	**2.8**	**2.3**

Source: Author's data.

In summation, virtually all the students in the sample met the Lisbon Strategy's language objective – far exceeding the language abilities reported by the general European population. Moreover the Erasmus students reported a higher degree of multilingualism than non-mobile students.[15] Given that students planning to study abroad have a practical incentive to learn a foreign language, this is not particularly surprising. Additionally, with more than two-thirds of Erasmus students taking classes exclusively or predominantly in a foreign language during their sojourn (Teichler, 2004), the experience of studying abroad is likely to strengthen their foreign language skills. Nevertheless, given the abundant historical evidence linking communication with political community-building (Deutsch, 1953; Weber, 1976; Gellner, 1983), the finding is quite interesting. If we accept that the ability to speak foreign languages is a prerequisite for community-building in a multi-lingual Europe, then Erasmus students are undoubtedly more capable of forging the sorts of transnational ties and networks that are likely to lead to a shared European identity.

Evaluating the civic assumptions about Erasmus

This section evaluated the theoretically-derived assumptions that underlie the civic view of the Erasmus program – e.g. that Erasmus students engage in meaningful contact with other Europeans, become more interested in Europe and other Europeans as a result, and self-identify as European. Erasmus students were found to engage in significant levels of cross-cultural interaction during their sojourn abroad. Only a small minority of students socialises primarily with students of their own nationality or speaks primarily their native language. Indeed, data on students' socialising and language use indicate that the Erasmus experience exposes students to much greater cross-cultural and multilingual interaction than they are accustomed to experiencing at home, thus supporting the view that Erasmus provides a unique channel of cross-cultural contact. The data also support the assumption that Erasmus participation leads to attitudinal change about Europe. As a result of studying abroad, most Erasmus students reported that they became more interested in other European countries, in other European people and cultures, and in the EU, and that the experience made them feel more European.

Finally, Erasmus students were found to be more favourable both the EU and to the idea of European and more attached to the EU than non-mobile students. The data also indicate that Erasmus students self-identify as European more frequently than do non-mobile students and they appear to accord a relatively higher level of importance to their

European identity than do non-mobile students. Erasmus students also reported greater foreign language proficiency, which will make it relatively easier for them to engage in the type of extensive cross-cultural interaction the civic view identifies as so important for future community-building.

CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISONS OF ERASMUS STUDENTS

The findings reported in section two are based on an analysis of the entire sample of Erasmus students, encompassing 25 nationalities. However, large surveys administered in the EU are often characterised by cross-national variation. Indeed, the Eurobarometer reports routinely disaggregate the data by nationality in order to facilitate cross-national comparison. Variation across countries has also been observed in various large-*n* Erasmus studies (*see* Bracht *et. al.*, 2006). To get a sense of how much cross-national variation exists among the Erasmus students in this survey, the mean response to the identity, attachment, and favourability questions on the survey was calculated for each of the four most-represented nationalities in the Erasmus sample (France, Germany, Italy, Spain) plus the UK. These results are summarised in Table 7 below.

Table 7: Mean responses of Erasmus students by nationality

	France (n=78)	Germany (n=926)	Italy (n=468)	Spain (n=143)	UK (n=33)
Do you ever think of yourself as European? - *lower numbers represent more frequent European identification*	1.74	1.77	1.64	1.51	2.24
In the near future, do you see yourself as national and/or European? - *higher numbers represent more prominent European identification*	2.47	2.43	2.76	2.06	1.94
EU attachment - *lower numbers represent greater attachment*	2.13	2.38	2.16	2.14	2.61
Favourability to idea of European integration - *higher numbers represent greater favourability*	3.65	3.66	4.15	4.16	3.27
Favourability to EU - *higher numbers represent greater favourability*	3.91	3.58	4.18	4.22	3.50

Source: Author's data.

The data indicate that the Spanish respondents most often identify as European; the Italians see their European identity as most prominent, in comparison with their national identity; the French are most attached to the EU, but are only barely ahead of the Spanish and the Italians; and the Spanish are the most favourable to both the idea of European integration and the EU. Apart from these observations, there are three interesting points to note.

First, in line with conventional wisdom on British Euroscepticism, students from the UK report the lowest frequency of and least prominent European identity, the lowest level of EU attachment, and the lowest levels of favourability to both the idea of European

integration and the EU. There were only 33 British students in the sample, but the British tendency toward Euroscepticism appears to be confirmed here, again raising a flag about the reliability of previous empirical studies of Erasmus students that are based primarily on British students.

Second, it is interesting that, while German students are significantly more favourable to the idea of European integration than the British students, their favourability to the EU is only slightly higher than the latter's, and both are significantly less favourable than the other three nationalities. Germans' comparatively low levels of support for the EU may reflect the timing of the survey, which took place while the EU continued to navigate the extremely costly financial rescue of the Eurozone's weakest members. Germany's economic contribution to the Greek bailout, in particular, has rankled many Germans and provoked a public opinion backlash. It would not be surprising if favourability among German students toward the EU and European integration were impacted by these developments.

Third, and related, it is noteworthy that Italy and Spain both report significantly higher levels of favourability to both the EU and to the idea of European integration than the other nationalities summarised in Table 7. It is plausible that this, like the German's relatively low levels of favourability, reflects the economic situation in Europe at the time of the survey. Already in 2010-11, mainstream media was predicting that Italy or Spain, or both, may need an EU bailout to avoid defaulting on sovereign debt.[16] The favourability ratings reported in the survey may partially reflect an assumption (subsequently borne out, in Spain's case) that the countries' European partners would provide the financial assistance to prevent economic catastrophe. But it is unlikely that this instrumental reasoning captures the whole story. Indeed, Eurobarometer surveys from the years preceding the economic crisis show that Spanish favourability toward the EU has consistently exceeded the EU average. On the other hand, Italian favourability to the EU had been slightly lower than the EU average and immediately prior to the 2008 financial crisis, had in fact decreased.

In addition to disaggregating the dataset by respondents' nationality, the dataset was further disaggregated by both respondents' nationality and Erasmus sojourn country in order to identify any obvious patterns related to destination. Of particular interest was the question of whether students spending their academic sojourn in the UK would have markedly different mean responses to the identity, attachment, and favourability questions than did their co-national studying in other countries. Unfortunately, the dataset contained only 61 Erasmus students who studied in the UK: 43 Italians, 14 Germans, and 4 Spaniards. With such small sample sizes in the case of the latter two nationalities, it was not possible to draw any firm conclusions on the question; the data do not reveal any consistent dampening effect on students' European identity, attachment, or favourability from studying in the UK. However, because of the prevalence of Britain as a study-abroad destination in existing studies of Erasmus students, this is a question that should be investigated further.

METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

There are trade-offs involved in any research design. The main drawback of previous face-to-face and mailed surveys of Erasmus students is the small number of respondents. Moreover, the reach of previous studies has often been limited – primarily – to British students and students studying in Britain. In order to reach a broader audience, this study has taken a different approach – namely, a widely-targeted, multinational, online survey – but there are trade-offs that must be acknowledged. This section discusses three potential drawbacks of this survey's methodology and discusses how they may affect the findings reported above. This is followed by some suggestions for future research.

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Methodological considerations

First, the selection of universities and students did not conform to a rigorous random sampling methodology.[17] Nevertheless, students in the survey represent a wide range of academic specialties and nationalities and, to the best of the author's knowledge, the targeted institutions and students have no particular bias that would affect the study's conclusions.

A second drawback—not only of this survey, but of all extant surveys of Erasmus students—is the obvious source of potential bias arising from the self-selection of students who, having received a solicitation to complete the survey, actually chose to respond. Common sense suggests that this source of bias would affect the results to a certain extent, especially if students with strong views on the survey content (e.g. strongly pro-or anti-European) were more likely to respond. There is no easy way to quantify this effect on this study, especially in the absence of accurate data on the number of students who received invitations. Nevertheless, the large number of respondents is encouraging, the demographic information raised no red flags other than the national distribution of respondents discussed below, and the scarcity of extreme responses on survey questions is also reassuring. It therefore seems plausible that the results of the survey indeed reflect the views of a substantial proportion of the target populations.

Finally, the varying levels of support received from different universities in distributing invitations to complete the survey greatly affected the number of responses received from different nationalities (*see* Table 8). In particular, the tremendous support extended by Bremen University proved a mixed blessing, as nearly half the total sample consists of German students. The effect is especially marked in the non-mobile group, where three-quarters of the respondents are German.

Table 8: Nationality of respondents, as % of each group

	ERASMUS	NON-MOBILE
French	4	4
German	19	77
Italian	45	3
Spanish	9	5
Other EU nationality	19	6
None given	4	5

Source: Author's data.

This distribution is obviously far from ideal and did affect the findings to a certain extent. By rerunning the statistical tests discussed in the previous section, this time comparing the Erasmus group with a non-mobile group that excluded the German respondents (i.e. the 747 non-mobile German students were excluded, so that 223 non-Germans remain in the non-mobile group) we can see one measure of that effect. As Table 9 shows, excluding the German students from the non-mobile group had no qualitative effect on much of the analysis: the p-values remained well below 0.01 in most cases, thus implying high levels of statistical significance. On the questions measuring pro-Europeanism, however, the effect was stronger. When the German students were removed from the non-mobile sample, the p-values for these questions increased more substantially (in two cases, to slightly above 0.05, which is often taken as the threshold for defining statistical significance). This indicates that the German students were less pro-European than the rest of the sample. Indeed, the mean favourability to the EU of the German students in the non-mobile group was 3.53 (on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 indicated "very unfavourable" and 5 indicated "very favourable") whereas the mean

favourability of the non-German students in the non-mobile group was 3.78. One possible reason for this has already been discussed – that the timing of the survey may reflect Germans' negative attitudes about shouldering the financial burden of the Eurozone crisis. However, in line with the analysis presented above, within the German cohort, the Erasmus students were markedly more pro-European than the non-mobile students, with a mean favourability to the EU of 3.91. (The mean score was 4.01 for non-German Erasmus students.) To summarise: the preponderance of German students in the non-mobile sample changes the level of significance of some of the statistical tests, but does not appear to affect the high-level conclusions of this study.

Table 9: Statistical findings from two comparisons of Erasmus and non-mobile students

	NON-MOBILE GROUP (includes Germans)	NON-MOBILE GROUP (excludes Germans)
Favourability to EU	$p<0.0001$	$p=0.05$
Favourability to European integration	$p<0.0001$	$p=0.04$
Attachment to EU	$p<0.0001$	$p=0.06$
Frequency of feeling European	$p<0.0001$	$p=0.0015$
Feel European and/or national	$p<0.0001$	$p=0.0006$
Language, fluent	$p<0.0001$	$p=0.005$
Language, conversational	$p<0.0001$	$p<0.0001$

Source: Author's data.

As a second check on the validity of the data – and thus the reliability of the conclusions drawn from the data – the data can be disaggregated by nationality and the findings compared against the aggregate data reported in section two above. Focusing on the four largest nationalities in the dataset, Table 10 shows that, while there is indeed variation across countries, in each case the reported differences between the Erasmus and non-Erasmus group still hold. For the questions measuring favourability toward European integration and the EU (where higher scores indicate greater favourability or attachment) the Erasmus students have a higher average score, both in the aggregate and when disaggregated by nationality. For the questions measuring attachment to the EU and frequency of feeling European (where lower scores indicate greater attachment or frequency) the Erasmus students have a lower mean score, both in the aggregate and when disaggregated by nationality.

Table 10: Comparison of Erasmus and non-Erasmus students, by nationality

	ERASMUS	NON-MOBILE
Favourability to EU (mean, all nationalities) *- higher numbers represent greater favourability*	4.0	3.6
mean French	4.0	3.9
mean German	3.8	3.5
mean Italian	4.2	4.2
mean Spanish	4.3	4.1
Favourability to European integration (mean, all nationalities) *- higher numbers represent greater favourability*	4.0	3.6
mean French	3.8	3.5
mean German	3.9	3.6
mean Italian	4.4	4.1
mean Spanish	4.1	4.1
Attachment to EU (mean, all nationalities) *- lower numbers represent greater attachment*	2.2	2.4
mean French	1.8	2.4
mean German	2.1	2.4
mean Italian	2.0	2.2
mean Spanish	2.1	2.3
Frequency of feeling European (mean, all nationalities) *- lower numbers represent more frequent European identification*	1.6	1.8
mean French	1.5	2.0
mean German	1.6	1.8
mean Italian	1.5	1.6
mean Spanish	1.5	1.6

Source: Author's data.

Section three has already discussed some of the interesting differences across countries that emerge when the data is disaggregated by nationality. An additional point that stands out in Table 10 is that the German students in the survey report lower levels of favourability to both the EU and to the idea of European integration than the other nationalities (with the exception, as noted above, of the British students). Yet the German students' level of *attachment* to the EU and the frequency with which Germans reported feeling European is about the same as that of the other nationalities. Unpacking the meaning that respondents ascribe to terms like "favourability" or "attachment" is beyond the scope of the current article, but could usefully be analysed in a future study.

Future research

The present study points to several additional promising avenues of research related to European identity. First, as yet there is no longitudinal study of Erasmus participation that contains respondents from more than a handful of nationalities. While this type of data collection is resource-intensive, it should be seen as the gold standard for inferring causality. Existing longitudinal studies are sceptical about the effect of Erasmus participation on attitudes and identities, but as discussed above, the focus on British students, or foreign students sojourning in British universities, may be problematic. Additional studies with a broader multinational perspective are needed. Van Mol's (2011) extensive study of students from 24 universities in 16 European countries utilises a

cohort design due to time constraints, but it demonstrates that the logistical barriers to administering a survey of this breadth are by no means insurmountable.

More substantively, existing studies, including this one, tend to take a rather one-dimensional approach to European identity. The survey instruments, for example, ask respondents whether, or how often, they "feel European" without actually unpacking what that European feeling means to them. Qualitative methods – e.g. interviews, focus groups – might be more appropriate for teasing out precisely what European identity actually signifies for its holders, but even surveys could incorporate questions that unpack the concept of European identity by asking those who "feel European" follow-up questions about the circumstances that engender such a feeling, how deeply-felt the identity is, and how important European identity is to the respondent, etc. A survey instrument could also be used to probe the relative importance of civic versus cultural attributes of the respondents' European identity (*see* Bruter, 2005).

Finally, a useful extension of research on European identity and attachment would be to establish a link between the presence of these attributes and specific policy preferences. For example, in the context of the current economic situation, it would be particularly interesting to know whether European identifiers are more supportive of "European" responses such as issuing Eurobonds, establishing a European banking system, or giving the EU the role of scrutinising national budgets.

CONCLUSION

In an era of economic and political turbulence the depth of European identity and the extent of Europeans' attachment to the EU and to other European states and people become especially salient. Responses to the current financial crisis – including the creation of a bailout fund for struggling Eurozone members (the European Financial Stability Facility, EFSF) and proposals to create Eurobonds that would effectively pool European debt – put the bonds of European solidarity to the test. Yet important questions remain about the nature of European identity and attachment and about the mechanisms that foster them.

Adherents of social communication theory have long held that cross-border interactions among individuals can be a significant mechanism of transnational identity formation (Deutsch, 1953; Deutsch *et al.*, 1967; Lijphart, 1964). In the European Commission, a similar logic provided part of the rationale for creating programs to increase student mobility in the EU during the so-called "relaunch" of European integration in the second half of the 1980s (Corbett, 2005; Petit, 2007).

Because of the cultural interaction presumed to be at the heart of a foreign study sojourn, Erasmus participation has often been characterised as a civic experience. Bringing students from across Europe together for a shared university experience is held to reshape participants' attitudes about Europe and other Europeans and to enhance their own sense of European identity. However, this view has been *asserted* or *assumed* more often than it has been *demonstrated*. This article has identified three assumptions central to the civic view of the Erasmus experience – that Erasmus students engage in significant contact with other Europeans, become more interested in Europe and other Europeans as a result, and self-identify as European – and has submitted each one to an empirical investigation.

In each case, the assumptions largely hold up. The data clearly indicate that, for the vast majority of Erasmus students, the sojourn abroad is indeed an intercultural, transnational experience, although quite different from the integrative model where students immerse themselves in the host culture and language. The data also suggest that the Erasmus experience increases participants' interest in Europe and the EU and

that, as a direct result of the sojourn, students feel more European. Finally, the data from the survey confirm that Erasmus students are more likely to identify as European and to feel attached and favourable to the EU than are non-mobile students, although further investigation is required to confirm whether this is the result of a transformative experience abroad or the result of an over-representation of European identifiers and supporters in the Erasmus cohort. The data also indicate that Erasmus students speak more foreign languages, and speak them better, than do non-mobile students, a point that is significant because the historical evidence demonstrates that political community-building is rooted in communication (Deutsch, 1953; Weber, 1976; Gellner, 1983). The ability to communicate with other Europeans is the precursor to any sort of meaningful interaction. While recent studies have raised questions about Erasmus as a transformative experience (Wilson, 2011; Sigalas, 2010a, 2010b), the findings presented here indicate that the civic function of the Erasmus program is successful for a strong majority of participants, at least according to their own self-reported assessments.

With that said, there are limits to the civic potential of Erasmus. For one thing, the reach of the program is relatively modest despite its impressive growth over two and a half decades of existence. From an inaugural cohort of around 3000 students in 1987, participation increased to around 10,000 the second year, 100,000 in the 2000-01 year, and more than 200,000 in the 2009-10 year. Yet this remains well short of the Lisbon Strategy target of ten per cent of students in higher education. Furthermore, the people with the least-European outlooks and attitudes may be the least likely to participate in the program. There remain socio-economic barriers to mobility, even though Erasmus provides some funding to defray the additional costs of studying abroad (Vossensteyn *et al.*, 2010).[18] On top of that, students' inclination to study abroad may be lowest for those with a firmly national identity and outlook and with no or low foreign language ability. Yet Theresa Kuhn (2012) suggests that the impact of cross-border mobility is strongest for precisely those people who do not feel European to begin with.[19]

But if we should not overstate the civic potential of Erasmus study, neither should we minimise it. More than 90 per cent of Erasmus participants surveyed reported that studying abroad made them more interested in other European countries, people, and cultures, and two-thirds reported that their interest in the EU had increased appreciably as a result of studying abroad. Moreover, three-quarters reported that their study abroad experience made them feel more European. As a programme accessible to only a minority of Europeans, Erasmus is unlikely to lead the way to a wide-spread European identity. But the programme is likely to reinforce any pre-existing European identity (Van Mol, 2011) and may quite possibly foster European identity or attachment in participants who were not previously predisposed to those feelings.

<div align="center">∗∗∗</div>

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various ways at virtually every stage of the project. Thank you all. Any errors are, of course, my own.

<center>***</center>

[1] The programme name is both a reference to the Dutch Renaissance scholar Desiderius Erasmus and an acronym for the official title of the program, European Action Scheme for the Mobility of European Students. In addition to promoting foreign study for university students, the Erasmus framework also supports a much smaller number of university staff and faculty exchanges and, since 2007, university student traineeships abroad. The Erasmus program is not the only EU educational exchange programs, but is the most significant one. With more than 2.5 million participants since its creation in 1987 and a budget of more than €3 billion for the 2007-2013 period (Education and Culture DG, 2010: 3), Erasmus can be considered the flagship of all the EU-administered educational programs (Papatsiba, 2006).

[2] The Erasmus framework facilitates student mobility in at least three ways. First, it encourages inter-university cooperation. Second, it institutionalises a set of procedures to maximise the transferability of credits completed while abroad back to the home university. Third, it provides funding for small student grants, disbursed through national agencies, to defray the additional costs associated with studying abroad (e.g. travel expenses, language classes, student housing).

[3] Van Mol argues that a foreign study experience acts as a catalyst, activating and augmenting a European identity that, to some extent, already existed prior to studying abroad.

[4] A recent chapter by Van Mol (2011) is the first to take a similar (multinational, large-n) approach.

[5] A complex interplay of forces within the Commission, the Council, and indeed within European higher education institutions, has driven the promotion of student mobility within Europe (Wilson, 2011; Papatsiba, 2006; Corbett, 2005, 2003); as a result the Erasmus programme has been framed to appeal simultaneously to various constituencies and has been justified multiple rationales. While it is not emphasised in this article, the Commission's primary rationale for promoting student mobility in higher education emphasises the material benefits of Erasmus study, promoting the "economic" and "professional" objectives of the Erasmus programme (Papatsiba, 2005: 175-176). Since the 1980s, increased economic cooperation among European states has been understood to be an essential prerequisite if Europe is to successfully compete in global markets (Sandholtz and Zyzman, 1989). Therefore, training a cadre of European professionals with personal, first-hand experience of intra-European cooperation and life in other European states became a high priority (Papatsiba, 2006: 99-100). There is also an emphasis on the individual benefits to participants, in the form of professional development opportunities, certifications, and transferrable jobs skills.

[6] We know for instance, that Erasmus participants generally enrolled in fewer courses during their academic sojourn than they did at their home university and that the courses were often not directly related to their field of study; that Erasmus participation was correlated with a slight prolongation of university studies; and that Erasmus students were twice as likely as other students to continue on to advanced studies after graduation (Maiworm, Steube, and Teichler, 1991; Teichler and Maiworm, 1994; Maiworm and Teichler, 1996; Jahr and Teichler, 2002; Teichler 2004; Bracht, Engle, Janson *et al.*, 2006; Teichler and Janson, 2007: 488).

[7] While Erasmus students have reported that their sojourn abroad was helpful in gaining initial post-graduate employment (Maiworm and Teichler, 1996; Bracht, Engle, Janson *et al.*, 2006; Teichler and Janson, 2007), the experience has not been clearly linked to subsequent professional prestige or earnings (Teichler and Janson, 2007). Several studies have linked university study abroad with post-graduate professional mobility (Maiworm and Teichler, 1996; Teichler and Jahr, 2001; King and Ruiz-Gelices, 2003; Parey and Waldinger, 2010).

[8] As Amir (1969) reviews in detail, contact between groups does not, on its own, necessarily lead to positive outcomes. Indeed, there are many intervening variables – including the character of the groups, the length and character of contact, and the nature of pre-existing views – that affect outcomes.

[99] In a rare non-quantitative study, Murphy-Lejeune's (2002) analysis of mobile students in Europe uses semi-structured interviews with 50 students who partook of various mobility schemes to generalise about the personal-psychological impact of a foreign study sojourn. The qualitative analysis, which includes fifteen Erasmus students (continental European students completing a sojourn in Dublin and Irish students studying in continental Europe), provides ample evidence of the transformative effect of a study-abroad experience, but it does not specifically investigate the presence of emergence of a European identity among the interviewees. In the section below on mobile students' social experience abroad, Murphy-Lejeune's findings are discussed further.

[10] While it was not a comparative work, Fernandez (2005) surveyed 206 University of Bristol (UK) students with foreign study experience, concluding that the majority were favorable to an integrated Europe, if lacking a real comprehension of the EU itself.

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[11] Students from these five countries comprised 58 per cent of all outgoing Erasmus students in 2009-10 and the five countries attracted 59 per cent of all Erasmus students.

[12] In fact, assistance with the survey's administration was mixed. With the help of university officials in Bologna and Bremen, an invitation to take the survey was e-mailed to all Erasmus students and a significant number of regularly-enrolled students in each university. The same degree of institutional support was not extended by the other universities, but numerous individual faculty members cooperated by inviting their students to participate. As the survey built momentum, faculty at two other institutions (in Murcia, Spain and Maynooth, Ireland) also issued invitations to their students.

[13] The Erasmus framework itself covers exchanges among universities from all 27 EU member states, plus Croatia, Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey.

[14] The EU provides funding for Erasmus, but the grants are disbursed through national agencies.

[15] Two additional checks were performed to confirm the validity of these findings. To ensure that the differences in foreign language ability observed between the two groups of students did not simply reflect a greater proportion of language students in the Erasmus group, the same statistics were calculated after excluding the language students from each group. With foreign language students filtered out, there was still a statistically significant ($p<0.0001$) difference between reported foreign language abilities of the Erasmus group and the non-mobile control group at both the fluent and conversational levels. Additionally, the differences remain statistically significant ($p<0.01$) when students are disaggregated by discipline (humanities, social sciences, science and technology) and compared separately.

[16] See, for example, "Contagion Fear Hits Spain", *Wall Street Journal*, April 28, 2010; "Italy's Lack of Growth Makes Debt Burden Heavier", *Wall Street Journal*, May 13, 2010; "Fear of Spanish debt contagion sends markets tumbling", *The Guardian*, May 25, 2010 "Will Spain face a debt crisis?", *Time*, June 18, 2010; "Italy's debt costs approach red zone", *The Telegraph*, December 29, 2010; "Italy's debt crisis: 10 reasons to be fearful", *The Guardian*, November 9, 2011.

[17] As previously mentioned, the target universities were chosen because of their existing links with the author's institution. And, at some of the institutions, the targeted students were those who happened to be taking classes with the individual faculty members who cooperated with the survey.

[18] In the 2009-10 academic year, the monthly Erasmus grant provided each participant with around €250 per month for the duration of Erasmus study.

[19] Erasmus, she says, "misses its mark" by focusing on students in higher education who by virtue of their age and socioeconomic status, in all likelihood, feel fairly European to begin with.

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Should the European Commission enact a mandatory lobby register?

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Abstract

This article reviews the literature on the mandatory government regulation/self-regulation approaches to regulating interest group behaviour. The findings of the author suggest that the voluntary register of the European Commission is bound to fail. The European Commission should implement a mandatory register as soon as possible if the genuine aim of the incumbents is to overcome the Commission's accountability deficit.

Keywords

INTRODUCTION

Undue and opaque nature of influence of interest groups on the policy-makers may have serious implications for the democratic legitimacy of a polity, and not least the European Union where a crowded number of interest groups lobby Brussels intensely. Therefore, regulating lobbying should be put on the top of the agenda of policy-makers that are concerned with the democratic deficit of the EU. There is a growing pressure on the EU officials to do so as transparency organisations such as The Alliance for Lobbying Transparency and Ethics Regulation (ALTER-EU) vehemently tries to convince the policy-makers to increase the stringency of lobbying regulation in the EU by using inside and outside lobbying methods. Despite the calls for more transparency and accountability in the EU, only the European Parliament exercises mandatory lobby registration. During a mini plenary session in Brussels on 23/03/2011, Jerzy Buzek gave a speech about the scandal where some of the MEPs have been offered money as bait in return for policy influence and accepted this offer. Buzek's reaction came as a proposal to increase transparency and accountability by putting in effect a legally binding code of conduct for all European Union (EU) institutions. The joint working group of the European Parliament and the European Commission agreed on a common register which has been put into action in June 2011. Recently, the Council of Ministers has also communicated its will to join the transparency register in the case that it stays voluntary.

The aim of this article is to compare the arguments for mandatory registration and self-regulation. The author explains why the absence of lobbying regulation in the European Commission should be involved in the discussions about the democratic deficit of the EU. Such regulations are directly related with increasing transparency and accountability. Based on the international experience, one can argue that self-regulating lobbying is likely to fail for the EU. Thus, the European Commission should enact a mandatory register.

DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT OF THE EU

Democratic deficit of the EU has been studied for a long time by scholars but there is not yet any consensus on how to overcome the democratic problem of the EU. Apart from a few authors such as Giandomenico Majone (1998) and Andrew Moravcsik (2002; 2004) who argue that we should not be concerned with the democratic quality of the EU, most of the researchers working on democracy in the EU points to a serious problem.

Democracy is about popular control and political equality (Beetham, 1994: 4-5). Accountability is a necessity for both of these concepts. It is the central element in

modern democracy: "Modern political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives" (Schmitter and Karl, 1991: 76). Sverker Gustavsson et al. defines accountability in the following way: "By accountability, we have in mind a relationship between two actors (X and Y) wherein X has the right to: 1) monitor the actions of Y 2) evaluate the actions of Y, and 3) impose sanctions on Y" (2009: 4). This definition implies that the existence of accountability first and foremost presupposes the existence of transparency (Persson, 2009: 144). A democratic audit of the EU points to limited accountability in the EU (Lord, 2004). Authors such as Yves Mény state that the accountability deficit applies to the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council of Ministers (2002: 11). Among these three institutions, the European Commission has been especially a target for criticism by many scholars for its unaccountable nature (Chryssochoou, 2003: 370-371). Some of the scholars who are more optimistic about the general state of democracy in the EU with regards to its institutional setup still argued that the accountability deficit of the Commission is an issue of concern (Crombez, 2003: 114). The problems surrounding the Commission today could be a consequence of the intention of Jean Monnet to keep this body as a technocratic and elitist institution with weak democratic legitimacy (Featherstone, 1994: 150-151). No wonder that the concern about the accountability of the European Commission has become a very hot issue after the 'permissive consensus' period of the EU has come to end and the European citizens started to demand that the EU meets the democratic legitimacy criteria.

Among a voluminous literature about the democratic deficit of the EU, many authors assess democracy in the EU by using the parliamentary democracy as an ideal model. On the other hand, more realistic scholars stated that the EU is far more different than European states where parliamentary democracy is the rule (Decker, 2002: 27). This does not mean that the EU does not have to meet democratic standards. Beetham and Lord (1998) successfully showed why the EU has to fulfil democratic legitimacy criteria. As the EU influences the legitimacy of democratic European states to a great extent, it also has to be democratic (Beetham and Lord, 1998: 22). Nevertheless, one can debate how to make the EU democratic.

Authors who try to find new yardsticks to assess democracy and legitimacy in the EU refer to the United States (US) as an ideal democratic model for the EU (Costa et. al., 2003: 671). One such work argues that the EU is not a parliamentary democracy but a pluralist democracy with interest groups having important influence on political decisions where political power is shared among various institutions, states, and actors (Coultrap, 1999). John Coultrap stresses that any form of democratic audit in the EU should take this into account (1999). He argues that this kind of analysis shows that the EU does not suffer from a grave democratic deficit problem as many scholars have argued. This argument can be strongly criticised. Unlike the US, the executive of the EU is not directly elected, the demos argument has not yet come to a conclusion, and the decline of national parliaments is still a problem. Nevertheless, Coultrap is right to argue that the EU resembles a pluralist democracy more than a parliamentary democracy. There is growing literature suggesting that the EU is a pluralistic advocacy community (Mahoney, 2008: 46).

Assessing democracy in the EU by using pluralist democratic criteria brings with it a less discussed but an important democratic problem. Lobbying in the pluralist US is regulated as a result of the long standing criticism of corruption, unfair influence, lack of transparency and accountability. In the EU, lobbying is regulated weakly in the European Parliament, but not the Council. Also, registering to the Commission's lobby register is voluntary. Using pluralism as an ideal model to assess the democratic legitimacy of the EU does not necessarily help it to evade the democratic deficit discussion but can add more problems to it with regards to interest representation.

Why regulate lobbying?

Regulation of lobbyists refers to the notion that there should be rules which the interest groups must abide by when trying to influence public decision-making. Following this logic, Raj Chari, et al. concluded that the voluntary nature of the register for lobbyists that has been created for the interest groups trying to lobby the European Commission does not count as regulation (2010: 4). The European Commission does not have regulation even though it is the most lobbied institution of the EU with plentiful lobbying activity taking place every day.

Among countries and institutions that have seen developments towards a pluralist system such as Argentine (Johnson, 2008), Denmark (Rechtman and Larsen-Leder, 1998) or the EP (Schaber, 1999: 219-210), lobbying gradually becomes an issue that has to be dealt with through regulation. Increasing number of lobbyists, concern about undue influence and lack of transparency are the prime reasons for regulating lobbyists (Yishai, 1998a: 574; Yishai, 1998b: 162-163; Pross, 173; Thomas, 1998; Rechtman and Larsen-Leder, 1998: 579; Warhurst, 1998: 538-539; Schaber, 1999: 210-211; Greenwood and Thomas, 1998: 488). According to Chari et al. "The basic rationale behind implementing regulations is that the public should have some insight into, as well as oversight of, the mechanisms that draw lobbyists into the policy-making environment, in order to better understand how they influence policy outputs" (2010: 2). Their research conducted in global comparative fashion supports the theoretical arguments about lobbying regulation's contribution to transparency and accountability even though loopholes can exist in the most robustly regulated environments (Chari et al., 2010: 133, 150 and 152-153; Chari et al., 2008; Chari et al., 2007). Showing who is lobbying, for what he is lobbying, how much he is spending on lobbying, together with penalising codes for unprofessional behaviour can increase transparency and accountability.

Apart from transparency and accountability, some also suggest that lobbying regulation has a positive effect on political equality. Democratic theory suggests that if interest group access is limited to only certain groups, the democratic legitimacy of this polity would be questionable because this may lead to biased politics (Steffek and Nanz, 2008: 10; Van Schendelen, 2010: 322; Persson, 2009: 145; Warren, 2002: 693; Coen, 1998). In the EU, access is restricted to few lobbyists (Coen, 1997: 98-99). Capacity to supply information to policy-makers is the main determinant for having access to EU policy-making (Bouwen, 2004; Bouwen, 2002; Eising, 2007a; Eising, 2007b; Broscheid and Coen, 2007: 349; Bouwen and McCown, 2007: 425). Not surprisingly, the situation is not much different with regards to the influence issue. Research suggests that possession of better resources makes a difference when the aim is to influence policy-making (Dür, 2008b: 1212-1215; Dür and Bièvre, 2007: 5). In overall, business interests have been more influential than other interests (Coen, 2007: 335), (Obradovic, 2009: 312; Woll, 2006: 459; Saurugger, 2008, 1283). The MEP Marc Galle involved equalisation of business and other interests in his report that strived for justifying why the EP needed lobbying regulation (McLaughlin and Greenwood, 1995: 144). The Australian experience suggests that the governors thought that regulating lobbyists can bring equality of access (Yishai, 1998b: 163). One NGO member argued that transparency can bring political equality to the lobbying game. He/she argued that without transparency, it is mainly the industrial lobbyists that win. When there is transparency, citizens win (Parks, 2009: 159). According to Sabine Saurugger, absence of access regulation exacerbates the inequality of power and influence among interest groups: "In the absence of regulation for interest groups, the action repertoires and strategies providing for efficient interest representation at the European level remain key elements for exercising influence. This absence of regulation seems to reinforce a situation in which groups possessing financial and social resources are privileged whereas the voices of small interest groups, be they general interest or small business groups, are not heard quite as loudly in the consultation process" (2008: 1283).

However, even the smallest positive effect of lobbying regulation on political equality is highly contested (Karr, 2007: 79). Clive Thomas argued that with lobbying regulation, "lobbyists, especially those representing powerful interests, are much less likely to use blatant strong-arm tactics…However, what has in fact happened is that modern big-time lobbyists are wheel-dealers under a different disguise" (1998: 512-513). Virginia Gray and David Lowery found that greater stringency is negatively correlated with the presence of institutions (1998: 88). Nevertheless, the effect turned out to be very small (Gray and Lowery, 1998: 88). Relying on interviews, Michelle Cini wrote that European Public Affairs Consultancies Association was sceptic about the possibility that regulation can balance corporate and civil society interests (2008: 753). Based on his game theoretical model, Scott Ainsworth even argued that stringent regulation would especially hurt the small groups (1993: 53). The cause of this argument could be the increased cost and effort needed to lobby. Margaret Brinig et al. argued that with regulation, entering the lobbying industry and lobbying become more costly. Organising a lobbying effort becomes more cumbersome (1993: 383). We see that lobbying regulation's impact on political equality is highly controversial, Unless, there is strong empirical proof that stringent regulations and unbalanced interest representation are inversely correlated, one should shy away from considering lobbying regulation's effect on balancing inequalities.

On the whole, one can say that regulating lobbying in the EU can be an important step towards remedying the democratic deficit of the EU by increasing transparency and accountability. However, one should note that this can happen on the condition that there is enough media attention to the register (Bassett, 2008: 1085-1086). Ignorance of regulation has always arisen as a consequence of limited or no media attention. This was clearly the case in Canada (Pross, 2006: 191; Rush, 1994: 639) and the US (Thomas, 1998: 512) more so before the Abramoff scandal.

WHY SELF-REGULATION CANNOT BE A SUBSTITUTE FOR MANDATORY REGISTRATION?

Unlike the proponents of regulating lobbying, some argue that mandatory lobbying regulation is not the best method for controlling lobbying. According to some authors, self-regulation may be preferable both by the regulator and the regulated to mandatory government regulation. Self-regulation is more flexible than formal legislation (Greenwood and Thomas, 1998: 494; McLaughlin and Greenwood, 1995: 154). Governmental authorities can avoid certain unwanted conflicts with some interests and overcome problems that arise with interest groups smoothly. At the other side, interest groups avoid strict control over their behaviour (Greenwood and Thomas, 1998: 494). According to these authors, self-regulation can be used by interest groups to gain certain respectability from the public and to be hold in esteem in the eyes of the policy-makers by applying their code of conducts (Greenwood and Thomas, 1998: 495-496; McLaughlin and Greenwood, 1995: 148).

In the UK most of the regulators were of the opinion that regulation would create barriers of access, so self-regulation should be preferred (Greenwood and Thomas, 1998: 496). Although they argued that the legislative regulations can be as useless as self-regulatory schemes which are normally weak and lack effectiveness (Greenwood and Thomas, 1998: 494), many examples do show that with government regulation, stringency and enforcement increases. The number of lobbyists signing to self-regulatory code of conducts remains very low (Preston, 1999: 225). In the UK, the secretary of The Association of Professional Political Consultants Charles Miller argued that: "What also concerned us at the time was that a self-regulatory body like ours has no ultimate sanction. We cannot require people to be regulated; we are a voluntary body and we felt that despite the circumstances that led to the establishment of this Committee,

government is still held in far higher esteem than we are as individual companies" (Jordan, 1998: 534).

Until the early 2000s, the Commission was against accreditation of pressure groups, as in their opinion, this would cause a problem for open access to EU policy-makers hampering their much needed information and expertise (McLaughlin and Greenwood, 1995: 143; Greenwood and Thomas, 1998: 492; Lehmann, 2010: 58; Eising, 2003: 197). Commission opted out for advocating self-regulation (Flannery, 2010: 72; Eising, 2003: 197). In 2004 Jens Nymand-Christensen, argued that the Commission works in a transparent and fair way with the civil society (Wesselius, 2005: 18). Compared to then, the Commission has somewhat changed its attitude towards pure self-regulation even though they still show signs of doubt towards implementing a mandatory register. Increasing number of actors and the determination to increase transparency in the Commission have been the main motivating elements for the Commissioner Siim Kallas to make a move (Long and Lörinczi, 2009: 180; Bouwen, 2010: 31-32). The European Commission had this to say about their motivation for creating a voluntary register: "The European Commission wishes to let citizens know which general or specific interests are influencing the decision-making process of the European institutions and the resources mobilized to that end" (European Commission, 2011).

One year after implementing a voluntary register, the Commission argued that enough registries have been made so that mandatory registering is not needed (European Commission, 2009). However, reports show that most lobbyists are not registering (European Voice, 2010; Chari and O'Donovan, 2011: 9, 15); research has pointed out that, fifty largest companies in the EU have not in fact registered to the voluntary register and they are lobbying in secret. These companies are using trade organisations to do their lobbying so that they can have more discretion (Euroactiv, 2010). There is also concern about the finances disclosed (Greenwood, 2011: 324). Research has shown that the information in the registry was highly inaccurate (EUobserver, 2010). These phenomena are not surprising as there are not enough incentives for interest groups to register voluntarily (Obradovic, 2009: 309-310; Greenwood, 2011: 322). It is difficult to argue that the voluntary register had any substantial effect in terms of regulating behaviour (Svendsen, 2011: 133).

This situation is not likely to change unless registration becomes mandatory. Having the evidence that self-regulation has not been successful anywhere so far, and the current voluntary register of the European Commission is failing, one can easily say that the self-regulation will never be taken seriously by the public (Billet, 2007: 329). Even some of those who fervently opposed a mandatory register seem to change their minds as self-regulation badly failed. Mr. Christian D. de Fouloy who argued that transparency could be achieved without a 'cumbersome bureaucracy' that will be the result of EU legislation on lobbying in 2002 clearly changed rhetoric and stated that self-regulation does not work and the Commission should change its policy to address this problem (Wesselius, 2005: 17-18). Those who argue for self-regulation do so because of their opposition to the 'negative consequences' of mandatory registration (Dinan, 2006: 62). Once registration becomes law though, the fears of the negative impacts of regulation faded away. The Canadian example shows that the concern over registration becoming onerous and costly did not materialise (Rush, 1994: 636, 639; Rush, 1998: 521).

CONCLUSION: TIME FOR ENACTING A MANDATORY REGISTER FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION

We have seen that the accountability issue in the Commission has an important part to play in the arguments against the democratic quality of the EU. Despite this problem and serious activism by certain transparency organisations such as The Alliance for Lobbying Transparency and Ethics Regulation (ALTER-EU) to make the Commission's register

mandatory, the lobby register for the Commission is still voluntary. Some of the latest proclamations by the Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič show some rhetorical change towards implementing a mandatory register. Rather than justifying the voluntary nature of the register, Šefčovič told the reporters in June 2011 that mandatory register will be considered after certain treaty changes required to enact such regulation can be done (Šefčovič, 2011). If the current Commissioner wants to be considered as a governor who had a real impact on increasing the democratic legitimacy of the European Commission and not become a target of criticism like Siim Kallas[1] who was the one that initiated the European Transparency Initiative (ETI) but fell short of obtaining results due to the voluntary nature of regulation, then he should not delay the decision to make the necessary changes that will result in a mandatory register.

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[1] Siim Kallas was perceived by some to be interested in the European Transparency Initiative to 'maximize his legacy and reputation rather than truly achieving transparency and accountability by paying attention to details with regards to operationalization of the regulation' (Greenwood, 2011: 324).

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40 Years of EU Membership: The UK, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland

Introduction

It is 40 years since the UK formally joined the European Community on 1 January 1973. To mark the anniversary, the *European Parliament Information Office in the United Kingdom* commissioned a number of experts on European integration to summarise the key events leading up to and since accession. Each has prepared a chronology and an accompanying narrative.

This anniversary comes at a time when the relationship between all facets of British society and Europe is at a crossroad. The likelihood of an in/out referendum in the years to come continues to rise, the debate on alternatives to membership and the current exercise of reviewing the balance of competences between the EU and Britain dominate the political debate and media coverage of EU affairs.

Helen Wallace has provided an overview from the British perspective. David Phinnemore, Lee McGowan, Cathal McCall and Peter McLoughlin have written about the perspective from Northern Ireland. Jo Shaw has presented the Scottish experience whilst Richard Wyn Jones and Rebecca Rumbul have summarised the key events relevant to Wales.

The UK: 40 Years of EU Membership

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Citation

KEY DATES

A chronology of significant events in British history, including the years leading up to accession on 1 January 1973.

19 Sep 1948	Winston Churchill: Zurich speech calling for a United States of Europe
7 May 1948	The Hague Conference, leading to Council of Europe, 140 British among the 800 participants
1950-1	Schuman Plan leading to European Coal and Steel Community: UK rejected invitation to join
1955	Messina Conference of the Six (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and The Netherlands) agrees to develop a common market and atomic cooperation via the Spaak Committee, which Russell Bretherton joined until withdrawn by UK government
1957-8	UK seeks to negotiate wider free trade area through the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, but negotiations fail
Jan 1960	Founding of EFTA (UK along with Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland)
1961-3	First UK application for membership of European Communities, negotiations led by Edward Heath
14 Jan 1963	First de Gaulle veto of UK accession
Oct 1964	Election of Labour Government (majority of 4) with Harold Wilson as Prime Minister, re-elected in March 1966 with larger majority, but divisions in cabinet and party over Europe
2 May 1967	Second UK application for membership of EC
27 Nov 1967	Second de Gaulle veto of UK accession
June 1970	Election of Conservative Government with Edward Heath as Prime Minister
1970-72	Successful accession negotiations (UK, Denmark, Ireland and Norway)
Jul 1972	European Communities' Act passed to incorporate European law in the UK, after stormy passage in Commons
1 Jan 1973	UK accession
1973-6	First two Commissioners from UK: Christopher Soames and George Thomson
1974	Election of minority Labour Government (-33 MPS) in February with Harold Wilson as Prime Minister, re-elected in October 1974 with tiny majority of 3, and persistent divisions on Europe

1974-5	UK renegotiation of terms of accession (including a flawed mechanism to limit budget contributions) completed at Dublin European Council of March 1975. Terms agreed in Cabinet with several ministers voting against, and in Commons with Conservative support but a much divided Labour Parliamentary Party. Collective cabinet responsibility suspended for the subsequent referendum
30 Nov 1974	Helmut Schmidt's speech to Labour Party Conference strengthens pro-European opinion
Feb 1975	Lomé Convention brings former British colonies into aid and trade relationship with EC
5 Jun 1975	UK Referendum on question: Do you think the UK should stay inside the European Community (Common Market)? Cross-party campaigns on each side. Turnout: 64.5%; Yes: 67.2%; No: 32.8 %; two regions of Scotland had 'no' majorities.
Jan-Jun 1977	1st British Presidency of EC Council
1977-81	Roy Jenkins as President of European Commission and Christopher Tugendhat as second Commissioner from UK
27 Oct 1977	Roy Jenkins' speech in Florence supporting EMU May 1979 Election of Conservative Government with Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister
1979	EP elections: turnout 31.6%; Conservatives 60 MEPs; Labour: 17; one each SNP, DUP, SDLP, and OUU
Feb 1979	Cassis de Dijon case before European Court of Justice which argues that mutual recognition of standards is legally correct, key prelude to single market
Mar 1979	Exchange-rate-mechanism of European Monetary System established – UK does not join till later
Dec 1979	Dublin European Council at which Margaret Thatcher asks for her 'money back"
Jan 1981	Greece joins EC
25 Jan 1981	Limehouse Declaration by Gang of Four (including Roy Jenkins) who leave Labour Party to found Social Democrat party, partly because staunch pro-Europeans
1981-4	Christopher Tugendhat continues as Commissioner and joined by Ivor Richard
Jul-Dec 1981	2nd British Presidency of EC Council, which includes London Declaration aiming to strengthen European foreign policy cooperation
1982	Falklands War between UK and Argentina. UK backed by EC economic sanctions on Argentina
Apr 1982	UK tries unsuccessfully to invoke Luxembourg Compromise in order to veto agricultural price package in Agriculture Council

Jun 1983	Re-election of Conservative Government with Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister; Labour Party campaigned for withdrawal from EC
Jun 1984	EP elections: turnout 32.57%; Conservatives 45 MEPs; Labour 32; one each SNP, DUP, SDLP, and OUU
Jun 1984	Fontainebleau European Council agrees rebate mechanism for UK on budget payments and Margaret Thatcher presents paper on 'Europe – the Future'
1985-8	Jacques Delors becomes President of the European Commission, with Stanley Clinton Davis and Lord (Arthur) Cockfield as Commissioners from UK
Jun 1985	Single Market White Paper calling for its completion by 1992 presented by Lord Cockfield; Milan European Council endorses with strong UK support, but also calls for treaty revision against the protest of Margaret Thatcher 1985/6 Negotiation of Single European Act, which comes into force July 1987, promoting single market, and extending use of qualified majority voting and powers of European Parliament
1985	Greenland holds referendum on EC membership and withdraws though retains connections as result of its status within the Danish Realm
Jan 1986	Portugal and Spain join EC
Jul-Dec 1986	1986 3rd British Presidency of EC Council
Jun 1987	Re-election of Conservative Government with Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister
1987-89	Henry Plumb as President of the European Parliament
1987-97	David Williamson as Secretary-General of Commission
Apr 1988	Labour Party recommits to EC membership
Jun 1988	Delors-1 budget package agreed after tough negotiations which retain UK rebate
8 Sep 1988	Jacques Delors' speech to TUC at Bournemouth
20 Sep 1988	Margaret Thatcher delivers her Bruges speech, which sets out her core view of Europe (including openness to eastern Europe and stronger role for collective European defence, as well as criticising the excessive and intrusive zeal of the Commission)
1989-95	Leon Brittan and Bruce Millan as Commissioners from UK
Jun 1989	EP elections: turnout: 36.2%; Labour 45 MEPs; Conservatives 32; one each SNP, DUP, SDLP, and OUU; Greens score 14.5%
Oct 1989	Nigel Lawson resigns as Chancellor of the Exchequer, partly because of disagreements over European policy
9 Nov 1989	Fall of Berlin Wall

1990-1	1st Gulf War, with UK and France with the US as major protagonists in a coalition including several other European countries
1990	Two plus Four negotiations over the future of the German Democratic Republic, during which Margaret Thatcher makes clear her preference for avoiding early unification
3 Oct 1990	German unification
6 Oct 1990	Sterling joins exchange-rate-mechanism of EMS
Oct 1990	Rome European Council at which Margaret Thatcher declares that UK will never join a single currency
13 Nov 1990	Sir Geoffrey Howe delivers resignation speech as Deputy Prime Minister with fierce criticism of Margaret Thatcher's European policy
22 Nov 1990	Resignation of Margaret Thatcher, who is succeeded by John Major, who commits to put UK 'at the heart of Europe'
1991-2	Negotiation of Treaty of Maastricht, which provides for economic and monetary union – with an opt-out provision for the UK, develops the 'three pillars' for EU policies, extended the powers of the European Parliament and exempts the UK from some employment provisions through a Social Protocol.
Apr 1992	Re-election of Conservative Government with John Major as Prime Minister
Jul-Dec 1992	4th British Presidency of EC Council
1992-5	UN-sanctioned peace-keeping operations in Croatia and then Bosnia Herzegovina, including the UK and many other European countries
Apr 1992	Conservative Party joins European Peoples' Party group in European Parliament in period of its rejuvenation as main centre-right group
Jun 1992	Danish 'no' vote on Maastricht in referendum, reversed after special decision of Edinburgh European Council of Dec 1992 by a second referendum in May 1993
17 Sep 1992	Black Wednesday – UK withdrawal from ERM (David Cameron an adviser to Norman Lamont, then Chancellor of the Exchequer)
Dec 1992	Edinburgh Council endorses Delors-2 budget package, which retains UK rebate. Also confirmed agreement that European Parliament work among three locations in Brussels, Luxembourg and Strasbourg.
1995-1999	Leon Brittan continues as Commissioner and joined by Neil Kinnock
1993	Foundation of Eurosceptical United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)

20 May 1993	Maastricht ratification in the UK contentious at several stages, with some Conservative rebels on the treaty as a whole, and Labour and Liberal Democrat criticism of the UK opt-outs, forcing the Government into a confidence vote to complete ratification. Many calls for a referendum and emergence of vocabulary of repatriation
Jun 1993	Copenhagen European Council endorses process leading to eastern enlargement with strong UK support
1 Nov 1993	Maastricht enters into force
Mar 1994	UK presses for modification of Council voting practice to maintain scope for 'blocking minorities' after enlargement and the Ioannina compromise is formulated.
Jun 1994	UK vetoes choice of Jean-Luc Dehaene as next President of Commission and Jacques Santer chosen instead
Apr 1994	WTO Marrakesh Agreement signed, key role of Leon Brittan as Trade Commissioner
Jun 1994	EP elections: turnout 36%; Labour 62 MEPs; Conservatives 18; Liberal Democrats 2; SNP 2; one each DUP, SDLP, OUU; Greens drop back to 3%
1994	Schäuble-Lamers (German Christian Democrats) paper calling for hard-core EU
1995	EFTA enlargement with UK support
1995	BSE problem flares up as other EU countries impose ban on imports of UK beef
Jun 1995	Joint (Anglo-French) Air Defence Group created
1995	As treaty reform is mooted, John Major under pressure from Eurosceptics colleagues resigns to fight leadership and is re-elected
1996	Continued blocking of UK beef exports to rest of EU after asserted link of BSE to a human variant, leading to a UK policy of 'non-cooperation' in Council on all issues subject to unanimity rule, eventually resolved at Florence European Council
12 Nov 1996	ECJ judgement that the Working Time Directive was correctly based on health and safety provisions and hence applies to UK
1997-2007	Julian Priestley as Secretary General of the European Parliament
May 1997	Election of Labour Government with Tony Blair as Prime Minister UK election (Lab 419; Con 165; Lib Dem 46; others 29; Referendum Party 3% of vote)
May 1997	Treaty of Amsterdam: incoming UK government reverses social protocol; extension of justice and home affairs and incorporation of Schengen Agreements, with opt-out provision for UK and Ireland allowing later opt-in subject to unanimity of other member states; 'flexibility' provisions included to enable certain decisions by reduced number of member states faced with reluctance of others. Comes into force October 1997

17 Jul 1997	Gordon Brown announces 5 economic tests for UK membership of EMU
Jan-Jun 1988	5th British presidency of EU Council
1998-9	Kosovo intervention by Nato including UK and various other European countries
1998	UK signs up for positive EU agenda on environmental issues and plays active part in Kyoto Convention discussions
Jan-Jun 1998	5th UK Presidency of Council and in this period Labour Government of Tony Blair pursues strategic review of UK European policy, including strengthening of bilateral relations with other member states and of foreign and security policy
4 Dec 1998	St Malo agreement between UK and France to press forward with European defence cooperation
1998-99	Agenda 2000 EU negotiations linking budget and enlargement reach agreement at Berlin European Council in March 1999, again retaining UK rebate, and showing emergence of 'net contributors' club' of member states
1999	Softening of UK position on JHA and Schengen, but continued arguments over EMU with hardening of organised opposition partly via 'Business for Sterling' and creation of 'Britain in Europe' as cross-party pro-EMU platform
Mar 1999	Resignation of Santer Commission in response to claims of wasteful expenditure and fraud
Jun 1999	EP elections: turnout 23%;Conservatives 36 MEPs; Labour 29; Liberal Democrats 10; UKIP 3; SNP 2; Plaid Cymru 2; Greens 2; NI parties 3. NB first significant results by UKIP. First EP elections in UK under proportional representation system
1999-2004	Neil Kinnock continues as Commissioner and joined by Chris Patten
Oct 1999	George Robertson becomes Secretary General of Nato: period of closer cooperation between Nato and EU
Dec 1999	Helsinki European Council further endorses enlargement and sets headline goal of developing European Rapid Reaction Force
Mar 2000	European Council adopts Lisbon Strategy (for economic growth) with keen UK support
6 Oct 2000	Tony Blair's speech in Warsaw calling for stronger Europe as 'union of states' able to play more effective role in the world and strong transatlantic relationship (one of a series of strongly pro-European speeches)
7 Dec 2000	EU institutions 'proclaim' Charter of Fundamental Rights, drafted by a European 'Convention', a procedural innovation. UK has reservations about giving it legal status, though this was accorded under the Treaty of Lisbon

Feb 2001	Treaty of Nice agrees limited institutional adaptations for further enlargement, especially voting rules in Council and proposal to reduce number of Commissioners. Irish referendum in June 2001 rejected the Treaty, but a second referendum in Oct 2002 was positive. Treaty comes into force on 1 Feb 2003
Jun 2001	Re-election of Labour Government with Tony Blair as Prime Minister
Dec 2001	European Convention established, with membership from across EU institutions as well as member governments and national parliaments, and produced in July 2003 a draft Constitution for Europe, with wide-ranging proposals for institutional and legal changes. Text finalised in June 2004.
Oct 2001-	Nato-led intervention in Afghanistan with contributions from every EU member state except Cyprus and Malta as well as other European countries
1 Jan 2002	Eurozone comes into existence as euro replaces currencies of participating countries
Mar 2003-	Intervention in Iraq, led by US and UK with support from many other European countries, but strong opposition from France and Germany
2004 and 2007	Eastern enlargement of EU with strong UK support
20 Apr 2004	Tony Blair commits to a UK referendum to ratify the Constitution for Europe.
Jun 2004	EP elections: turnout 37.6%; Conservatives 27 MEPs; Labour 19; UKIP 12; Liberal Democrats 12; Greens 2; SNP 2; one each DUP, Sinn Féin (replacing SDLP), OUU
Jun 2004	Tony Blair successfully proposes Jose-Manuel Barroso as President of Commission against Franco-German preference for Guy Verhofstadt
2004-2009	Under revised rules Peter Mandelson is the single Commissioner from UK, serving until Oct 2008, when replaced by Catherine Ashton
May 2005	Re-election of Labour Government with Tony Blair as Prime Minister
May-Jun 2005	French and Dutch referendums reject Constitution for Europe
23 Jun 2005	Tony Blair's speech to European Parliament calling for a renewal of EU policies to meet new circumstances, including importance of economic growth agenda and enhanced defence capability
Jul-Dec 2005	6th British Presidency of EU Council
Dec 2005	European Council agrees Financial Perspective 2007-11 budget deal, retaining UK rebate
Jun 2007	European Council abandons Constitution for Europe and proceeds instead by IGC to negotiate more limited treaty amendments

Dec 2007	Treaty of Lisbon signed focusing on institutional adaptations, including: incorporation of Charter of Fundamental Rights; more powers for European Parliament; some powers for national parliaments to show an orange light to Commission proposals; appointment of a full-time President of the European Council; expanded role for the High Representative of the Union for foreign and security policy (based also in Commission and with creation of European External Action Service); and jurisdiction given to European Court of Justice after 5 years' transition over justice and home affairs issues, on which UK has to decide whether or not to opt-in or to opt-out completely, with residual option to opt-in on individual measures.
12 Jun 2008	Irish referendum rejects Treaty of Lisbon
Jul 2008	UK parliament ratifies Treaty of Lisbon after failed legal challenge to demand a referendum. David Cameron and Conservative Party favoured a referendum on Lisbon, though in 2009 stated that only practicable if ratification process by other member states incomplete
Autumn 2008-	Banking and then eurozone crises
Dec 2008-	EU Operation Atalanta by EU Navfor, with operational HQ at Northwood, UK and a British commander and cooperation with naval forces from some non-EU countries
Jun 2009	EP elections: turnout 34%; Conservatives 25 MEPS; UKIP 13 (second place in terms of votes); Labour 13; Liberal Democrats 11; Greens 2; BNP 2; SNP 2; one each DUP, SDLP, OUU; Conservative MEPs withdraw from European Peoples' Party to found European Conservatives and Reformists
2009-	Catherine Ashton as Commissioner from UK becomes High Representative for foreign and security policy. British MEPS, Sharon Bowles and Malcolm Harbour, chair key EP committees on economic and single market issues
2 Oct 2009	Second Irish referendum accepts Treaty of Lisbon
1 Dec 2009	Treaty of Lisbon comes into force, but nb constitutional court challenges in the Czech Republic and Germany
May 2010	UK election produces hung parliament after which the Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition was formed, including commitment on Europe to play 'leading role', but no further transfer of powers without referendum, amendment of European Communities Act, review of balance of competences, and stay outside Euro
Nov 2010	Lancaster House Treaties between UK and France on security and defence
Mar 2011	Intervention in Libya, with key roles of France and UK and involvement of several other European countries

Jul 2011	European Union Act passed by UK parliament which: requires referenda to endorse significant amendments of EU treaties; requires primary legislation to implement certain EU provisions, especially those involving the passerelle procedure; and restates UK parliamentary sovereignty
Dec 2011	European Council to discuss eurozone crisis resolution at which David Cameron blocks proposal to resolve through new arrangements under EU treaties
Jul 2012	Government announcement of the Review of the Balance of Competences, to assess the impact on the UK of EU policy powers across the range of government responsibilities, and to be completed in autumn 2014

THE NARRATIVE

An overview

The relationship between the UK and the European integration process is complex. The European Community (EC), later European Union (EU)[1], emerged as a continental project which has developed into a process of deeper and deeper integration across the years. Successive British governments, backed by British public opinion, have generally supported a shallower version of economic and political integration. However, in several areas the UK has been among the leading proponents of more far-reaching collective action by the EU. British policy has strongly favoured greater trade liberalisation both within Europe and internationally. The UK has repeatedly supported the enlargement of the EU to enable other European countries to benefit from EU policies and to stabilise the security of the continent. Over the past decade the UK has been among the firmest proponents of measures to protect the environment and to combat climate change. The UK has consistently led the way in pressing Europeans to take more seriously their foreign and defence policy responsibilities. New integration initiatives however have generally come from others, leaving the UK to engage reactively rather than proactively. The UK chose not to join the eurozone or to enter the Schengen Agreements. There has been repeated British criticism of some EU policies, such as those for agriculture, fisheries and employment measures, as well as the budgetary arrangements. Overall the UK has found it difficult to settle into a steady pattern of engagement within the EU.

A liberal economy

The extent of British economic interdependence with other European countries became pronounced from the mid-1950s onwards as the patterns of international trade evolved. Broadly the trend has been for some 50% or so of British exports and imports to be traded with other EU countries, with some variations year on year, including the effects of exchange rates and of economic circumstances in both EU and non-EU countries. British policy has promoted free trade and open markets in Europe and in the broader international economy. The UK has firmly supported trade liberalisation within the GATT and the WTO and the role of the EU in pressing for this. Trade Commissioners from the UK, notably Leon Brittan and Peter Mandelson, played important parts in this process.

British policy-makers and industrialists were among the first to press for the deepening of free trade within the EU and in particular for the creation of the Single European Market (SEM) by 1992. Lord Cockfield designed in detail and piloted the 1992 project for the Delors Commission in 1985-88. The Kangaroo Group in the European Parliament, led by Basil de Ferranti MEP, gave keen support. British expertise and experience played an

enormously important part in underpinning this process, with Mrs Thatcher as Prime Minister an influential advocate. During the 1990s proactive British policy served to ensure that the SEM would include the countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) through the European Economic Area (EEA) and that the emerging democracies of central and eastern Europe could achieve full integration within the SEM. Leon Brittan, as the responsible Commissioner from the UK, played a central role in operating the complementary rules of competition which aim to ensure a level-playing field in the SEM. The SEM has generated well-evidenced benefits for the EU and for the economic interests of the UK. The SEM remains incomplete, as new issues arise and new service and industrial sectors emerge. British policy remains firmly committed to strengthening the SEM.

Successive British governments have supported collective EU efforts to promote growth-inducing initiatives, including the shift of EU expenditure to areas such as the research and development programmes. However, a defining feature of UK economic policy during the 1980s was the move to make the labour market much more flexible. This put the UK at odds with plans within the EU to develop a version of 'social Europe' that involved more extensive regulation of labour markets. Hence the Conservative Government voted against a series of measures such as the Working Time Directive (first version 1993), from which it secured a partial opt-out, and also insisted on the Social Protocol of the Treaty of Maastricht to exempt the UK from plans to reinforce the social dimension. In 1997 the incoming Labour Government reversed the Social Protocol in order to opt in to the Employment Chapter. The issue of EU employment legislation remains, however, among the most contentious for the UK and is at the top of the Conservative Party's targets for repatriation.

The creation of an economic and monetary union (EMU) proved a step too far for the British. Proposals for EMU had been discussed since the Werner Report of 1970. Roy Jenkins, as President of the European Commission, helped drive the project forward, through his Florence speech of 1979. The UK had, however, declined to join the exchange-rate-mechanism in March 1979 and did not join until October 1990, only to withdraw under severe currency market pressures in September 1992. In the negotiation of the Treaty of Maastricht (1991/2) the UK government secured an opt-out from the EMU provisions and the creation of the eurozone. Some British objections consisted of root-and-branch opposition to the proposal – this included a significant section of opinion within the Conservative Party. For others, notably in the Labour Party, the issue was the divergence between the UK and the continental business cycles, which led Gordon Brown to set out five economic tests to be met for the UK to enter the eurozone. In the 1997 election Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat manifestoes promised a referendum to approve any recommendation for EMU membership. Since then no UK government has wished to recommend this, and the eurozone crisis has made any such move even more improbable.

The budgetary issues

By the time of UK accession in 1973 the basic arrangements for the EU budget were in place, with spending overwhelmingly concentrated on agricultural price support and a revenue system of 'own resources', the net effect of which was that the UK was from the outset destined to be a net contributor. Transitional measures to soften the impact were agreed but wound down during the 1970s. The renegotiation exercise of 1974/5 produced palliative measures which failed to correct the underlying problem. The outgoing Labour Government and the incoming Conservative Government in 1979 made it crystal clear that UK would seek a more durable solution. There followed a period of acrimonious negotiations, resolved at the Fontainebleau European Council of 1984, which established a durable UK abatement mechanism (the rebate) to reduce significantly the UK net contribution.

The UK has supported efforts to change the focus of EU spending programmes. In 1975 George Thomson, as Commissioner, piloted the Regional Development Fund, to stand alongside the Social Fund, which evolved into a package of structural and cohesion funds, destined for the less affluent regions of mainly less affluent member states. The UK has advocated reforms to the common agricultural policy, which now takes a much lower proportion of the EU budget. The UK has supported programmes to reinforce the EU's responsibilities for external action, including vis-à-vis its neighbourhood. Enlarged EU membership and shifts in revenue and expenditure have altered the pattern of the EU budget's distribution among countries. The UK remains a net contributor, with the continuing rebate alleviating the burden; other net contributor countries have become more active in seeking to moderate expenditure; and the number of poorer member states, the 'cohesion' countries, has increased.

In the 1980s the EU moved from a process of annual budgetary wrangles to periodic negotiations over a multi-annual financial framework, agreed by unanimity among the member states. At each such negotiation UK governments have tenaciously defended the rebate against critics who have sought to remove or to dilute it, but latterly with allies among the other net contributor countries. UK policy has sought continued changes to the pattern of expenditure within a constrained overall settlement. This approach carries strong support from across the political spectrum within the UK, where the debate is not about whether the UK should take a tough stance, but rather on how tough that stance should be.

Europe and its neighbourhood

UK policy has consistently recognised that enlargement of EU membership is the keystone of EU policy towards its neighbouring countries, in the 1970s and 1980s as southern European countries escaped from dictatorship and from 1989 onwards as the Soviet imperium crumbled. UK governments have been at the forefront of the EU debate in arguing the case for full membership of candidates, subject to sensible conditionality. Commissioners from the UK, notably Leon Brittan, helped to steer this forward with the proposals adopted at the Copenhagen European Council of 1996 which led to the 2004 enlargement in the teeth of French opposition. UK policy has also favoured maintaining membership as a realistic prospect for Turkey.

The UK, like other member states, was tested by the outbreak of the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s. The EU as a whole was slow to agree on a collective approach. The eventual military intervention in 1995 was through the Nato framework, with UK forces actively engaged and the UK government much involved in the Dayton Agreement. Thereafter UK gave active support to the subsequent EU contribution to peace-making and peace-keeping. Paddy Ashdown served as the EU High Representative for Bosnia Herzegovina from 2002-2006. In response to the Kosovo War, Tony Blair was a leading proponent of the 'humanitarian intervention' which took place in 1999, again coordinated by Nato. Subsequently the UK within the EU has supported the process of stabilisation and the prospect of EU membership for the countries of the Western Balkans, as and when the necessary conditions can be met.

As regards the Mediterranean neighbourhood, historically the UK has been concerned rather with the Middle East than with North Africa. During the 'Arab Spring' in 2011, the UK became actively engaged. In the absence of a wider EU approach, notably as regards Libya, the British and the French played leading parts in the intervention by a 'coalition of the willing' to prevent the crushing of the anti-Gaddafi movement.

As regards JHA, despite remaining outside the Schengen Area, the UK has engaged with EU efforts to combat cross-border crime, terrorism and so forth, with active involvement in Eurojust (recent President Aled Williams from the UK) and Europol (current Director

Rob Wainwright from the UK). Under the Treaty of Lisbon the UK has to decide by 31 May 2014 whether to opt-in or to opt-out of provisions relating to police and criminal justice measures, in the latter case with the possibility of opting-in to individual measures. This question has become controversial, with the current coalition partners not yet agreed on how to proceed.

Wider international issues

The UK from the late 1970s actively promoted moves to develop European Political Cooperation, drafting the London Declaration of 1981, agreed during the UK presidency of the EU Council. UK governments have supported subsequent efforts to reinforce the Common Foreign and Security Policy. This chimes with the persistently active involvement of the UK in international action from the soft power end of the spectrum to the hard power end. As Commissioner Chris Patten improved the working relationship between the EU and Nato, as well as generally seeking more effective EU external action. UK governments have lent support to a series of EU coordinated actions to deal with security issues in Africa, currently including the Atalanta anti-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia which is coordinated from the UK military headquarters at Northwood. Catherine Ashton has continued to develop this role as High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

The British have been more circumspect about the role of the EU in the defence field. The questions for the British have repeatedly been: when and whether the EU as a whole would prove capable of action; what should be the division of labour between the EU and Nato; and when action would depend on a coalition of the willing, often involving the US. On the one hand, British governments have made efforts to develop European defence cooperation, as even Mrs Thatcher was prepared to entertain in the late 1980s (see her 1988 Bruges speech). More substantively Tony Blair worked to achieve the British-French St Malo Agreement of December 1998 to strengthen bilateral cooperation and to press for wider European cooperation on defence. This British-French approach was echoed in November 2010 in the Lancaster House Treaties committing to practical measures to strengthen military interoperability. On the other hand, there has been repeated British frustration as to the limits of collective European action and an enduring preference for working whenever possible through Nato. In the First Gulf War, in the Afghanistan intervention, and most contentiously in the military intervention in Iraq, UK governments were proactive in the operations, in all cases working closely with the US. In all of these operations a number of other European countries were involved in 'coalitions of the willing'.

As regards EU action to combat climate change and to address the wider international agenda on environmental issues the British position shifted in the 1990s from a rather lukewarm stance to a one of firm engagement. The UK government played a leading role within the EU caucus in the negotiations leading to the Kyoto Protocol of November 1997. Subsequent meetings have been slow to produce results. The UK remains committed to working with EU partners to make progress.

The politics of EU institutions and treaty reform

Over the years successive inter-governmental conferences (IGCs) have negotiated changes to the treaties. Recurrent issues for the UK have included: efforts to avoid competence creep of additional powers for the EU, including extended jurisprudence for the Court of Justice; the retention of unanimity voting in the Council in sensitive areas of policy; and protection of distinctive British interests, sometimes by opt-out arrangements.

In 1985 Mrs Thatcher was persuaded that treaty reform was necessary to drive the SEM forwards and the UK (both government and parliament) was a willing party to the Single European Act. Subsequent IGCs have been trickier for the British. In the 1991/2 IGC leading to the Treaty of Maastricht the UK government focused on the EMU proposals, contributing to the substantive discussion, while intent on securing a UK opt-out The UK insisted on a Social Protocol to avoid the application of new social (essentially employment) measures. The ratification process in the UK was deeply contentious and generated a wave of calls for a referendum, spurred partly by the first negative Danish referendum on the Treaty. The IGC of 1996/7 leading to the Treaty of Amsterdam found the British Conservative Government intent on limiting its scope and insistent on an opt-out from the incorporation of the Schengen Agreements into EU law. The incoming Labour Government in 1997 held to the Schengen opt-out, but agreed to the broader development of EU activity in justice and home affairs (JHA), and to reverse the Maastricht Social Protocol. Ratification in the UK went smoothly. The IGC leading to the Nice Treaty, convened to deal with institutional issues to facilitate eastwards enlargement, was not controversial for the UK.

Subsequent proposals for further treaty reform became deeply controversial for the UK. The EU summoned in 2001 a Convention (with Lord (John) Kerr as its Secretary General) to meet in public, with participants from beyond the usual IGC format. The ensuing 'Constitutional Treaty' proposed far-reaching changes to the operating system and treaty structure of the EU, which provoked increasing clamours in the UK for a referendum. The ratification process was halted after negative referenda votes in 2005 in France and The Netherlands, before the UK had completed its parliamentary ratification process. A conventional IGC then negotiated what became the more modest Treaty of Lisbon. Difficult issues for the British included: the incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights into EU law, the provisions for opting-into/-out of JHA measures, and some procedural questions re the use of the passerelle clauses to enable certain steps to be taken by majority vote in the Council without the need for further treaty amendments. Ratification proved contentious in the UK, partly because the Conservative opposition disliked much of the content and partly because of the increasing demands for a referendum for its ratification.

The current coalition Government passed in July 2010 the European Union Act, which requires a referendum to ratify any future treaty reform involving a transfer of powers from the UK to the EU. In December 2011 the UK Prime Minister, David Cameron, blocked the plan for EU treaty reform to anchor the fiscal compact for the eurozone, leaving all other member states (except the Czech Republic) to proceed instead by an inter-governmental treaty. More broadly there has been growing support for the calling of a referendum in one of two scenarios:

> i. a UK negotiation with other member states to alter the terms of UK membership, with options mooted, such as the Norwegian or Swiss forms of association, with a menu of repatriated powers, the plausibility of which remains to be tested; and

> ii. A decision on EU membership as such in the hope of settling the controversy within the UK.

British domestic politics and public opinion

Across the years of pre-accession, accession and post-accession the European issue has been contentious in British domestic politics among and often within parties. Contention has increased with: the emergence on the scene of the hard Eurosceptical United Kingdom Independence Party, which has made inroads into especially the otherwise Conservative-voting electorate; the continuing steps being taken by other EU countries

to support deeper integration against the widespread British preference for shallower integration; and the increasingly loud calls for resorting to referenda to resolve EU controversies. The UK now has a multi-party system in which the EU issue has become an important element in political competition. The prospect of an independence referendum in Scotland is an additional complication.

British public opinion reflects and conditions these controversies. As the Tables below show, British public opinion exhibits a three-way split on EU membership and on whether EU membership benefits the UK. At one end of the spectrum is a core constituency of support for the EU; at the other end of the spectrum is a core 'hard' Eurosceptical segment; in between lies a more volatile constituency which has over the years shifted back and forth between the two ends of the spectrum. This last has sometimes shifted towards a more pro-European position, as in the 1975 referendum on the terms of renegotiation; latterly more of this constituency has moved to a 'soft' Eurosceptical position. These developments beg the question as to whether it is the stances of the political parties which frame and drive public opinion or the constraints of public opinion that box the parties into their defensive positions on EU policies.

Table 1: UK Public Opinion on the European Union

Question: "*Generally speaking, do you think that UK membership of the European Community (Common Market) is …?*" 1973-2010

Date	A good thing	A bad thing	Neither good or bad	Don't know
Sep-73	31%	34%	22%	13%
May-75	47%	21%	19%	13%
Apr-80	23%	49%	22%	6%
Apr-84	25%	48%	20%	7%
Apr-85	37%	30%	28%	5%
Apr-90	52%	19%	24%	5%
May-95	44%	20%	31%	5%
Jun-00	25%	24%	29%	22%
Jun-05	36%	27%	28%	9%
Jun-10	29%	33%	31%	7%

Source: *Eurobarometer*, used because it asked this same question from 1973-2011.

Table 2: UK Public Opinion in April 2012

Question: "*Which of these statements do you agree with most, even if you don't agree with any entirely?*"

Britain would be better off leaving the EU	33%
Britain would be better off staying in the EU but only as a member of a free trade area	36%
Britain would be better off staying in the EU as it is currently but not taking part in any further integration, even if other countries did	18%
Britain would be better off staying in the EU and playing a full role in any further integration	14%
NET: Staying in under varied scenarios	67%

Source: *Populus* for Policy Network

In conclusion

It is hard to draw up the balance sheet of the UK's forty years of EU membership. The British have been active proponents and beneficiaries of some EU policies and programmes but have consistently had reservations, sometimes major, about others. The tendency towards British exceptionalism has become more pronounced across the years and the patterns of partnership and alliance with other EU countries have fluctuated, not least as regards the key relationships with France and Germany, which have not delivered of the trilateral EU leadership of which there had been some hopes. When and how these controversies will be resolved is a matter of fierce current debate.

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[1] The term EU is used generally in this text and encompasses the three founding European Communities.

Scotland: 40 Years of EU Membership

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KEY DATES

This chronology picks out the most significant UK and EU events, noting where possible how these affect Scotland in specific ways. It also identifies some Scotland specific events.

1967	Establishment by JDB Mitchell (first Salvesen Chair of European Institutions) of the Centre for European Governmental Studies in the Law Faculty of the University of Edinburgh, on of the first centres for the study of European integration institutions in the UK (now Edinburgh Europa Institute)
1972	European Communities Act adopted
1973	UK joins the European Communities
1973	George Thomson appointed as one of the UK's first two European Commissioners
1973	Lord (Jack) Mackenzie Stuart becomes UK judge in the Court of Justice (President of the Court 1984-1988) (retired 1988)
1974	UK General Election leads to election of Labour Government committed to holding a referendum of UK membership of European Communities
1975	European Commission office in Scotland established
1975	UK referendum on European Community membership; Scotland votes in favour of retaining membership by 58.4% to 41.6%, although this majority is lower than elsewhere in UK. Shetland and Western Isles vote against.
1979	First direct elections to the European Parliament; 8 MEPs elected by first past the post election from constituencies in Scotland (5 CON, 2 LAB, 1 SNP) (constituencies). Election of Winnie Ewing as SNP MEP played significant role in changing attitudes in the SNP towards the European Communities
1979	UK General Election leads to election of Conservative Government, adopting noticeably more skeptical policies towards certain aspects of European integration (although SEA and Treaty of Maastricht are signed) (re-elected in 1983, 1987 and 1992)
1984	Second direct elections to the European Parliament; 8 MEPs elected by first past the post election from constituencies in Scotland (5 LAB, 2 CON, 1 SNP) (constituencies). David Martin LAB MEP first elected (Scotland's longest serving MEP)
1986	Single European Act comes into force giving significant new powers to the European Parliament

1988	Bruce Millan is appointed as one of the UK's two European Commissioners under Jacques Delors. Significantly, Millan held the portfolio for regional policy and cohesion
1988	Significant reforms of the Structural Funds lead to new principles of regional policy creating a direct link between Scottish partners and the European Commission. New programmatic approach adopted, along with a significant increase in funding, and real impetus given to the slogan 'Europe of Regions'
1988	SNP adopts 'Independence in Europe' policy, highlighting most significant political shift on European integration by a political party in Scotland, building on strand of thinking pioneered by Jim Sillars – by then Deputy Leader of the SNP – when a member of the shortlived Scottish Labour Party, before joining the SNP
1988	Establishment of a Scottish Constitutional Convention, bringing together all the mainstream parties apart from the Conservative Party, and many large and small organisations within civil society including the churches established the momentum which led to the successful devolution campaign in 1997. SNP participated initially, but then withdrew
1989	Sir David Edward becomes first UK judge in the newly established Court of First Instance, becoming in 1992 the successor to Sir Gordon Slynn as UK judge at the Court of Justice (retired 2004)
1989	Third direct elections to the European Parliament; 8 MEPs elected by first past the post election from constituencies in Scotland (6 LAB, 1 CON, 1 SNP) (constituencies)
1992	Establishment of Scotland Europa – now part of Scottish Enterprise to lobby for Scottish issues
1992	Edinburgh Summit (European Council meeting) during UK Presidency significant for the concessions made to enable Denmark to hold second referendum on Treaty of Maastricht, and also for putting Edinburgh on the European map
1993	Treaty of Maastricht comes into force – without UK participation in 'social chapter' and with arrangements for opt out from monetary union, and creating the Committee of the Regions, with members representing Scotland
1994	Fourth direct elections to the European Parliament; 8 MEPs elected by first past the post election from constituencies in Scotland (6 LAB, 2 SNP) (constituencies)
1997	UK General Election leads to election of a Labour Government committed to introducing the Maastricht 'social chapter', and also to holding referendums on devolution in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland (re-elected in 2001 and 2005)

1997	Referendum on devolution votes overwhelmingly in favour (74.3% in favour of a Scottish Parliament, with a significant majority also in favour of it being given tax raising powers (63.5%))
1998	Scotland Act 1998 – Scottish Parliament precluded from legislating in a manner which is incompatible with EU law and reserving international relations, including EU matters to the Westminster Government
1999	First Scottish Parliament elections leads to LAB-LD coalition Scottish Executive
1999	Scottish Executive opens first representative office in Brussels – now Scottish Government European Union Office (SGEUO)
1999	Memorandum of Understanding and related overarching Concordat on the Co-ordination of European Union Policy Issues (updated most recently 2010) between Westminster Government and the devolved administrations, including attendance of Scottish Ministers at meetings in the Council of Ministers (and COREPER)
1999	Fifth direct elections to the European Parliament; 8 MEPs elected using the d'Hondt method of party-list proportional representation from Scotland (3 LAB, 2 SNP, 2 CON, 1 LD). MEPs include Neil MacCormick
1999	European Parliament Information Office in Edinburgh opened
1999	Treaty of Amsterdam comes into force – with UK participation in 'social chapter', but with UK opt out from Schengen related matters
2001	Establishment REGLEG – the network of regions of European Union Member States with legislative power, of which Scotland is a member
2002-2003	Neil MacCormick appointed substitute member of the Convention on the Future of Europe where he pushes for a significant boost to the principle of subsidiarity to recognize its importance for regions, and for places such as Scotland
2003	Treaty of Nice comes into force
2003	Second Scottish Parliament elections also leads to LAB-LD coalition Scottish Executive
2004	Constitutional Treaty (based primarily on work of Convention on Future of Europe) approved by Member States for ratification, containing significant recognition of diversity of governance arrangements *within* Member States and recognizing these as an element of national identity; not ratified but same provision reappears in Treaty of Lisbon

2004	Sixth direct elections to the European Parliament; 8 MEPs elected using the d'Hondt method of party-list proportional representation from Scotland (3 LAB, 2 SNP, 2 CON, 1 LD)
2007	Third Scottish Parliament election leads to a minority SNP Scottish Government
2009	Treaty of Lisbon comes into force, giving legal force to Charter of Fundamental Rights, and establishing Treaty on European Union and Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and also introducing various powers for national parliaments in relation to the implementation of the subsidiarity principle which are significant also for subnational parliaments
2009	Seventh direct elections to the European Parliament; 6 MEPs elected using the d'Hondt method of party-list proportional representation from Scotland (2 LAB, 2 SNP, 1 CON, 1 LD)
2010	UK General Election leads to a Con-LD coalition
2010	Scottish Parliament European and External Relations Committee report on the implications of the Treaty of Lisbon for Scotland notes the need (and opportunity) for enhanced engagement with EU law and policy-making after Lisbon
2011	Fourth Scottish Parliament election leads to an SNP Scottish Government with an absolute majority of MSPs and committed to holding a referendum on Scottish independence before the end of its term
2012	Agreement between the United Kingdom Government and the Scottish Government on a referendum on independence for Scotland (Edinburgh Agreement), paving the way for enabling legislation in the Westminster Parliament and the Scottish Parliament
2012	Scotland Act 2012 giving significantly enhanced tax variation powers to the Scottish Parliament

THE NARRATIVE

Scotland is, of course, part of the EU because it is part of the United Kingdom, which has been a Member State of the EU for 40 years on 1 January 2013. On the other hand, given that there have been – throughout the UK's membership of what was then the European Communities and is now the European Union – debates about 'home rule', devolution and now independence for Scotland, these offer a significant gloss upon the meaning of EU membership for Scotland. The 'idea of Europe' and lately the notion of 'independence in Europe' has been an important trope within Scottish nationalist politics for many decades. Hence, many of the significant moments of Scottish constitutional politics since the UK's accession to the EU also have resonance for a chronology of Scotland in the EU.

While 'Europe' was not a significant factor in the first devolution referendum in 1979, when Scots voted by a majority for devolution, but did not surpass the 40% population threshold set by the Westminster legislation (and thus this referendum is not included in the timeline), by 1997 when the second referendum was held, the landscape had shifted to a very substantial degree. The footprint of European integration was to be found by then all over Scotland, and not just in the traditional policy areas of agriculture and fisheries that had generated a previous hostility to European integration, which saw Scotland vote in the 1975 membership referendum by a lower majority to remain in the Communities.

The changes which mattered most stemmed not just from the evolving character of the European integration project after the amending treaties of the Single European Act, the Treaty of Maastricht and the Treaty of Amsterdam (agreed during the first weeks of the new Labour Government elected in May 1997 which also put in train the wheels of devolution) and subsequent to a significant increase in focus on regional and structural policy in partnership with the regions after 1988, but also related to alterations in the landscape of Scottish politics.

As a result of hostility to Thatcherism in Scotland during the 1980s, the electoral representation of the Conservative party had declined dramatically, and while electoral politics was largely dominated by the Labour Party which was itself moving gradually towards greater acceptance of European integration because it saw this as a vehicle for social democratic politics, from 1979 onwards the Scottish National Party was represented in the European Parliament. This representative opportunity, held initially by Winnie Ewing MEP, opened the eyes of a hitherto Eurosceptic party which had campaigned for a no vote in the UK referendum on membership in 1975 to two key factors: first, the possibility of being an effective small polity within the broad protective umbrella of European integration, which would give access to markets but also a voice in international negotiations, e.g. on trade matters (a view also championed by Jim Sillars, the pioneer of 'Independence in Europe'), and second, the opportunities offered by regional and structural policies for direct partnerships between Scottish bodies and the European Commission, in the period of structural funds growth before the accession of the post-1989 Member States in 2004 resulted in a decisive shift eastwards of the focus of those policies.

Meanwhile, the idea of a Europe of the Regions, the establishment of the Committee of the Regions after the Treaty of Maastricht, and the setting up of the so-called REGLEG network for regions with legislative powers within the EU have all provided opportunities for voice for Scotland and Scottish institutions within the framework of European integration. From 1992, Scotland had a presence in Brussels in the form of Scotland Europa. And in the midst of the crisis over the first Danish 'no' to the Treaty of Maastricht, a crucial European summit was held in Edinburgh which helped to resolve some of the most intractable tensions to ease the way towards a second Danish referendum, and which had the side effect of putting Edinburgh at that point firmly on the 'European map.' By that stage, meanwhile, a more or less unstoppable momentum towards a greater degree of governmental autonomy was building, most evidently in the form of the Scottish Constitutional Convention established in 1988 and bringing together most significant forces within civic and political Scotland including, for a time, the SNP, except the Conservative Party.

The devolution settlement after the overwhelming 'yes' vote in the referendum in 1997, which resulted in the Scotland Act 1998, the reconvening of a Scottish Parliament in 1999 for the first time in almost 300 years and the creation of a Scottish Executive of Ministers (now largely designated the 'Scottish Government', with significant practical responsibilities in relation to the implementation of all types of matters falling within the competences of the EU, required a sophisticated power-sharing and intergovernmental communications structure to be established. Thus by 1999, not only were Scottish governmental institutions established, but also the European Parliament had joined the

European Commission (since 1975) in opening an (Information) Office in Scotland. This also reinforced a stronger sense – buttressed also by the introduction of the d'Hondt method of election based on party lists which created a single constituency for EP elections in Scotland – of a 'Team Scotland', interfacing between Scottish representatives in Brussels and European institutions with offices in Scotland.

The Scotland Act itself provides that international and European relations are a reserved matter. The Scottish Parliament is also explicitly prohibited from legislating in a manner that is incompatible with EU law. Thus from the perspective of the EU institutions and the other Member States, they are only dealing with the UK as a Member State, including in matters related to the responsibility for breach of EU obligations. However, in practice many areas of highly active EU policy-making, including a number that have become more significant in recent years such as criminal justice and environmental policy, fall within the law-making powers conferred upon the Scottish Parliament. A Memorandum of Understanding and associated Concordats between the UK government and the government of the devolved parts of the UK establish the practical arrangements which deal with the inevitable complexities and frequent tensions that are going to arise in such circumstances, such as granting Scottish Ministers representation at Council and COREPER level in areas such as agriculture and fisheries, while ensuring that a 'UK line' is adopted, and allowing flexibility in implementation in relation to sensitive matters such as criminal justice which are not only devolved matters under the Scotland Act, but – more significantly from a historical perspective – were always preserved as distinctive Scottish matters under the Act of Union. The Scottish Government now maintains a substantial presence in Brussels as part of the 'UKRep family'.

European Union policy is an inevitable source of friction between the UK and Scottish governments, with both Scottish Ministers and the Scottish Parliament puzzling over the most effective ways to ensure sufficiently early engagement with policy priorities of the Commission in order to be able to make a difference to the types of proposals made as well as how to work with the UK government. For the first time after the Treaty of Lisbon, the European and External Relations Committee of the Scottish Parliament compiled, after hearing extensive evidence, a substantial report on the impact of the treaty on Scotland, marking a new level of sophistication in its engagement with European affairs. Alongside a continuing interest in the future of the Structural Funds, the current preoccupations of the Committee have also turned to other opportunities which arise to promote both science and economic development in Scotland, such as Horizon2020.

Scotland's distinctiveness in European affairs has also been maintained by a succession of major public figures who have contributed to European debates. Two of the UK's most distinguished judges – including the only UK judge thus far to hold the office of President of the European Court of Justice – have hailed from a background of Scots law: Lord (Jack) Mackenzie Stuart and Sir David Edward. Both have been associated in different ways with one of the first centres for the study of European affairs to be established in the UK (and the first with a specific legal focus) by the pioneering legal scholar Professor JDB Mitchell. This is now the Edinburgh Europa Institute. Similarly, a powerful contribution to the work of the Convention on the Future of Europe – belying his status as a mere 'substitute' member – was made by Sir Neil MacCormick, SNP MEP from 1999-2004 and legal scholar and philosopher. He pushed for a stronger sense of subsidiarity to be embedded in the European treaties, and in some respects his vision for better recognition of intra-state diversity is recognized in the text of the Treaty of Lisbon. Meanwhile, Scotland has supplied three of the UK's eleven Permanent Representatives since 1973 (Sir Donald Maitland, Sir John Kerr and Sir John Grant), and Kerr was also Secretary General of the Convention on the Future of Europe. Two Commissioners have hailed from Scotland – George Thomson and Bruce Millan.

It is hard to gauge public opinion in Scotland and to ascertain whether – on controversial issues such as the call for a further referendum on UK membership – there are

significant differences between Scotland and the rest of the UK. Polling figures – where they disaggregate Scotland – are based on very small numbers, but they appear to indicate that the Scottish public is marginally more supportive of UK membership than the UK as a whole. On the other hand, the political forces most associated with such calls for a referendum – the Conservative Party and the UK Independence Party – have little or no traction in electoral terms in Scotland. Moreover, individual elected representatives of the Conservative Party in Scotland are not amongst those prominent in calling for the UK to seek a radically looser relationship with the EU and the other Member States. And amongst those who are most publicly passionate about increased autonomy and even independence for Scotland, full participation within the European integration project continues to be one of the most important elements of their argument. Overall, therefore, it is very hard to separate out the debate about the future of Scotland within the EU – whether as part of the UK or not – from its own constitutional futures debate.

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Wales: 40 Years of EU Membership

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Citation

KEY DATES

A timeline of Wales in the EU.

1 Jan 1973	UK joins the European Economic Community
Dec 1974	The European Regional Development Fund is created
5 Jun 1975	UK votes 'Yes' in a referendum on EEC membership
1977	Roy Jenkins appointed President of the European Commission
1979	European Monetary System established
Jun 1979	First direct elections to the European Parliament. Beata Brookes, Ann Clwyd, Win Griffiths and Allan Rogers take the Welsh seats
Jun 1984	European Elections. Beata Brookes and Win Griffiths are joined by David Morriss and Llewellyn Smith
1984	Margaret Thatcher negotiates UK rebate
1984	Milk quotas are introduced in the EU as part of the CAP
1985	Jaques Delors becomes President of the EU
1986	The EU Flag is unveiled
1986	The Single European Act enters into force
1987	The Erasmus programme is launched
1988	Regional aid is doubled, and the regulations governing Structural Funds are significantly revised.
Jun 1989	European Elections. Wayne David and Joe Wilson join David Morriss and Llewellyn Smith. It is the first time Wales is without a female representative.
Oct 1990	UK enters European Exchange Rate Mechanism.
7 Feb 1992	Treaty of Maastricht is signed
16 Sep 1992	Black Wednesday UK market crash. The UK is forced to withdraw from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism
1993	The Treaty of the European Union comes into effect
1994	The Committee of the Regions is established and requests clarification on the definition of 'subsidiarity'
Jun 1994	European elections. Eluned Morgan becomes youngest ever MEP representing Mid and West Wales
26 Mar 1995	The Schengen pact enters into force
1 May 1997	Labour sweep to victory in the UK and immediately announce plans for a referendum on devolution in Scotland and Wales
18 Sep 1997	Wales votes 'Yes' by a narrow margin for devolution

13 Dec 1997	Agreement is made to open accession negotiations with 10 eastern and central European countries
31 Jul 1998	The Government of Wales Act 1998 receives Royal Assent and established the National Assembly for Wales
1998	The Jones Report urges Wales to take a proactive approach to engaging with European affairs
Mar 1999	Resignation of the European Commission. Financial regulation would now become more stringent
6 May 1999	First National Assembly for Wales elections. Labour win 28 seats and form a minority government
Jun 1999	European elections experience one of the lowest turnouts in Wales.
2000	The 2000-2006 Objective 1 programmes begin to be managed and administered in Wales for the first time.
9 Feb 2000	Alun Michael resigns as First Secretary for Wales. Poor leadership concerning the Structural Funds and negotiations with the UK Treasury over match-funding for them is a key cause.
1 Jan 2002	The Euro arrives in the 12 participating countries
1 May 2004	The EU welcomes 8 new nations. Large numbers of Polish migrants settle in Wales
Jun 2004	Turnout for European elections is 41% in Wales
Oct 2004	Wales disappears from the map of Europe on Eurostats annual publication
2005	Wales is awarded Objective 1 level funding for 2007-2013
25 Jul 2006	Government of Wales Act 2006 receives Royal Assent
1 Jan 2007	Romania and Bulgaria join the EU but the UK imposes travel restrictions until 2013
2007	Welsh Labour and Plaid Cymru make 'One Wales' agreement
13 Dec 2007	Lisbon Treaty signed strengthening principle of subsidiarity
Nov 2008	Welsh is used in the European Council of Ministers for the first time.
2009	EC & UK sign an agreement on use of the Welsh language in the EC
Mar 2010	Key elements of Europe 2020 agreed
3 Mar 2011	Wales votes 'Yes' on a referendum for full law-making powers for the National Assembly for Wales
2011	National Assembly for Wales abolishes European Affairs Committee
Mar 2012	First Minister Carwyn Jones poses the 'Bridgend question' on why UK representatives speak for Wales in Europe on devolved matters

Nov 2012   Carwyn Jones warns of the risks of a UK referendum on EU membership

Jan 2013   Wales celebrates 40 years as part of the European Community

THE NARRATIVE

Historically the Welsh believed themselves to have a special affinity with Europe. Wales, it was claimed, had retained the benefits of Roman civilization even as our less fortunate neighbours had succumbed to the ravages of the so-called 'Dark Ages'. With the country playing a full part in the worldwide British Empire this feeling of affinity may have waned. Still Europe loomed large in Welsh life, even it was the austere Geneva of John Calvin that inspired the country's fervent nonconformist Protestantism rather than Rome or the Romans. By the time the UK finally joined what was then called the Common Market – or in Welsh the *Farchnad Gyffredin* – nonconformism was in retreat and there was little by the way of a specifically Welsh debate about membership. Indeed, if anything the Welsh electorate were marginally less enthusiastic about the Union than voters in the rest of the state. In the 1975 referendum 64% voted to remain in the EEC as compared to 67.2% in favour across the UK as a whole.

In the intervening 40 years, however, there is no doubt that European membership has had a profound effect on everyday life in Wales. It is often now claimed that the Welsh look upon the European Union more favourably than the English (European Commission, 2007). They have certainly remained more resistant to the siren calls of Euro-scepticism. Indeed Welsh First Minister Carwyn Jones has recently confidently claimed that, should a new referendum on UK membership of the Union eventually be held, Wales would vote to remain part of the European Union (Jones, 2012).

Even if, as has been claimed, the past is always a foreign country, the Wales of 1973 was profoundly different to the Wales of today. The legacy of Wales's pioneering role in the industrial revolution remained with significant coal and steel industries still dominating the country's economic and, indeed, social life. Harbingers of change were, however, certainly in evidence. Heavy industry was in decline, while the opening of the Sony plant in Bridgend represented the first major investment by a Japanese company in the country and the beginning of a period in which inward investment was regarded as central to the successful restructuring of the economy. Yet a Wales without a coal industry seemed almost unimaginable. Political self-government also appeared a distant prospect. After all, the Welsh Office – the UK government's administrative office for Wales – was less than a decade old when Wales became part of the Union. The prospect of Welsh Government Ministers representing the UK in European Council meetings would have seemed entirely fanciful.

It was in rural Wales that the effects of European membership first became apparent through the workings of the Common Agricultural Policy. While the support provided to farmers and the rural economy more generally was welcome, it was not a policy without its controversies. Attempts to discourage over-production – in particular the 'milk quotas' introduced in the mid 1980s – led to several memorable protests by angry dairy farmers.

In the rest of Wales it was the precipitate decline of heavy industry in the recession of the early 1980s, followed by the collapse of the coal industry after the defeat of the 1984-85 Miners Strike, that brought the potential significance of European membership to the fore. With the skills base of much of the workforce apparently obsolete and unemployment stubbornly high, the 1988 reform of European Regional Development Funds and the doubling of regional aid would eventually have a hugely significant effect in Wales.

Although Wales received comparatively little by way of regional development aid throughout the 1990's, it was in the 2000-2006 programming period that the impact of these developments would really be felt. Following the redrawing of the NUTS II regional boundaries in Wales in 1998, much of west Wales and the Valleys qualified for Objective 1 funding, with the rest of Wales being eligible for Objective 3 support.

The management of the Structural Funds in Wales was to provide the first great test for the devolved National Assembly for Wales, meeting for the first time in 1999 as a result of a narrow Yes vote in the 1997 referendum (Cole & Palmer, 2011). Successful delivery of the programmes not only had the potential to significantly improve the country's economic potential but could also serve to legitimate the new governmental structures themselves. In the event, Objective 1 would also furnish Wales with its first post-devolution constitutional crisis. Disagreements with the UK government on the question of match funding would eventually lead to the removal of Alun Michael from his role as Wales' First Secretary. He was replaced by Rhodri Morgan, who had been the Welsh Labour party's original choice as leader, but whom had been opposed by UK Prime Minister Tony Blair. Here was a case, then, of tensions with the UK government around an apparently arcane issue of European funding mechanisms leading to the installation in Wales of the leader that most of the Welsh electorate had wanted all along. Such are the sometimes serendipitous ways of multi-level politics.

It was not only the overthrow of Alun Michael that served to increase awareness of the importance of Wales' relationship with Europe among the wider population. European funding provided businesses, civil society organisations and individuals with new opportunities. New vistas were also opened up for those civil servants charged with implementing the programmes that were, for the first time, interpreted, structured and delivered in Wales by Welsh organisations. Plaques bearing the 'Funded by the European Union' logo became nigh on ubiquitous across the country with the relationship with the Union being widely promoted as being a key dimension in the regeneration of Wales's economy and society.

While the award of Objective 1 funding for 2000-2006 was widely described as a 'one-off' opportunity to receive such a high level of funding, it was announced in 2005 that the West Wales and the Valleys region had again failed to cross the threshold of 75% of average EU GDP. As a result, Convergence funding would provide a second bite of the cherry for Wales in the period 2007-13. Here was a chance to redeem some of the failures of the earlier period and build a more strategic and coherent programme than the one for 2000-2006, which was widely criticised for its incoherence and barriers in participation (Royles, 2006, Entwistle et al, 2007). The Welsh European Funding Office charged with management and distribution of the funds confidently asserted that the 2007-2013 programmes would be a great success for Wales. It will soon be time to assess whether such confidence was truly justified.

In the initial years of UK membership Wales was not directly represented in European institutions. Rather it was left to individuals of Welsh origins to make their mark. None more prominent than Roy Jenkins, hailing from Abersychan in south east Wales, who became the first British President of the Commission in the 1977.

The first four directly elected representatives from Wales to sit in the European Parliament were returned in 1979. Given the, until then, dire Welsh record of ensuring female representation, the fact that two of the four were women (Labour's Ann Clwyd and the Conservative's Beata Brookes) represented a major breakthrough. Meanwhile, inside the Commission, prominent Welsh individuals continued to make an impact, with Ivor Richard installed as Commissioner for Employment and Social Affairs during the early 1980's, and fellow Welshman and acting Director General, Hywel Ceri Jones, playing a prominent role in the development of the flagship Erasmus programmes.

Welsh representation at the European level provided a fascinating footnote in the history of the establishment of the Single European Market. Specifically, the difficult passage of the Maastricht Treaty though the UK House of Commons was aided by a deal between the nationalist Plaid Cymru (Party of Wales) and the Conservative government that saw the party's MPs support the treaty in return for enhanced Welsh representation on the Committee of the Regions.

With the establishment of the National Assembly for Wales following the 1997 referendum, ensuring that a Welsh voice would be heard at the European level became an important political priority. Wales, it was argued, should not only benefit from structural funding and other support programmes, but devolved Wales should also seek to contribute positively in shaping the future development of the Union (Jones, 1998). On occasion, however, it wasn't entirely clear that Welsh interest in Europe was reciprocated. The omission of Wales from the map of Europe displayed on the cover of Eurostat's 2004 yearbook certainly raised a few eyebrows! Welsh politicians, however, were quick to laugh this off as a genuine mistake.

In 2008 it was not only a Welsh voice that was heard at a European Union Council of Ministers meeting, but for the first time a voice speaking in the Welsh language. The following year Welsh was recognised as a co-official language of the European Commission, ensuring translation of certain official publications, and providing for communication in Welsh to the Union through designated bodies. The governing Labour-Plaid Cymru coalition in Cardiff hailed this as a milestone for the language, and indicated their hope that other European institutions would follow suit.

The way that the National Assembly itself deals with European matters became the subject of controversy following a reorganisation of the Assembly's committee structures as a result of the granting of more expansive legislative powers to Welsh legislature after a further referendum in March 2011. This reorganisation saw the disappearance of the Assembly's Committee for European and External Affairs. Whilst some commentators argued this would lead to the downgrading of European affairs within the National Assembly (Dickson, 2011), the Presiding Officer was quick to defend the move on the grounds that this now placed responsibility on all Committees to keep abreast of European level developments and their ramifications for Wales. It is perhaps too soon to say whether or not this has proven to be the case. But what cannot be doubted is that most Welsh politicians, and certainly three of the four main parties in Wales, remain enthusiastically pro-European. But what of the broader population as a whole?

Wales enters its 40th year in the European Union with a stark warning from First Minister, Carwyn Jones, to those Euro-sceptics demanding another referendum on UK membership. Holding such a referendum, he argues, could serve hasten the break-up of the UK given that the different component nations of the UK might well vote differently. His assumption is that the Celtic nations are more likely to adopt a positive attitude than their English neighbours. It is clearly the case that Euro-scepticism is not a prominent feature of Welsh political culture. Yet neither can it realistically be claimed that the Welsh have begun to think of themselves as the confident 'Welsh Europeans' imagined by thinkers such as Raymond Williams. What is beyond doubt, however, is that European membership has had – and continues to have – a profound effect on everyday life in every part of Wales. Whether or not we identify as Welsh Europeans, ours is very clearly, a European Wales.

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The UK 40 Years in the Union – Wales Timeline

1st January 1973: UK joins the European Economic Community

December 1974: The European Regional Development Fund is created

5th June 1975: UK votes 'Yes' in a referendum on EEC membership

1977: Roy Jenkins appointed President of the European Commission

1979: European Monetary System established

June 1979: First direct elections to the European Parliament. Beata Brookes, Ann Clwyd, Win Griffiths and Allan Rogers take the Welsh seats

June 1984: European Elections. Beata Brookes and Win Griffiths are joined by David Morriss and Llewellyn Smith

1984: Margaret Thatcher negotiates UK rebate

1973 · 1974 · 1975 · 1977 · 1979 · 1984

7th February 1992: Treaty of Maastricht is signed

October 1990: UK enters European Exchange Rate Mechanism.

June 1989: European Elections. Wayne David and Joe Wilson join David Morriss and Llewellyn Smith. It is the first time Wales is without a female representative.

1988: Regional aid is doubled, and the regulations governing Structural Funds are significantly revised.

1987: The Erasmus programme is launched

1986: The Single European Act enters into force

1986: The EU Flag is unveiled

1985: Jaques Delors becomes President of the EU

1984: Milk quotas are introduced in the EU as part of the CAP

1992 · 1990 · 1989 · 1988 · 1987 · 1986 · 1985

16th September 1992: Black Wednesday UK market crash. The UK is forced to withdraw from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism

1993: The Treaty of the European Union comes into effect

1994: The Committee of the Regions is established and requests clarification on the definition of 'subsidiarity'

June 1994: European elections. Eluned Morgan becomes youngest ever MEP representing Mid and West Wales

26th March 1995: The Schengen pact enters into force

1st May 1997: Labour sweep to victory in the UK and immediately announce plans for a referendum on devolution in Scotland and Wales

18th September 1997: Wales votes 'Yes' by a narrow margin for devolution

13th December 1997: Agreement is made to open accession negotiations with 10 eastern and central European countries

31st July 1998: The Government of Wales Act 1998 receives Royal Assent and established the National Assembly for Wales

1993 · 1994 · 1995 · 1997 · 1998

June 2004: Turnout for European elections is 41% in Wales

1st May 2004: The EU welcomes 8 new nations. Large numbers of Polish migrants settle in Wales

1st January 2002: The Euro arrives in the 12 participating countries

9th February 2000: Alun Michael resigns as First Secretary for Wales. Poor leadership concerning the Structural Funds and negotiations with the UK Treasury over match-funding for them is a key cause.

2000: The 2000-2006 Objective 1 programmes begin to be managed and administered in Wales for the first time.

June 1999: European elections experience one of the lowest turnouts in Wales.

6th May 1999: First National Assembly for Wales elections. Labour win 28 seats and form a minority government

March 1999: Resignation of the European Commission. Financial regulation would now become more stringent

1998: The Jones Report urges Wales to take a proactive approach to engaging with European affairs

2005: Wales is awarded Objective 1 level funding for 2007-2013

October 2004: Wales disappears from the map of Europe on Eurostats annual publication

2005 · 2004 · 2002 · 2000 · 1999

25th July 2006: Government of Wales Act 2006 receives Royal Assent

1st January 2007: Romania and Bulgaria join the EU but the UK imposes travel restrictions until 2013

2007: Welsh Labour and Plaid Cymru make 'One Wales' agreement

13th December 2007: Lisbon Treaty signed strengthening principle of subsidiarity

November 2008: Welsh is used in the European Council of Ministers for the first time.

2009: EC & UK sign an agreement on use of the Welsh language in the EC

March 2010: Key elements of Europe 2020 agreed

3rd March 2011: Wales votes 'Yes' on a referendum for full law-making powers for the National Assembly for Wales

2011: National Assembly for Wales abolishes European Affairs Committee

March 2012: First Minister Carwyn Jones poses the 'Bridgend question' on why UK representatives speak for Wales in Europe on devolved matters

November 2012: Carwyn Jones warns of the risks of a UK referendum on EU membership

January 2013: Wales celebrates 40 years as part of the European Community

2006 · 2007 · 2009 · 2011 · 2012 · 2013

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Northern Ireland: 40 Years of EU Membership

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Citation

KEY DATES

A timeline of Northern Ireland in the EU.

Jan 1973	Accession of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland to the European Communities
May 1974	Collapse of the Sunningdale Power-Sharing Agreement after five months; return of direct rule from London
Jun 1975	UK referendum on continued membership of the European Communities. In Northern Ireland the 'yes' vote is 52.1%. Turnout is 48.2%.
Mar 1975	European Regional Development Fund created
Jun 1979	First direct elections to European Parliament (EP): Ian Paisley, leader of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) tops the poll; John Hume, deputy leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) comes second; John Taylor of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) takes Northern Ireland's third seat.
May 1980	First Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Summit led by Charles Haughey and Margaret Thatcher
Oct 1981	Irish Republican prisoners start hunger strike; Sinn Fein's political rise begins
Feb 1983	EP Political Affairs Committee commissions report on Northern Ireland
Mar 1984	EP adopts Haagerup Report on the Situation in Northern Ireland
Jun 1984	EP election: Paisley (DUP) again tops the poll; Hume (SDLP) again comes second; Taylor (UUP) takes Northern Ireland's third seat.
Nov 1985	Anglo-Irish Agreement and the establishment of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference staffed by British and Irish government officials.
Oct 1988	Paisley (DUP) is ejected from the EP's Strasbourg plenary meeting after a protesting against the visit of Pope John Paul II, shouting 'I renounce you as the anti-Christ'.
Jan 1989	January Northern Ireland becomes an Objective 1 region under the EU's regional policy. EC Community Support Framework for Northern Ireland launched
Jun 1989	EP election: Paisley (DUP) tops the poll; Hume (SDLP) comes second; Jim Nicholson (UUP) takes Northern Ireland's third seat.
Mar 1994	Committee of the Regions established with two representatives from Northern Ireland

Jun 1994	EP election: 1989 result is replicated with Paisley (DUP), Hume (SDLP) and Nicholson (UUP) being elected.
Aug 1994	Irish Republican Army (IRA) announces 'complete' ceasefire
Sep 1994	As the EP endorses the IRA ceasefire, Hume's Socialist MEP colleagues initiate his nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to secure an end to violence in Northern Ireland.
Oct 1994	Loyalist ceasefire announced
Dec 1994	European Council agrees to establish €300m multiannual programme of financial assistance to support the burgeoning Northern Ireland peace process (initiated through joint-lobbying by all three MEPs).
Jul 1995	Special EU Programme for Northern Ireland and the Border Counties of the Republic of Ireland (Peace I) launched with funding worth €400 million
Apr 1998	Good Friday/Belfast Agreement signed. The agreement contained provisions on cross border cooperation and an international dimension (including the EU) for the new political architecture. Overall responsibility for foreign affairs is a reserved matter for the UK government but the regional administration in Northern Ireland is made responsible for ensuring the implementation of EU policies
Oct 1998	Hume (SDLP) and David Trimble (UUP) jointly awarded Nobel Peace Prize in recognition of their role in the making of the Good Friday Agreement. Hume stresses the European model of post-war reconciliation as his primary inspiration in accepting the award.
Mar 1999	European Council agrees to fund Peace II (2000-2004) programme
Jun 1999	EP election produces same result as in 1994: Paisley (DUP), Hume (SDLP) and Nicholson (UUP) re-elected
Dec 1999	Devolved powers granted to Northern Ireland Assembly
Jan 2000	Peace II launched with funding worth €597 million; Objective 1 status retained on transitional basis.
Jul 2000	European Policy Coordination Unit established within the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister
2001	Office of the Northern Ireland Executive in Brussels (ONIEB) opened
Oct 2001	Northern Ireland Assembly's Committee of the Centre launches an inquiry into Northern Ireland's relations with the EU
Mar 2002	Committee of the Centre publishes report: Approach of the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Devolved Government on European Union Issues

Oct 2002	Devolved powers suspended; direct rule from Westminster returns
Jun 2004	EP election: Paisley is replaced by Jim Allister, but the DUP still tops the poll; the SDLP loses its seat to Bairbre de Brún of Sinn Féin (SF) as Hume retires; Nicholson (UUP) is again in third place
Jan 2005	Peace II extended
Oct 2006	Northern Ireland Executive launches Northern Ireland's first European Strategy: Taking Our Place in Europe
Jan 2007	Peace III (2007-2013) launched with funding worth €333 million
Mar 2007	Allister resigns from the DUP following its agreement to share power with Sinn Féin
May 2007	European Commission Task Force for Northern Ireland announced
May 2007	Devolved powers restored
Mar 2009	Northern Ireland Executive launches the first of a series of annual and biannual European Priorities documents
Jun 2009	EP election: de Brún (SF) tops the poll. Diane Dodds (DUP) comes second. Nicholson is again in third place, this time standing for a short-lived alliance between the UUP and the Conservative Party under the banner, Conservatives and Unionists – New Force (UCUNF).
Mar 2010	Memorandum of Understanding and its Concordat on Co-ordination of European Union Policy Issues sets out the mechanisms for dealing with EU business between the UK government and the devolved administrations.
Mar 2011	Members of the Barroso Taskforce visit Northern Ireland
May 2012	Martina Anderson takes over from de Brún as Sinn Féin's MEP

THE NARRATIVE

Since the United Kingdom and Ireland joined the European Communities (EC) 40 years ago, Northern Ireland has not only witnessed many of the darkest years of 'The Troubles' but also emerged from violent conflict as a more economically prosperous region with a broadly functioning devolved administration. The EU has often enjoyed a high profile, particularly as a source of funding. Successive European Parliament (EP) elections have been hotly contested as the region's four main parties have fought over the three available seats. Despite their clear political differences the three MEPs have generally demonstrated an uncharacteristic willingness to cooperate on matters of particular interest to communities and voters in Northern Ireland. Agriculture, fisheries and continued access to the Structural Funds have featured large. Objective 1 status in 1989-99 resulted in £1.7 billion of EU funding for Northern Ireland. Moves towards peace since the 1990s have been rewarded by the EU, notably with three dedicated Peace programmes.

As devolution has become an established reality, the Northern Ireland institutions – the Assembly and Executive – have gradually become more engaged with the EU and with EU policy issues. At the same time the EU, through the European Commission and most recently the Barroso Task Force, has continued to demonstrate its commitment to support peace, stability and improved economic and social well-being in Northern Ireland. This does not, however, translate into a heartfelt endorsement of the EU and further integration among voters in Northern Ireland. While they may look more favourably than voters elsewhere in the UK on the EU, there can be no mistaking the fact that the majority of political parties in Northern Ireland remain eurosceptic with most MPs taking their seats in Westminster supporting a referendum on the UK's withdrawal from the EU.

Positive perceptions

During 'The Troubles' European integration was for many people in Northern Ireland a policy issue of only marginal concern. The opportunities and restrictions created by the Common Agricultural Policy and the Common Fisheries Policy certainly found resonance with the farming and fishing communities. So too did receipts from the European Regional Development Fund. Specific EC-funded infrastructure projects such as URBAN and INTERREG, the Single Market project, the dedicated Community Support Framework for Northern Ireland and the creation the Peace Programmes from 1995 also raised general awareness of the EU and over time contributed to more positive attitudes being expressed towards the EU. In the 1975 referendum on the UK's continued membership referendum, however, only just over half of the electorate voted 'yes'; and there was a noticeable difference between the two main communities: the Protestant community being more sceptical towards European integration than its Catholic counterpart.

The difference reflected contrasting stances on British sovereignty and links with other European states. Nearly three decades on, perceptions of the EU have improved and the gap between the two main communities has narrowed. An academic survey in 2002 found that Northern Ireland voters displayed more positive views on participation in the EU and whether it brought benefits exceeded the UK average by 14 percentage points (although this was well behind views expressed in the Republic of Ireland). A Flash Eurobarometer survey in 2008 also presented Northern Ireland as the region of the UK most positive about the EU.

Increasing engagement

A key event in the Northern Ireland's recent history was the return of devolved government in 1999. Although the area of foreign affairs was designated a reserved matter for Westminster, the Northern Ireland Assembly was tasked with ensuring the correct implementation of EU directives. Moreover, a 1999 (and recently reviewed 2010) Memorandum of Understanding and its Concordat on Coordination of European Union Policy Issues set out the mechanisms for dealing with EU business between the UK government and the devolved administrations. Previously, such business had largely been the preserve of specific departments, primarily Finance and Agriculture, the three MEPs and a small number of consultancies and interest groups. Awareness of EU issues amongst the new Assembly members (MLAs) was in most cases limited.

Devolution led to the creation of a special European Policy Coordination Unit (EPCU) within the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM) and the establishment of the Office for the Northern Ireland Executive in Brussels in 2001. OFMDFM sought to play a proactive role in terms of Northern Ireland's engagement on EU policy issues producing, a 2006 consultation paper, 'Taking our Place in Europe' and,

since the launch of the Barroso Task Force in 2007, adopting annual and biannual European Priorities strategy documents focused on improving the region's economic competitiveness and creating sustainable employment opportunities. OFMDFM also organises an annual Opportunity Europe event in Belfast.

The Assembly too has sought to engage in EU issues, launching in 2002 an *Inquiry into the Approach of the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Devolved Government on European Union Issues*. In 2010 a further *Inquiry into Consideration of European Issues* was held. There is still more work to do to bring together an EU policy informed community to include the three MEPs, members of both the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions as well as a number of other interested parties (including interest groups, wider civil society and academics) but the devolved institutions and EU programmes have facilitated engagement and embedded Northern Ireland as a region deeper into EU than at any time before.

Northern Ireland's Three MEPs

The EU owes much of its profile in Northern Ireland to the region's three MEPs although EP elections have generally only added to the polarisation within society between the two predominant communities. From 1979 until 1999, Ian Paisley, leader of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) topped the poll with a majority of unionist votes. John Hume of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) received a similarly large mandate from nationalists. John Taylor of the Ulster Unionist Party secured the third seat. As in their views on Northern Ireland, Paisley and Hume represented very different attitudes towards Europe. Paisley's staunch opposition to the EC matched his hardline unionism, and reflected those in the unionist community who saw European integration as an additional threat to British sovereignty over Northern Ireland. By contrast, Hume – French-speaking and having previously worked as a special advisor in the European Commission – was unrepentantly Europhile, articulating the dominant view among progressive nationalists that European integration – diminishing the importance of borders, transferring political sovereignty, and reconciling previously warring populations – would help to ease the path towards Irish reunification.

The actions of Paisley and Hume in the EP also contributed to communal antipathy back home. Paisley's ejection from a 1988 plenary for protesting against the visit of Pope John Paul II may have delighted his evangelical followers, but offended many Catholics. Meanwhile, Hume's apparent influence among MEPs only heightened unionists' hostility towards him. With the SDLP a member of the European Confederation of Socialist Parties, Hume sat with the largest and most powerful political group in the EP. Moreover, as the group's treasurer he had a place on the front benches, a position Hume used to secure support to initiate a formal EC investigation into the Northern Ireland problem, culminating in the Haagerup Report of 1984. The investigation was opposed by unionists as unwarranted interference in Northern Ireland's affairs, even more so when it concluded by advocating a solution very much in line with SDLP thinking: power-sharing between the two communities and co-operation between the British and Irish governments in dealing with the problem. The report and Hume's lobbying within the EP, however unpalatable, arguably helped nudge Margaret Thatcher towards the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985. With this a first step in the peace process was taken as the British and Irish governments began to co-manage the Northern Ireland problem.

Though it often provided another arena for antagonism between nationalists and unionists, the EP did, at times, encourage co-operation between Northern Ireland's political representatives. Indeed, Paisley and Taylor were quite content to join in Hume's lobbying efforts when it came to the crucial issue of economic assistance for the region's conflict-damaged economy. Thus, throughout the 1980s, all three were eager to present a united front in order to maximise financial assistance from Brussels. This tendency

continued into the 1990s, by which time Jim Nicholson had replaced Taylor as the UUP's MEP, and led to the establishment of the Peace I programme in 1995.

Whilst Hume was continuously rewarded by nationalist voters for his efforts to secure EU support for Northern Ireland, this loyalty did not extend to his party. When Hume retired in 2004, the SDLP immediately lost to the Sinn Féin challenger, Bairbre de Brún. By contrast, when Paisley stood down in the same year, his DUP colleague, Jim Allister, again topped the poll. Though Allister subsequently resigned from the DUP following its agreement to share power with Sinn Féin, Diane Dodds retook the seat for the party in 2009. With Dodds, de Brún and Nicholson all representing parties with various shades of eurosceptic thinking, Northern Ireland since Hume's retirement has lacked a prointegration voice in the EP. With Nicholson in 2009 following British Conservative MEPs into the European Conservatives and Reformists grouping, Northern Ireland also lost its last representative in any of three largest EP groups. Nicholson's move also meant that he was unable to secure reelection as an EP quaestor, a post he had held since 2004, being re-elected in 2007.

The European Union in Northern Ireland – contributing to conflict transformation

Prior to EC membership relations between the United Kingdom and Ireland were often strained. A 'Cold War' over Northern Ireland existed. EC membership, however, facilitated a transformation of the British-Irish relationship since the EC offered neutral political spaces in Brussels and Strasbourg where British and Irish government ministers, parliamentarians and officials could build a new relationship unsullied by economic dependence, political antagonism and mutual suspicion. Their priority was dealing with the escalating ethno-national conflict in Northern Ireland. The new interstate relationship gradually became characterised by co-operation to that end.

A key development resulting from the transformed intergovernmental relationship was the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement which drew on EC-inspired notions of transnational governance in that it gave the Irish government a role in the public affairs of Northern Ireland. Thereafter, any fruitful negotiation on the future governance of Northern Ireland would require a transnational dimension leading to the establishment of transnational institutional structures. These structures were made manifest in the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. The territorial Northern Ireland Executive, Assembly and Civic Forum (Strand 1) were matched by a transnational North/South Ministerial Council and its Implementation Bodies (Strand 2), as well as a transnational British-Irish Council and British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference (Strand 3). The importance of the North/South arrangements was highlighted by the mandatory nature of the Implementation Bodies and by the clause, on paper at least, that linked the fate of the North/South Ministerial Council to that of the Northern Ireland Assembly. The Implementation Bodies concentrated on the specifics of cross-border co-operation in the areas of food safety, minority languages, trade and business development, aquaculture, waterways, and EU Programmes, with an all-island company established to communicate abroad Ireland's tourism potential.

The provision of the Special EU Programmes Body (SEUPB) was of particular significance, not least because this implementation body was given responsibility for managing EU programmes. Meanwhile, the North/South Ministerial Council, involving ministers with sectoral responsibilities for education, health, transport, agriculture, the environment and tourism, would meet to discuss wideranging cross-border co-operation. These institutions bear testimony to the effects of Europeanisation on the realisation of post-conflict, post-sovereign state institutional arrangements for the island of Ireland.

Though the EU was not a transnational diplomatic player in negotiations leading to the Good Friday Agreement its presence was felt in a number of ways. Many key actors in the peace process saw the agreement as one derived from many European sources, including the principles and treaties of the EU. Moreover, the EU, particularly through the European Commission, provided crucial and sophisticated support for the process at the local community level through its Peace programmes. Peace I (1995-1999), Peace II (2000-2006) and Peace III (2007-13) represent a sophisticated and sustained example of a 'peace-building from below' strategy. Europeanisation describes the tenor of the work undertaken in that the promotion of cross-border, inter-cultural dialogue, with a view to the acceptance of difference and the recognition of commonality, is central.

This communicative potential has been an important aspect of the cross-border, cross-community co-operation experience of local-level projects funded under the EU Peace programmes in Ireland. Project leaders have spoken of their positive experiences, for example, through engaging in discussions on history, participating in storytelling, and in organising cross-border, inter-cultural musical events or leisure pursuits for young people. It is also claimed that it was an important stepping stone on the path to improved cross-community relations in Northern Ireland. For others, benefit was gained from the simple relief of escaping the cage of territorial conflict in Northern Ireland, however briefly, and glimpsing another way of life.

The EU Peace programmes for Ireland have engaged public, private and third sector organisations on both sides of the Irish border and many cross-border partnerships for conflict transformation have been established. The issue of their sustainability is a major concern, however, as Peace III ends in 2013.

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Book Review

Claudia Engelmann *Maastricht University*

Security, Insecurity and Migration in Europe
by Gabriella Lazaridis (ed)
Ashgate (2011), ISBN: 9781409409205 (hb)

In today's world it has become impossible to think of migration without also thinking of security. To some this may seem rational and healthy, to others regrettable, but one way or another it has become inevitable to think of the two as being somehow connected. The securitization of the migration debate and the ensuing policies that could be observed all over Europe have been strongly criticised, mainly because, paradoxically, this ever-closer nexus has resulted in a great level of insecurity, especially with regard to the migrant himself/herself. Structural change, such as technological innovation or the persistent economic and financial crisis, is not without influence on this debate, and research is needed to understand these changes.

Security, Insecurity and Migration in Europe combines sixteen chapters dealing with the connection between these three terms. Though the topic as such is not new, the edited volume is a very timely contribution insofar as individual chapters take into account many of the structural changes that potentially have an impact on migration and security. Gabriella Lazaridis has collected a dense compilation of essays on the topic including different country foci and drawing on a wide variety of disciplines (such as anthropology, political science, law, history and sociology) and research methods. The different chapters discuss to what extent immigrants are perceived as security threats (by media or politicians), but also to what extent these perceptions, once translated into policies, create a more insecure situation for immigrants themselves (including studies on different groups of immigrants, such as women or unaccompanied minors).

Most of the chapters in the volume focus on insecurity. Four of them are particularly noteworthy because they link insecurity to discourse analysis and thus provide a comprehensive analysis of one of the major underlying factors of insecurity. Togral shows in his contribution how discourses of essentialism and homogenization have made it possible for conservative and racist groups to build their arguments around the defence of 'our' values. Such narratives of threat have increasingly gained the status of 'truth' and have structured migration policies, which in turn have led to increased insecurity. Several other contributions pick up this line of argumentation by looking at more specific cases. Campani shows in her essay how a gender-approach can contribute to deconstructing the security rhetoric in political discourse. For that reason she analyses the multiple impacts on migrants that security-labeled policies have. By studying statistical data and the dominant discourse of the Italian political arena, Campani shows that the security-migration nexus has little if anything to do with the facts, but – in the Italian case – rather reconstructs 'an authoritarian and anti-democratic ideology that is embedded in the national-populist and fascist traditions' (p. 161). In an empirically very rich comparative study of Greece and France, Tsoukala comes to the conclusion that the social construction of a threat adheres to strict rational criteria that incorporate the vested interest and needs of the host society. The chapter by Krasteva nicely follows up on this through an even more narrowed focus on the French burqa debate, showing how the "visibilisation" of the invisible actually led to increasing insecurity for the women affected.

An entirely different but very timely aspect is analysed by both Koser and Likic-Broric, whose contributions address the link between insecurity and economic structure. Based on a large amount of data, Koser discusses the current economic and financial crisis and its potential impact on migration and security. While he himself concedes that evidence on the impact that the global and financial crisis has on international migration patterns is just emerging and consequently limited, the figures he provides do show a worrying pattern and constitute an excellent basis for future research. Likic-Broric addresses the link between insecurity and economy from a more historical perspective. His chapter provides an in-depth study on economic policy choices made by Central and Eastern European countries and the effect that neoliberal economic policies in combination with a securitized asylum acquis have on migrants' rights.

A further issue that is closely linked to the security-migration nexus is the impact of recent technological developments. Maguire contributes a praiseworthy, particularly innovative chapter on biometric security that does not follow the familiar line of normative argumentation, but calls instead for a more open, historically informed and comparative approach to the topic. He sets the standard himself by showing that the debate on biometrics is not at all new. Instead, it can be traced back to the nineteenth century where biometric identification emerged as part of a broader identity evolution (determining types of human beings) and soon became a tool for individual identification. He also demonstrates that the use of biometrics for security purposes can be traced back to the end of the nineteenth century. He ends by adding a comparative element to the study of contemporary biometric security, by looking at Ireland and Qatar (which he calls the 'test beds' of biometric citizenship). Maguire unravels the differences in cultural conditions that condition different states' options with regard to biometric security. Considering the technological progress made in this field, and taking into account national as well as European policy plans, it is unfortunate that this remains the only contribution linking technology to the migration-security nexus.

Overall, *Security, Insecurity and Migration in Europe* lays strong emphasis on insecurity, human security and the role of the individual in general. It thus reflects the change from a security notion focused on nation states to one focused on individuals. Most authors make it very clear that this change has not yet reached policy-makers. While it is important, even crucial, to stress the aspect of the individual, it is also unfortunate that only a few of the contributions address security and the state in perspective. Consequently, a drawback to this edited volume is that it barely goes beyond calling for a more rights-friendly approach. The book thus lacks a framework providing guidance on how to deal with the migration-security nexus in the future, both from a societal and an academic perspective. Neither the introduction nor the conclusion go beyond providing a summary of the chapters, and the different contributions, while convincingly pointing out that policy-makers are not (yet) willing to move from a national-focused security notion to an individual one, fall short of addressing possible approaches to overcome this imbalance, be it with regard to the current re-negotiation of the EU asylum acquis or national (non-) reactions.

Taken together, *Security, Insecurity and Migration in Europe* provides empirically rich analyses of the security-migration nexus, in particular the resulting insecurity for different actors in a variety of countries. The book's main strengths lie in the variety of disciplines and methods employed in respect of the topic. It will be a valuable reading for experts on the subject matter, but the novice reader will miss some overall structure and topical guidance. Both sets of readers will probably miss a concluding discussion on where to go from here. This question will have to be taken up by future research, for which the present volume provides very valuable impetus.

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Book Review

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Eastern Partnership: A New Opportunity for the Neighbours
by Elena Korosteleva (ed)
Routledge (2012), ISBN: 9780415676076 (hb)

This book is a reprint of a special issue, 27 (1), in the *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*. It offers a collective assessment of the development and impact of the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership initiative on its Eastern neighbours, most specifically Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, and, entirely logically, Russia. It is unfortunate that the volume does not extend its geographical coverage further, especially to those South Caucasus countries of strategic importance such as Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia, since additional focus here would have enriched the data, adding value by answering several critical questions that the manuscript tackles.

Chapter One deals with the ambitious but ambiguous ENP, explaining its practical limitations and often vague offerings. The research underlines the importance of differentiating between each of the partners, suggesting that the "one size fits all" principle does not work in relation to such a diverse set of countries. Thus, the EU has to approach each partner country individually. The idea of differentiating between and categorising "the neighbours of Europe" to the South and the "European neighbours" to the East with a "natural membership perspective" is a welcome addition to our understanding and worth highlighting. The chapter further focuses on Russia which still entertains its divisive Cold War attitude of "who is not with us, is against us" towards its external environment. This is particularly noticeable in relation to Russia's aggressive stance as energy-supplier both to EU states as well as Eastern neighbour countries, in particular Ukraine.

Chapter Two, mostly based on surveys, provides a good source of evidence. It aims to describe the foreign policy choices and priorities of the Eastern neighbours by revealing that there is more talk than action in the EU's relations with neighbouring countries. It argues too that the rhetoric and action are not always compatible with each other, a conclusion that is also valid for several other neighbouring countries. The case of Moldova shows us the nuanced nature of the reality; officially European integration is declared the main objective, but in reality Russia is still a priority in the country, implying a level of inconsistency and ambiguity in the foreign policy focus. The chapter further reveals that the values of altruism, collectivism and spirituality are closer to the Eastern neighbours, which, combined with emotionality, paternalism, irresponsibility and disregard for the law are in stark contrast to those of the EU countries, namely individualism, pragmatism, competitiveness, a willingness to abide by the law, political awareness and environmental consciousness. The differences in (cultural) values are indeed very much relevant and help to explain the complexities behind the (dis)integration process. The volume further exemplifies that the EU uncompromisingly dictates its conditions without offering membership. Therefore the declarative and vague character of the EU policies and the uncertainty of dividends upon meeting obligations are negatively assessed. However it is very much believed that it is only the prospect of EU membership that will cause Moldova and Ukraine to surrender their relationship with Russia.

The following chapters are also focused on the mismatch between what the EU offers and what it demands, with country specific cases of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. The research on Ukraine refers to the growing lack of motivation amongst Ukrainian political elites and considers current EU-Ukraine relations to be ineffective. Predictions here are that relations will continue to remain declarative in nature, within a framework of a multi-vectored foreign policy. It is evident that Ukraine will not be welcomed into the EU in the near future, while Russia can offer real economic, military and political opportunities for the country and therefore a rational basis for Ukraine maintaining relations with Russia. In the case of Belarus, the chapter further examines the strategic preference that has clearly been given to the Russian vector at the expense of its relations with the EU. Since the level of trust of the Belarusians towards the West is rather low, Belarus wishes to cooperate with the EU on the basis of common interests rather than strict convergence with its norms and values. By doing so, Belarus acts as a "connecting bridge" and as a "separating buffer" between East and West.

Unlike Belarus, the Moldovan case demonstrates a more optimistic picture, even though the evolution of EU-Moldova relations is largely characterised by missed opportunities and sporadic actions, as the expert survey reveals. Often labelled as a front-runner, Moldova created all the necessary institutions that were expected of the candidate countries, owing to the Moldovan government's ambitious reform-orientated agenda. However, the chapter argues that the EU itself did not have a clear and transparent message for Moldova. This and other malfunctions can be explained by the limited legitimacy within the EU which makes it difficult to make demands of partner countries and to push for further reforms.

In the last chapter, Stephen White attempts to define the concept of "Europe" and its "neighbourhood". The author argues that membership is a matter of values and practices and not simply of location, by giving solid examples of participation of "non-European" countries in "European" activities: Russian membership of the European Broadcasting Union, its representation in the annual song festival Eurovision and Kazakhstan's UEFA membership.

In summary, this book presents a good source of data with a methodological analysis predominantly based on data collected in surveys. The volume therefore makes a significant contribution to the EU studies literature. However structural problems, perhaps relating to its history as a special issue, detract somewhat from the other qualities. Apart from the above-mentioned reservations, this edited contribution can be recommended to those researchers and practitioners interested in the EU's external relations.

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