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Research Article

Fifty Years of Public (Dis)Satisfaction with European Governance: Preferences, Europeanization and Support for the EU

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Abstract

Since its beginnings in the 1950s, the policymaking scope and authority of the European Union have dramatically expanded across a wide range of issue areas. Yet much remains unknown about the interaction between public preferences for EU-level governance, changes in such governance and overall support for European integration. This article analyses surveys ranging from 1962 to 2010 to show that while support for integration in different policy areas has fluctuated over time, it has been surprisingly stable overall; moreover, the relative preference ordering across issue areas has been even more consistent. In addition, this consistency is not affected by changes in Europeanization, nor do such changes appear to be driven by the relative strength of preferences. Finally, issue-specific support for EU-level governance has an impact on overall EU support that becomes stronger as Europeanization in that issue area increases, an effect that increases further with greater political knowledge. These findings call into question understandings of rising Euroscepticism as a reaction to Europeanization taking place primarily in areas where publics oppose it. In addition, they indicate that public awareness of European integration is far greater than political knowledge tests appear to indicate.

Keywords

Public opinion; Governance; Europeanization; Euroscepticism; Political knowledge

European leaders have been interested in public attitudes regarding European integration since the very beginning of those efforts, with systematic surveys dating back to the early 1960s. Since then, an extensive literature has developed investigating patterns and trends in public support for European integration. Surprisingly, this literature has largely ignored both preferences for and actual European governance in specific policy areas. This is puzzling, since 1) the activities of the European Union (EU) have changed dramatically over time; and 2) actual or perceived EU-level governance activities in specific issue areas may well affect public attitudes towards the EU as a whole.

Indeed, the European Union today is a vastly different institution from the European Community (EC) or Common Market of the 1950s and 1960s: not only membership, but also policymaking scope and authority have dramatically expanded. Someone whose preferences for European governance have remained constant over the course of several decades might well have strongly supported the EU at one point only to become a fierce Eurosceptic years later. The opposite is possible too: someone interested only in monetary integration might have not thought much of the European Community in the 1960s, while supporting it wholeheartedly today.

This article investigates the connections between 1) preferences for European governance in particular issue areas; 2) Europeanization in those issue areas; and 3) overall support for European integration: asking whether preferences for European integration in specific areas have changed over time. Are those preferences affected by changes in EU-level governance, or, conversely, are changes in EU-level governance driven by those preferences? And, perhaps most importantly in an era of rising Euroscepticism, does the interaction between Europeanization in an issue area and

preferences regarding such Europeanization (for or against) have an impact on overall support for the European Union?

I provide evidence from surveys ranging from 1962 to 2010, showing that while support for integration in different policy areas has fluctuated over time, it has been surprisingly stable overall; moreover, the relative preference ordering across issue areas has been even more consistent. In addition, this consistency is not affected by changes in Europeanization, nor do such changes appear to be driven by the relative strength of preferences. Finally, issue-specific support for (or opposition to) EU-level governance has an impact on overall EU support that becomes stronger as Europeanization in that issue area increases, an effect that increases further with greater political knowledge.

These findings challenge the conventional wisdom in two areas. First, arguments about Euroscepticism (especially ‘soft Euroscepticism’¹) often invoke the notion that publics have grown increasingly sceptical of further integration, even though they supported initial integration efforts (e.g. Eichenberg and Dalton 2007). However, this claim is compatible only with integration taking place primarily in areas where issue-specific preferences tend to run against (further) Europeanization. In fact, that is not how integration has evolved over time: integration takes place just as often in policy areas where publics are supportive.

Second, scholars have long been concerned about low levels of knowledge about the European Union among EU citizens, and the implications thereof for voter competence (Clark 2014; de Vries, van der Brug, van Egmond and van der Eijk 2011; Hobolt 2007). However, if Europeanization in an area affects the influence of issue-specific preferences on overall EU support, this implies that voters are somehow aware of Europeanization, even if they score poorly on tests of political knowledge. The findings here thus call into question the value of such tests for gauging awareness of important policies, while simultaneously offering a more positive picture of public awareness of European integration.

The article proceeds in four steps. The first section briefly reviews the literature on issue-specific governance preferences of EU citizens. The second section introduces the data used: measures of issue-specific integration and of popular support for issue-specific and overall European integration from the early 1960s to 2010. The third section analyses the connection between changes over time in issue-specific integration and issue-specific governance preferences. Finally, the fourth section links those two factors to overall support for European integration.

THEORISING PREFERENCES FOR ISSUE-SPECIFIC EU GOVERNANCE

The determinants of public support for European integration are the subject of an extensive literature which has produced a number of important findings. Among others, support for the EU has been shown to be affected by demographic variables such as age and gender, by socio-economic variables such as education level and type of employment, by nationality and identification with or attachment to Europe, and by contextual factors such as the current (and expected) economic outlook (see e.g. Boomgaarden, Schuck, Elenbaas and de Vreese 2011; Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Gabel 1998; Hooghe and Marks 2005; Wessels 1995). Moreover, notwithstanding many changes in its governance over the decades, overall attitudes towards the European Union have remained surprisingly stable over time (Franklin and Wlezien 1997), and the original six member states have tended to be the most consistently supportive of integration (Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996).

Preferences for integration in specific issue areas have received less attention in the literature. Eichenberg and Dalton, considering the time period 1989-2002, found preferences to be consistent over time, with ‘the rank order of preferences remain[ing] very much the same from year to year’

and high support, in particular, for foreign policy (including development cooperation). In contrast, citizens seem less interested in EU governance over 'policies for maintaining and distributing standards of living' (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007: 142; cf. also Green 2001). Hooghe, similarly, noted that European publics as well as elites are 'least enthusiastic about Europeanizing high-spending policies' (Hooghe 2003: 281), while Ahrens, Meurers and Renner (2007) identify the least popular areas for European integration as those that 'represent issues of national identity' or 'can clearly be regarded most efficient when decentralised decisions are taken' (Ahrens, Meurers and Renner 2007: 460).

Finally, Clark and Hellwig found that in the vast majority of EU member states, and for nearly all issue areas, a lack of knowledge reduces support for issue-specific integration. They found this effect to be greatest in issue areas involving cross-border political issues, where European publics may be less aware of EU initiatives than is the case for more 'traditional' economic issue areas in integration (Clark and Hellwig 2012).

The present study advances the literature by investigating for the first time the connections between issue-specific European governance, preferences for such governance, and overall support for European integration, and by covering a longer period of time than preceding studies. This makes it possible to investigate further the stability of public preferences over time and, more importantly, to see whether such preferences have any impact on integration or, conversely, integration has an impact on those preferences. In addition, the study examines whether issue-specific integration has an impact, mediated through preferences for such integration, on overall public support for the EU. In other words: publics may not be enthusiastic about the Europeanization of high-spending issue areas, but does an increase in the Europeanization of such areas reduce their overall support for the EU? Or, conversely, if citizens do support Europeanization of an issue area, does their support of the EU increase with greater EU-level governance in that area? As I shall show, the answer to both questions is 'yes'.

The preceding discussion gives rise to five hypotheses about the relationships between preferences, integration, and support. First, I aim to verify the same consistency of preferences that other scholars have found, even over the longer time period examined here. In addition, the stability of preferences suggests that they are not measurably affected by changes in European integration. Second, and conversely, changes in issue-specific governance are unlikely to be driven by public preferences. The logic of democratic representation suggests that governments should be responsive to public preferences (e.g. Ahrens, Meurers and Renner 2007). However, integration was long supported by a 'permissive consensus' which placed few pressures or constraints on governments in this respect (cf. Hooghe and Marks 2008), and while this consensus has eroded in recent years, European integration has not been a salient driver of national electoral outcomes (de Vries 2007).

- H1 — Preferences for issue-specific EU governance are stable over time and are not affected by changes in such governance
- H2 — Changes in issue-specific EU governance are not shaped by public preferences for such governance

The next hypothesis addresses the impact of the interaction between preferences and governance on generalised support for European integration. First, and most straightforwardly, I expect that support for issue-specific Europeanization should have an impact on support for integration overall (cf. Cerniglia and Pagani 2009). In fact, the opposite ought to be true too: opposition to EU-level governance in an issue area ought to reduce overall support.² Second, Europeanization in an issue area ought to strengthen this effect: someone who supports European governance in a particular issue area ought to like the EU more overall if such governance is (or becomes) a fact. Finally, this

relationship clearly depends on a respondent's awareness of Europeanization; therefore, the effect ought to be stronger among respondents with greater political knowledge.

- H3 — Issue-specific support for (opposition to) EU-level governance has a positive (negative) effect on overall EU support
- H4 — The size of this effect increases with the extent of European integration in that issue area
- H5 — The size of this effect increases with an individual's knowledge about European integration.

DATA

As the other contributors to this special issue show, it is not easy to delineate precisely the competences of the European Union at any particular moment, let alone their development over time. Lindberg and Scheingold introduced a classification of competences in terms of scope (policy areas) and locus (EU-level vs. national-level decision-making). However, it was often hard to identify 'the relative importance of Community decision-making processes as compared with national processes' (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970: 68). Their solution was to focus on the formal, legal competences of the EC institutions, but those are often somewhat ambiguous as well.³

Schmitter improved on this model by focusing on level rather than locus of integration, with the level ranging from exclusive national competence to exclusive EU competence (1996). This makes it a bit easier to take into account that the EU's 'governance of governance' takes many different forms, hierarchical and non-hierarchical as well as more or less formal (Tömmel, this issue).⁴ Limitations notwithstanding, the legal treaty texts do represent the best single source of information about the scope and extent of EU-level governance. Everything else — directives, regulations, expenditures, and even non-hierarchical and informal policies and agreements — builds on these basic foundations.

Moreover, the treaty texts have the advantage of permitting judgments as to the importance of EU-level decision-making relative to the national level. Accordingly, I use the two-part measure of EU-level competence produced by Börzel (2005) based on Schmitter's categorisation: level of authority (whether or not the EU has exclusive competence or shares it with the national level); and scope of authority (how decisions are made at the EU level).⁵ Börzel's measure of level of EU authority ranges from exclusive national competence (1) to exclusive EU competence (5), while the measure of scope of EU authority ranges from no coordination (0) to unilateral decision-making by the Commission (or the European Central Bank) (5). In order to obtain a single value for each issue area, I add the values for scope and level, giving a range of 1-10. Table 1 displays the data, covering 18 different issue areas.

In most of these, EU governance has expanded considerably over time; the only area where no change has taken place is taxation. Exactly half of the issue areas were at the minimum possible level in 1957; just one issue — monetary policy — is at the maximum possible level as of the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam;⁶ occupational health and safety comes close. More importantly, the data are largely congruent with the overall impressions that emerge from this issue's articles, including those on external relations (Dominguez) and energy policy (Eckert).

Table 1. Data about EU-Level Governance Authority (Börzel 2005: 222-223).

Nr	Treaty Issue	1957 Rome	1986 SEA	1992 Maastricht	1997 Amsterdam	2001 Nice	2007 Lisbon
1	Foreign political relations	1 (1,0)	2 (1.5,0.5)	4 (2.5,1.5)	4.5 (3,1.5)	5 (3,2)	5 (3,2)
2	Foreign economic relations	3.5 (2,1.5)	3.5 (2,1.5)	7 (3.5,3.5)	8 (4.5,3.5)	8 (4.5,3.5)	8 (4.5,3.5)
3	Crime / domestic security	1 (1,0)	1 (1,0)	3 (2,1)	4.5 (2.5,2)	5.5 (2.5,3)	6.5 (2.5,4)
4	Civil affairs	1 (1,0)	1 (1,0)	5.5 (2.5,3)	6.5 (3,3.5)	7 (3,4)	7.5 (3.5,4)
5	Environment/ consumer protection	1 (1,0)	6 (3,3)	7.75 (4,3-4.5)	7.75 (4,3-4.5)	7.75 (4,3-4.5)	7.75 (4,3-4.5)
6	Occupational health & safety	1 (1,0)	7 (3,4)	7 (3,4)	9 (4.5,4.5)	9 (4.5,4.5)	9 (4.5,4.5)
7	Labour affairs	2 (1,1)	2 (1,1)	5.5 (2,3.5)	6 (2,4)	6 (2,4)	6 (2,4)
8	Culture	1 (1,0)	1 (1,0)	2 (1,1)	2 (1,1)	2 (1,1)	6.5 (2,4.5)
9	Welfare	1 (1,0)	1 (1,0)	4.5 (1.5,3)	5.5 (1.5,4)	5.5 (1.5,4)	5.5 (1.5,4)
10	R&D	1 (1,0)	5 (1.5,3-4)	5 (1.5,3-4)	5.5 (1.5,3.5-4.5)	5.5 (1.5,3.5-4.5)	5.5 (1.5,3.5-4.5)
11	Economic freedoms	4 (2,2)	5 (2.5,2.5)	8 (4.5,3.5)	8 (4.5,3.5)	8 (4.5,3.5)	8 (4.5,3.5)
12	Competition	4.5 (2.5,2)	5 (3,2)	6 (3,3)	6 (3,3)	7 (3,4)	7 (3,4)
13	Energy & transport	3.5 (1.5,2)	3.5 (1.5,2)	3.5 (1.5,2)	3.5 (1.5,2)	3.5 (1.5,2)	7.5 (3.5,4)

Table 1. Data about EU-Level Governance Authority (Börzel 2005: 222-223).

Nr	Treaty Issue	1957 Rome	1986 SEA	1992 Maastricht	1997 Amsterdam	2001 Nice	2007 Lisbon
14	Macro-economic policy & jobs	3 (1.5,1.5)	3 (1.5,1.5)	3 (1.5,1.5)	5.5 (2,3.5)	5.5 (2,3.5)	5.5 (2,3.5)
15	Agriculture	7 (4,3)	7 (4,3)	7 (4,3)	7 (4,3)	7 (4,3)	8.5 (4,4.5)
16	Regional cohesion	3.5 (2,1-2)	5 (2,3)	7.25 (4,3-3.5)	7.75 (4,3-4.5)	8 (4,3.5-4.5)	8 (4,3.5-4.5)
17	Monetary policy	1 (1,0)	2.5 (1.5,1)	8 (4,4)	10 (5,5)	10 (5,5)	10 (5,5)
18	Tax	3 (1.5,1.5)	3 (1.5,1.5)	3 (1.5,1.5)	3 (1.5,1.5)	3 (1.5,1.5)	3 (1.5,1.5)

The figures in parentheses are Börzel's *level* and *scope* measures, respectively; the first number in each cell is their sum. For the Lisbon Treaty data, I use Börzel's figures for the Constitutional Treaty

The articles in this issue on migration (Caviedes) and citizenship (Maas) represent sub-issues of the larger headings identified by Börzel. These articles illustrate the difficulty of measuring and quantifying Europeanization when every major issue area can be subdivided into sub-areas, some policy initiatives cross major areas, and all have their own unique governance story to tell. Although it is important to be aware of such limitations, the data in Table 1 provide a key starting point for comparing those governance stories across issue areas, and hence for investigating the connections between governance and public preferences.

Data about those preferences can be found in public opinion surveys going back more than half a century. In this article, I focus on five surveys: the first in-depth, cross-national survey on European integration available, from 1962, plus four Eurobarometer (EB) surveys. I include the first Eurobarometer survey for which the raw data remain available, from the autumn of 1974; two surveys held a few years before and after the ratification of the Treaty on European Union, in the autumn of 1989 and the autumn of 1994 respectively; and one conducted in the autumn of 2010, after the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 and the beginning of the global financial crisis. This set of surveys offers an unparalleled view of patterns over time in the EU governance preferences of European publics, and makes it possible to evaluate these preferences against treaty-driven changes in governance.

In 1962, Gallup International conducted a survey of member state publics on behalf of the European Communities (Press- and Information Service of the European Communities 2011). Largely overlooked in the literature, this survey included numerous questions foreshadowing those in the Eurobarometer surveys.⁷ In particular, question Q21a asked about support for issue-specific EC-level governance in areas such as tariff abolition and labour mobility. Moreover, a follow-up question (Q21b) asked respondents 'for each policy alternative, whether it already has been provided for in the European Common Market or not' (Q21b).⁸

The Eurobarometer survey series began in 1974, with annual spring and autumn surveys. The first survey for which the raw data remain available today is EB 2, conducted in the autumn of 1974 (European Commission 2012a). This survey came shortly after the first enlargement of the EC, offering a snapshot of the attitudes towards European governance held by citizens of the original as well as the newer member states. Respondents were asked, for each entry on a list of problems, to ‘tell me if, in your opinion, it would be better to deal with to [sic] by combined action through the Common Market or rather by an action of our own Government independently of other countries?’ (Q24).⁹ The policy areas on the list differed from those in 1962: inflation and energy supplies were added, while the abolition of tariffs and labour mobility disappeared.

In the autumn of 1989, EB 32 featured a slightly different question (Q24), reading: ‘Which of the following areas of policy do you think should be decided by the <national> government, and which should be decided jointly within the European Community?’ (European Commission 2012b). Apart from changing the last word to ‘Union’, the question has remained the same since. The list of possible issue areas also became increasingly standardised while varying in length. The 1989 survey queried respondents about 12 issue areas; five years later, in EB 42.0 (Q30) the list had expanded to 18 issues (European Commission 2012c).

Finally, EB 74.2, from autumn 2010, listed 20 policy areas, split across two questions (QA22 and QA23) (European Commission 2013). In addition, this survey included a question testing political knowledge. Respondents were asked three fairly easy, factual questions about the EU (QA18). One in three respondents answered all three questions correctly.¹⁰ Along with the 1962 survey question about planned EC action in particular issue areas, this general political knowledge question makes it possible to test the impact of knowledge on the link between issue-specific governance preferences and general support for the EU.

Each survey used here has one or more questions about overall support for European integration, although the particular question has varied over time. In the 1962 survey, the question that captured overall support was ‘To what extent are you in favour of or against efforts to unify Europe?’ (Q8). For the 1989 and 1994 surveys, I use a very similar question inquiring whether respondents are very much for, somewhat for, somewhat against, or very against European unification. I recode these two questions to range from -2 (very against) to +2 (very much for), with those who do not express a preference at 0. Unfortunately, this question was not asked in 1974 or 2010. For 1974 I use a question about whether one’s country’s membership of the EC is a good thing; in 2010, neither the ‘support for unification’ nor the ‘membership is good’ questions were asked; instead, I use the respondent’s judgment about his/her country having benefited from membership.¹¹ Each of these is recoded from -1 to +1, as the questions do not allow respondents to indicate degree of support.

PREFERENCES FOR ISSUE-SPECIFIC EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE

Table 2 compares respondent answers about their preferences for and beliefs about plans for integration in particular issue areas to the legal status of integration in those issue areas in the Treaty of Rome. Support levels are quite high overall, with the notable exception of taxation for redistribution to other EC countries or to Africa. To arrive at a single measure of support, I subtract the proportion of respondents opposed from that in favour; support level is thus negative when more respondents oppose EU-level decision-making than support it. For perceptions — belief that an issue area was already ‘provided for’ in the Treaty — I simply take the proportion of respondents that answered that question in the affirmative.

Table 2. Integration of Governance, Preferences, and Perceptions in 1962 (N=4774)

Policy Area	Nr	Support	Belief	Actual
Abolition of tariffs	11	0.77	0.62	4
Labour mobility	11	0.46	0.41	4
Harmonising educational qualifications	7/8	0.72	0.23	1.5
Joint foreign policy	1	0.56	0.37	1
Joint scientific research	10	0.78	0.44	1
Joint agricultural policy	15	0.64	0.52	7
Equivalent social benefits	9	0.76	0.26	1
Taxes for redistribution to poor European regions	16	0.19	0.24	3.5
Taxes for redistribution to African countries	2	-0.07	0.31	3.5

Nr — Issue number from Börzel's coding scheme (Table 1).

Support — Mean support levels for EU governance in particular issue areas

Belief — Belief that an issue area is already 'provided for' in the Treaty.

Actual — Governance score as of 1957 Treaty, according to Börzel.

Source: Press- and Information Service of the European Communities 2011: Q21a&b; Börzel 2005

The two policy areas most respondents believed were already provided for in the EC Treaty, tariff abolition and agricultural policy, accurately represent the focus of European integration efforts at the time. The overall correlation between the final two columns is 0.50, which is just significant at the 0.1 level (one-tailed). This suggests that even though (or perhaps precisely because) the European Community was quite new the public was reasonably well-informed about its efforts.

Table 3 provides a side-by-side comparison of net support levels for issue-specific integration across all five surveys, including citizens of all member states at that time.¹² Table 4 provides the same information, but limited to citizens of the original six member states. The issue areas are listed in the order of the category from Börzel's classification they most closely fit (shown in the left column).¹³ The many blank entries in the table reflect the fact that different issue areas were included from one survey to the next. Nonetheless, respondents were queried sufficiently often about the same issue area at different points in time to make it possible to draw some conclusions.

Table 3. Mean Support Levels for EU Governance in Particular Issues, 1962-2010

Börzel	Survey Issue Area	1962	1974	1989	1994	2010
1	Foreign policy / international influence	0.56	0.51	0.38	0.42	
1	Security against external threats / defence			-0.08	-0.03	

Table 3. Mean Support Levels for EU Governance in Particular Issues, 1962-2010

Börzel	Survey Issue Area	1962	1974	1989	1994	2010
1	Defence & foreign affairs					0.37
1 & 3	Fight against (international) terrorism					0.71
2	Humanitarian aid / helping countries in the Third World	-0.07		0.58	0.55	
3	Protection of computer-based information on individuals			-0.17		
3	Fighting crime					0.33
3	Fight against drugs				0.44	
4	Media (broadcasting and press)			-0.02	-0.11	
4	Workers' reps. on company boards			-0.23	-0.26	
4	Immigration policy				0.04	0.24
4	Political asylum				0.11	
5	Environment / pollution		0.40	0.30	0.23	0.42
5	Consumer protection					0.07
6	Occupational health and safety				-0.23	
7 & 8	Education	0.72		-0.34	-0.42	-0.29
8	Cultural policy				-0.31	
9	Health and social welfare	0.76		-0.24	-0.41	-0.21
9	Challenges of aging population / pensions					-0.43
10	Scientific research	0.78		0.63	0.50	0.53
11	Abolition of tariffs	0.77				
11	Labour mobility	0.46				
11 & 14	Economic growth					0.19
13	Energy (supplies)		0.57			0.37

Table 3. Mean Support Levels for EU Governance in Particular Issues, 1962-2010

Börzel	Survey Issue Area	1962	1974	1989	1994	2010
13	Transport					0.08
14	Rising prices / inflation		0.46			0.17
14 & 18	Tackling public debt					-0.10
14 & 12	Reform/supervision of financial sector					0.23
14	Unemployment				-0.04	-0.09
14	Industrial policy				0.05	
15	Agricultural policy / fishing policy	0.64	0.20			0.02
16	Reducing regional econ. diffs. In EU	0.19	0.18			
16	Supporting regions in econ. Difficulties					0.37
17	Currency			0.19	0.06	
18	Rates of VAT			0.16	-0.01	
18	Taxation					-0.4
<i>N</i>		<i>4774</i>	<i>9060</i>	<i>9885</i>	<i>14063</i>	<i>26723</i>
<i>#states</i>		<i>5</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>27</i>

Source: author's calculations from (Press- and Information Service of the European Communities 2011: Q21a&b) and Eurobarometer, various years (see text).

Table 4. Mean Support Levels for EU Governance in Particular Issue, EC-6 Only

Börzel	Survey Issue Area	1962	1974	1989	1994	2010
1	Foreign policy / international influence	0.56	0.63	0.56	0.59	
1	Security against external threats / defence			0.21	0.28	
1	Defence & foreign affairs					0.51
1 & 3	Fight against (international) terrorism					0.76
2	Humanitarian aid / helping countries in the Third World	-0.07		0.67	0.66	

Table 4. Mean Support Levels for EU Governance in Particular Issue, EC-6 Only

Börzel	Survey Issue Area	1962	1974	1989	1994	2010
3	Protection of computer-based information on individuals			-0.04		
3	Fighting crime					0.38
3	Fight against drugs				0.56	
4	Media (broadcasting and press)			0.14	0.01	
4	Workers' reps. on company boards			-0.18	-0.18	
4	Immigration policy				0.27	0.38
4	Political asylum				0.29	
5	Environment / pollution		0.54	0.50	0.38	0.61
5	Consumer protection					0.17
6	Occupational health and safety				-0.13	
7 & 8	Education	0.72		-0.27	-0.32	-0.33
8	Cultural policy				-0.18	
9	Health and social welfare	0.76		-0.20	-0.33	-0.19
9	Challenges of aging population / pensions					-0.53
10	Scientific research	0.78		0.72	0.58	0.58
11	Abolition of tariffs	0.77				
11	Labour mobility	0.46				
11 & 14	Economic growth					0.31
13	Energy (supplies)		0.68			0.53
13	Transport					0.22
14	Rising prices / inflation		0.59			0.36
14	Unemployment				0.07	-0.14

Table 4. Mean Support Levels for EU Governance in Particular Issue, EC-6 Only

Börzel	Survey Issue Area	1962	1974	1989	1994	2010
14 & 18	Tackling public debt					-0.08
14 & 12	Reform/supervision of financial sector					0.39
14	Industrial policy				0.21	
15	Agricultural policy / fishing policy	0.64	0.31			0.29
16	Reducing regional econ. diffs. In EU	0.19	0.17			
16	Supporting regions in econ. difficulties					0.36
17	Currency			0.36	0.23	
18	Rates of VAT			0.36	0.24	
18	Taxation					-0.42
<i>N</i>		4774	5921	4829	5670	5663

(Italy not included in 1962)

Both tables generally support hypothesis 1: for most issues, preferences remain relatively stable over time: preferences for foreign policy and scientific research, for example, have remained strongly pro-Europeanization since the very beginning; meanwhile, Eurobarometer respondents have been opposed, overall, to Europeanization in education and health/social welfare. The 1962 survey is strikingly different on those issues, however, with strong support for Europeanization in those areas. This difference is likely due to the much narrower question wording in 1962 ('harmonisation of educational qualifications' vs. 'education' and 'equivalent social benefits' vs. 'health and social welfare'). Note also that the original six member states, the only states polled in 1962, are systematically more positive than later joiners, as a comparison between Tables 3 and 4 shows. In fact, this comparison suggests that apparent declines in support for Europeanization across issue areas are driven more by the addition of sceptical national publics than by changing preferences among the publics of existing member states.¹⁴

Both tables also support the second part of hypothesis 1, as well as hypothesis 2: changes in European governance appear neither to be driven by nor to have much of an impact on issue-specific preferences. Table 1 shows that Europeanization of foreign policy went from 1 to 5 from 1957 to 2007, while research and development went from 1 to 5.5. Yet, despite such similar and fairly extensive changes in Europeanization, the two issue areas represent both some of the most stable issue-preferences over time and some of the most contrasting ones (strongly supportive vs. strongly opposed). Similarly, education, where respondents have been consistently opposed to Europeanization since the 1980s, has seen a large jump in European-level governance over that time. Meanwhile, environmental policy, where respondents have been systematically supportive since the 1970s, saw large jumps in 1986 and 1992 with no changes in preference, but no changes in

governance since then, despite continued support for European governance (and even as further integration occurred in other issue areas).

By way of further illustrations, consider energy, cohesion and employment policies, studied in this issue by Eckert and Tömmel. Citizens strongly supported a common European energy policy in 1974, but as Eckert (2016) discusses there was little or no progress on the energy front during the years after that survey. In the case of cohesion policy, support levels for EU-level policies to reduce regional economic differences in 1962 and 1974 are mildly positive but clearly lower than support for most other issues. However, as Tömmel (2016) notes, cohesion policy was set up in 1975, after the first enlargement, while other issue areas remained unaddressed for many years. Employment policy, finally, was the ‘birthplace’ of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) in the late 1990s, even though it is another area where public opinion cannot have been the driver, having been nearly neutral since the mid-1990s.

ISSUE-SPECIFIC GOVERNANCE AND OVERALL EU SUPPORT

Finally, I turn to the impact of the interaction between issue-specific governance and preferences for such governance on overall support for European integration. Since question wording about issue-specific preferences varies across surveys (‘joint’ policy, ‘combined action’, ‘acting together’) and since issue areas vary as well, I conduct separate analyses for each survey. In order to test hypotheses 3-5, I run an ordered logistic regression (logit), with overall EU support as the dependent variable. Ordered logit is particularly well-suited to handle a small number of discrete, ordered outcomes, such as opposed, neutral, and in favour, as is the case here. Logit coefficients can be converted to odds ratios, which have a more straightforward interpretation than the coefficient estimates themselves. Odds ratios are expressed relative to a value of 1 (representing no change in the odds of a higher outcome): 1.25 means a 25 per cent greater likelihood of a higher outcome, whereas 0.75 means 25 per cent lower odds of a higher outcome. The regression results presented below are all expressed as odds ratios.

In order to adjust for the dramatically different sizes of national populations, the model is set up with individual countries identified as survey strata and with weights to correct for different sampling rates across states.¹⁵ All issue areas queried in a particular survey are included in a single model to reduce the risk of omitted variable bias (preferences for Europeanization in different issue areas may well be correlated). In addition, since it is well established that support for European integration systematically differs across member states, each analysis features dummy variables for individual member states.¹⁶ Finally, I add controls for three standard demographic variables that are known to be causally related to general EU support and are also causally prior to support for Europeanization in particular issue areas: gender, age and education level. In order to conserve space and to keep the focus on the issue areas, the tables do not list the estimates for these additional variables.¹⁷

The hypotheses can effectively be split into two separate hypotheses, depending on whether a respondent supports or opposes joint European action. However, those two options will generally be highly correlated, as a respondent can choose only support or opposition, or else indicate no preference. Rather than ignoring the no preference category (generally expressed as a ‘don’t know’ answer), it makes more sense to run the analyses separately. Accordingly, each of the subsequent analyses separately displays coefficient estimates for the impact of supporting Europeanization and for opposing it (or rather, preferring national action).

Table 5 reports the analysis of the 1962 ‘Attitudes toward Europe’ survey. This survey not only offers the earliest systematic evidence available about citizen preferences for Europeanization, but also queried respondent beliefs about whether Europeanization in particular issue areas was already

‘foreseen’ in the EC Treaties (beliefs that were fairly accurate, as seen above). This makes it possible to ascertain whether those beliefs have an impact on generalised support for European integration. The table shows the odds ratio estimates for supporting (or opposing) Europeanization, as well as for an interaction term between the former and the belief that Europeanization is foreseen in that issue area.

Table 5. Analysis for Attitudes towards Europe 1962 (EC-6, N = 4736)

Issue Area	Level	For		Against	
Abolition of tariffs (support)	4	1.50	***	0.32	***
Labour mobility (support)	4	1.19	***	0.78	***
Harmonising educational qualifications (support)	1.5	1.26	***	0.87	***
Foreign policy (support)	1	1.52	***	0.82	***
Scientific research (support)	1	1.14	***	0.52	***
Agricultural policy (support)	7	1.47	***	0.64	***
Social benefits (support)	1	1.15	+	0.85	+
Taxes for cross-regional redistribution (support)	3.5	1.54	***	0.89	***
Taxes for Africa (support)	3.5	0.80	**	2.22	**
Abolition of tariffs (support & expect)	4	1.46	**	0.68	**
Labour mobility (support & expect)	4	0.97	***	1.11	***
Harmonising qualifications (support & expect)	1.5	1.12	***	2.60	***
Foreign policy (support & expect)	1	1.03	***	0.42	***
Scientific research (support & expect)	1	1.18		0.72	
Agricultural policy (support & expect)	7	1.22	***	0.53	***
Social benefits (support & expect)	1	1.17		0.67	
Taxes for redistribution (support & expect)	3.5	0.79	***	1.25	***
Taxes for Africa (support & expect)	3.5	1.77		1.82	

Ordered logistic regression, reporting odds ratios, weighted to adjust for country population size. Statistical significance: *** 0.001, ** 0.01, * 0.05, + 0.1.

First, the link between issue-specific support and general support for European integration is both statistically significant and in the direction predicted by H3 for most issues (with the exception of taxes for Africa): the odds ratios for the 'for' regression are greater than 1 (issue-specific support makes overall support more likely), while those for the 'against' regression are smaller than one (opposition makes overall support less likely). Moreover, the estimated size of the effects varies considerably, in line with the prediction of H4. On the 'for' side, the average effect size for the five issue areas where real Europeanization is taking place (level of 3.5 or higher) is 38 per cent, whereas the average estimate for the other four issue areas is much lower at 27 per cent. Indeed, the two lowest estimates occur where no integration is taking place. On the negative side, the picture is similar (52 per cent for the five Europeanizing areas; 24 per cent for the others).

The estimate for 'taxes for Africa' is surprising, as the 'for' column should contain positive effects: if a respondent supports Europeanization in an issue area, s/he ought also to support the EC overall. However, on this question, supporting Europeanization makes the respondent less likely to support the EC; conversely, opposing it makes her/him more supportive of the EC. This suggests that respondents associate the EC with policies that are at odds with direct taxation for redistribution to Africa, perhaps because the EC is seen primarily as a market- (not government-) focused, non-redistributive organisation. This possibility is given additional support by the interaction effects in the bottom half of the table, where the other redistributive policy (across regions within Europe) also has an effect in the opposite direction, reducing the non-interacted effect size.

The interaction effects also support the final hypothesis, H5. Coefficient estimates are not statistically significant in two issue areas without integration (along with the taxation for Africa issue). Meanwhile, the largest significant estimate on the 'for' side is on tariff abolition, where real Europeanization was indeed taking place at the time.¹⁸ Most significantly, combining the estimated effect sizes that are statistically significant (since respondents who expect and support Europeanization also simply support it) the two largest positive effects on the 'for' side are on tariff abolition ($1.50 \times 1.46 = 2.20$) and agricultural policy ($1.47 \times 1.22 = 1.79$), and the two largest negative effects on the 'against' side are for those same two policies. In other words, and exactly as predicted, the greatest impact, in the positive as well as the negative direction, comes among those who are aware of actual Europeanization and occurs in the two issue areas representing the most visible and salient EC initiatives at the time: abolition of tariffs and agricultural support.

Table 6 shows the results of the analysis for 1974 (EB 2), which are again in accordance with the general prediction: issue-specific preferences are associated with an effect on overall support. Moreover, the single weakest estimate (neither statistically significant nor an estimated odds ratio that is far from 1) is for environmental protection, an issue area without any real Europeanization at the time. However, the other area with little real Europeanization, diplomacy, musters a large and significant estimated effect. This was evident in 1962 as well: strong supporters of a joint European foreign policy also tend to support European integration overall, regardless of how much actual joint foreign policy takes place. Still, even with this outlier included, there is a positive (albeit weakened) correlation between the level of Europeanization in an issue area and the estimated effect of support for such Europeanization on general support for European integration, as H4 predicts.¹⁹

Table 6. Analysis for EB 2, 1974 (EC-9, N = 8234)

Issue Area	Level	For	Against		
Regional redistribution	3.5	1.55	***	0.68	***
Fight inflation	3	1.47	***	0.62	***
Energy policy	3.5	1.75	***	0.50	***
Agriculture	7	1.40	***	0.82	**
Environmental protection	1	1.01		0.94	
Diplomacy	1	1.70	***	0.64	***

Ordered logit, reporting odds ratios. Weighted to adjust for country population size. Statistical significance: *** 0.001, ** 0.01, * 0.05.

Table 7 shows, side by side, the results for surveys in 1989 and 1994. The Maastricht Treaty came into effect in the interim, so European governance levels were considerably higher in 1994. Nevertheless, results for both surveys support H3 as well as H4. Indeed, the correlation between European governance level and estimated odds ratios is positive for those who support Europeanization and negative for those who oppose it.²⁰ Lack of statistical significance is more likely to occur in issue areas with little or no Europeanization (in 1989) or, after the Maastricht Treaty, with comparatively less Europeanization. More substantively, in 1994, monetary integration ('currency') has the largest estimated effect size; this was also the area that had seen the largest (and most visible) increase in Europeanization. Similarly, the area of security/defence, where the Maastricht Treaty had also brought highly visible Europeanization in the form of a Common Foreign and Security Policy, had the second largest effect sizes in 1994.²¹

Table 7. Analysis for EB 32 (1989, EU-12) and EB 42.0 (1994, EU-15)

Issue Area	1989			1994		
	Level	For	Against	Level	For	Against
Security and Defence	2	1.35 ***	0.75 ***	4	1.44 ***	0.73 ***
Protection of the environment	6	1.27 ***	0.80 ***	8	1.17 **	0.86 ***
Currency	2.5	1.73 ***	0.63 ***	8	2.04 ***	0.50 ***
Co-operation with LDCs, Third World	3.5	1.42 ***	0.71 ***	7	1.10	0.88 +

Table 7. Analysis for EB 32 (1989, EU-12) and EB 42.0 (1994, EU-15)

Issue Area	1989			1994		
Health and social welfare	1	1.20 **	0.83 ***	4.5	1.16 *	0.94
Education	1.5	1.03	0.98	3.75	1.08	0.96
Basic rules for media	1	1.20 ***	0.91 +	5.5	1.15 *	0.93
Scientific research	5	1.08	0.93	5	1.03	0.90
Rates of VAT	3	1.05	1.03	3	1.28 ***	0.87 **
Foreign policy outside the European Community	2	1.32 ***	0.89 +	4	1.41 ***	0.72 ***
Workers' representatives on company boards	1	1.16 *	1.04	5.5	1.05	1.04
Computer privacy	1	1.03	1.14 *			
Industrial policy				3	1.20 ***	0.85 **
Cultural policy				2	0.91	1.21 ***
Immigration policy				5.5	1.14 *	0.84 **
Rules for political asylum				5.5	1.33 ***	0.78 ***
Health and safety of workers				7	1.12 +	0.91
The fight against unemployment				3	1.16 **	0.83 ***
The fight against drugs				3	1.03	0.94
<i>N</i>		11492	11492		13030	13043

Ordered logistic regression, weighted to adjust for country population size. Reporting odds ratios; statistical significance: *** 0.001, ** 0.01, * 0.05, + 0.1.

EB 74.2 (2010) is the final survey considered here. It was conducted after the Lisbon Treaty had come into effect, and well into the global financial crisis. The results of the analysis are displayed in the columns labeled 'for' and 'against' of Table 8. The correlation between governance level and effect size is once again statistically significant in both models (at the 0.001 level) and estimates that are not statistically significant disproportionately occur in issue areas where there is comparatively less Europeanization. The two most Europeanized issue areas, agriculture/fisheries and support for troubled regions, also boast two of the five highest effects in the 'for' column. The other issues among those five, immigration, inflation and financial reform, not only boast above-average levels of Europeanized governance, they are also all made more salient by the ongoing economic crisis.

Table 8 also offers another test of hypothesis H5, in the final two columns. These report the results of the same analysis, but conducted only on the subset of the population that correctly answered all three political knowledge questions. Here every statistically significant effect size is greater (or, in two cases, equal) when the sample is limited to the most knowledgeable respondents, as predicted. In most cases, however, the difference is comparatively small. This is almost certainly reflective of the fact that the political knowledge questions were not issue-specific; it seems likely that those with more general political knowledge will also have more issue-specific knowledge of Europeanization, but the difference on the latter front may be quite small.

Table 8. Analysis for EB 74.2, 2010, EU-27

Issue Area	Level	For	Against	For*	Against*
Fighting crime	5	0.98	1.01	1.01	1.00
Taxation	3	0.88 *	1.17 **	1.02	0.92
Fighting unemployment	5.5	1.03	0.97	0.99	1.04
Fighting terrorism	6.5	0.95	0.97	1.03	0.93
Defence and foreign affairs	5	1.17 **	0.85 **	1.21 *	0.85 +
Immigration	7.5	1.32 ***	0.75 ***	1.34 ***	0.74 ***
The education system	6.25	1.09	0.93	1.18 +	0.90
Pensions	5.5	0.92	1.08	0.81 *	1.18

Table 8. Analysis for EB 74.2, 2010, EU-27

Issue Area	Level	For	Against	For*	Against*
Protecting the environment	8	1.16 **	0.85 **	1.37 ***	0.73 ***
Health	5.5	0.86 **	1.13 *	0.82 *	1.18 +
Agriculture and fishery	8.5	1.20 ***	0.84 ***	1.44 ***	0.68 ***
Consumer protection	8	1.08	0.91 +	1.08	0.90
Scient. & technol. research	5.5	0.98	1.07	0.88	1.17
Support for troubled regions	8.5	1.29 ***	0.78 ***	1.33 ***	0.74 ***
Energy	7.5	1.23 ***	0.80 ***	1.29 **	0.77 **
Transport	7.5	1.08	0.96	0.97	1.03
Fighting inflation	5.5	1.17 **	0.86 **	1.14	0.90
Economic growth	6.75	1.02	0.94	1.06	0.94
Tackling public debt	4.25	0.80 ***	1.27 ***	0.80 *	1.30 **
Reform the financial sector	6.25	1.27 ***	0.83 ***	1.33 **	0.79 *
<i>N</i>		26723		10019	

Ordered logistic regression, weighted, reporting odds ratios. Statistical significance: *** 0.001, ** 0.01, * 0.05, + 0.1.

CONCLUSION

Over the course of half a century, as citizens of EU member states have been asked about their preferences for national versus European-level governance in specific issue areas, a few key patterns have emerged. First, preferences remain fairly consistent from one survey to the next, especially in terms of their relative rank ordering. Second, the apparent decline over time in support for Europeanization in many issue areas appears driven more by the addition of new member state publics than by significant changes in the preferences of citizens of long-time member states. The analyses presented here confirm these patterns. In addition, they also illustrate that changes in issue-specific European governance are not driven by public preferences for Europeanization in those issue areas (nor, conversely, are such preferences affected by those changes).

More importantly, this article demonstrated that the interaction between preferences for issue-specific European governance and Europeanization in those issue areas has a significant effect on overall support for the EU. It is perhaps not surprising that issue-specific support for EU-level governance has a positive effect on overall EU support. However, the fact that the size of this effect increases with the degree of Europeanization in the issue area in question had not previously been demonstrated, nor had the role of political knowledge in strengthening the effect.

The data show that higher levels of issue-specific Europeanization are systematically associated with an estimated impact on overall EU support that is both larger and more statistically significant. The fact that this finding emerges despite the serious data limitations constraining the analysis — an inevitably imperfect measure of Europeanization, a frequently poor match between that measure and the issue areas polled, and a limited question instrument in those surveys (offering no gradation) — suggests that the actual pattern is likely stronger than that found here. In addition, the significance of the finding is further strengthened by the time period covered by the surveys analysed here, from as early as 1962 to as recently as 2010.²²

The first and last surveys analysed also underscored the role of political knowledge in the observed patterns. When respondents in 1962 were queried as to which issue areas were likely to see Europeanization in the near future, their belief that European-level governance in particular issue areas was ‘foreseen’ in the Treaties further strengthened their support for Europeanization overall. Similarly, in 2010, the effect of the interaction between Europeanization and issue-specific preferences on overall EU support was greater for the subset of the population that scored highest on political knowledge.²³

Overall, these findings underscore the importance of taking into account issue-specific preferences in any discussion of support for European integration. The evidence presented here indicates that issue-specific preferences have a strong impact on overall support, especially when governance has been Europeanized in the issue areas in question. This has significant implications too for European policy-makers who until now have focused more on overall support for European integration than on issue-specific preferences. After all, European governance is much more likely to be successful if it enjoys public support.

The analyses in this article also challenge one common interpretation of (soft) Euroscepticism as resulting from an ever-expanding EU matched against publics with fairly constant preferences. While greater Europeanization in issue areas where respondents are opposed to such integration does reduce overall support for the EU, the opposite is the case as well: Europeanization can also increase overall support. For further integration to drive Euroscepticism, one of two scenarios must hold. First, integration might take place primarily in issue areas where publics are inclined to oppose Europeanization. The analyses here show this not to be the case. Second, Euroscepticism might be on the rise primarily in countries where citizens are inclined to oppose Europeanization. This, too, is at odds with the evidence: the analyses here show publics in the original member states to be

comparatively pro-Europeanization, yet Euroscepticism has risen dramatically in original member states such as France and the Netherlands in recent years.

Finally, the findings here call into question widespread scepticism about the awareness of European integration among European citizens. The fact that actual Europeanization levels have a significant effect on the relationship between issue-specific preferences and overall support implicitly indicates that Europeans must be somehow aware of those Europeanization levels; the fact that political knowledge strengthens the relationship explicitly confirms it. Although citizens tend to perform poorly on specific knowledge 'trivia' questions, a general awareness of political initiatives is arguably more significant to their competence as voters. Whether this awareness is conveyed in the media (Schuck, Xezonakis, Elenbaas, Banducci, and De Vreese 2011) or through party cues (Hobolt 2007), the evidence suggests that, where it matters, voters are more informed than is widely believed.

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¹ In contrast to 'hard euroscepticism', which 'implies outright rejection of the entire project of European political and economic integration', 'soft euroscepticism' is 'contingent or qualified opposition to European integration ... expressed in terms of opposition to specific extensions of EU competencies' (Taggart and Szczesniak 2004: 4).

² To some degree, the causal arrow works both ways: someone who supports European integration overall is more likely to support European governance in a given issue area (e.g. Ray 2004). However, the interaction of this effect with actual Europeanization (H4) is unlikely to be driven by overall support, unless an individual is simply rationalising. Moreover, the impact of overall support on issue-specific preferences ought to be constant across issues; in fact, however, the observed effect is variable, suggesting that the causal arrow is primarily in the direction posited here.

³ In fact, despite occasional attempts by the member states legally to proscribe ‘creeping competence’ (Pollack 1995) such as the principle of ‘conferred powers’ in the Treaty of Maastricht, key Treaty provisions permit the EU to adopt measures in line with general Treaty objectives even without specific legal basis (cf. Conway 2010).

⁴ In fact, the output of the European Union in terms of directives, regulations, and expenditures also represents an imperfect measure of the impact or pervasiveness of EU governance across different issue areas (Pollack 1995, 2000). Moreover, to get any sense of the importance of EU-level relative to national-level governance, comparable information about national directives, expenditures, etc. would be required.

⁵ Treaty data do not shed any light on whether or not the EU is actually *using* its competences, a point made by several scholars who prefer the regulation-counting approach (e.g. Alesina, Angeloni and Schuknecht 2002). Fortunately, Börzel’s codes are largely congruent with assessments produced by other approaches, including those focusing on legislative & financial output (Alesina et al. 2002; Pollack 2000; Schmitter 1996).

⁶ For countries not in the Eurozone, the correct figure will be lower. Still, even they are constrained in their ability to implement an independent monetary policy; accordingly, I do not adjust the code for respondents from those countries.

⁷ Individual-level data for the Italian sample is unavailable for this survey, so the analysis here covers only the other five original member states.

⁸ In the Dutch questionnaire, this question better translates as ‘being considered’ (overwogen) rather than ‘provided for’. The German (vorgesehen) and French (prévu) versions — both of which literally translate as ‘foreseen’ — are more in accordance with the English ‘provided for’. Short of excluding the Dutch sub-sample, there is no obvious way to correct for these linguistic differences.

⁹ Across all surveys considered here, ‘don’t know’ answers generally accounted for 5-7 per cent of all responses. I ignore these answers in the calculation of mean support levels, and code them as the null category for the dummy variables reflecting support for or opposition to EU-level governance.

¹⁰ The three true/false questions were: ‘The EU currently consists of 27 member states’ (true in 2010), ‘The members of the European Parliament are directly elected by the citizens of each Member State’ (true), and ‘Switzerland is a member of the EU’ (false).

¹¹ Answers to these various questions, when asked within the same survey, are strongly correlated.

¹² The autumn 1995 Eurobarometer (42.0) was conducted a month or two prior to the official accession of Austria, Finland, and Sweden, but respondents in those countries already knew their country would join the EU in 1995.

¹³ As noted earlier, some issue areas queried in the surveys constitute only one small part of one of the broader issue areas in Börzel’s list. Meanwhile, others may cross issue-area boundaries, as indicated by listing two numbers in the first column of Tables 3 and 4.

¹⁴ Actually, unlike other late joiners, the Central and East European (CEE) member states are about equally pro-Europeanization as the EC-6, on average. However, their issue-specific preferences do differ. For example, the CEEs are much less opposed to Europeanized anti-unemployment efforts, education policy, pension policy, and health policy, but much more opposed to Europeanized agricultural policy, anti-inflation policy and environmental protection.

¹⁵ Using the Stata statistical package, the command is `svy: ologit`, with Eurobarometer’s ‘weight Europe’ as the `pweight` variable. For the 1962 survey, weights were calculated by the author, based on the size of each national sample and national population sizes in 1962.

¹⁶ Germany, the largest member state, is the baseline case.

¹⁷ Full regression results for all analyses reported and discussed here are available from the author.

¹⁸ On the ‘against’ side, there is less of a clear pattern, apart from the non-significant estimates already noted. This is not all that surprising, as Table 2 showed that the proportion of respondents opposing Europeanization was low on average, producing just a small number of observations to work with.

¹⁹ In the absence of information regarding respondents’ beliefs, it is impossible to derive further insights. For example, perhaps the estimated effect for agriculture is smaller than that for the first three issue areas listed because respondents see most actual agricultural policy being implemented at the national level, in the form of price supports.

²⁰ However, the correlation reaches statistical significance only for the 1994 survey, and then only at the 0.1 level, so the pattern is not as strong as for some of the other surveys.

²¹ Foreign policy is nearly tied with security/defence in terms of effect size in 1994. Recall, however, that diplomacy/foreign policy already generated large and statistically significant odds ratio estimates in earlier surveys, so the same results here do not represent a change.

²² Moreover, performing the same analysis on additional surveys within this time period produces substantively equivalent results, further supporting the hypotheses. For example, in 1984 (EB 22), there is a strong and significant correlation on both sides (0.73 for ‘for’ and -0.70 for ‘against’) between the estimated odds ratios and the level of Europeanization. Moreover, the two issue areas with no real Europeanization generate effect sizes that are not (or only barely) statistically significant. Similarly, in 1999 (EB 52.0) every issue area with a Europeanization level of 7 or higher has statistically significant estimates in both the ‘for’ and ‘against’ columns. Among the remaining 20 issue areas, only three meet this same standard.

²³ Here, again, the fact that this finding emerged despite the tenuous relationship between general (and fairly superficial) knowledge about the EU and specific knowledge about Europeanization in particular issue areas suggests that the real impact of such knowledge is likely greater than found in this analysis.

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