Contents

Contributors

Zakaria Babutsidze   *SKEMA Business School*

Quincy Cloet   *University of Aberystwyth*

Maxine David   Leiden University

Renke Deckarm   *Oldenburg University*

Vincenzo Emanuele   *LUISS, Rome*

Fadıl Ersözer   University of Manchester

Simona Guerra   University of Leicester

Tim Haesebrouck   *Ghent University*

Karen Heard-Laureote   *University of Portsmouth*

Felix Heiduk   *German Institute for International and Security Affairs*

Thomas Hörber   *École Supérieure des Sciences Commerciales d'Angers (ESSCA)*

Iraklis Lazakis   *University of Strathclyde*

Simon Lightfoot   *University of Leeds*

Anna Lito Michala   *University of Strathclyde*

Nicola Maggini   *University of Florence*

Bruno Marino   *Scuola Normale Superiore, Florence*

Mike Neary   *University of Lincoln*

Kathryn Simpson   *University of Manchester*

Natalia Timuș   *Maastricht University*

Osman Turan   *University of Strathclyde*

Reflection

Teaching Excellence Framework: a critical response and an alternative future

Mike Neary, *University of Lincoln*

Teaching Excellence Framework: a critical response and an alternative future

The Teaching Excellence Framework marks a paradigm shift in the approach to teaching and learning in Higher Education in England. This is not a sudden change but the culmination of a policy process that has been ongoing since the 1980s by successive governments (Shattock 2006). The shift is away from public higher education to higher education as 'a major business and revenue generator' (Hubble et al 2016 6), encouraging 'competition and value for money' (Hubble et al 2016 13) providing greater opportunities and choice for students as well as access and social mobility (Hubble et al 2016). At the core of this shift is the status of students, the independence and autonomy of universities, a new support framework for research as well as opening up the sector to new higher education providers.

At the centre of this fundamental change are two recent pieces of legislation: the Consumer Rights Act (CRA) 2015, and the Higher Education Research Bill (HERB) 2016, now making its way through parliament. In this paper I want to discuss this paradigm shift with a focus on the Teaching Excellence Framework, a central aspect of the Higher Education Bill. My view will be informed by and reflect the criticism of this legislation from academics, the University and College Union, the National Union of Students and policy analysts, counteracting the broad support from Vice Chancellors and University Boards of Governors, but I want to add a new dimension to the discussion. I want to suggest that this new paradigm requires us to think of alternatives to the current form of Higher Education based on a debate about the meaning and nature of higher education grounded in the culture and values of academic life. At the end of the paper I will present work I am doing with others to create a co-operative university.

In December 2015 Jo Johnson, the Minister for Higher Education, described teaching in Higher Education as 'lamentable' (Morgan 2015). This view was not supported by data produced by the higher education sector, notably the National Student Survey, which records high levels of student satisfaction, but it did correspond with a report published by the *Which?* organisation in 2014: 'A Degree of Value: value for money from the student experience'. This report presented a very negative view of the student experience with wide variations in teaching quality, undemanding courses, non-stimulating seminars, too few contact hours, as well as poor course management and organisation. Students were not satisfied about the way in which complaints were handled; and they felt more could be done about helping them to find work. All of which added up to poor value for money. In response to these findings *Which?* recommended a new regulatory system for higher education so that terms and conditions comply with consumer protection regulation, including improvement to information and advice, customer protection and regulation. This report has been influential in the framings of the both the CRA 2015 and the HERB 2016.

Few of us working in higher education think there is not some need for reform. The question becomes the nature of this realignment, as something that should involve public debate, particularly among academics who have been almost entirely excluded from the current reframing process.

At the centre of any debate about the future of higher education is the nature of the student-teacher relationship. While we may have become accustomed to referring to students as consumers since the introduction of fees in 1997, the new Consumer Rights Act has consolidated this rhetoric as an objective legal fact. The act confirms the University is a trader and supplier of educational

services to the student in what amounts to a direct, individual contractual relationship. It is not only students and their institutions who are covered by the act, academics need to deliver courses in an up-to-date, knowledgeable and timely way. Failure to meet the minimum standard will give rise to consumer law remedies, including repeat performance and damages, and can be subject to the criminal law in cases of misleading or aggressive commercial practices. This means that legal judgement may be extended to areas of academic practice from which it has previously been excluded, with unknown negative consequences for academic freedom. This new legal and financial framework has profound implications for the student-teacher relationship. All legal regulation is based on a conflict of private interests which need to be protected, undermining the more progressive social aspects of community, collaboration and cooperation (Pashukanis 1983). Compliance with the act is the first stage of being recognised as a provider under the terms of new Teaching Excellence Framework so as to be able to access funding through the student loans company.

The Teaching Excellence Framework is a central aspect of the Higher Education Bill. The core ambition of the framework is 'to raise the quality and status of teaching in higher education institutions' (Hubble et al 2016 9). Excellence is to be measured through a series of proxy metrics that include, student satisfaction, retention, employability and a new metric, learning gain, which sets out to record the improvement in knowledge and personal development of students during their time in higher education. These metrics have been extensively criticised as being unreliable measures of the quality of teaching and learning in higher education (Holyroyd and Saul 2016). Critics argue the real intention is to create a market differential providing a justification for raising fees linked to improvements in the quality of teaching. At the heart of the Bill is the intention to open the sector up to new providers, described as 'challenger institutions' by creating 'a level playing field', with no restriction on numbers and with immediate degree awarding powers on a 'monitored, probationary basis' (Hubble et al 2016 13). A feature of any marketised environment is instability and possibility of failure, so the legislation requires new providers to provide an exit strategy for such an eventuality. The focus on social mobility and increasing access by raising the student number cap is undermined by the fact that HE is only accessible through taking on massive debt, putting at risk other lending for mortgages and credit facilities on which social mobility is often assessed, notwithstanding the prejudicial attitude to working class life and culture that it implies. Institutions will provide their own TEF submission that will feature other aspects on which they wish to be assessed, including learning analytics, employer engagement, staff qualifications as well as enterprise activities and entrepreneurship.

At the centre of a new governance model is the Office for Students, 'a consumer focused market regulator' (HERB 2016) responsible for monitoring finances and efficiency, maintaining standards, awarding teaching grants with the power to remove university status, as well as redraft quality codes. The extent to which it acts on these matters is based on advice from the Secretary of State, restricting the independence or autonomy of higher educatin providers. Despite its focus on students it is not at all clear how students will engage with this new institution. The creation of the Office for Students marks a fundamental change in the regulation of higher education. Under the current regime the Higher Education Funding Council for England supports a stable system based on the interests of institutions and their students while the new Office for Students is designed to regulate a marketised system that is inherently unstable, with the instability in the new system putting students at greater risk. All of this in a hostile regulatory environment exemplified by the policing-like authority given to the Office for Students for 'entry and search' to exercise their powers (Jamdar 2016).

While the concept of student engagement has been a key aspect of recent policy and practice in higher education, driven by the Quality Assurance Code, the bill makes no reference to the concept;

indeed, is more interested in the danger of 'student disengagement' from their studies in response to 'distracted academics' who are more interested in their research (HERB 2016). The government is seeking views on the detailed operation of the bill through a consultation document where engagement does feature more prominently. However, the requirements to include the student voice are undermined as institutions do not require the input of NUS or students as part of their TEF submission, which was a significant feature of student engagement under the previous quality regime.

The legislation recommends a new framework to support research, UK Research and Innovation, bringing the research councils under one organisation along with Innovate UK and a new body, Research England. There is nothing in the bill that considers the relationship between teaching and research, beyond the idea of research-led teaching, and, therefore, ignores one of the most significant advances in HE pedagogy in the recent period which has sought to connect research and teaching through research-engaged teaching (Healey and Jenkins 2009, Brew 2006). The University of Lincoln, in England, adopted research-engaged teaching as the organising principle for all its teaching and learning, with undergraduate research a central feature of the undergraduate curriculum. This model has been widely adapted by other universities and colleges in the UK and around the world, e.g., most recently at University College London: Research=Teaching, and has been promoted and celebrated through an international journal of student research: The Reinvention Journal and the British Conference for Undergraduate Research. This is not just a teaching technique but is part of a broader debate about the meaning and purpose of higher education which sees the connection between research and teaching, with students' involvement in the production of knowledge being seen as that which distinguishes higher education from other education provision (Neary et al 2015, Neary and Saunders 2016).

A key feature of the bill is to allow new private providers to award degrees, with no specification as to the nature of these institutions, other than a strong implication they support the privatisation process. There is nothing within the current legislation that would preclude a more radical form of university from being established based not on markets and privatisation but collaboration and co-operation. I want to suggest that such an institution might be created as a co-operative university. Co-operative enterprises do not avoid the imperatives of capitalist production but offer the potential for future radical possibilities. There is strong synergy between the values of the co-operative movement and academic values: sharing, education, collaboration, open membership, democratic member control, autonomy and independence and concern for community (Cook 2013). The co-operative is a real alternative because it is based on a different legal, governance and management structure, challenging the consumer model with a model based on workers ownership and democracy, not value for money but social solidarity (Winn 2015). It is, therefore, entirely possible that 'a small cooperative organisation...could now see a route to becoming a university in name, and this appears to be in-line with the government's intentions, with other parts of the White Paper arguing that the legislation allows for a return to small communities of scholars establishing as universities' (Cook 2016). This can build on the success of the schools co-operative movement with more than 800 schools in the UK now having co-operative status since 2006.

Given the nature of the political paradigm within which higher education is being constituted, it is likely that a more radical institution would be grounded in the principles of co-operation and collaboration rather than privatisation and profit-making. A new co-operative form of higher education might choose to have its degree programmes validated by an international university that was part of an education system not committed to neo-liberalism. The University of Mondragonin the Basque Country in Spain is already a well established international co-operative institute for higher education.

I have been involved in establishing a cooperative form of HE in England, as a founder member of the Social Science Centre (SSC), Lincoln. This cooperative, offering no-fee higher education, was set up in 2011 following the massive rise in student fees and withdrawal of public funding for teaching arts and humanities, social science, business and law. The SSC raises funds through membership subscription based on what students and teachers can afford. All labour is voluntary. The SSC offers awards at the level of higher education qualifications, these are not degrees but give students an experience of higher education that is equivalent to a university level of teaching and learning. The SSC is an autonomous institution and has no connection with any other higher education provider. The students at the SSC are involved with their teachers in running the co-operative with equal votes and ownership rights. All courses are taught through the principles and practices of critical pedagogy and popular education, recognising that students and teachers have much to learn from each other. Currently the SSC has around 50 members including associate members who can act as external examiners and reviewers of student work. The SSC is on-line but is not a web-based provision; rather, it is rooted in the local community and the city of Lincoln. This co-operative principle for higher education has been further developed through research projects, undertaken by myself and Joss Winn, funded by Independent Social Research Foundation: Beyond Private and Public - a framework for co-operative higher learning (Neary and Winn 2016), as well as ongoing research on Co-operative Leadership for Higher Education, funded by the Leadership Foundation for Higher Education (LFHE 2016).

This type of alternative provision provided by the SSC is not simply a matter of different management and governance structures, but is based on a fundamentally different view on the nature of the state in capitalism. The free market view is that the state intervention should be reduced to a minimum, although paradoxically strong regulation is needed in order to facilitate marketisation. This is very evident in the new higher education and research bill. For those who defend public education the state is a neutral arbiter that can be put to use for the defence of the public good. This is the model on which the Alternative White Paper on Higher Education is based (Holmwood et al 2016). The model that I am working on with Joss Winn and others is that both the state and the market are not antithetical but complementary forms of capitalist regulation (Neary 2012). The history of the co-operative movement in the UK is that it has never been incorporated within a statist model, but is international in its outlook and orientation, containing within it the possibility of generating a new form of social life which is close to the idea of the commons or commonwealth as a definition of the public (Winn 2015). The co-operative movement does not depend on the state, indeed its ideal expression requires its dissolution and replacement with new forms of human association not grounded in models of political society. If that sounds utopian, that is the point. In a hostile climate where intellectual dissensual debate is being shut down, not least by the 'anti-terror' Prevent agenda which criminalises radical thought inside universities and which is likely to be enforced by the Office for Students, it is vital to develop new critical imaginaries based on our own radical academic histories and traditions (Neary and Winn 2016).

The political crisis following the vote to leave the European Union means the prospects for the Higher Education and Research Bill are uncertain. The plan is to lobby Parliament with the support of the Labour and Co-operative Party as well the Higher Education Commission so that co-operative and other heterodox forms of universities will be referenced in the new higher education act if it passes into law, and be part of any future discussions about alternative higher education provision. This may not alter the marketised and privatised logic of this new proposed legislation, but it will remind lawmakers and those who seek to develop higher education in England that another post-capitalist world is possible along with another form of higher learning, now and in the future.

<div align="center">***</div>

REFERENCES

Brew, Angela (2006) Research and Teaching: Beyond the Divide. London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Consumer Rights Act (CRA) 2015: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/15/contents/enacted

Cook, Dan (2013) Realising the University: A Consultancy Report for the Co-operative College: http://josswinn.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/realising-the-co-operative-university-for-disemmination.pdf

Cook, Dan (2016) The Co-operative University https://coopuni.wordpress.com/2016/06/21/what-does-the-he-and-research-bill-mean-for-the-prospect-of-cooperative-universities/

Healey, Mick and Jenkins, Alan (2009) Developing Undergraduate Research and Inquiry, Higher Eduation Academy, York. https://www.heacademy.ac.uk/sites/default/files/developingundergraduate_final.pdf

Higher Education and Research Bill (HERB) 2016-2017: http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2016-17/highereducationandresearch.html

Holyroyd, Jules and Saul, Jennifer (2016) Will the Teaching Excellence Framework Be Sexist. The Guardian, 4th April: http://www.theguardian.com/higher-education-network/2016/apr/04/will-the-teaching-excellence-framework-be-sexist

Hubble, Sue, Foster, David and Bolton, Paul (2016) Higher Education and Research Bill, Research Briefing http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7608

Leadership Foundation for Higher Education (LFHE) (2016) Small Development Projects: http://www.lfhe.ac.uk/en/research-resources/small-development-projects/sdp-2016.cfm

Holmwood, John, Hickey Tom and Wallis, Sean (2016) The Alternative White Paper for Higher Education. In Defence of Public Higher Education: Knowledge for a Successful Society. https://heconvention2.files.wordpress.com/2016/06/awp1.pdf

Jamdar, Smita (2016) The Market is Free Yet Everywhere it is in Chains, WonkHE: Higher Education, People, Policy and Politics http://wonkhe.com/blogs/the-market-is-free-yet-everywhere-it-is-in-chains/

Morgan, John (2015) 'Jo Johnson Under Fire For Calling Some University Teaching Lamentable' Times Higher Education, December 8th. https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/jo-johnson-under-fire-calling-some-university-teaching-lamentable

Neary, Mike and Saunders, Gary (2016) Student as Producer and the Politics of Abolition: Making a New Form of Dissident Institution. Critical Education 7 (5): http://ices.library.ubc.ca/index.php/criticaled/article/view/186127

Neary, Mike, Saunder, Gary, Andy Hagyard and Derricott, Dan (2015) Student as Producer: Research Engaged Teaching: An Institutional Strategy Higher Education Academy York. https://www.heacademy.ac.uk/sites/default/files/projects/lincoln_ntfs_2010_project_final_report_fv.pdf

Neary, Mike (2012) Beyond Teaching in Public: the University as a Form of Social Knowing. In Mike Neary, Howard Stevenson and Les Bell (eds.) Towards Teaching in Public: Making the Modern University.

Neary, Mike and Joss Winn (2016) Beyond Private and Public: A Framework for Co-operative Higher Education. In: Co-operative Education Conference, Manchester http://eprints.lincoln.ac.uk/23051/

Neary, Mike and Winn, Joss (2016) 'The University of Utopia'. Post-16 Education.

Pashukanis, Evgeny (1983) Marxism and the Law. Pluto Books: London.

Shattock, Michael (2006) Managing Good Governance in Higher Education, Maidenhead: OUP.

Which Report? A Degree of Value: Value for Money from the Student Experience'. http://www.wonkhe.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Which-A-degree-of-value-Nov-2014.pdf

Winn, Joss (2015) The Co-operative University: Labour, Property and Pedagogy. Power and Education. Vol 7 No 1 pp 39 - 55 http://josswinn.org/2015/04/08/the-co-operative-university-labour-property-and-pedagogy-2/

Research Article

Gaining Votes in Europe against Europe? How National Contexts Shaped the Results of Eurosceptic Parties in the 2014 European Parliament Elections

Vincenzo Emanuele, *LUISS, Rome*
Nicola Maggini, *University of Florence*
Bruno Marino, *Scuola Normale Superiore, Florence*

Abstract

In the wake of the harshest economic crisis since 1929, in several European countries there has been a rise of Eurosceptic parties that oppose EU integration. The 2014 European Parliament elections were a fundamental turning point for these parties. In this article, after a theoretical discussion on the concept of Euroscepticism, we provide an updated classification of Eurosceptic parties after the 2014 European Parliament elections. We show the cross-country variability of such parties' results and present two hypotheses aiming at explaining Eurosceptic parties' results, one related to each country's economic context and one related to each country's political-institutional context. Through a comparative approach and the use of quantitative data, we test the two hypotheses by creating two standardised indices of economic and political-institutional contexts. Three important findings are shown: Eurosceptic parties perform better in either rich, creditor countries or in poor countries; Eurosceptic parties perform better in countries with peculiar political-institutional features, such as high levels of party system instability and a more permissive electoral system; finally, and crucially, favourable political-institutional contexts seem to be more important than favourable economic contexts for Eurosceptic parties' electoral results.

Keywords

After the European Parliament (EP) elections of 2014, many commentators pointed out that 'Eurosceptic' parties gained many votes and obtained a relevant number of seats in the European Parliament. This work aims at analysing the electoral results of Eurosceptic parties and shedding some light on how the national contexts influenced their performance. We proceed as follows: in the first section we select the definition of Euroscepticism used in this work and present an up-to-date classification of Eurosceptic parties; the second section identifies Eurosceptic parties' electoral results in the 2014 EP elections and shows their characteristics; in the third section the hypotheses are presented; in the fourth section we connect Eurosceptic parties' results and the economic and political-institutional frameworks of the European countries by presenting a typology of Eurosceptic parties' results; the final section delivers our conclusions.

EUROSCEPTICISM: DEFINITION AND PARTIES' CLASSIFICATION

How can we define Euroscepticism? A good definition is Taggart's: 'Euroscepticism expresses the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration' (1998: 366). Starting from this definition, Szczerbiak and Taggart have separated Euroscepticism into two concepts, soft and hard Euroscepticism: the latter 'implies outright rejection of the entire project of European political and economic integration and opposition to their country joining or remaining members of the EU' (2001: 10), while the former is related to a more contingent opposition concerning some EU policy areas or is related to the defence of the national interest.

This definition has been criticised by several authors, such as Kopecky and Mudde (2002), who have proposed an alternative way to identify opposition to / support for the European Union (EU) by building a four-fold typology of pro-EU or anti-EU parties based on the distinction between 'diffuse support' (for the idea of European integration) and 'specific support' (for the application of European integration). In a similar vein, Flood (2002) has developed a classification into six types (from EU-rejectionist to EU-maximalist), based on parties' support of a country's membership of the EU and/or a country's participation in particular institutions or policies. Moreover, Rovny (2004) has built a four-fold typology based on two categories of magnitude (that is, Szczerbiak and Taggart's hard-soft distinction) and of motivation (that is, ideology-driven opposition versus strategy-driven opposition). Finally, Krouwel and Abts (2007) have created a typology which is created by two axes: the first one regards the targets of positive or negative attitudes, while the second deals with different types of political evaluations of the targets. Nonetheless, these alternative classifications have fostered criticisms by many scholars (see for instance Conti 2003; Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008; Vasilopoulou 2013), who have advanced the necessity to move away, among other things, from two extreme problems: non-mutually-exclusive categorisations (the fact that a party can fall into more than one category) or extremely refined and over-specific categorisations (that may risk not finding empirical confirmation in reality). Regardless of the fact that scholars have interpreted Euroscepticism through dichotomous categorisations, multi-dimensional typologies or, as undertaken by Hooghe and Marks (2007), as a continuum, all scholars have tried to distinguish between parties that are Eurosceptic and parties that are not.

Finally, in 2008, Szczerbiak and Taggart, addressing scholars' critiques, redefined their original definition of hard Euroscepticism that now no longer includes the rejection of EU membership as the key element identifying the category but is meant as a 'principled opposition to the project of European integration as embodied in the EU' (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008: 247). Therefore, they suggested that 'a party's stance on its country's EU membership is not, in fact, such a caesura as described in our original hard–soft conceptualisation' (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008: 243).

We believe that this redefinition made by Szczerbiak and Taggart in 2008 can be a good starting point. Still, the increasing spread of anti-EU discourses and attitudes (Usherwood and Startin 2013) have basically made all parties have at least some soft Eurosceptic attitudes (Flood 2009). Indeed, the category of soft Eurosceptic parties is no longer useful, since it risks being over inclusive. A more fruitful way to identify Eurosceptic parties would be that of focusing on the attitude towards the European integration process, as stressed by several authors (Flood 2002; Conti 2003). As a result, in this light Eurosceptic parties are not only those that explicitly push for the withdrawal of their country from the EU, but also those that express a very negative attitude towards European integration.

Following this conceptualisation, we provide a fresh classification of Eurosceptic parties after the 2014 EP elections. Indeed, notwithstanding the large amount of literature on the topic, there is no up-to-date classification of Eurosceptic parties based on empirical data. The existing literature has either provided partial classifications, based on a limited number of countries (Taggart 1998; Kopecky and Mudde 2002; Külahci 2012; Pirro and Van Kessel 2013[1]) or classifications that are out-dated (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002; De Sio and Legnante 2010), given the large changes occurred in the European party systems in more recent years.

To pursue the goal of devising a classification of Eurosceptic parties, we have created a database made up by 308 parties, namely, all parties that contested the 2014 EP elections in the 28 EU member states and received at least 0.5 per cent of the national share. For each party we have reported the score obtained on European integration-related issues according to two well-known

expert survey datasets: Chapel Hill (Bakker et al. 2015) and EUandI (2014). They provide parties' positions on a set of EU-related variables based on Likert scales.[2]

We have thus classified each party according to its attitude towards Europe. We have analysed parties' scores on EU integration issues[3] and selected only those parties that oppose EU integration. When there were some conflicting results for Eurozone parties' scores, we relied on Euro-related questions.[4] The rationale behind this choice is straightforward: given the fundamental importance of European Monetary Union for countries in the Eurozone, parties belonging to these countries should be treated in a different way from parties coming from countries which are outside the monetary union. Indeed, the Eurozone's party systems tend to be more pro-European than those that are outside (Külahci 2012: 190). Therefore, opposing the Euro for parties within the Eurozone is a signal of strong Eurosceptic attitudes that should be taken into account. Finally, in cases of missing or incomplete data, we have used other sources, especially party platforms or manifestos and the reports of country experts in De Sio, Emanuele and Maggini (2014).

This classificatory effort has produced a final list of 60[5] Eurosceptic parties from 23 European countries, reported in Table 1.

Table 1: List of Eurosceptic parties after the 2014 European Parliament Elections

Country	Eurosceptic parties
Austria	Freedom Party (FPÖ); EU-STOP; The Reform Conservatives (REKOS); Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ)
Belgium	Flemish Interest (VB)
Bulgaria	Attack (PPA); National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria (NFSB)
Croatia	-
Cyprus	Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL); National Popular Front (ELAM)
Czech Republic	Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM); Party of Free Citizens (SSO Svobodni); Party of Common Sense (ROZUMNI); Workers' Party of Social Justice (DSSS)
Denmark	Danish People's Party (DFP); People's Movement against the EU (FOBE)
Estonia	Conservative People's Party (EKRE); Estonian Independence Party (EIP)
Finland	True Finns (PS)
France	National Front (FN); Arise the Republic (DLR); Workers' Struggle (LO)
Germany	Alternative for Germany (AfD); National Democratic Party of Germany (NDP)
Greece	Golden Dawn (LS-CA); Communist Party of Greece (KKE); Independent Greeks (AE); Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS); United Popular Front (EPAM)
Hungary	Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik)
Ireland	Sinn Féin (SF)
Italy	Five Star Movement (M5S); Northern League (LN); Brothers of Italy (FdI)
Latvia	Union of Greens and Farmers (ZZS); Socialist Party of Latvia (LSP)
Lithuania	-
Luxembourg	Communist Party of Luxembourg (KPL)
Malta	-
Netherlands	Party for Freedom (PVV); Socialist Party (SP); Reformed Political Party-Christian Union (SGP-CU); Party for the Animals (PvdD); Article 50
Poland	Congress of the New Right (KNP); United Poland (SP); National Movement (RN)
Portugal	Democratic Unitarian Coalition (CDU); Workers' Communist Party (PCTP/MRPP) National Renovator Party (PRN)
Romania	Greater Romania Party (PRM)

Country	Eurosceptic parties
Slovakia	Slovak National Party (SNS); People's Party – Our Slovakia (L'SNS)
Slovenia	-
Spain	-
Sweden	Green Party (MP); Sweden Democrats (SD); Left Party (V);
United Kingdom	United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP); An Independence from Europe (IndEU); British National Party (BNP); Sinn Féin (SF); Democratic Unionist Party (DUP); Ulster Unionist Party (UUP); Traditionalist Unionist Voice (TUV)

EUROSCEPTIC PARTIES' RESULTS AND PARTY CHARACTERISTICS: A PATCHY FRAMEWORK

Eurosceptic parties after the 2014 EP elections gained 135 seats out of 751, 18 per cent of the total EP seats, increasing their presence in the parliament by 63 seats compared to the 2009 elections. Interestingly, the mean of the results of all the Eurosceptic parties in the EU is 6.8 per cent, substantively the same as that recorded in the 2009 EP elections (see Table 2). However, looking only at mean values could be misleading. Indeed, in the 2014 EP elections, 60 Eurosceptic parties obtained 0.5 per cent or more of valid votes, whereas in the 2009 EP elections this number was lower (45). Furthermore, in the European elections of 2014 the number of Eurosceptic parties that got more than 15 per cent of valid votes doubled with respect to 2009, rising from four to eight.

Table 2: Electoral results for the main Eurosceptic parties at the EP elections (vote differences in percentage points between 2009 and 2014)

Country	Party	Party Name	Votes (%)	Seats	Votes (change from 2009)	Seats (change from 2009)
Cyprus	AKEL	Progressive Party of Working People	27	2	-7.9	0
Denmark	DF	Danish People's Party	26.6	4	+11.3	+2
United Kingdom	UKIP	United Kingdom Independence Party	26.6	24	+10.0	+11
France	FN	National Front	24.9	24	+18.6	+21
Italy	M5S	Five Star Movement	21.2	17	new	new
Austria	FPÖ	Freedom Party	19.7	4	+7.0	+2
Ireland	SF	Sinn Féin	19.5	3	+8.3	+3
Sweden	MP	Green Party	15.4	4	+4.4	+2
Hungary	Jobbik	Movement for a Better Hungary	14.7	3	-0.1	0
Portugal	CDU	Democratic Unitarian Coalition	13.7	3	+2.3	+1
Netherlands	PVV	Party for Freedom	13.3	4	-3.7	0

Country	Party	Party Name	Votes (%)	Seats	Votes (change from 2009)	Seats (change from 2009)
Finland	PS	True Finns	12.9	2	+3.1	+1
Czech Republic	KSCM	Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia	11.0	3	-3.2	-1
Sweden	SD	Sweden Democrats	9.7	2	+6.4	+2
Netherlands	SP	Socialist Party	9.6	2	+2.5	0
Greece	LS-CA	Golden Dawn	9.4	3	+8.9	+3
Latvia	ZZS	Green and Farmers' Union	8.3	1	+4.5	+1
Denmark	FmEU	People's Movement against the EU	8.1	1	+0.9	0
Poland	KNP	Congress of the New Right	7.2	4	new	new
Germany	AFD	Alternative for Germany	7	7	new	new
Netherlands	SGP-CU	Reformed Political Party-Christian Union	6.8	2	0	0
Sweden	V	Left Party	6.3	1	0.6	0
Italy	LN	Northern League	6.2	5	-4	-4
Greece	KKE	Communist Party of Greece	6.1	2	-2.3	0
Czech Republic	SSO	Party of Free Citizens	5.2	1	+3.9	+1
*Total/Mean (N=60)**			*6.8*	*135*	*0.0*	*+63*
Note: we have not reported in the table the results of another 35 Eurosceptic parties which received between 0.5 per cent and 5 per cent of valid votes. Those Eurosceptic parties below 0.5 per cent have been excluded from the analysis.						

Source: Authors' elaboration on official data from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/election-results-2014.html.

Still, data regarding the overall progress in Eurosceptic parties' electoral results may actually hide a high heterogeneity. In fact, Table 2 shows the electoral results of the main Eurosceptic parties both in percentage terms and in seats. Eurosceptic parties that gained 5 per cent or more of valid votes are 25, whereas those that won less than 5 per cent are 35. The main Eurosceptic parties belong to countries from different parts of the EU and to different party families.

According to Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002: 985) 'the conventional Left/Right dimension … structures European integration. Political parties located toward the Left extreme and the Right extreme - peripheral parties - are significantly more Euro-skeptical than parties toward the Center'. Table 3 reports the positions of the main Eurosceptic parties according to their position on the left-

right continuum. Among the main rising Eurosceptic parties there is a certain degree of ideological heterogeneity. First, populist and right-wing Eurosceptic parties have registered electoral progress in these elections. These parties have conservative, xenophobic and populist political orientations and generally oppose Europe (Mudde 2007; Pirro and Van Kessel 2013). More on the far right, there are radical and anti-Semitic national parties, such as the Greek Golden Dawn and the Hungarian Jobbik. There is also another consistent group of parties of the radical left, mainly belonging to the European Left Party (GUE-NGL).

Table 3: Left-Right and GAL-TAN positions of Eurosceptic parties. Descriptive statistics

| Party characteristic	Category	N
Left-Right Dimension	Extreme Left	9
	Centre-Left	6
	Centre	3
	Centre-Right	7
	Extreme Right	25
GAL-TAN Dimension	Extreme GAL	1
	Moderate GAL	7
	Centre	2
	Moderate TAN	6
	Extreme TAN	20

Note: In the Extreme Left category we have collapsed the values ranging from 0 to 1.9, in the Centre-Left the values ranging from 2 to 4.4, in the Centre the values ranging from 4.5 to 5.5, in the Centre-Right the values ranging from 5.6 to 8, in the Extreme Right the values above 8. Conversely, in the Extreme GAL category we have collapsed the values ranging from 0 to 1.9, in the Moderate GAL the values ranging from 2 to 4.4, in the Centre the values ranging from 4.5 to 5.5, in the Moderate TAN the values ranging from 5.6 to 8 and, finally, in the Extreme TAN the values above 8. Values for the Dutch SGP-CU are the means of the values given to SGP and to CU in Bakker et al. (2015).

Source: For the Left-Right Dimension, authors' elaborations on data taken from Bakker et al. (2015) and from parties' political platforms; for the GAL-TAN Dimension, authors' elaborations on data taken from Bakker et al. (2015).

Consistent with Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002), the largest group is the extreme-right category, followed by the extreme-left category. As also posited by Taggart (1998), parties coming from different points of the left-right continuum can have the same level of Euroscepticism. Table 3 also reports the values of the main Eurosceptic parties on the GAL-TAN dimension (Green/Alternative/Libertarian – Traditional/Authoritarian/Nationalist) (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002: 985). This dimension of party competition powerfully structures variations on issues arising from European integration. This cleavage could influence national parties' stances towards the EU, since TAN-wing parties are seen as 'the most clearly-defined group of Eurosceptic parties' (Bartolini 2012: 158). The emergence of this new dimension of political conflict is related, according to some authors (Kriesi et al. 2008), to the transformative power of globalisation, which has created a new 'integration-demarcation' cleavage, with latent structural potentials of 'winners' and 'losers'. The mobilisation of the globalisation 'losers' by new political challengers has not added a new dimension of conflict to the existing national political space but, instead, has transformed the existing dimension of cultural conflict and enhanced its relative saliency compared to the traditional economic dimension. As shown in Table 3, there are more Eurosceptic parties on the TAN wing than on the GAL one, consistent with the authors' expectations.

Departing from party-level results, Figure 1 reports the national variations in the electoral results of Eurosceptic parties.

Figure 1: Total vote share received by Eurosceptic parties in the 2014 EP elections, by country

Source: Authors' calculations on official data.

The overall mean, obtained by aggregating the results of Eurosceptic parties in each country, is 14.5 per cent, substantively higher than that recorded in the 2009 EP elections (10.8 per cent). Hence, the 2014 EP elections were characterised by a general rise of Eurosceptic parties even at country level. However, there is a wide cross-country variability. In five countries (Croatia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovenia and Spain), there are no Eurosceptic parties at all, while in other countries (Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, Romania and Slovakia), they only play a minor role in the respective party systems. On the left side of the histogram, we find countries where Eurosceptic parties have received a large share of votes. Note that among the countries that fall above the EU mean of 14.5 per cent, only the Czech Republic and Hungary belong to the post-communist bloc. The rest of the countries are composed of North-Western European polities (Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom) and Southern European nations (Cyprus, Greece, Italy and Portugal).

HYPOTHESES

How can we explain the cross-country variability of Eurosceptic parties' results? We introduce two hypotheses related to the effect exerted by national contexts. Many scholars have recently underlined that 'context matters' (Lane and Ersson 1987; Marsh 2002; Maggini and Emanuele 2015), especially for electoral behaviour. Therefore, in order to understand the variation in Eurosceptic parties' results we need to resort to two types of contextual characteristics: economic and political ones. We put forward two hypotheses: the first deals with the economic conditions of European countries, while the second one is related to the national political and institutional frameworks.

Starting with our first hypothesis, Hernández and Kriesi (2015) have connected the economic conditions of European countries after the 2008 crisis and the results of prime ministers' parties, of governing parties and, to a lesser extent, of opposition parties in national political elections. Their analysis has shown that prime ministers' parties and governing parties were punished by electorates after the 2008 crisis because of dire economic conditions, while new parties, like a certain number of

Eurosceptic parties, have generally benefitted from the effects of crisis. Moreover, according to Pirro and Van Kessel (2013), populist radical right parties in four European countries (Hungary, Slovakia, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) have become more and more sceptical towards the European Union in recent years, also because of the EU reaction to the 2008 crisis, which has strongly influenced the economic measures brought about by national governments. Indeed, after 2008, the financial and sovereign debt crisis has affected Europe, but it did not have an immediate impact: the 2009 European elections did not show particularly clear effects of the crisis (De Sio and Legnante 2010). In subsequent years, the European Union has emerged as a key player. Many states have negotiated bailout deals with the 'Troika' committee (European Commission, European Central Bank and International Monetary Fund) that have strongly limited, if not temporarily cancelled, their economic policy sovereignty. Also, many other Eurozone countries had to take economic measures with a strong impact on the everyday life of ordinary people. Given the importance of Europe in regulating national economies, a bigger politicisation of this issue could be expected, and it would obviously boost Eurosceptic parties.

In this regard, we hypothesise a territorial differentiated pattern in the electoral performance of Eurosceptic parties, which would have been stronger in two (albeit very different) subgroups of European countries. The first subgroup is made by debtor states that had to sign a memorandum of understanding with the Troika (Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain). The second subgroup is made up of richer creditor countries of the Eurozone (for example Austria, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) and by countries with high economic status outside the Eurozone (Denmark, Sweden and the UK). In the former subgroup, austerity policies could have created a strong social malaise, preparing fertile terrain for populist and anti-EU parties; in the latter subgroup conversely, a populist and Eurosceptic protest could have collected the resentment of citizens 'forced' to finance debtor countries, fearing the loss of their prosperity (for example, citizens coming from a net payer country would be less willing to support the EU than citizens coming from countries that strongly benefit from EU's funds because they could think that not only are they giving more money to the EU but they are also supporting 'irresponsible' countries). In a third, intermediate group that includes countries with macroeconomic variables mostly in line with EU averages, we expect a less strong success for Eurosceptic parties and a general lower salience of European issues. Moreover, in this intermediate group we also find Central and Eastern European countries, which have strongly benefitted from EU structural funds since their entry into the EU. These funds represent a fundamental engine of economic development and therefore we expect a non-linear relationship between the economic context and Eurosceptic parties' results.

Our second hypothesis concerns the role played by the political and institutional context. To begin with, we expect a greater success of Eurosceptic parties in contexts of higher party system instability. Indeed, it seems there is a relationship between the stability of a party system and the emergence and success of (partially or totally) new and of non-mainstream parties (Sikk 2005, 2012; Tavits 2008). Indeed, many Eurosceptic parties are non-mainstream parties that challenge the established actors of the system. In some cases, they are genuinely new parties (Sikk 2005), like the Italian Five-Star Movement, in others they are old parties that have remained for a long time at the fringe of their political system and have only recently become important actors, like the French *Front National*. In both cases, we expect they have benefitted from contexts of accelerated party system change and fluid electoral markets. In other words, being generally non-mainstream or extreme actors of the political system, Eurosceptic parties could have performed well where there are significant voting shifts between elections rather than in contexts of strong electoral partisan allegiances. Second, we expect that Eurosceptic parties, being generally located at the extremes of the political continuum, as shown in Table 3, have performed better in highly ideologically polarised contexts. Third, there could be 'incentives created by political institutions such as the electoral

system, types of legislature or the spatial distribution of power within the polity' (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2003: 17).[6] Since Eurosceptic parties are often new challengers in the political landscape, and in many cases also small-sized parties, we expect that they have been advantaged in contexts with lower institutional barriers to entrance into the electoral arena of new political actors. Finally, EP elections in general are a favourable context for new challengers because party system instability and electoral fluidity are higher than in national elections, whereas partisan cues and institutional constraints are more relaxed and turnout is lower, as stated by the second-order-election framework (Reif and Schmitt 1980).

TOWARDS AN EXPLANATION: THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL-INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTS

The Economic Context

Regarding the economic contexts, our first hypothesis assumed a non-linear relationship between the economic performance of a country and the Eurosceptics' success. In particular, we expected a larger success for parties with Eurosceptic views in two opposite groups of countries: the richer, creditor countries and the debtor states, while in an intermediate group of countries we expected less strong success for Eurosceptic parties.

To test this hypothesis, we have considered different variables: GDP per capita, public debt-to-GDP ratio and the unemployment rate (all measured in 2013), the variation of these variables between 2013 and the beginning of the crisis (2008). Moreover, we have added a dummy for having signed or not a memorandum of understanding with the Troika. Descriptive statistics of these variables are reported in Table 4.

Table 4: Variables of the economic context. Descriptive statistics

Variable	Mean	Max.	Min.	Std. Dev.	N
GDP per capita in 2013	30,736	78,670	13,396	12,781	28
GDP variation 2013-2008	771	4,510	-4,899	2,179	28
Public debt to GDP ratio in 2013	72.3	173.8	11.3	38.2	28
Debt/GDP var. 2013-2008	26.0	78.7	2.2	20.9	28
Unemployment rate in 2013	11.2	27.3	4.9	5.5	28
Unemployment var. 2013-2008	4.8	19.6	-2.2	4.6	28
Troika	0.8	1.0	0.0	0.4	28

Source: International Monetary Fund (World Economic Outlook Database, April 2014).

Although these statistics concern different aspects of the economic status of a country, they consistently contribute to depicting a very clear overall economic situation, which can be synthetically summarised by the chart in Figure 2.

Figure 2: 2013 GDP per capita and GDP variation 2013-2008 in the EU (Luxembourg excluded)

Source: Authors' elaborations on data taken from International Monetary Fund (World Economic Outlook Database, April 2014).

Figure 2 plots the GDP per capita in 2013 against its variation during the crisis. The GDP per capita has been used because it tells us the general economic status of a country (rich or poor) while the GDP variation clarifies the path followed by the country during the crisis (rising or declining). The chart is divided into four quadrants, according to the mean values of both variables, thus creating four possible economic situations. A substantial group of wealthy countries can be easily identified, headed by Luxembourg that, with a GDP per capita of 78,670 EUR, has been left out from the figure for general visualisation reasons. The group of rich countries has not followed a homogeneous pattern during the crisis: some countries have continued to grow economically (Germany, Sweden and, to a lesser extent, Austria), while others have started to decline (for example, Ireland). On the left part of the chart, we find those countries with a GDP per capita lower than the European average. Many Eastern European countries are located in the 'rising countries' quadrant, having experienced high rates of economic growth even in times of crisis. Conversely, on the lower-left quadrant there are those countries that have suffered the most from the economic crisis. Among them we note Cyprus, Greece, Portugal and Spain, which had to sign a memorandum of understanding with the Troika.

Looking at Figure 2, the assumptions hypothesised in section 2 about the non-linear relationship between the economic context and the electoral performance of Eurosceptic parties seem to find empirical confirmation. Eurosceptic parties have scored their best results in both rich countries such as Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK and in declining countries such as Cyprus, Greece and Portugal. At the same time, the Central and Eastern countries that have strongly benefited from EU structural funds have generally increased their economic strength during the last years. This is compatible with Hernández and Kriesi's findings (2015) regarding the fact that after the 2008 economic crisis, governing parties in Western Europe have been more severely punished by voters (therefore, in several cases, favouring Eurosceptic parties) than parties in Central and Eastern Europe. Moreover, these findings are also compatible with Tilley and Garry's research (2007) on

citizens' support for European integration in Europe. Tilley and Garry have found that support for European integration is higher in Central and Eastern European countries than in Western European ones. It seems logical to continue Tilley and Garry's argument by saying that Central and Eastern European countries, having generally benefitted from steady economic growth even in the harshest moments of the economic crisis, have not had a favourable economic framework for the emergence or the rise of Eurosceptic parties (as we will show below).

However, the economic context does not successfully explain some other cases, like Spain (whose poor and declining economy has been put under the Troika's control but where no party has assumed hard Eurosceptic positions) or Germany and Luxembourg (where a strong economy has not fostered Eurosceptic parties' success).

These contrasting findings suggest that the economic context does not give us a totally clear picture regarding the performance of Eurosceptic parties. In order to reach a more comprehensive explanation, we therefore also take into account the political and the institutional context.

The political-institutional context

The political structure of the competition and the set of electoral rules contribute to shaping the political setting, namely the arena where parties decide their electoral strategy and voters decide how (and if) to vote. It is therefore clear that the features of the electoral arena, being close to the act of voting, may significantly affect both the electoral supply (the decision of a Eurosceptic party to stand for the elections) and the electoral demand (the decision of voters to support a Eurosceptic party), thus contributing to explaining the variable performance of Eurosceptic parties in the 28 EU countries.

As stated before, our second hypothesis is related to the influence of the political-institutional context on Eurosceptic parties' success. Obviously, the political-institutional context we are dealing with is not that of national elections but that of the European elections. We know that, despite a strong link between the two certainly existing (political actors and voters are the same in the two contexts), European elections are second-order elections (Reif and Schmitt 1980) and this results in different behaviour for both parties and voters. Furthermore, despite many observers hypothesising that the 2014 EP elections could have become the first truly 'European' elections, thus showing the features of first-order elections, empirical evidence suggests that the second-order model still holds (De Sio, Emanuele and Maggini 2014). Hence, when we refer to concepts like party system instability, electoral fluidity, partisan cues and so on, we refer to the European elections contexts, where generally instability and fluidity are higher than in national elections and partisan cues are more relaxed (as stated by the second-order model).

To assess the features of the political-institutional context in the 28 EU member states we consider five different aspects, each measured by a different variable, whose descriptive statistics are summarised in Table 5.

Table 5: Variables of the political and institutional context. Descriptive statistics

Variable	Mean	Max.	Min.	Std. Dev.	N
Turnout change	24.4	46.0	-3.2	12.8	28
Total Volatility	21.8	50.4	9.0	10.1	28
ENEP	5.9	9.9	2.2	2.0	28
Ideological distance	6.4	9.2	1.5	1.9	28
Mean district magnitude	19.6	96.0	2.8	21.4	28

Source: Authors' elaboration on official data.

The first variable concerns the level of electoral participation. The second-order elections theory claims that the level of voter turnout in EP elections is lower than in general elections as the stake in EP elections is lower (Reif and Schmitt 1980). By measuring the turnout change between the national and the European elections in each country, we can understand how much EP elections are peculiar with respect to the 'normal' parliamentary elections of a given country: the higher the turnout difference, the higher the probability that many voters of mainstream parties have abstained given that the national government is not at stake, thus opening a window of opportunity for non-mainstream parties.

The second variable we use is that of electoral volatility (Pedersen 1979) that is, the net aggregate change between two subsequent elections (in our sample, the 2009 and the 2014 EP elections). We assume that a high level of electoral volatility has favoured the success of non-mainstream parties since it means that traditional loyalties are weaker and voters are more likely to change their established voting choices. The mean level of vote change in the 2014 EP elections was 21.8, much higher than the general level registered in parliamentary elections.[7] Furthermore, despite the large difference that usually occurs between Western and Eastern European countries, the latter being characterised by much greater levels of instability in parliamentary elections (Powell and Tucker 2014), data on EP elections show much more balance.[8]

Two other variables that we consider are the 'format' and the 'mechanics' of the party system (Sartori 1976). The format of the party system is measured through the ENEP[9] (Effective Number of Electoral Parties) developed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979). Our expectation, according to Downs's model (1957), is that as the party system gets more fragmented, the opportunities for Eurosceptic parties are higher, since the ideological and programmatic distance between parties reduces and voters more easily transfer their voting choice from one party to another. Moreover, in contexts of high party system fragmentation, established parties are generally less strong (each party holds a lower share of votes) and thus more easily challengeable by newcomers.

As regards the mechanics, we measure the degree of ideological distance between parties. Following Mainwaring (1999), we rely on Sani and Sartori's measure of 'ideological distance' (1983), based on expert judgments. Therefore, we have computed the ideological distance of a party system as the absolute difference between the mean of the farthest left-wing and that of the farthest right-wing party in a given country according to the parties' left-right position (on a 0-10 scale), as in Bakker et al (2015).[10] The underlying assumption is the following: given that Eurosceptic parties are generally extreme parties, a more ideologically polarised party system would have been favourable for their emergence since voters in those contexts usually tend to support parties located at the edge of the ideological spectrum.

Finally, the last variable we introduce is related to the electoral system for the EP elections. Even if a decision of the Council (Dec 772/2002) has introduced some common principles to harmonise the

elections for the EP,[11] the electoral systems for the EP elections may vary significantly between the 28 member states. In order to assess how disproportional the electoral system for the EP elections is in each state, we have calculated the Mean District Magnitude (MDM), that is, the ratio between the number of representatives to be elected in each state and the number of districts in which they have to be elected. The higher the MDM, the higher the proportionality of the system. Since Eurosceptic parties are often new challengers in the electoral arena and in many cases also small-sized parties, we hypothesise that they are advantaged by a permissive electoral system. Thus, the more proportional the system, the higher the probability that Eurosceptic parties have decided, believing that they would have had good chances to win seats, to stand for the election with their own label. At the same time, even voters could be more likely to support parties they consider as 'viable' and instead would abandon parties generally considered as having little chance of winning a seat.[12] These five variables contribute to shaping the political and institutional setting of each national context.

National Contexts and Eurosceptics' Results: a Typology

In order to assess the impact of the economic and political-institutional contexts, a multivariate regression model would have probably been the most accurate solution. Yet, the number of observations is too small (N=28) to perform a reliable statistical analysis. However, we can achieve interesting results even through the building of a four-fold typology of economic and political-institutional contexts, comparing the averages of the countries' shares of votes received by the Eurosceptic parties.

The first step consists of combining the seven aforementioned economy-related variables (see Table 4) into a synthetic, composite index of economic context. The new index is the mean of the previous variables expressed in standardised form.[13]

As seen before, the hypothesised relationship between the economic context and Eurosceptic parties' performance is not linear. Thus, we consider as 'favourable' economic contexts both the top and the bottom quartiles of the distribution of the index (i.e., both those countries with the strongest and the weakest economic frameworks), while the two middle quartiles are considered to be 'non-favourable' contexts.

The second step is to do the same for the five variables of the political-institutional context. Even if the five 'political' variables deal with different aspects of the political and institutional framework, what is important here is only the way they affect the performance of Eurosceptic parties. The hypothesis is that the higher the turnout decrease between national and EP elections, the higher the level of volatility, party-system fragmentation and polarisation, and the higher the Mean District Magnitude,[14] the better the results of Eurosceptic parties in a given country. Therefore, countries that fall above the median value will be considered as having had a 'favourable' political-institutional context, while countries falling under the median as having had a 'non-favourable' context. Thus, a high level of the index in a given country means a high probability of success for Eurosceptic parties in that country and vice versa.[15]

The last step is the intersection of the two indices, and the building of a four-fold typology, presented in Figure 3. Through a comparison of the mean national share of votes received by the Eurosceptic parties in each of the four situations, the combined influence of the two contexts succeeds in explaining the success or failure of the Eurosceptic parties in most of the countries. Where both the economic situation and the political setting produce positive incentives for success for the Eurosceptic parties, the mean national share of these latter is a remarkable 20.5 per cent. On

the contrary, where both contexts seem to produce constraints for Eurosceptic parties' good performance, the mean national share of votes for these parties is only 8.4 per cent.

Figure 3: A typology of Eurosceptics' results according to the political and the economic context

	Favourable economic context but unfavourable political context	Favourable economic and political contexts
Economic context	AT CY EE HR IE LU 11.5 MT	DE DK EL ES IT PT 20.5 SE
	BG FI HU LV LT PL 8.4 RO Unfavourable economic and political contexts	BE CZ FR NT SK SI 17.7 UK Favourable political context but unfavourable economic context

Political context

In the first subset of cases (upper-right quadrant) we find seven countries, among which there are three countries which themselves reside among those which have the highest results of Eurosceptic parties (Denmark, Italy and Sweden) and two other cases above the mean (Greece and Portugal). However, even Germany and Spain fall into this quadrant, with the former showing a weak 8 per cent, despite the remarkable increase of the Eurosceptics' result with respect to 2009 (0.3 per cent) and the latter showing no Eurosceptic parties at all. These seven countries share features of the political-institutional context favourable for Eurosceptic parties. At the same time, from an economic point of view, some of these countries show a high economic status (Denmark, Germany and Sweden) and some others are some of the countries that have suffered the most from the crisis (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain).

The opposite subset of countries showing negative incentives for the rise of Eurosceptic parties (lower-left quadrant) includes member states with an average vote share of Eurosceptics strongly below the mean value. Only Hungary and, to a lesser extent, Finland and Poland, show a quite significant result. Many Central and Eastern European countries fall into this quadrant.

In the other two quadrants the structural incentives are not consistent: in the upper-left quadrant the economic context is favourable but the political one is non-favourable, while in the lower-right quadrant the situation is completely reversed. Among the countries located in the upper-left quadrant, in three out of seven countries (Austria, Cyprus and, to a lesser extent, Ireland) Eurosceptic parties have played an important role. Conversely, in the lower-right quadrant, three out of seven countries (France, the Netherlands and the UK), which displayed an intermediate economic status but a particularly unstable political-institutional context, show Eurosceptic parties' results well above the average.

Notice that the mean share of Eurosceptic parties when only the political-institutional context is favourable is considerably higher than in the opposite situation of favourable economic context (17.7 per cent against 11.5 per cent). This evidence seems to suggest that the political-institutional context drives the Eurosceptic parties' electoral performance more than the economic context.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This article has analysed the results of Eurosceptic parties in the 2014 EP elections and has explored how national contexts shaped their performance. We have firstly analysed the concept of 'Euroscepticism' as defined in the scholarly literature and we have presented an updated classification of Eurosceptic parties. Secondly, starting from the differentiated patterns of support for Eurosceptic parties, we have formulated two main hypotheses to explain such support, to be empirically tested. These hypotheses are related to national economic situations and to national political-institutional contexts. We have discovered that by taking into account the economic and the political-institutional contexts, that is, the incentives and the constraints they provide to Eurosceptic parties, we are able to explain why many Eurosceptic parties have performed better or worse in specific countries. Such a finding emerges from a four-fold typology, based on two standardised indices of economic and political-institutional contexts that identify four subsets of countries, in which Eurosceptic parties perform differently. Specifically, Eurosceptic parties are likely to perform better in either rich and 'creditor' countries or in poor countries, possibly affected by superimposed economic policies. Moreover, Eurosceptic parties are also likely to obtain better results in countries with specific political and institutional features, such as high de-mobilisation with respect to the previous general election, high levels of party system instability, higher ideological distance between parties, and more permissive electoral systems. Furthermore, we have discovered that for Eurosceptic parties' fortunes having a favourable political-institutional context seems to be more important than having a favourable economic context.

This article opens room for further empirical analyses. For instance, certain relevance could be given to the role of political entrepreneurship – that is, the decision to politicise and to make salient the EU cleavage – in order to understand Eurosceptic parties' results in unfavourable contexts. This could be an interesting point to address in future works, and could help us shed further light on the rise of Eurosceptic parties in and after the 2014 EP elections.

***

CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS

Vincenzo Emanuele, LUISS Guido Carli - Department of Political Science, Viale Romania 32, 00197 Rome, Italy, [vemanuele@luiss.it]

[1] Taggart's contribution (1998) is related to Western Europe; Kopecky and Mudde (2002) focus on Eastern European countries; Pirro and Van Kessel (2013) deal with populist radical right parties; while Külahci's comparative study (2012) takes into account almost exclusively large countries.

[2] Respectively, a 1-7 by Chapel Hill and 1-5 by EUandI.

[3] For example the party position on the following issue: 'European integration is a good thing' (EUandI 2014).

[4] For example the party position on the following issue: 'The single European currency (Euro) is a bad thing' (EUandI 2014).

[5] As mentioned earlier, minor parties that received less than 0.5 per cent of the national vote share in the 2014 EP elections have been excluded. Further notice that during the campaign for the 2016 UK EU membership referendum, the Sinn Féin and the UUP were in favour of the UK membership of the EU.

[6] According to Szczerbiak and Taggart (2003: 17), some interesting hints regarding the influence of these factors can be found in Aspinwall (2000), Lees (2008) and Raunio (2008).

[7] Note that Mair (2011) has identified a level of 20 as the reference point beyond which an election can be considered as 'highly volatile'.

[8] The average level of volatility in post-Communist countries is 24.2, while that of Western countries is 20.

[9] ENEP = $1/\sum p_i^2$ where p is the party's national share of votes. As regards the 'other parties' category, we have followed the averaging of extremes method advocated by Taagepera (1997).

[10] This measure is based on the variable *Irgen* in the Chapel Hill Expert Survey. Such a variable provides a measure of the overall ideological stance of a party by taking into account both economic issues (left: more government spending; right: fewer taxes) and democratic freedoms and rights issues (the so-called GAL-TAN dimension).

[11] MEPs have to be elected with a PR system, using either the party list vote or the single transferable vote system.

[12] These effects, both from parties' and voters' sides, are the so-called 'psychological effects' of the electoral systems; see Duverger (1951) and Cox (1997) on this point.

[13] To get a meaningful index, the sign of some variables has been inverted so that higher values of all variables mean a better economic status and vice versa.

[14] Following previous empirical research, we expect a non-linear impact of the variable, since 'the impact of any marginal seat in the proportionality of the electoral system will tend to be lower than the previous one' (Simon 2013: 42). Given this underlying assumption, we have transformed the variable into its natural logarithm.

[15] When one builds a synthetic index starting from different variables or items, it is important to check for reliability and validity (Drost 2011). As regards reliability, we have estimated internal consistency of our two composite indices of economic and political contexts. 'Internal consistency measures consistency within the instrument and questions how well a set of items measures a particular behaviour or characteristic within the test' (Drost 2011: 111). Therefore, we have run the well-known Cronbach's alpha test. The composite index of economic context (consisting of seven items) show an (almost) excellent value for the coefficient alpha (0.88). The coefficient alpha for composite index of political context is lower (0.40). Yet, coefficients of internal consistency are sensitive to the number of items: the lower the number of items, the lower the coefficient alpha. As Drost states (2011: 111-112), 'a 5-item test might correlate .40 with true scores, and a 12-item test might correlate .80 with true scores'. Furthermore, we are conscious that the five 'political' variables deal with different aspects of the political and institutional framework of each country. Yet, we have selected them according to the literature (among others, see Lees 2008) as factors affecting the performance of Eurosceptic parties. These variables, therefore, are well-established measures in comparative research and are often part of comparative political and economic datasets. This ensures their content validity, being also able to 'travel' across (European) countries. Furthermore, the composite indices, being composed of the aforementioned variables, cover the domains and dimensions of the overall concepts they aimed to measure, namely the 'political opportunity structures' (Tarrow 1994) and the structure of the economic conditions of each national context we hypothesised to favour Eurosceptic parties' success.

REFERENCES

Aspinwall, M. (2000) 'Structuring Europe: Powersharing Institutions and British Preferences on European Integration', *Political Studies* 48(3): 415-442.

Bakker, R., Edwards, E., Hooghe, L., Jolly, S., Marks, G., Polk, J., Rovny, J., Steenbergen, M. and Vachudova, M. (2015) '2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey', Chapel Hill (NC): University of North Carolina. Available online: www.chesdata.eu. [accessed 07 January 2016].

Bartolini, S. (2012) 'The Strange Case of the 'European Parties', in E. Külahci (eds), *Europeanisation and Party Politics. How the EU affects domestic actors, patterns and systems*. Colchester: ECPR Press: 157-170.

Conti, N. (2003) *Party Attitudes to European Integration: A Longitudinal Analysis of the Italian Case*, SEI Working Paper n. 70, EPERN Working Paper n. 13.

Cox, G. W. (1997) *Making Votes Count. Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

De Sio, L. and Legnante, G. (2010) 'Economic crisis and European elections: an alteration of the electoral cycle?', *Quaderni di Scienza Politica*, 17(3): 447–489.

De Sio, L., Emanuele, V. and Maggini, N. (2014) *The European Parliament Elections of 2014*. Rome: CISE.

Downs, A. (1957) *An Economic Theory of Democracy.* New York: Harper.

Drost, E. A. (2011) 'Validity and reliability in social science research', *Education Research and Perspectives 38*(1): 105.

Duverger, M. (1951) *Les partis politiques.* Paris: Armand Colin.

EUandI (2014) 'Discover your party, create your community'. Florence: European University Institute. Available online: http://euandi.eu. [accessed 07 January 2016].

European Council (2002) Euratom: Council Decision of 25 June 2002 and 23 September 2002 amending the Act concerning the election of the representatives of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, annexed to Decision 76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom (2002/772).

Flood, C. (2002) *Euroscepticism: A Problematic Concept (illustrated with particular reference to France)*. Paper presented at the 32nd UACES Annual Conference and 7th Queen's University Belfast Research Conference, 2-4 September. Available online: http://uaces.org/documents/papers/0201/flood.pdf [accessed 10 March 2016].

Flood, C. (2009) 'Dimensions of Euroscepticism'. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 47(4): 911-917.

Hernández, E. and Kriesi, H. (2015) 'The electoral consequences of the financial and economic crisis in Europe'. *European Journal of Political Research*. Epub ahead of print. DOI: 10.1111/1475-6765.12122.

Hooghe, L., Marks, G. and Wilson, C. J. (2002) 'Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?', *Comparative Political Studies* 35(8): 965-989.

Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (2007) 'Sources of Euroscepticism'. *Acta Politica* 42(2): 119-127.

International Monetary Fund (2014), World Economic Outlook Database, available online: https://www.imf.org/data. [accessed 29 June 2014].

Kopecky, P. and Mudde, C. (2002) 'The Two Sides of Euroscepticism – Party Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe'. *European Union Politics* 3(3): 297-326.

Kriesi, H., Grande, E., Lachat, R., Dolezal, M., Bornschier, S. and Frey, T. (2008). *West European Politics in the Age of Globalization.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Krouwel, A. and Abts, K. (2007) 'Varieties of Euroscepticism and Populist Mobilization: Transforming Attitudes from Mild Euroscepticism to Harsh Eurocynism'. *Acta Politica* 42(2): 252-270.

Külahci, E. (ed.) (2012) *Europeanisation and Party Politics. How the EU affects domestic actors, patterns and systems.* Colchester: ECPR Press.

Laakso, M. and Taagepera, R. (1979) 'The "Effective" Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe', *Comparative Political Studies* 12(1): 3-27.

Lane, J.-E. and S. Ersson (1987) *Politics and Society in Western Europe*. London: Sage Publications.

Lees, C. (2008) 'The political opportunity structure of Euroscepticism: Institutional setting and political agency in European polities', in A. Szczerbiak and P. Taggart (eds) *Opposing Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 28-51.

Maggini, N. and Emanuele, V. (2015) 'Contextual effects on individual voting behaviour: the impact of party system nationalization in Europe', *Italian Political Science Review* 45(2): 105-130.

Mainwaring, S. (1999) *Rethinking party systems in the third wave of democratization: the case of Brazil*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Mair, P. (2011) 'The election in context', in M. Gallagher and M. Marsh (eds), *How Ireland Voted 2011: The Full Story of Ireland's Earthquake Election.* Basingstoke: Palgrave: 283–297.

Marsh, M. (2002) 'Electoral context', *Electoral Studies* 21(2): 207–217.

Mudde, C. (2007) *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pedersen, M. N. (1979) 'The Dynamics of European Party Systems: Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility', *European Journal of Political Research* 7(1): 1-26.

Pirro, A. L. P. and Van Kessel, S. (2013) *Pushing towards Exit: Euro-rejection as 'Populist Common Denominator'?*, Paper presented at the 2013 EUDO Dissemination Conference, 'Elections in Europe in Times of Crisis', 28-29 November, Florence: European University Institute.

Powell, E. N. and Tucker, J. A. (2014) 'Revisiting Electoral Volatility in Post-Communist Countries: New Data, New Results and New Approaches', *British Journal of Political Science* 44(1): 123-147.

Raunio, T. (2008), *The Difficult Task of opposing Europe: the Finnish Party Politics of Euroscepticism in Finland'*, in A. Szczerbiak and P. Taggart (eds) *Opposing Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 168-180.

Reif, K. and Schmitt, H. (1980) 'Nine Second-Order National Elections – a Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results', *European Journal of Political Research* 8(1): 3-44.

Rovny, J. (2004) 'Conceptualising Party-based Euroscepticism: Magnitude and Motivations', *Collegium* 29: 31-48.

Sani, G., and Sartori, G. (1983) 'Polarization, Fragmentation and Competition in Western Democracies', in: H. Daalder and P. Mair (eds), *Western European Party Systems: Continuity and Change*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage: 307-340.

Sartori, G. (1976) *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Sikk, A. (2005) 'How unstable? Volatility and the genuinely new parties in Eastern Europe', *European Journal of Political Research* 44(3): 391-412.

Sikk, A. (2012) 'Newness as a winning formula for new political parties', *Party Politics* 18(4): 465-486.

Simón, P. (2013*)* 'The Combined Impact of Decentralization and Personalism on the Nationalisation of Party Systems', *Political Studies* 61(S1): 24-44.

Szczerbiak, A. and Taggart, P. (2001) *Parties, Positions and Europe: Euroscepticism in the EU Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe*. SEI Working Paper n. 46, EPERN Working Paper n. 2. Available online: https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=sei-working-paper-no-46.pdf&site=266 [accessed 10 March 2016].

Szczerbiak, A. and Taggart, P. (2003) *Theorising Party-Based Euroscepticism: Problems of Definition, Measurement and Causality*, SEI Working Paper n. 69, EPERN Working Paper n. 12. Available online: https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=epern-working-paper-12.pdf&site=266 [accessed 10 March 2016].

Szczerbiak, A. and Taggart, P. (2008) *Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics on Euroscepticism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Taagepera, R. (1997) 'Effective Number of Parties for Incomplete Data', *Electoral Studies* 16(2): 145-151.

Taggart, P. (1998) 'A touchstone of dissent: Euroscepticism in contemporary Western European party systems', *European Journal of Political Research* 33(3): 363-388.

Tarrow, S. (1994) *Power in movement: Social movements, collective action and politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tavits, M. (2008) 'On the linkage between electoral volatility and party system instability in Central and Eastern Europe'*, European Journal of Political Research* 47(5): 537-555.

Tilley, J. and Garry, J. (2007), 'Public Support for Integration in the Newly Enlarged EU: Exploring Differences Between Former Communist Countries and Established Member States', in M. Marsh, S. Mykhaylov and H. Schmitt (eds), *European Elections after Eastern Enlargement*, CONNEX Report Series, 1: 181-203. Available online: http://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/projekte/typo3/site/fileadmin/BookSeries/Volume_One/Ch06_chapter_final.pdf [accessed 10 March 2016].

Usherwood, S. and Startin, N. (2013) 'Euroscepticism as a Persistent Phenomenon'. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 51(1): 1-16.

Vasilopoulou, S. (2013) 'Continuity and Change in the Study of Euroscepticism: Plus ça change?'. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 51(1): 153-168.

Externalizing the EU's Justice and Home Affairs to Southeast Asia: Prospects and Limitations

Felix Heiduk, *German Institute for International and Security Affairs*

Abstract

The transnational security dimension ascribed to many phenomena such as terrorism, drug trafficking, pandemics, or people smuggling has led to increased pressures to increase cooperation across national borders to 'fight' or 'manage' many of the new, transnational security threats. Against this background the EU has sought to promote its own norms and ideas, policy preferences and its own model of regional cooperation and integration in her external affairs. A number of recent studies have examined the growing potency of the EU to actively promote ideas and policy preferences in its neighborhood as well as with the U.S., however, scant attention has been given to EU cooperation with other regional organizations. By closely examining the EU's cooperation with ASEAN in two policy fields deemed central within JHA – human trafficking and counter terrorism – this article seeks not only to broaden the empirical basis of respective scholarship, but additionally seeks to connect the empirical findings with the wider debate on the EU's ability to externalize its internal security governance. The study finds that despite numerous declarations and plan of actions, very little policy transfer has actually taken place between the EU and ASEAN. It argues that any attempt to externalize or transfer policy is met by long-standing ideas and norms, policy paradigms and an established specific modus operandi of regional cooperation within ASEAN itself. This will continue to make nigh impossible any externalization of EU JHA policies to Southeast Asia for the foreseeable future.

Keywords

INTRODUCTION

The transnational security dimension ascribed to many phenomena such as terrorism, drug trafficking, pandemics, or human trafficking has led to increased pressures to increase cooperation across national borders to 'fight' or 'manage' many of the new, transnational security threats. The European Security Strategy (ESS) describes the post-Cold War environment as 'one of increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked' (European Union 2003b: 3). The perceived diffusion between internal and external security has not only accelerated demands for greater cooperation between the EU and third states and international organizations, but also provided the EU with larger policy-making competencies. Subsequently the EU has over the last decade or so established policies in a number of different policy fields, which seek to guide the behavior of its member states within the EU, as well as the EU's external cooperation.[1]

With regard to external cooperation the EU has portrayed itself as a model for effective as well as legitimate governance (Boerzel and Risse 2009). As a consequence, the EU has sought to promote its own norms and ideas, as well as its own model of regional cooperation and integration, in her external affairs. With regard to the policy areas under study in this article, this has most commonly become associated with the EU's so-called rights-based approach in counter terrorism, as well as the EU's human security focus in fighting human trafficking.[2] Whereas the EU's security role initially was

regarded by various analysts as a 'paper tiger' (Bures 2006), a number of recent studies have examined the growing potency of the EU to actively promote its own respective norms and ideas in its neighborhood as well as with the U.S. (Kaunert and Léonard 2011; Kaunert 2009; Wolff, Wichmann, and Mounier 2009; Mounier 2007). Scant attention, however, has been paid to the EU's role in other parts of the world. Especially research on the EU's cooperation with what has arguably emerged as the second most successful regional organization after the EU, ASEAN, in policy fields related to JHA is, with few exceptions, almost non-existent (Chevallier-Govers 2012; Maier-Kapp 2012; Floristella 2013).

By closely examining the EU's cooperation with ASEAN in two policy fields deemed central within JHA – human trafficking and counter terrorism – this paper seeks not only to broaden the empirical basis of scholarship, but additionally seeks to connect the empirical findings with the wider debates on the EU's ability to externalize[3] its internal security governance to third states and other regional organizations. Both, terrorism and human trafficking, have a strong regional and international dimension to it (Broadhurst and Le 2013; Abuza 2003; Ramakrishna and Tan 2003; Lee 2013). Given that, through the Lisbon Treaty and the ASEAN Charter, both regional organizations gained legal personality granting them the legal capacity and the powers to act in international affairs, EU-ASEAN cooperation in policy fields often associated with so-called non-traditional security also makes for an interesting case study of how the EU conducts inter-regional affairs. This article builds on earlier research, which found that despite numerous declarations and plan of actions, very little policy transfer has actually taken place between the EU and ASEAN (Heiduk 2009, 2014). The earlier research, however, made very little contribution in terms of explaining this observation. It is all the more puzzling, as the EU repeatedly has often been ascribed to be a "model" for regional integration processes in other parts of the world. At least, in the words of former ASEAN General Secretary Ong Keng Yong, the EU is viewed as a provider of ideas and best practices: 'The very nature of ASEAN as an intergovernmental organization differs from that of the EU. However, we are looking for good ideas and best practices, and the European Union certainly has plenty of these' (Yong 2007). More specifically, instances such as the modeling of ASEAN's Committee of Permanent Representatives (CPR) on the EU's Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) have thrown up questions on institutional mimesis regarding ASEAN (Murray and Moxon-Browne 2013). Furthermore, the EU's relationship with ASEAN and its member states has for the most part been an asymmetrical one of donor and recipient. Brussels has provided funding as well as capacity building to ASEAN institutions on a large scale for years.[4] While the term "assistance" has been replaced with "cooperation" in recent documents, the relationship has remained one-sided in the sense that ASEAN or its member states have provided very little, if anything, in terms of ideas on regional integration or capacity building to Brussels-based institutions (Lim 2012). Against this background this article poses the question: How can we explain the observation that there has been so little externalization or policy transfer in the field of JHA between the EU and ASEAN?

Established scholarship in the field of EU Studies has traditionally been inward-looking when seeking to explain failure of the EU to externalize its own policy preferences, i.e. by blaming low levels of Europeanization and weak regional institutions in Brussels. This paper, however, argues that we have to turn our analytical focus away from what is assumed to be the 'norm innovator' or 'promoter' (the EU) and towards the supposed 'norm or policy taker' (in our case ASEAN) to be able to give a more rounded answer to the question. By tracing the development of regional policies in the aforementioned two policy fields within Southeast Asia the paper finds that any attempt to externalize or transfer of EU norms is met by long-standing ideas and norms, policy paradigms and an established specific modus operandi of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia. It is the so-called ASEAN-way, which, I argue, will continue to make nigh impossible any externalization of EU norms in the area of non-traditional security to Southeast Asia for the foreseeable future. More so, if anything

it has been ASEAN, not the EU, which successfully managed to externalize its very own norms and its modus operandi into its external relations with the EU in the area of non-traditional security.

NORM EXTERNALIZATION, TRANSFER AND TRANSLATION

There has been a burgeoning academic debate during the last decade on the externalization of EU policies, hereby understood as attempts 'to transfer the EU's rules and policies to third countries and international organisations' (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009: 791), in recent years. It has been argued that it is essentially Europe's 'normative power', which defines its particular role in international affairs. Understood as the power to shape ideas and 'conceptions of normal' in world politics. The EU's normative power rests on its ability to project its core values, defined by Manners as 'peace', 'liberty', 'democracy', 'rule of law' and 'human rights', as well as its very own model of regional integration, to areas outside its own borders (Manners 2002). More so, the promotion of democracy, human rights and regional integration is not simply an attempt to introduce particular normative standards into its external relations, but these ideas are considered to be enablers of security and prosperity outside of the EU's borders, too. The EU's so-called rights-based, normative approach has found repercussions in numerous policy fields, one of them being the EU's approach to counter terrorism. With regard to counter terrorism cooperation with third states the EU's counter terrorism strategy paper states that '… outside the Union we must promote even more vigorously good governance, human rights, democracy as well as education and economic prosperity, and engage in conflict resolution'. The document also speaks of a rights-based approach in the context of pursuing terrorists across borders: 'Our objectives are to impede terrorists' planning, disrupt their networks and the activities of recruiters to terrorism, cut off terrorists' funding and access to attack materials, and bring them to justice, while continuing to respect human rights and international law' (European Union 2005). This has led some to describe the EU as a 'clearing house for regional norms' with a 'specific mandate to ensure that states' counter terrorism activities are conducted in conformity with the relevant regional and international human rights law' (Ewi 2013, 165). The rights-based approach has seemingly also come to shape the EU's relations with ASEAN as exemplified in the 2015 strategy paper, which states that the EU is 'supporting dedicated human rights dialogues at both the regional and bilateral level' and 'as part of the effort to build a more mature and more political partnership, the EU is also keen to work constructively with ASEAN to promote and protect international human rights standards' (European Parliament and European Council 2015). A recent joint statement also echoes Europe's normative approach by stating that 'the Ministers agreed on the importance of continued cooperation to promote respect for human rights and the rule of law' (European Union 2014).

Regarding the success (or failure) of externalization processes, the current literature draws on four broad sets of factors. The first set of factors ('degree of Europeanization') claims that the modes and the impact of externalization are primarily shaped by the EU's internal modes of governance. Essentially the argument hereby is that the degree of Europeanization in any given policy field has a strong impact on the scope and depth of the externalization of said policies beyond the EU's borders (Keohane 2008: 129; Monar 2007). The higher the degree of Europeanization the more the EU is able to externalize its policy preferences (Rees 2006: 4). A second set of factors highlights the degree of institutional similarities between the EU, as well as its member states, and those of third states. Accordingly, the more the domestic structures and practices of other actors resemble those of the EU, the more likely a successful externalization becomes (Shapiro and Byman 2006). A third strand of research claims that the power resources the EU holds vis-à-vis third states and other actors ('relative distribution of power') are the main explanatory factor when trying to understand externalization processes. Accordingly, it is the ability of the EU to ensure third country compliance

with its own rules and policy preferences through the pressuring medium of future accession which has been viewed as the main explanatory factor. This has been framed as the EU's 'governance by conditionality' approach, whereby the EU is able to make compliance with its own norms and policies (laid out in the Copenhagen criteria) a condition candidate countries have to fulfil to become EU members (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004).

Although the aforementioned sets of factors produce different explanations for the EU's ability to externalize its internal security interests (or the lack thereof), they all conceive of externalization as a hierarchical, coercive, top-down process. However, while the EU has certainly has wielded coercive power to comply with EU law towards member states and candidate countries, the use of such coercive powers has very limited applicability outside of the EU's direct neighborhood. 'Instead, it has relied on capacity-building (technical and financial assistance) and socialization (political dialogue, technical cooperation) to induce domestic reforms' (Börzel and Risse 2012: 195). In line with this critique, Lavenex and Wichmann (2009: 85) conceived of a different, horizontal mode of externalization – that of externalization through non-hierarchical, voluntary networks between formally equal partners (Lavenex and Wichmann 2009: 86).

While the distinction between coercive (vertical) and network (horizontal) modes of the externalization of EU policies is important to incorporate coercive and voluntary forms, it tells us very little about either the process of externalization itself or the role the recipient plays in it. The established concepts conceive of the transfer of norms and ideas as a linear, quasi-mechanistic process, whereby the externalization starts with norm innovation by the EU and / or its member states, which is subsequently externalized (or 'send') elsewhere, and ends with the adoption (or the lack thereof) of norms by a third country or organization. As a result of a successful adoption, local practices and institutions begin to resemble those of the EU. Notwithstanding the (at least theoretical) possibility of such a linear transfer, such conceptualization closes the door on the agency of the norm taker. Recently, the neglect of the recipients' agency in determining what norms and ideas are imported and how this process takes place has been identified as a theoretical blind spot in the debate (Stone 2012; Björkdahl et. al. 2015). As noted by McCann, 'policies, models and ideas are not moved around like gifts at a birthday party or like jars on shelves, where the mobilization does not change the character and content of the mobilized objects' (McCann 2011: 120)

Accordingly, it can be assumed that the 'demand side' or the 'norm taker' exercises agency by translating, by interpreting and by ascribing meaning to external norms and ideas on the basis of already existing 'cognitive priors', 'local norms' (Acharya 2004) and 'cultural fillers' (Manners 2002). With this in mind, various scholars have taken issue with the implicit assumption, prevailing in much of the literature on the externalization of EU policies (c.f. Heiduk 2014; Heiduk 2009; Kaunert and Léonard 2011; Chevallier-Govers 2012; Joffé 2008), that norm transfer or norm externalization is essentially undertaken by rational agents skimming norms, ideas and policies around the world for the objectively 'best', most successful one to import based on the assumption that they will provide for similar (successful) results in a different place (and often time) (Stone 1999; Dolowitz and Marsh 2000). This has led newer approaches towards a research agenda, which heavily focuses on the inter-subjective constitution of norms, ideas, meanings, and knowledge. Freeman (2009) for example speaks of 'translations' rather than 'transfers' or 'externalizations' of norms, ideas and policies, during which a series of interpretations and disruptions occurs. Similarly, Björkdahl has also emphasized the importance of frictions between norm-maker and norm-taker 'to reflect a complex, multi-layered process of norm export and import' (Björkdahl et al. 2015: 5). From such a conceptual starting point, externalization constraints are not simply to be found with regard to different institutional set-ups, the high transaction costs of alterations, or resistance of entrenched elites (Benson and Jordan 2011), but are closely tied to social factors such as world views, norms, and identities.

In view of that, and based on various empirical studies that suggest that externalization processes rarely, if ever, result in a complete adoption of EU norms, ideas and policies by third parties, a recent study has organized responses to norm exports along four ideal types: adoption, adaptation, resistance, and rejection. Adoption entails a complete transfer of EU norms resulting in local practices fully complying with the newly imported norms. Adaption involves changing EU norms so that they fit with local practices while the original normative content remains intact. Resistance is adaption in reverse in that it entails a few gradual change in local practices and institutions, often 'to give an impression of adoption or adaption', while leaving the majority of local norms and practices largely unchanged. Rejection involves continuing divergence of local norms and practices from European ones. This is to prompt us to take serious in our analysis the assumption, that 'despite structural constraints such as asymmetries of economic and political power, norm-takers exercise agency' (Björkdahl et al. 2015: 5). Hence the conceptual point of departure of this paper is to conceive of externalization not simply as a top-down process largely depending on the capacities and mechanisms of the EU, but to take serious the agency of the norm taker as interpreter / translator in the process, as well as his prior embeddedness in established norms, institutions and practices.

EXAMINING THE NORM TAKER: ASEAN AND THE ASEAN-WAY

Examining the political rhetoric and terminology currently used by ASEAN certainly invokes connotations to the EU way of regional integration: ASEAN documents repeatedly speak of "regional integration" and the organization has, as part of the Bali Concord II in 2003, committed itself, amongst other things, to build a "single market" as well as a "single production base" by the end of 2015. Furthermore, a number of ASEAN institutions such as the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration or the Committee of Permanent Representatives have been modelled after similar EU institutions (Jetschke and Murray 2012; Murray and Moxon-Browne 2013). The ostensible convergence in political rhetoric and institutional design notwithstanding, ASEAN and the EU have traditionally pursued different paths of regional integration (Acharya 2000). The adoption of EU-coined rhetoric and institutions has not led to a convergence on a common path towards regional integration. Whereas the EU's integration process has been characterized by the pooling (of some degree) of national sovereignty, its institutionalization, and its legalistic character, the ASEAN integration process has been exclusively intergovernmental and characterized by the "ASEAN-way" as a set of ideas and norms dissimilar to that inherent to the EU's integration process. Central to the so-called ASEAN-way are the notions of sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and non-interference among member states and to preserve regional autonomy. Article 2 of ASEAN's founding document, the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Co-operation (TAC), states that it aims to espouse the independence and sovereignty of its members; the right of its members to exist without external interference; and non-interference in the internal affairs. In addition, article 13 calls for the resolution of conflicts between member states through non-violent, non-confrontational, friendly means. The roots of ASEAN's informal, consensual, non-legalistic style of decision-making lie in the organizations' initial focus on regional security. Against the backdrop of the Cold War and increasing tensions between neighboring states in the region,[5] ASEAN's primary *raison d´etre* was to ensure regional peace and stability, build trust between its members, minimize the influence of external powers and provide for regional solutions to regional problems.

As Acharya has pointed out, the ASEAN-way as such 'incorporates a set of well-known principles, e.g. non-interference in the domestic affairs of each other, non-use of force, pacific settlement of disputes, respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states, that can be found in the Charter of the United Nations as well as regional political and security organizations elsewhere in

the world' (Acharya 1997: 329). Hence ASEAN's code of conduct converges with international norms rather than to diverge away from them. Where the ASEAN way actually diverges is with regard to the 'operationalization' of its code of conduct (Acharya 1997: 330). In order to preserve the member states' sovereignty and to ensure non-inference, ASEAN decision-making rests on the principles of discussion and consultancy (*musyawarah*), consensus (*mufakat*), as well as a sense of community (*gotong royong*). Consensus is aimed for through consultation. Whilst this does not necessarily always have to entail unanimity, it certainly involves a consultation process, which specifically focusses on the amalgamation of the basic interests of all members. The heterogeneity of the ten member states in terms of their political systems, levels of economic development and their socio-cultural systems tends to draw out decision-making processes and often results in the lowest common denominator. ASEAN's primary mode of activity hereby is inter-governmental meetings among the representatives of the ten member states. Hence the organization disposes of a sense of shared purpose based around a set of core norms (the "ASEAN way"). As such these norms are more than mere talking points; they have developed into uniformly held norms, which socialized the member states into a specific modus operandi of policy-making at the regional level for over 40 years.

Fast forward to 2015, more than 40 years after the signing of the Bangkok Declaration, which led to the founding of ASEAN, and the ASEAN-way remains central to ASEAN's internal modus operandi. More so, its genuine sense of a regional political identity also manifests itself in ASEAN's relations with the rest of the world. ASEAN has been active, much like the EU, in promoting its very own modus operandi in its external affairs. It has been successful to socialize its many of its neighbors, including China, Japan and Australia, into ASEAN-led multilateral dialogue forums such as the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) or the East-Asia Summit. The ASEAN hereby provides the normative foundations for these multilateral dialogue forums and has left a mark on operational procedures in that they attain to consensual decision-making, high levels of informality and a rejection of institutionalized forms of cooperation (Dosch 2012).

EU-ASEAN COOPERATION IN THE AREA OF NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY (NTS)

The EU's relations with ASEAN from ASEAN foundation in 1967 until the 1990s were marked by the absence of an institutional framework, consisting of informal contact between European and Southeast Asian states. Hence the relations between the two regions have traditionally been characterized as almost exclusively dominated by economic concerns with little concerns for security cooperation (Robles Jr. 2006; Umbach 2008; Wong 2012; Holmes 2013). A beginning formalization of the relations between the EU and ASEAN only commenced after the end of the Cold War. The 1994's EU's Asia Strategy ('Toward a new Asia Strategy') defined Asia as a strategically important region and identified a number of policy areas for closer cooperation, i.e. poverty reduction and environmental protection, but was still mainly dominated by economic aspects (European Commission 2003). The beginning institutionalization of the EU's relations with Asia also led to the establishment of ASEM (Asia Europe Meetings) in 1996 – an informal forum for ad hoc dialogues on the ministerial level, which also holds bi-annual meetings of the heads of states.

It wasn't until the 2002 Bali bombings, which cost the lives of 49 EU citizens, that security concerns, specifically transnational terrorism, made it on to the EU-ASEAN agenda. This resulted in an EU-ASEAN "Joint Declaration to Combat Terrorism" in 2003 which called for closer cooperation between Europe and Southeast Asia (European Union 2003a). 2003 also saw the publication of the EU's first ASEAN strategy paper ("A new partnership with Southeast Asia"), which listed 'the fight against terrorism' and 'mainstreaming JHA' as strategic priorities of the EU (European Commission 2003). It

is hereby stated that human rights aspects and democratic governance 'should be promoted in all aspects of policy dialogue and development cooperation, through building constructive partnerships with ASEAN and national governments based on dialogue, encouragement and effective support' (European Commission 2003: 3).

The broadening of the EU's agenda with regard to ASEAN also touched upon more general strategic documents, such as the EU's "A Strategy for the External Dimension of JHA: Global Freedom, Security and Justice" published in 2005. The document explicitly refers to the Bali bombings as its point of reference for calling for an intensification of international counter terrorism cooperation (Council of the European Union 2005). The aforementioned documents, however, while formalizing EU-ASEAN relations, did not venture beyond non-binding, very general letters of intent with regard to closer cooperation between the EU and ASEAN. 2007's "Nuremberg Declaration" refined the strategic priorities laid out in the "New partnership with Southeast Asia" and established 'political and security cooperation' as one of its five inter-regional areas for closer co-operation. The section on political and security cooperation states that EU and ASEAN aim for '… closer cooperation in addressing and combating terrorism, trafficking in human beings, drug trafficking, sea piracy, arms smuggling, money laundering, cyber-crime and related trans-national crime…' (European Commission 2007a: 3). Besides this, its relevance with regard to the focus of this paper lies with the accompanying Plan of Action (PoA) intent to implement the Nuremberg Declaration between 2007 – 2012 (European Commission 2007b). For the first time the non-binding letters of intent to be found in previous were to be accompanied by a PoA which lists concrete policy measures to be implemented. Upon its expiry in 2012, the EU-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Brunei released a new PoA for the years 2013-2017 (European Commission 2012).

Both PoA's consist of stated objectives and planned activities, which by and large draw on facilitating (and deepening) political dialogue, the exchange of best practices and, to a lesser extent, capacity building. While a range of workshops, seminars and visits to EU institutions is listed in the annex of the 2007-2012 PoA, none of these activities are directly linked to issues such as counter terrorism or human trafficking. Instead the listed activities in the annexes include, amongst others, a seminar on anti-personnel landmines and a workshop on small arms and light weapons. More so, with regard to the political dialogues mentioned in the PoA's, the PoA's do not foresee the creation of new interregional dialogue forums, but refer to previously established forums in the context of the EU-ASEAN Ministerial meetings, forums at UN level and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). For example with regard to human trafficking the 2007-2012 PoA calls for the support of 'ASEAN's efforts, where practicable, in combating trafficking in persons through existing programs, projects or activities and intensify cooperation between ASEAN and EU with regard to supporting the ASEAN Declaration against Trafficking in Persons particularly Women and Children, recommendations of SOMTC Work Programme on Trafficking in Persons, the ASEAN Plan of Action for Cooperation on Immigration Matters and, when appropriate, the Palermo Convention and its protocols' (European Commission 2007b, 3). Similarly, the document calls for 'support the implementation of the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism and promote the full and effective implementation of the UN Security Council's Resolutions related to terrorism as well as ratification or accession, as the case may be, and implementation of the international conventions relating to counter terrorism and relevant resolutions of the United Nations on measures aimed at countering international terrorism, including assisting ASEAN Member Countries in capacity building' (European Commission 2007b: 2).

The PoA for the years 2013 – 2017 is for the most part extending measures and activities listed in the first PoA. The main focus is again on dialogue forums and the exchange of best practices through formats such as seminars and workshops. Hereby it is again the ARF that is deemed the central forum for security affairs. In the 2013 – 2017 PoA technical assistance takes up more room as the EU aims to support newly created ASEAN institutions such as the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement

Cooperation (JCLEC), the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT) and the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA). The PoA also sets out the implementation of an ASEAN-EU Comprehensive Border Management Programme with the aim of improving border management in ASEAN member states. Additionally the document, in contrast with its predecessor aims to explore '…the establishment of a regular policy dialogue on counter terrorism' (European Commission 2012: 2).

To be sure, the aforementioned declarations and plan of actions have established a range of new forums for the transfer of norms and ideas through information exchange, sharing of best practices, and capacity building, such as various dialogue fora (Senior Official Meetings, Joint Committees), partnership agreements, joint action plans and strategy papers. More so, the Bandar Seri Begawan Plan of Action to strengthen the ASEAN-EU Enhanced Partnership (2013-2017) integrated fighting terrorism as well as human trafficking amongst its priorities. However, while the newly established forums theoretically open up space for the transfer of ideas and norms, they do not fall on some sort of terra nullius. The following examination of the assumed norm taker (ASEAN) shows that ASEAN had various intra-regional agreements and policy guidelines established in the respective policy fields, which pre-date the Nuremberg declaration from 2007 by a decade.

ASEAN AND THE FIGHT AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME

A 2006 report by ASEAN summarizes ASEAN's response to human trafficking as, broadly speaking, driven by the respective national criminal justice systems. It also states that: 'This focus is not meant to detract from other important responses to trafficking, such as prevention activities and the reintegration of victims. It does, however, reflect a growing acceptance of the key role that criminal justice agencies must play, at both the national and regional levels, in the fight against trafficking' (ASEAN 2006, 86). The measures listed on the report to implement such a criminal justice response effectively within Southeast Asia are the sharing of expertise and experience by the respective national agencies bilaterally and at the regional level; the development of mutual legal assistance and extradition treaties; ensuring coherence of the individual member states' approaches to human trafficking with international norms established by the UN Trafficking Protocol; and the harmonization of donor efforts at the national level amongst others. Thus intergovernmental policy harmonization, rather than regional integration, can be deduced as the modus operandi in ASEAN's fight against transnational crime and human trafficking. ASEAN's approach therefore incorporates key tenets of the ASEAN way such as non-interference and absolute respect for the national sovereignty of the other member states.

It is the outcome of more than ten-year old policy process, which dates back to the mid-1990s. At that time human trafficking and terrorism were, amongst other areas of concern, bundled together under the umbrella term "Transnational Organized Crime (TOC)" before evolving into single areas of concern in the 2000s (ASEAN 1997a). In 1997 the member states signed the "ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime" in Manila, including a section on human trafficking, in which the member states agreed to 'strengthen cooperation at the regional level'; 'to convene an ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime', and to 'hold discussion (…) about bilateral and regional agreements on issues such as mutual legal assistance' (ASEAN 1997b). At the ASEAN level cooperation at senior level takes place through the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime while senior officials cooperate through the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC). ASEAN Police chiefs also meet regularly in the context of ASEANOPOL to discuss prospects for greater operation cooperation between the member states. At subsequent AMMTC's (ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime) awareness of transnational crime grew and it

was decidedly regarded as an issue of concern for the stability of the states in the region and for economic prosperity (ASEAN 1999). All of this, however, was clad into a non-binding language in line with ASEAN's key norms of non-interference and national sovereignty. The aforementioned "Manila declaration" for example stressed regional action by, amongst other measures, 'harmonizing, as appropriate, existing laws' (ASEAN 1997b). Hereby various issues have been discussed at the regional level, including law enforcement, airport security, intelligence sharing, and bomb detection amongst others. Activities listed in the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime include: information exchange; the harmonization of national policies; best practice exchanges between national law enforcement agencies; strengthening regional capabilities to fight transnational criminal activities; and the establishment of the ASEAN Center for Combating Transnational Crime (ASEAN 1998).

This is not to say that attempts towards a more formalized approach, including legally binding regional agreements, were not made. Former Secretary-Generals, as well as certain member states such as Indonesia or the Philippines, have at various time called for more regional integration. Within the inherent tension between ASEAN's sacrosanct norms on the one hand (the "ASEAN-way"), and the need for increased regional cooperation if not integration when faced with transnational issues on the other, the pendulum, however, constantly swung in the direction of the ASEAN way. The 2004 ASEAN Declaration Against Trafficking in Persons reaffirmed the inter-governmental approach inherent to the preceding declarations and agreements. It states that ASEAN member states will fight human trafficking 'to the extent permitted by their respective domestic laws and policies' (ASEAN 2004) thus reiterating ASEAN's sacrosanct norms of non-interference and absolute national sovereignty. This approach is reaffirmed in the ASEAN Handbook on international legal cooperation in cases of human trafficking, too (ASEAN 2010). It has also become the dominant modus operandi in ASEAN-driven multilateral cooperation such as ASEAN+3 (China, S. Korea, and Japan), ASEAN+6 (India, Australia and New Zealand), the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum), the East Asia Summit and the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and related Transnational Crime. ASEAN's firm position on national sovereignty has also hampered the actual implementation of international and regional norms on fighting human trafficking in the face of transnational challenges such as the ongoing regional refugee crisis involving the Rohingyas, the discovery of mass graves of trafficked persons in Malaysia and Thailand and allegations of slavery in Thailand's seafood industry. Myanmar, for example, signed the ASEAN Convention Against Trafficking in Persons in late 2015. At the same time it declared the plight of the Rohingya a domestic matter and subsequently had the issue removed from the regional agenda (Goh 2015). More so, while some member states have changed domestic legislation in line with the stipulations found in the ASEAN Declaration Against Trafficking in Persons, others have failed to prosecute any traffickers or failed to investigate cases of forced labor (U.S. Department of State 2015). Similarly, while the majority of ASEAN member states have become parties to the UN's "Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons", others haven't. The same can be said with regard to the track record of ASEAN member states' compliance with the U.S.' "Trafficking Victims Protection Act". ASEAN simply lacks any mechanism to enforce implementation of anti-trafficking norms across its members. As a result, member states like Thailand continue to violate respective international and ASEAN agreements.

A similar picture emerges when one examines ASEAN's counter terrorism efforts. Article 3 of ASEAN's convention on counter terrorism launched in 2007 states that: 'The Parties shall carry out their obligations under this Convention in a manner consistent with the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of States and that of non-interference in the internal affairs of other Parties'. Article 4 reiterates the "ASEAN-way" further by stating that: 'Nothing in this Convention entitles a Party to undertake, in the territory of another Party, the exercise of jurisdiction or

performance of functions which are exclusively reserved for the authorities of that other Party by its domestic laws' (ASEAN 2007). The measures to implement ASEAN's counter terrorism conventions include the promotion of capacity building through regional meetings; cross-border cooperation; intelligence and information sharing; and to overall strengthen the capabilities and the readiness of the respective member state agencies to deal with all forms of terrorism (ASEAN 2007). Regional counter terrorism thus has rested predominantly on enhancing national capabilities rather than building up institutions at the regional level. Like the ASEAN Center for Combating Transnational Crime, a regional body on counter terrorism has not progressed beyond respective declarations of intent. Hence ASEAN's approach has been aptly described in a report as: 'Cooperation in fighting terrorism in Southeast Asia has largely been limited to bilateral or trilateral efforts, involving only a few of the ten ASEAN countries. As an organization, ASEAN has made numerous statements and adopted many declarations about its intentions to prevent and combat terrorism. Its members have a mixed record, however, in incorporating these decisions or commitments into their respective national legislation or practice' (Center on Global Counter-Terrorism Cooperation 2007: 7).

ASEAN's approach to counter terrorism is the outcome of a more than decade old policy process which goes back to the aforementioned Manila Declaration on Transnational Crime in 1997, which name terrorism as one of the transnational crime issues Southeast Asian states should be most concerned with. The areas laid out for intensified regional cooperation were intelligence sharing, extradition, law enforcement cooperation, airport security and the creation of national anti-terrorism units. However, cooperation essentially remained at the level of declarations of the willingness of member states to work together to combat terrorism. The necessity to adopt a regional approach to counter terrorism gained new impetus after 9/11 when ASEAN leaders issued the ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism in late 2001. In a move to formulate a specific regional position towards to U.S.-led "Global War on Terror", which was at the time well underway with a military operation against the Taliban, the declaration defines ASEAN's approach by rejecting any attempts to link terrorism with any race or religion as well as by stressing the importance of the UN charter and associated norms: '…efforts to counter terrorism must be conducted in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and all of its relevant resolutions'. The latter signifies the centrality of the UN multilateral framework on counter terrorism as ASEAN's primary point of reference for regional as well as international counter terrorism cooperation. The declaration also calls for the 'strengthening of national mechanisms to combat terrorism' and to 'deepen cooperation among our front-line law enforcement agencies in combatting terrorism and sharing best practices' (ASEAN 2001). It did not, however, mark a break with the Association's well-established principles of non-interference and absolute respect for national sovereignty. Subsequent declarations adopted after the terror attacks in Bali 2002 and Jakarta 2005, as well as communiques by the AMMTC on counter terrorism, have mainly echoed established positions without introducing any deeper cooperative, or even integrationist, measures (Emmers 2009).

In efforts to deepen regional collaboration, military intelligence directors of Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand and Brunei have held a number of informal meetings to discuss intelligence sharing to counter Southeast Asia's main transnational terrorist network Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Under the guise of Interpol the police chiefs of numerous ASEAN member states have exchanged best practices and experiences in counter terrorism measures. And ASEAN foreign ministers also discussed regional collaboration efforts against terrorism at a number of meetings. Nonetheless, the implementation of counter terrorism measures highlighted by ASEAN such as intelligence sharing has taken place bilaterally and trilaterally between various member states. An example is the Anti-Terrorism Pact signed by Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines in an effort to bolster cooperation

in the fight against terrorism. Thailand, Brunei and Cambodia later joined the pact (Ramakrishna 2006).

ASEAN's collective emphasis on inter-governmental approaches to counter terrorism is also discernible in the ASEAN Security Community (ASC) endorsed at the Bali Summit 2003, where a proposal for a plan of action on counter terrorism calling for the establishment of a ASEAN peacekeeping force, a counter terrorism center and the promotion of democracy and human rights by Indonesia was rejected. The proposal had included measures such as the promotion of human rights, which in the eyes of member states like Vietnam and Myanmar would have related to their own domestic affairs and thus infringed on their national sovereignty. This non-binding agreement, like its predecessors, gives national laws precedence over the numerous regional provisions mentioned in the ASC agreement. This resulted in a what was described as a 'watered down version' of the plan of action, which 'no longer included the idea of introducing more flexible application of the non-interference principle' (Emmers 2009: 172). Hence the ASEAN policy processes on human trafficking and counter terrorism, consisting of a reoccurring circle of pledges and meetings as well as non-binding declarations and communiques, underline the much-derided ASEAN way as the organizations modus operandi. Regional institutions are noticeably weak or absent, as the failure to establish the planned ASEAN Center for Combating Transnational Crime indicates. Instead, ASEAN's efforts are focused on policy harmonization across its members, thereby prioritizing the responsibility of the individual member states and resulting in closer inter-state bilateral and trilateral cooperation to tackle issues related to human trafficking and terrorism.

What's more, the key principles of the ASEAN way have been introduced into ASEAN's security cooperation with external actors. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the principal multilateral forum for regional security cooperation in Asia, was created after the 1993 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting against the background of a changing security environment in the Asia-Pacific after the end of the Cold War. The emergence of new transnational security challenges, as well as a change in great power politics due to the demise of the Soviet Union and the rise of China, led ASEAN to create a new security forum that would foster regional security and stability on the basis of ASEAN's specific norms and modus operandi. The ARF is the only security dialogue forum in the Asia-Pacific that the EU participates in (it is neither a member of the EAS nor the ADMM+). The first ARF meeting in 1994 in Bangkok endorsed 'the purposes and principles of ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia as a code of conduct governing relations between states and a unique diplomatic instrument for regional confidence-building, preventive diplomacy, and political and security cooperation' (ARF 1994). The statement goes further, stating that 'there would be great hope for the Asia-Pacific if the whole region could emulate ASEAN's record of enhancing the peace and prosperity of its participants'. The ARF's emulation of the ASEAN-way was re-affirmed in 2003 when the chairman's statement declared the ARF to be 'a venue for multilateral and bilateral dialogue and consultations and the establishment of effective principles for dialogue and cooperation, featuring decision-making by consensus, non-interference, incremental progress and moving at a pace comfortable to all' (ARF 2003). Moreover, as Weber explains, 'during its first ten years, the ARF largely held workshops with the main purpose of disseminating the 'ASEAN way' (…) thereby earning it the label of a 'norm brewery'' (Weber 2013, 346). A further example of ASEAN's role as the 'norm brewer' in the ARF can be found in the ARF's "Statement on Strengthening Transport Security against International Terrorism" which stresses 'the need to respect independence, sovereign equality and territorial integrity of states, the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of states and non-use of force or threat of force' (ASEAN Regional Forum 2004). This has not gone uncontested by ARF members such as the U.S., Australia or the EU: 'A common theme that has emerged (…) is the tension between participating states who underscore the importance of adherence to ARF's norms and principles on sovereignty and non-interference, on the one hand, and

those that stress the need to implement cooperation agreements that to some extent impinge on these very fundamental norms and principles, on the other hand' (Morada 2010: 31). However, attempts to depart from these fundamental norms and principles anchored in the ASEAN-way have been futile so far due to the resistance of most ASEAN member states.

The ASEAN member states have also made efforts to retain control over the operational aspects of the ARF: All ARF meetings are chaired by the chairman of ASEAN and ASEAN member states provide the venues for the ARF's annual meetings. The ASEAN consensus principle always governs all ARF meetings. And the heads of any ARF's inter-sessional group meetings, which are headed by two participating states, at all times have to include one ASEAN member state. For the inter-sessional year 2015/16 the EU assumed co-chairmanship, together with Cambodia, of the inter-sessional group meetings on counter-terrorism and transnational crime issues. Hence ASEAN's own model of cooperative security has been largely externalized to the wider regional sphere through the ASEAN-driven establishment of the ARF. More so, the ARF vision statement, adopted by the ARF ministers in 2009, called for the accession of all ARF-participants to the TAC and for full adherence to the TAC's 'purposes and principles' (ARF 2009). Through accession to the TAC the so-called ASEAN-way, including mutual respect, equality, non-interference, and peaceful conflict resolution, has essentially been codified into ASEAN's relations with third states and other regional organizations. By acceding to the TAC in July of 2012, and, more generally, by recognizing ASEAN as the driving force of regional security, the EU has essentially subscribed to the ASEAN way in its relations with ASEAN (Fitriani 2015: 135). The ARF, and ASEAN's centrality in it, is, as laid out in in the Bandar Seri Begawan PoA, at the center of EU-ASEAN security cooperation. Regarding security cooperation the PoA calls for a strengthening of 'ASEAN's centrality in the evolving architecture' and the enhancement of the ARF 'with ASEAN as the primary driving force in promoting peace and stability, as well as dialogue and cooperation, in the Asia-Pacific region'(European Commission 2012: 1). Furthermore, with regard to practical cooperation between the EU and ASEAN the PoA calls for consultations on transnational crime and trafficking in persons to be 'in accordance with the respective domestic laws and policies' (European Commission 2012: 2), thereby reflecting ASEAN member states concerns over non-interference and absolute national sovereignty.

In turn it is ASEAN's firm position on national sovereignty and non-interference, and their fastening in ASEAN's cooperation with the EU (and other external actors) that has limited the actual implementation of international and regional norms on counter terrorism in the region. For example, ASEAN has over the past decade or so at various times emphasized the need for compliance with international law in the fight against terrorism. The organization has in principle recognized international law as the normative framework for counter-terrorism. Nonetheless serious issues remain at the practical level. Firstly, while some ASEAN member states have modified or newly introduced counter terrorism legislation in line with key propositions stipulated in regional agreements, others possess no such legislation at all. More so, some of the states possessing counter terrorism legislation that openly violate international and regional human rights norms. Malaysia's Prevention of Terrorism Act for example grants the Prevention of Terrorism Board the power to order two-year detention or five-year restriction orders without charge. The board's decisions are not subject to a judicial review and its orders can be renewed indefinitely. Similarly, Singapore's Internal Security Act allows for the arrest and detention of persons for virtually unlimited periods without charge or judicial review, too. Generally, ASEAN member states have continued to operate with deference to their domestic laws while placing ASEAN and international norms behind their respective national interests. ASEAN, as a regional organization that strictly adheres to state sovereignty and non-interference, lacks any mechanism to implement counter terrorism and anti-trafficking norms across its members.

CONCLUSION

This article's conceptual starting point was to understand any externalization or transfer of norms as not simply as a choice made by rational actors browsing for the "best" norms, ideas and practices out there, but to pay attention to the 'local norms' and cultural fillers' of the norm taker and his embeddedness in particular norms, institutional legacies and long-held policy paradigms. In contrast to much of the existing literature on externalization processes by the EU we have thus diverted our analytical focus away from Brussels and towards the norms and modus operandi of ASEAN to answer the question why, despite rhetorical commitments to greater cooperation between the two regional organizations and the EU being often considered a model and source of inspiration for ASEAN, cooperation in the field of non-traditional security remains very much in its infancy.

On the basis of tracing the developments in ASEAN in the respective policy fields, the article argues that attempts by external actors such as the EU to externalize their norms to ASEAN are subsequently confronted by long-standing norms, policy paradigms and a specific modus operandi (often summarized under the label "ASEAN way"), which make nigh impossible any externalization of EU policies to Southeast Asia for the foreseeable future. Hence even where we find a (gradual) adoption of EU coined political rhetoric or similarities in institutional design this is not to be equated with norm adoption. Rather, the findings of this article showcase the resistance of ASEAN member states as their normative practices have remained largely untouched. The ASEAN way, with its focus on sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, regional autonomy and non-interference among member states has socialized the member states into a an strictly intergovernmental, non-legalistic, informal modus operandi which diverges strongly from the pooling of national sovereignty, the institutionalization and the legally-binding character of European integration.

To be sure, the relations between the EU and ASEAN have developed from an almost exclusively economic focus to the incorporation of new forums (Senior Official Meetings, Joint Committees) as well as joint declarations and joint plans of actions 'in the field of security affairs. And issues such as counter terrorism or human trafficking have been integrated into the inter-regional agenda. However, while these forums certainly open up space for the transfer of ideas, best practices and policies, any such transfer from the EU to ASEAN has been heavily constrained by ASEAN's own norms and particular modus operandi. Coming from there, we can furthermore assume that changes on the institutional level of the EU's cooperation with ASEAN, such as the recent appointment of an EU Ambassador dedicated to ASEAN, will not significantly alter these findings for the foreseeable future. Moreover, we found a number of cases where it has been ASEAN, rather than the EU, who has been successful in transferring its own norms and specific modus operandi into its external relations with Europe (and other powers) through the successful introduction of the ASEAN-way into various multilateral dialogue forums (Sukma 2010).

***

CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS

Felix Heiduk, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Ludwigkirchplatz 3 – 4, 10719 Berlin, Germany [Felix.Heiduk@swp-berlin.org]

---

[1] In the field of human trafficking for example these include, amongst others, the EU Strategy towards the Eradication of Trafficking in Human Beings (2012-2016), the Directive on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Human Beings and Protecting its Victims (2011/36), the Directive on Temporary Residence Permits for Victims of Trafficking in Human Beings (2004/81/EC), and the Action Oriented Paper (AOP) on strengthening the EU external dimension on combating trafficking in human beings.

[2] See for example EU Directive 36/2011 on human trafficking.

[3] While there are various cases where the EU has been able to directly externalize its own policy preferences to other actors, e.g. by directly setting standards for consumer product safety to ensure that only safe products are sold within the EU, this is the exception rather than the rule. More often, externalization takes place in the sense of the EU providing norms and ideas as well as 'a model of cooperation to be emulated' (Björkdahl u. a. 2015, 1). Thus I conceive of externalization mainly as the spread of norms and ideas from one actor, or group of actors, to another.

[4] See for example the current ASEAN Regional Integration Support from the EU (ARISE) program funded by Brussels.

[5] This relates specifically to the armed confrontations ("konfrontasi") between Indonesia and Malaysia, but also tensions between Malaysia and the Philippines during the 1960s.

REFERENCES

Abuza, Z. (2003) *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: crucible of terror*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

ARF (2009) '2009 ASEAN Regional Forum Vision Statement'. Phuket.

ARF (1994) 'Chairman's Statement of the 1st Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum'. Bangkok.

Acharya, A. (2004) 'How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism', *International Organization* 58 (2): 239–275.

ASEAN. (2003) 'Chairman's Statement of the 10th Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum'. Phnom Penh.

Acharya, A. (2000) *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*. London: Routledge.

Acharya, A. (1997) 'Ideas, identity, and institution-building: From the 'ASEAN way' to the Asia-Pacific way'?', *The Pacific Review* 10 (3): 319–346.

ASEAN (2010) *ASEAN Handbook on International Legal Cooperation in Trafficking in Persons Cases*. Jakarta.

ASEAN (2007) 'ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism'. Cebu.

ASEAN (2006) 'ASEAN responses to trafficking in persons'. Jakarta.

ASEAN (2004) 'ASEAN Declaration Against Trafficking in Persons Particularly Women and Children'. Available at: http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-political-security-community/item/asean-declaration-against-trafficking-in-persons-particularly-women-and-children-3. Accessed on 15 January 2016.

ASEAN (2001) 'ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism'. Bandar Seri Begawan.

ASEAN (1999) 'Joint Communique of the Second ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) Yangon, 23 June 1999'. Yangon.

ASEAN (1997a) 'ASEAN Vision 2020'. Kuala Lumpur.

ASEAN (1997b) 'Asean Declaration on Transnational Crime'. Manila.

ASEAN Regional Forum (2004) 'ARF Statement on Strengthening Transport Security Against International Terrorism'. Jakarta.

Benson, D. and Jordan, A. (2011) 'What Have We Learned from Policy Transfer Research? Dolowitz and Marsh Revisited', *Political Studies Review* 9 (3): 366–378.

Björkdahl, A., Chaban, N., Leslie, J. and Masselot, A. (2015) 'Introduction: To Take or Not to Take EU Norms? Adoption, Adaptation, Resistance and Rejection'. In A. Björkdahl, N. Chaban, J. Leslie and A. Masselot (eds) *Importing EU Norms: Conceptual Framework and Empirical Findings*. Heidelberg: Springer: 1-9.

Boerzel, T. A. and Risse, T. (2009). 'Venus Approaching Mars? The European Union's Approach to Democracy Promotion in Contemporary Perspective'. In A. A. Magen, T. Risse and M. McFaul (eds) *Promoting Democracy and the Rule of Law: American and European Strategies*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan: 34-60.

Börzel, T. A. and Risse, T. (2012) 'When Europeanisation Meets Diffusion: Exploring New Territory', *West European Politics* 35 (1): 192–207.

Broadhurst, R. and Le, V. K. (2013) 'Transnational Organized Crime in East and Southeast Asia'. In A. T. H. Tan (ed) *East and South-East Asia: International Relations and Security Perspectives*. London: Routledge: 223-235.

Bures, O. (2006) 'EU Counterterrorism Policy: A Paper Tiger?', *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18 (1): 57–78.

Center on Global Counter-Terrorism Cooperation (2007) 'Implementing the United Nations General Assembly's Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in the Asia-Pacific'. New York.

Chevallier-Govers, C. (2012) 'Antiterrorism Cooperation between the EU and ASEAN', *European Foreign Affairs Review* 17 (1): 133–156.

Council of the European Union (2005) 'A Strategy for the External Dimension of JHA : Global Freedom, Security and Justice'. 14366/3/05. Brussels.

Dolowitz, D. P. and Marsh, D. (2000) 'Learning from Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer in Contemporary Policy-Making', *Governance* 13 (1): 5–23.

Dosch, J. (2012) 'ASEAN and the challenge of regionalism in the Asia Pacific'. In J. Dosch, M. K. Connors and R. Davison (eds) *The New Global Politics of the Asia Pacific*, London: Routledge, 2nd ed.

Emmers, R. (2009) 'Comprehensive security and resilience in Southeast Asia: ASEAN's approach to terrorism', *The Pacific Review* 22 (3): 159–177.

European Commission (2012) 'Bandar Seri Begawan Plan of Action to Strengthen the ASEAN-EU enhanced partnership (2013-2017)' Bandar Seri Begawan. Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/129884.pd. Accessed on 15 January 2016.

European Commission (2007a) 'Nuremberg Declaration on an EU-ASEAN Enhanced Partnership'. Nuremberg.

European Commission (2007b) 'Plan of Action to Implement the Nuremberg Declaration on an EU- ASEAN Enhanced Partnership'. Nuremberg. Available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/asean/docs/action_plan07.pdf. Accessed on 15 January 2016.

European Commission (2003) 'A new partnership with Southeast Asia'. COM (2003) 399/4. Brussels.

European Parliament and European Council (2015) 'The EU and ASEAN: a partnership with a strategic purpose'. JOIN(2015) 22 final. Brussels. Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=JOIN:2015:22:FIN&from=EN. Accessed on 15 January 2016.

European Union (2014) 'Co-Chairs' Statement on the 20th EU-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting'. Brussels. Available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2014/140723_03_en.pdf. Accessed on 15 January 2016.

European Union (2005) 'The European Union Counter-terrorism Strategy'. Brussels. Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=URISERV:l33275&from=EN. Accessed on 15 January 2016.

European Union (2003a) 'Joint Declaration on Co-Operation to Combat Terrorism'. 5811/03. Brussels.

European Union (2003b) 'A Secure Europe In A Better World - European Union Security Strategy'. Brussels.

Ewi, M. (2013) 'The Role of Regional Organizations in Promoting Cooperation on Counter-Terrorism Matters: The European and the African Institutions in a Comparative Perspective'. In L. van den Herik and N. Schrijver (eds) *Counter-Terrorism*

Strategies in a Fragmented International Legal Order: Meeting the Challenges. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 128-180.

Fitriani, E. (2015) 'Indonesia's Strategy toward the EU: Anti-Colonialism, Non-Alignement, and Equal Partnership'. In W. Ting, M. Tsuruoka and S. Hong Kim (eds) *Asian Countries' Strategies towards the European Union in an Inter-Regionalist Context*. Taipei: National Taiwan University Press: 127-160.

Floristella, A. P. (2013) 'Are Non-Traditional Security Challenges Leading Regional Organizations towards Greater Convergence?', *Asia Europe Journal* 11 (1): 21–38.

Freeman, R. (2009) 'What is translation?', *Evidence & Policy: A Journal of Research, Debate and Practice* 5 (4): 429–47.

Goh, M. (2015) 'ASEAN to set up joint task force, fund to combat human trafficking'. *Channel NewsAsia*, Juli 2. Available at: http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/asean-to-set-up-joint/1956660.html. Accessed on 15 January 2016.

Heiduk, F. (2014) 'In it Together Yet Worlds Apart? EU–ASEAN Counter-Terrorism Cooperation After the Bali Bombings'. *Journal of European Integration* 36 (7): 697–713.

Heiduk, F. (2009) 'ESDP in Asia: The Aceh Monitoring Mission in Indonesia'. In M. Asseburg and R. Kempin (eds) *The EU as a Strategic Actor in the Realm of Security and Defence? A Systematic Assessment of ESDP Missions and Operations*. SWP Research Paper 14. Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik: 100-111.

Holmes, L. (2013) 'Dealing with Terrorism, Corruption and Organised Crime: The EU and Asia'. In T. Christiansen, E. Kirchner and P. B. Murray (eds) *The Palgrave Handbook of EU-Asia Relations*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan: 143-164.

Jetschke, A. and P. Murray (2012) 'Diffusing Regional Integration: The EU and Southeast Asia', *West European Politics* 35 (1): 174–191.

Joffé, G. (2008) 'The European Union, Democracy and Counter-Terrorism in the Maghreb', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 46 (1): 147–171.

Kaunert, C. (2009) 'The External Dimension of EU Counter-Terrorism Relations: Competences, Interests, and Institutions', *Terrorism and Political Violence* 22 (1): 41–61.

Kaunert, C. and Léonard, S. (2011) 'EU Counterterrorism and the European Neighbourhood Policy: An Appraisal of the Southern Dimension', *Terrorism and Political Violence* 23 (2): 286–309.

Keohane, D. (2008) 'The Absent Friend: EU Foreign Policy and Counter-Terrorism', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 46 (1): 125–146.

Lavenex, S. and Schimmelfennig, F. (2009) 'EU rules beyond EU borders: theorizing external governance in European politics', *Journal of European Public Policy* 16 (6): 791–812.

Lavenex, S. and Wichmann, N. (2009) 'The External Governance of EU Internal Security". *Journal of European Integration* 31 (1): 83–102.

Lee, M. (2013) 'Introduction: Understanding Human Trafficking'. In M. Lee (ed) *Human Trafficking*. London: Routledge: 1-25.

Lim, P. (2012) 'ASEAN's Relations with the EU: Obstacles and Opportunities', *EU External Affairs Review* 2 (1): 46–58.

Maier-Kapp, N. (2012) 'The EU and Non-Traditional Security in Southeast Asia'. In D. Novotny and C. Portela (eds) *EU-ASEAN Relations in the 21st Century: Towards a Stronger Partnership in the Making*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan: 26-44.

Manners, I. (2002) 'Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40 (2): 235–258.

McCann, E. (2011) 'Urban Policy Mobilities and Global Circuits of Knowledge: Toward a Research Agenda' *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 101 (1): 107–130.

Monar, J. (2007) 'Common Threat and Common Response? The European Union's Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Its Problems', *Government and Opposition* 42 (3): 292–313.

Morada, N. M. (2010) 'The ASEAN Regional Forum: Origins and Evolution". In J. Haacke and N. M. Morada (eds) *Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific: The ASEAN Regional Forum*. London: Routledge: 13-35.

Mounier, G. (2007) 'European Police Missions: From Security Sector Reform to Externalization of Internal Security Beyond the Borders'. *HUMSEC Journal* 1: 47–64.

Murray, P. and Moxon-Browne, E. (2013) 'The European Union as a Template for Regional Integration? The Case of ASEAN and Its Committee of Permanent Representatives', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 51 (3): 522–537.

Ramakrishna, K. (2006) 'The Southeast Asian Approach' to Counter-Terrorism: Learning from Indonesia and Malaysia', *Journal of Conflict Studies* 25 (1): 27–47.

Ramakrishna, K. and Tan, S. S. (2003) *After Bali: the threat of terrorism in Southeast Asia*. Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies.

Rees, W. (2006) *Transatlantic Security Cooperation: Counter Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century*. London: Routledge.

Robles Jr., A. C. (2006) 'The ASEAN and the Euopean Union'. In R. Roloff, J. Rueland and H. Hänggi (eds) *Interregionalism and International Relations*. London: Routledge: 99-112.

Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. (2004) 'Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe', *Journal of European Public Policy* 11 (4): 661–679.

Stone, D. (2012) 'Transfer and translation of policy', *Policy Studies* 33 (6): 483–499.

Stone, D. (1999) 'Learning Lessons and Transferring Policy across Time, Space and Disciplines', *Politics* 19 (1): 51–59.

Sukma, R. (2010). 'The accidental driver: ASEAN in the ASEAN Regional Forum". In J. Haacke and N. M. Morada (eds) *Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific: The ASEAN Regional Forum*. London: Routledge: 111-123.

Umbach, F. (2008) 'Asian-European Relations: More security through inter- and transregional relations?'. In J. Rueland (ed) *Asian-European Relations: Building Blocks for Global Governance?*. London: Routledge: 114-142.

U.S. Department of State (2015) 'Trafficking in Persons Report 2015'. Washington D.C. Available at: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/245365.pdf. Accessed on 15 January 2016.

Weber, K. (2013) 'The ASEAN Regional Forum and the EU's Role in Promoting Security in the Asia-Pacific'. In T. Christiansen, E. Kirchner and P. B. Murray (eds) *The Palgrave Handbook of EU-Asia Relations*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan: 344-358.

Wolff, S., Wichmann, N. and Mounier, G. (2009) 'The External Dimension of Justice and Home Affairs: A Different Security Agenda for the EU?', *Journal of European Integration* 31 (1): 9–23.

Wong, R. (2012) 'Still in Deficit: Perceptions of the EU's Capabilities among Foreign Policy Elites in Singapore, Indonesia and Vietnam', *EU External Affairs Review*, July: 34–45.

Yong, O. K. (2007) 'Forty Years of ASEAN: Can the European union be a Model for Asia?' Berlin, 16 July.

Research Article

From National Enclaves to Supporting Offices: an Analysis of the 1999 Reform of European Commissioners' Cabinets

Renke Deckarm, *Oldenburg University*

Abstract

This article analyses the transformation of European commissioners' private offices (cabinets) from national enclaves to supporting offices. Structural changes were caused by a reform by then-Commission President Prodi in 1999. To analyse this reform, a typology based on management literature is developed. The reform is characterised as 'big bang': it was strategically planned by a leader, transformational and affected the entire cabinet system. The most important measures were that at least three nationalities and three Commission officials were required in cabinets. These and other measures anticipated changing demands towards cabinets caused by the 2004/7 enlargement and the Kinnock reforms. This article closes a gap in research on the Commission, in which cabinets are seldom analysed in their own right. It complements earlier evidence on change in cabinets by explaining why and how structural changes evoked a functional transformation. This contributes to the broader research agenda on change in the functioning of the Commission. Content analysis of primary sources (Prodi's speeches and publications, expert interviews and a biographic database) and recent academic publications contribute to the analysis.

Keywords

This article analyses European commissioners' influential private offices (cabinets). It explores change in cabinets, specifically how these former national enclaves were transformed into supporting offices. The changes resulted from then-Commission President Romano Prodi's reform in 1999. Prodi took office after his predecessor Jacques Santer and his entire Commission resigned over allegations of mismanagement and fraud (Committee of Independent Experts 1999), at this time, the Commission faced a major institutional crisis. At the same time, the EU was about to be enlarged from 15 to 25 members, which presented additional challenges to its institutions. Cabinets are in a pivotal position in the EU's political system. Their 1999 reform resulted from the consensus on the need for reform and can be seen as a first instance of a series of adaptions which were to happen.

The article's first and central aim is to analyse the cabinet reform, which until now has only been mentioned in passing by scholars. It extends existing evidence of structural changes (Egeberg and Heskestad 2010) and provides a detailed account of the functional adaption (Kassim et al. 2013). The 1999 reform needs to be understood in the context of other transformations in the Commission. Consequently, the second aim is to explore the context of the reform. It does so by inductively analysing the cabinet reform's interaction with the Kinnock reforms and the Eastern enlargement.

Considering the lack of an appropriate toolkit to analyse such a reform, this article thirdly aims at presenting a typology of reforms. This is done along the lines of two types of organisational change: 'big bang' and 'small steps'. Four dimensions of organisational change borrowed from management studies are considered: how it occurred, its magnitude, focus and level (Hodges and Gill 2014). In its analysis of the process and outcome of the reform, the article relies both on primary sources (interviews, data on cabinet composition, speeches and publications by Prodi) and recent academic publications.

There has been research on commissioners (Egeberg 1996, 2012) and the services (Hooghe 2001; Suvarierol 2008; Ban 2013; Kassim et al. 2013; Wille 2013). Nationality has been found to have a minor and declining impact on political behaviour in the Commission. This is related to the Eastern enlargement, the Commission's presidentialisation and a professionalisation of the Commission after the Kinnock reforms (Dimitrakopoulos 2004; Bauer 2008; Kassim et al. 2013; Wille 2013).[i] This article contributes to this literature by adding an analysis of the functioning and the development of the organisational layer between commissioners and the services.

UNDERSTANDING CHANGE IN ORGANISATIONS

This section presents an analytical framework for the analysis of the cabinet reform – which political science currently lacks. Much literature on Commission reforms deals with the extent to which the Kinnock reforms complied with standards of the new public management approach; most business literature on change aims at discovering the ideal way of managing change, contributions being manuals rather than analyses. Here, a change shall be analysed ex post to understand both the process and the outcomes.

The analysis is based on the typology of change in organisations suggested by Hodges and Gill (2014). The different extremes on four dimensions – how change happened (D1), magnitude (D2), focus (D3), level (D4) – will be summarised in the types 'big bang' and 'small step'. This will allow conclusions on the relevance of the cabinet reform. Table 1 summarises the Hodges-Gill typology and adds the types.

Table 1: Typology of change

	Type 'big bang'	Type 'small step'
D1: How?	Change was planned, momentary and leader-driven.	Change was emergent, continuous and leader-managed.
D2: Magnitude?	Change was transformational.	Change was incremental.
D3: Focus?	Change was strategic and far-reaching.	Change was operational and adjusted only details.
D4: Level?	The entire organisation was affected by change.	Change affected only individuals.

Source: Hodges and Gill (2014), except for summary in types

D1 concerns how change happened, whether it was planned or emergent in character. Planned change is strategic, mostly leader-driven and addresses organisational aspects with a clear aim (Tenkasi and Chesmore 2003). Emergent change breaks with the understanding of change as a linear and planned process. Burnes defines emergent change as a 'continuous, open-ended, cumulative and unpredictable process of aligning and re-aligning an organization to its changing environment' (Burnes 2009, 372). This does not mean that this kind of change is leader-less, but the leader discreetly manages change instead of imposing it.

D2 concerns the reform's magnitude, in which transformational and incremental reforms are the most extreme instances. Weick and Quinn (1999) distinguish between episodic and continuous change, which Hodges and Gill (2014) describe as transformational versus incremental change. Transformational change is a major redefinition of an organisation. It transforms its identity and strategy and can also be understood as revolutionary change. Incremental change by contrast is characterised as continuous and adaptive change in small steps. The punctuated equilibrium theory posits that the two types of change follow each other: transformational changes are followed by periods of incremental change (Gersick 1991; Hayes 2014).

Regarding D3, the focus of a reform, the literature distinguishes strategic from operational types (de Wit and Meyer 2010). Strategic changes are fundamental to structure and processes, while operational changes are smaller adaptions. Often, operational changes stabilise or sustain the functioning of the system in its current form, whereas strategic changes aim at a renewal and are more radical. While the remaining dimensions are quite distinct, this dimension is inter-related to magnitude (D2). Strategic change can be transformational or incremental, or a combination of both. There are strategies of change which foresee a long-term series of incremental steps. By contrast, operational change can hardly have a transformational focus. It can only involve small-scale incremental changes, but a transformational change is necessarily a major redefinition of the organisation. Thus, strategic change can be transformational and incremental, but operational change can be incremental in its magnitude only.

D4 concerns the level of the reform. Hodges and Gill distinguish between individual, group, team and organisation levels. Change on higher levels affects lower levels as well. Hodges and Gill call this the 'waterfall' effect, change imposed on higher levels trickles down to lower levels. The process of change needs to be adapted according to the level which is to be changed.

For the purpose of the analysis and possible applications to other contexts, the four dimensions of the typology will be summarised in two types of change, the 'big bang' and the 'small steps'. Burnes's (2009) summary of the literature on emergent change allows the conclusion that, generally, it is a process of small and detailed steps, followed by power-play in organisations. This is summarised in the 'small steps' type. Complementary, planned change is transformational, strategic and aims at the whole organisation, resulting in the 'big bang' type.

This typology put forward here is a means for a systematic analysis and classification of a reform in the public sector, which political science literature so far has not offered. Future research could apply the typology and adapt and refine it to serve broader purposes. The dimensions are not associated with weights and there are no predefined boundaries by which a certain reform could be classified as one type or the other. As it stands, the typology supports a systematic analysis of a reform in order to understand a case, which is the core aim of this article.

ANALYSING CHANGE IN THE CABINET SYSTEM

Cabinets are commissioners' private offices and link the political (college of commissioners) and bureaucratic layers (Commission services) of the Commission. Each commissioner is entitled to six cabinet members (and administrative personnel), the vice-presidents can employ more staff. Cabinet members are hand-picked by commissioners.

Cabinets are crucial in the Commission's policy-making. Vertically, they co-ordinate the work of commissioners and the services attached to them. The services, organised in directorates-general, draft policies and fulfil the Commission's administrative tasks. Cabinets follow policy proposals and

transmit the political directions by the commissioner. Horizontally, the existence of cabinets ensures the principle of collegiality in the Commission: each commissioner is responsible for every policy. A major part of cabinets' work therefore concerns the monitoring of other commissioners' portfolios. There are regular meetings of cabinet members, the most important one being the 'Hebdo', the meeting of the heads of cabinet. In this meeting, the meetings of commissioners are prepared and conflicts over policies are often resolved at this stage. Additionally, cabinet members occasionally represent the commissioner and keep in constant contact with other EU institutions and outside stakeholders.

Cabinets occupy a pivotal position in the Commission and are of paramount importance in its internal organisation. Their reputation used to be bad, they were known as 'national enclaves' (Michelmann 1978, 482ff.). The baseline of the decade-long criticism is provided in 1979: cabinets had bad relations with the services and questioned their authority and they represented national interests in appointment procedures (Spierenburg 1979, 19). There were accusations of bringing intergovernmentalism into the Commission, one official claiming cabinets to be 'mini-Councils' (Peterson 1999, 56).

Today, cabinets are perceived differently. There has been a structural (Egeberg and Heskestad 2010) and functional denationalisation (Kassim et al. 2013, 199). In their survey, Kassim et al. do not find support for the persistence of cabinets' characterisation as 'national enclaves'. Wille comes to a similar conclusion on (heads of) cabinets who developed 'From National Agents to Professional Advisers' (Wille 2013, 115).

The remainder of this section displays and analyses the changes in the cabinet system in the past twenty years, building on four kinds of sources. First, I conducted five interviews with top Commission officials who worked in cabinets before and after 1999. The interviewees occupied senior positions both in cabinets and in the services, one was a member of Prodi's transition team. This allowed a better understanding of the functioning of cabinets before and after the reform and of the relevant aspects of the reform itself. Second, speeches and other publications (Prodi 2000, 2008) by Commission President Prodi are utilised to analyse the intentions of the reform. Third, structural changes are analysed based on a database with biographical information of 1,343 members of 149 commissioners' cabinets, broadening the results presented by Egeberg and Heskestad. This information was collected from the official Commission website as well as other webpages (news pages, conference pages, professional networks). In addition, an online form was sent to current and former cabinet members in 2015, resulting in 94 responses with detailed biographical information. Fourth, the analysis benefits from results published in excellent monographs on the Commission (Ban 2013; Kassim et al. 2013; Wille 2013).

DENATIONALISATION AND BEYOND: DEVELOPMENTS IN CABINETS, 1995-2015

Incoming President Prodi had a clear mandate to reform the Commission. He announced major institutional reforms which were to be implemented by Vice-President Neil Kinnock. In the same spirit, Prodi announced a concrete set of measures concerning commissioners' cabinets, which the college had to implement right at the term's beginning.

Table 2 provides a detailed overview of the measures taken and those not taken by Prodi. It assesses the measures with regard to their theoretical significance, and describes the situation before 1999, the measures taken, their effects and the post-1999 developments. The table also includes evidence from the collected data and refers to other sources. The following analysis of the typology's four dimensions will build on Table 2.

The most important measures were Prodi's decision to require at least three Commission civil servants[ii] and three nationalities per cabinet, as well as limiting their size. Figure 1 complements Table 2 and summarises the most important developments in the composition of cabinets in the past two decades. It displays the share of commissioners' compatriots, people who have no Commission experience and people who had worked with their commissioner before; as well as the cabinet members' average experience in the Commission.

Table 2: Measures of the 1999 Cabinet Reform

|	Structure	Structure/Employment Status	Size	Selection
Influence	The organisation could be divided along national or portfolio lines (Gulick 1937).	The organisation could be the primary structure for its members (such as the EP now) or the secondary structure (such as the EP made up of national MPs) (Egeberg 2006). Future career prospects influence loyalty.	The bigger the cabinet, the more powerful it is.	The selection of staff matters for an organisation. It could be highly formalised (like the usual Commission personnel selection procedures) or very flexible, in the individual commissioner's responsibility
Status quo before 1999	Officially, the commissioners and their cabinets have always represented portfolios, not countries.	The Commission has been the primary structure for most cabinet members, except for those seconded from member states.	The initial number of cabinet members was two, but grew to up to eight (Coombes 1970, 255; Donnelly and Ritchie 1994, 42f.)	Despite some formal requirements, staff selection has always been the sole responsibility of the commissioner and her/his head of cabinet (Nugent 2001, 119). Some cabinet staff were 'parachuted' into the services, circumventing the concours (Balint, Bauer and Knill 2007, 58f.)
Measures in 1999	The portfolio division was further strengthened (see nationality).	No outside secondments into cabinets are allowed anymore (European Commission 1999, 13).	The usual number of cabinet members was limited to six (European Commission 1999, 12; Prodi 1999c)	While the cabinet selection procedures were not altered, the practice of 'parachuting' was stopped.
Results	Nationality is a less significant division line in the Commission, cabinets work less in the national interest (Kassim et al. 2013, 198ff.)	The loyalty of all cabinet staff belongs to the Commission, since it is the clear primary structure. Cooperation with the services is better since cabinet members might work there in the future (interview 2).	Each cabinet member faced an increasing workload, which limited cabinets' capacity. This cut the power of cabinets.	It is seen as a good thing that commissioners have the sole responsibility for selecting their staff. Stopping the practice of 'parachutage' silenced criticism and improved relations to the services.
Measures after 1999	None.	None.	Some minor changes were introduced, which did not significantly affect the size of standard cabinets.	None.

(Table 2 continued)

	Tasks & Routines	Location	Gender	Age
Influence	Cabinets are access points to their commissioners and hence fulfil important tasks – which gives them power as well.	The physical location matters because it constructs identities and affects interactions (Egeberg 1996, 725; 2004, 204)	Members of small, distinct groups are seen as representatives of this group. Increasing the share of women tackles this and leads to better results (Pfeffer 1997).	Older staff are more experienced, whereas younger staff might be more capable and willing to cope with an extraordinary workload.
Status quo before 1999	Cabinets have always been criticised for being too powerful and interfering in the work of the services (Nugent 2001, 126). There were no formalised rules on cabinets' tasks and working routines. There were regular meetings of the heads of cabinets and of the relevant staff to prepare decisions.	The commissioners and their cabinets were traditionally housed together in the Berlaymont (or the Breydel) building (Wille 2013).	There were no rules on the share of women in cabinets.	Cabinets have traditionally been staffed with young people (Nugent 2001, 121), who often understand this as preparation for other tasks (Coombes 1970, 256; Wille 2013, 107).
Measures in 1999	A Code of Conduct was introduced, which detailed tasks and routines of cabinets (European Commission 1999). Internal organisation was not affected by the rules.	After 1999, the cabinets were decentrally located with their respective services, aiming at improved relations (Prodi 1999c, 2008).	Prodi emphasised his will of achieving a gender balance. However, this did not result in formalised rules.	The 1999 reform did not address the age of cabinet members.
Results	The relations between cabinets and services improved because of a clearer division of labour (Kassim et al. 2013)	The relocation was criticised, the interviewees were very divided. There was more contact with the services, which is not necessarily a good thing. The coordination between cabinets suffered.	The share of women in cabinets slightly increased from 32 to 36 per cent, it remained at 13 per cent in senior positions.	The average age of cabinet members increased slightly from 38 to 39. Interviewees were indifferent regarding the changes.
Measures after 1999	Barroso adopted the same rules, Juncker's system of more powerful vice-presidents changes tasks and routines.	Barroso reversed Prodi's decision and the college moved back into the Berlaymont in 2004.	The share continuously increased and is now at 45 per cent (41 in senior positions).	The ageing trend continues. The average age increased to 43 years in the current Commission.

(Table 2 continued)

	Nationality	Shared Work Experience	Commission Experience	Education
Influence	Nationality in the Commission generally has little influence, it matters when the group is representing something (Egeberg 2006, 4).	Shared experience of the commissioner and his/her staff increases familiarity and trust. Also, national or partisan positions are known.	Working in any environment socialises and transcends norms and perceptions (Egeberg 1996). Thus, a person who has worked for the Commission before has a different view than an outsider.	There is no clear evidence on effects of the type of educational background on an organisation.
Status quo before 1999	Cabinets were considered 'national enclaves' and were named by their commissioners' nationality rather than the name or portfolio (Michelmann 1978, 482; Prodi 2008). Cabinets had at least two nationalities.	Commissioners traditionally employed people they had worked with before (Donnelly and Ritchie 1994, 43).	Many cabinet members were not Commission staff. This contributed to criticisms directed at cabinets: they were interfering in the services' work and had no knowledge of procedures and people in the Commission.	Cabinet members are usually well educated and have higher education degrees in various subjects.
Measures in 1999	Prodi required three nationalities per cabinet, the head or deputy head of cabinet had to be of a nationality different than that of the commissioner.	Setting limits to compatriots and requesting three service members (see next column) limits the number of staff with shared work experience.	Prodi requested at least three members of a cabinet to be officials from the Commission services (Prodi 1999c; European Commission 1999).	There were no rules on the education of cabinet members.
Results	Commissioners over-fulfilled Prodi's rules (Egeberg and Heskestad 2010). The share of commissioners' compatriots in cabinets fell from 74 per cent (80 in senior positions) to 51 (44). Cabinets are no longer seen as national enclaves, mixing nationalities is seen as a good thing.	The share of staff who have shared prior work experience with the commissioner increased from 15 to 20 per cent. Commissioners seem to select staff more carefully Interviewees emphasise the importance of trust more than contacts to national parties and government.	The share of cabinet members without Commission experience dropped from 43 to 30 per cent, the average tenure in the Commission rose from four to six years. Interviewees emphasise the importance of a mix and say that the measure improved relations with the services. This is in line with other evidence on this (Wille 2013, 107; Kassim et al. 2013, 203f.).	Most cabinet members are lawyers, followed by economists and social scientists. In Prodi's Commission, the share of economists was slightly higher, which cannot be related to any reform measures.
Measures after 1999	Although the formal requirements were not changed, the share of compatriots decreased further to around 42 per cent in the Barroso and Juncker Commissions.	No further measures were taken, the numbers are stable. The share of senior cabinet members with shared work experience increased from 12 per cent under Prodi to 31 per cent under Juncker.	Both trends continued after Prodi, without being strengthened by further measures. Under Juncker, the share of Commission outsiders is 21 per cent and the average tenure is nine years.	Educational background continues to vary slightly without being externally influenced.

Figure 1: Developments in cabinets, 1995-2015

Source: own data collection

A 'BIG BANG'? ANALYSING THE REFORM'S IMPACT

This section analyses the 1999 reform along the lines of the typology presented above and evaluates the nature of the reform as a 'big bang' or a 'small step'.

D1: How did the reform occur?

The dimension on how the reform occurred (D1) distinguishes planned from emergent change. The changes in the functioning of cabinets are a result of planned change by Prodi as leader. The resignation of the Santer Commission led to the opportunity for the first major Commission reform. President Prodi had a clear reform mandate and announced a reform of commissioners' cabinets, which is seen as part of a bigger change agenda encompassing also the major Kinnock reforms (Dimitrakopoulos 2004, 5).

In his speech before the EP in April 1999, Prodi made clear that his aim was also to reform organisational aspects of the Commission (Prodi 1999a). Less than a month later, cabinets are mentioned:

> In my view, one of the reasons for the development of grey areas between technical and political spheres lies in the role assumed by the Cabinets. The Cabinets need to acquire a more markedly supranational structure and must simply serve as an instrument supporting the policies developed by the President and the Commissioners. The task of implementation must be left to the departments (…) (Prodi 1999b).

In the same debate, Prodi identified blurred responsibilities as one cause for the Commission's crisis and offers a solution: 'This is a problem of fundamental importance, which I wished to tackle head-on by defining the function of the Cabinets – one of the difficulties which has led in the past to tension and misunderstanding' (Prodi 1999b).

Later, Prodi reflected that he had feared that the national influence of cabinets would turn the entire Commission into an international body with commissioners representing their governments (Prodi 2008, 125), which explains the relevance Prodi gave to cabinets. In his speech before the June European Council in Cologne, Prodi announced the measures. He underlined his will to clarify the roles of cabinets and of the services, aiming at 'a genuine shift in the balance of power from the Cabinets towards the Commission's services. The role of Cabinets should be to support their Commissioners in the development of policy' (Prodi 1999c).

These statements show that Prodi followed a plan. He developed a strategy (see section on focus (D4)) with measures aimed at achieving the purpose of reforming cabinets. This was embedded in a broader reform agenda (Prodi 2008, 123f.). This is a clear sign of a planned and top-down change process. The planned process did achieve its aims, as the cabinet members interviewed confirm. The member involved in the reform process emphasises that Prodi had a clear vision and the above-quoted speech at the Cologne European Council was meant as an introduction to his comprehensive reform programme.

Subsequently, there were also instances of emergent change, for example the unintended consequence that commissioners employ more persons they had worked with before. Their share has continuously increased (see Figure 1). The rules led to limited access to people who could provide the link to the own government or party and this resulted in more careful selection. This, however, does not undermine the original reform, and interviewees do not evaluate this negatively. First, the commissioners need to be informed about what is happening in their home countries. Second, establishing a link does not necessarily result in national position-taking. Third, the single most important selection criterion explaining this trend is trust, as all interviewees unanimously emphasise:

> You want people you can trust. (…) You want somebody that reminds you of home and especially somebody you can really trust. Why? Well, because you spent years working with somebody and you know exactly that the guy will never betray you, he will never lie to you (interview 1).

> Of course the overall, perhaps the ultimately (…), the most decisive quality is that of trust. Such people trust these people, normally. The ones which they bring from their capitals. And it's a huge asset (interview 5).

In summary, the cabinet reform can be identified as planned change with major relevance. It was followed by emergent changes, which did not counteract the original reform.

D2: The reform's magnitude

The typology's dimension on magnitude (D2) distinguishes between transformational and incremental change. Prodi's cabinet reform can be considered transformational since there has been a major re-definition of cabinet's purposes. They are no longer national enclaves but, again, their role 'should be to support their Commissioners in the development of policy' (Prodi 1999c). This is the case now (see 'Tasks & Routines', 'Nationality' and 'Commission Experience' in Table 2, among

others). All interviewees considered the 1999 reform important, but most point to the importance of the Kinnock reforms and the enlargement on the functioning of the cabinets as well, as the following section will reveal in more detail.

Of course, not only the function was transformed, but also the form. The analysis has shown clear changes in the composition of cabinets. They are more diverse, less national and consist of more Commission civil servants, as Figure 1 and Table 2 (see especially 'Nationality' and 'Commission Experience') have demonstrated.

The transformation from national enclaves to supporting offices was caused by a variety of factors, but there are some crucial ones. The changes with regard to employment status are seen as very important by the interviewees. Three changes need to be considered in this respect: Prodi introduced a minimum of three Commission civil servants per cabinet, and stopped the practices of secondments of Commission-outsiders and 'parachuting' of cabinet members into the Commission (see 'Structure/Employment Status', 'Selection' and 'Commission Experience' in Table 2). Figure 1 displayed both an increasing Commission experience of cabinet members and a decreasing share of Commission outsiders. The development which had started under Prodi was reversed in the first Barroso Commission (because of the influx of staff from the new member states who of course had not worked in the Commission), but continued in his second term (also because of reappointed commissioners and their cabinets) and in the Juncker Commission.

Interviewees emphasised the importance of having Commission insiders because of the Commission's complex nature. An interviewee who was involved in selecting cabinet members himself stated:

> I always relied quite heavily on people from the services. Because it is not an easy organisation to understand and to have a high yield, high production, to be familiar with the system helps a lot. And therefore, it is useful to have a minimum number of Commission officials among the ranks. That said, the subject matter may well require some fresh blood; actually, always requires a certain degree of fresh blood. So that is the incentive also to have people from outside (interview 5).

The relations with the services improved: 'people who came from the services would be less inclined to start bullying around the services because they knew what it was like, they would have more respect for the services' (interview 3).

Other observers also note better cooperation between services and cabinets due to knowledge of each other's work (Wille 2013, 107; Kassim et al. 2013, 203f.). Increasing the number of civil servants and stopping outside secondments also increases loyalty, as one interviewee points out:

> Because unless you are particularly foolish, you know that the director general of the directorate which you are passing instructions will become again your boss. Very soon. So you don't want to make an enemy and therefore, you are careful. While if you are a national official (…) you can start being a little bit rude, sometimes, a bit more aggressive. And that creates tension (interview 2).

Stopping the practice of 'parachuting' also improved relations with the services since cabinet members were no longer able to avoid the difficult entry and promotion procedures. These three measures increased loyalty and, together with a clearer division of labour, enhanced cooperation between the services and the cabinets.

These measures were combined with a reduction of cabinets' size (see 'Size' in Table 2), a normal commissioner's cabinet was limited to six persons. This weakened cabinets, which is the exact consequence intended by Prodi and which cabinet members did acknowledge:

> Then you cut the numbers so that they would have to work like, you know, like slaves. Until three o'clock in the morning so they would not have time to plot a plot on their own. (…) We had a lot, lot of work. Lot, lot... (interview 1).

Unsurprisingly, cabinet members did not share the criticism of cabinets excessively interfering in the services' work, which is illustrated by the sarcastic talk of plots in the quote above. But the interviewees knew that the measure was intended as a cut in their power and agree on its success in this regard.

Finally, further limiting the number of compatriots in cabinets (see 'Nationality' in Table 2) clearly contributed to the transformation away from national enclaves. De facto, Prodi only increased the minimum number of required non-nationals from one to two. Nevertheless, Figure 1 has shown that this measure had a clear and lasting effect. This structural denationalisation has been shown (Egeberg and Heskestad 2010), as well as the functional consequences thereof (Kassim et al. 2013, 199ff.), although initial evaluations were less clear regarding the functional consequences (Kassim and Menon 2004, 99; Peterson 2004, 25).

There have been incremental changes as well: the rules concerning cabinet composition are slightly adapted by each president, as is the Code of Conduct. Table 2 has shown further minor changes within the past twenty years. These changes supported the overall transformation by Prodi's measures and did not have independent effects on cabinets. This supports the notion of the punctuated equilibrium, which states that major changes and phases of small adaptions alternate. But comparably to the conclusion on planned change (D1), the conclusion on the magnitude is that the 1999 reform had a transformational character.

D3: The reform's focus

D3 distinguishes between strategic and operational changes. Prodi's speeches clearly revealed his intentions and the Cologne speech detailed the measures he was going to take (Prodi 1999c). Prodi had clear aims and a strategy to achieve the transformation of cabinets. The section above demonstrated the transformation of cabinets, which was strategically steered by Prodi. Through Prodi's reform, the structure of cabinets was substantially altered and processes were defined. This was part of Prodi's broader reform agenda to adapt the Commission to oncoming challenges, such as the enlargement (Prodi 2008, 123).

But there were operational changes in cabinets as well. The rule regarding nationality in cabinets was over-fulfilled, also in subsequent Commissions, as Figure 1 and Table 2 have shown. One simple reason can be a misunderstanding, since many people still refer to the rules thinking they required three non-nationals instead of three nationalities. But also, commissioners had realised the different function of cabinets and therefore adapted the selection – and nationality simply lost relevance.

Also, Barroso taking back the decision to house the cabinets with the services is an instance of operational change (see 'Location' in Table 2), which does not fundamentally change an organisation, but ensures its functioning. Prodi's relocation of cabinets from a central building to their respective services was controversial. It should have enhanced relations between cabinets and services, but interviewees were divided regarding the success. There was certainly more contact, but:

> Either they [the relations between services and cabinets] got better or they realised that they hated each other. So, if there were tensions between a commissioner and a director general or the cabinets and the DG and you are in the same building that became more difficult to manage (interview 4).

And the coordination between cabinets was more difficult. The interviewee who was involved in the reforms noticed that relocating cabinets made it more difficult to 'just spend all the time having coffee together and hatching deals, you know, you look at the German state aid case and I'll look at that French infringement and we will all be fantastic' (interview 4).

But this positive view is a minority one, since most people value the coordination between cabinets higher than the immediate contact with the services. Prodi's decision was revised by Barroso due to its negative effects on collegiality and horizontal coordination between cabinets (Christiansen 2001, 753; Wille 2013, 171). This is an operational change, which was not implemented to achieve a strategic aim but to fix a shortcoming.

D4: The reform's level

The level of the reform (D4) was the entire cabinet system – it can hence be considered a mid-range reform. Prodi did not address the college of commissioners (as Juncker did in 2014), neither did he address the Commission's civil service with these measures (as the Kinnock reforms did). Addressing the cabinet system had effects on lower units, namely each cabinet and ultimately every individual member of cabinet; which confirms the theoretical 'waterfall effect'.

Having considered all four dimensions allows the conclusion that Prodi's cabinet reform was 'big bang'. It was a planned and strategic change of a transformational nature which addressed the whole cabinet system. My interviewees acknowledge the importance and the success of Prodi's reform in changing cabinets. But they also emphasise that it is important to understand the transformation of cabinets in the context of the changes to follow. How did these changes – the Kinnock reforms and the 2004/07 enlargement – affect cabinets?

THE CABINET REFORM IN ITS BROADER CONTEXT

The previous sections presented a detailed analysis of the cabinet reform. This section embeds the 'big bang' cabinet reform in the context of other change processes in the Commission. It does so by inductively relating the cabinet reform to two other substantial changes in the Commission. It first displays how the Eastern enlargement's effects on the college of commissioners changed commissioners' demands towards cabinets. Second, it displays how the Kinnock reforms of the Commission's services altered the relationship between cabinets and services. It then embeds the 'big bang' reform into these broader processes, as Prodi also did (Prodi 2000, 8; 2008, 123). The section's main point is that the cabinet reform was effective in anticipation of and in combination with the enlargement and the Kinnock reforms.

The Eastern enlargement of 2004 and 2007, saw twelve, mostly Eastern European countries, joining the EU. Staff from new member states had to be recruited on all Commission levels. The enlargement had the most decisive impact on the top level of the Commission, the college of commissioners. Analyses have identified three main developments.

First, the college grew. New member states were also entitled to commissioners. To avoid a college of more than thirty commissioners, big member states no longer sent two commissioners. This led to an apparently intergovernmental design with one commissioner per member state. The growing number of commissioners had to be given portfolios on their own which led to more specialised portfolios. This in turn also lowered the feasibility of horizontal coordination, since six people can hardly follow dozens of commissioners' specialised portfolios (Kassim et al. 2013, 200f.; Wille 2013, 65). Second, my interviewees pointed to the fact that it was more difficult to voice national interests in an enlarged college; strong positions outside the own specialised portfolio become suspicious when they happen to concern the own member state. Third, the potential intergovernmental character was offset by a much stronger role for the Commission President. He gave less liberty to his commissioners and controlled the overall processes in the college, despite the ongoing principle of collegiality (Peterson 2015).

These changes altered the commissioners' role, which is now more comparable to that of ministers than it used to be. Consequently, this affected commissioners' demands towards cabinets. After enlargement, they needed less support for a national agenda, and more expertise to cope with a specialised portfolio.

The Kinnock reforms present the second decisive change in the Commission after 1999. Kinnock was appointed to administer a broad reform of the Commission's bureaucracy between 1999 and 2004. These reforms modernised administrative procedures, personnel administration, financial control and other aspects. In short, the Commission became a more modern and effective bureaucracy (Kassim et al. 2013, 205; Wille 2013, 116). This also affected the relationship between cabinets and services. Before, cabinet members were accused of interfering in the work of the services. After the reforms, the roles were much clearer: cabinets were responsible for the politics, whereas the services were responsible for the bureaucratic work and were subject to the political guidance of commissioners and their cabinets. Having clarified the roles and professionalised the services, the cooperation is much better now. The analysis above demonstrates that this was also caused by the inclusion of more civil servants in cabinets, which continued after 1999. Wille summarises: 'The changes in the political and bureaucratic accountability arrangements had a "spillover" effect on the operation of the cabinets' (Wille 2013, 149).

Figure 2 summarises the interactions between the different change processes in the Commission. At the top, Figure 2 displays how commissioners generally do not pursue a national agenda and do not need support in such a national role by their cabinets. They became 'European ministers', they needed more portfolio-centred expertise and a good relationship with their respective directorate(s) general. The cabinet reform had transformed the cabinets according to these changing demands: cabinets were less national and more diverse, comprising more Commission officials. At the bottom, Figure 2 shows that the services had a clearer bureaucratic profile which they fulfilled more professionally. The cabinet reform had changed cabinets so that they would be able to better cooperate with the services and would not unduly interfere anymore in their work.

Figure 2: Interaction between simultaneous change processes in the Commission

The 'big bang' cabinet reform thus was a highly strategic anticipation of the cabinets' future role. It transformed cabinets from national enclaves to commissioners' supporting offices, a profile which is complemented by a changing context as well.

In addition, this embedding explains those ongoing emergent and operational changes in the cabinet system which were found earlier. Commissioners still have considerable leeway in the composition of their cabinets. A still growing Commission expertise in cabinets and the hitherto puzzling over-fulfilment of rules (Egeberg and Heskestad 2010) underline their realisation of changing demands towards cabinets. The pattern of a decreasing role for nationality exemplifies Prodi's anticipation of changing demands towards cabinets: while the biggest drop in the share of commissioners' compatriots in cabinets happened in 1999 (from 74 to 51 per cent), the decreasing trend continues as commissioners realise the decreasing importance of having compatriots in cabinets.

In conclusion, the cabinet reform of 1999 anticipated broader changes at other Commission levels. The demands towards cabinets and their interaction with the other Commission levels changed. The developments in the Commission hence underlined the necessity of the changes introduced in 1999 and sustained their effects by changing the roles of cabinets. The changed Commission needs the multinational, diverse and less powerful cabinets Prodi envisioned.

CONCLUSION

The 1999 reform was found to be a 'big bang' reform of the cabinet system. By referring to several data sources, this article could analyse the relevance of the cabinet system, its functioning and the impact of the 1999 reform. Here, it was shown which organisational factors were addressed and what the consequences were. Prodi's cabinet reform was an instance of planned, transformational and strategic change aiming at the entire cabinet system. Due to this reform, cabinets became denationalised and professionalised entities serving their important function in the Commission. The analysis of the 1999 reform adds to our understanding of the functioning of cabinets, a hitherto under-researched topic.

The more explorative second empirical part aimed to contextualise the cabinet reform in the light of other changes in the Commission. It considered the Eastern enlargement and the Kinnock reforms which affected other Commission levels. At the top, the Eastern enlargement led to a specialisation of commissioners and an increasingly strong role for the President. This changed commissioners' demands towards cabinets, more portfolio-related work is needed rather than the service of 'national enclaves'. The Kinnock reforms of the services also had a substantial indirect impact on the work of cabinets. The services now work more professionally and the distinction between their work and that of cabinets is clearer. This in turn leads to clearer demands towards cabinets to steer politically the administrative work of the services. The 1999 reform of cabinets consequently anticipated and complemented changes in the political and the bureaucratic levels of the Commission. By analysing the level in between, this article contributes to a more encompassing understanding of change in the Commission.

The third aim was to propose a typology of change for the analysis of public sector reforms, connected with the call for further refinements and applications to other reforms. This typology has been useful to disentangle the numerous organisational aspects of the 1999 reform. In the Commission context, President Juncker's recent reforms of the college's structure or of the spokesperson service could be considered using this typology. This would ultimately also lead to a broader picture of determinants of occurrences and success of reforms in the Commission. Explanatory factors such as external pressures, the interaction with other institutions and the personality of the President could add to our understanding of reforms. Here, the rich literature on the Kinnock reforms could be synthesised.

Substantially, this article provided more evidence to scholarship finding a decreasing role for nationality in the Commission. It showed how President Prodi's 'big bang' reform actively addressed this issue and transformed the influential cabinets from national enclaves to supporting offices.

***

CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS

Renke Deckarm, Department of Social Science, Oldenburg University, Ammerlaender Heerstrasse 114-118, 26129 Oldenburg, Germany [renke.deckarm@uni-oldenburg.de].

REFERENCES

Balint, T., Bauer, M.W., and Knill, C. (2007) 'Bureaucratic Change in the European Administrative Space - The Case of the European Commission', in M. Egeberg (ed.), *Institutional Dynamics and the Transformation of Executive Politics in Europe. Connex Report Series Nr. 03*. Mannheim: Mannheim Centre for European Social Research: 43-81.

Ban, C. (2013) *Management and Culture in an Enlarged European Commission: From Diversity to Unity*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bauer, M.W. (2008) 'Introduction: Organizational change, management reform and EU policy-making'. *Journal of European Public Policy* 15(5):627-47.

Burnes, B. (2009) 'Reflections: Ethics and Organizational Change – Time for a Return to Lewinian Values'. *Journal of Change Management* 9(4):359-81. doi: 10.1080/14697010903360558.

Christiansen, T. (2001) 'Intra-institutional politics and inter-institutional relations in the EU: toward coherent governance?'. *Journal of European Public Policy* 8(5):747-69.

Committee of Independent Experts (1999) 'First Report on Allegations regarding Fraud, Mismanagement and Nepotism in the European Commission', Brussels: European Parliament, available online: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/experts/pdf/reporten.pdf. [last accessed 15 June 2016]

Coombes, D. (1970) *Politics and Bureaucracy in the European Community. A Portrait of the Commission of the E.E.C.* London: George Allen and Unwin.

de Wit, B. and Meyer, R. (2010) *Strategy: Process, Content, Context.* Andover: Cengage Learning.

Dimitrakopoulos, D.G. (2004) *The Changing European Commission*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Donnelly, M. and Ritchie, E. (1994) 'The College of Commissioners and their Cabinets', in G. Edwards and D. Spence (eds), *The European Commission*. London: Cartermill Publishing: 31-61.

Egeberg, M. (1996) 'Organization and Nationality in the European Commission Services'. *Public Administration* 74:721-35.

Egeberg, M. (2004) 'An organisational approach to European integration: Outline of a complementary perspective'. *European journal of political research* 43(2):199-219.

Egeberg, M. (2006) 'Executive Politics as usual: Role Behaviour and Conflict Dimensions in the College of European Commissioners'. *Journal of European Public Policy* 13(1):1-15.

Egeberg, M. (2012) 'Experiments in Supranational Institution-Building: the European Commission as a Laboratory'. *Journal of European Public Policy* 19(6):939-50.

Egeberg, M. and Heskestad, A. (2010) 'The Denationalization of Cabinets in the European Commission'. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 48(4):775-86.

European Commission (1999) 'SEC(1999)1479 Code of Conduct for Commissioners'. Available from the European Commission on request at https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/index.cfm?fuseaction=fmb&&CFID=56029878&CFTOKEN=9927158c8bccfe96-A6EEAF51-C40A-E982-FF03514ACCE724F0&language=en [last accessed 18 June 2016].

Gersick, C.J.G. (1991) 'Revolutionary Change Theories: A Multilevel Exploration of the Punctuated Equilibrium Paradigm'. *The Academy of Management Review* 16(1):10-36.

Gulick, L. (1937) 'Notes on the Theory of Organization. With Special Reference to Government in the United States', in L. Gulick and L. Urwick (eds), *Papers on the Science of Administration*. New York: Insitutue of Public Administration, Columbia University: 1-45.

Hayes, J. (2014) *The Theory and Practice of Change Management*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hodges, J. and Gill, R. (2014) *Sustaining Change in Organizations*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Hooghe, L. (2001) *The European Commission and the Integration of Europe. Images of Governance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kassim, H. and Menon, A. (2004) 'EU member states and the Prodi Commission', in D.G. Dimitrakopoulos (ed.), *The changing European Commission*. Manchester: Manchester University Press: 89-104.

Kassim, H.; Peterson, J.; Bauer, M.W.; Connolly, S.; Dehousse, R., Hooghe, L.; Thompson, A. (2013) *The European Commission of the Twenty-First Century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Michelmann, H.J. (1978) 'Multinational Staffing and Organizational Functioning in the Commission of the European Communities'. *International Organization* 32(2):477-96.

Nugent, N. (2001) *The European Commission*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Peterson, J. (1999) 'The Santer Era: the European Commission in Normative, Historical and Theoretical Perspective'. *Journal of European Public Policy* 6(1):46-65.

Peterson, J. (2004) 'The Prodi Commission: fresh start or free fall', in D.G. Dimitrakopoulos (ed.), *The changing European Commission*. Manchester: Manchester University Press: 15-32.

Peterson, J. (2015) 'The Commission and the New Intergovernmentalism', in C.J. Bickerton, D. Hodson and U. Puetter (eds), *The New Intergovernmentalism: States and Supranational Actors in the Post-Maastricht Era.* Oxford: Oxford University Press: 185-207.

Pfeffer, J. (1997) *New Directions for Organization Theory. Problems and Prospects*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Prodi, R. (1999a) 'Statement by Mr Prodi, nominee for President of the Commission. European Parliament Debate 13 April 1999', Strasbourg: European Parliament.

Prodi, R. (1999b) 'Statement by Mr Prodi, nominee for President of the Commission. European Parliament Debate 4 May 1999', Strasbourg: European Parliament.

Prodi, R. (1999c) 'Intervention of Romano Prodi - Cologne European Council, 3rd June 1999', available online: http://ftp.infoeuropa.eurocid.pt/files/database/000025001-000026000/000025367.pdf. [last accessed 16 June 2016].

Prodi, R. (2000) *Europe as I see it*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Prodi, R. (2008) *La mia visione dei fatti. Cinque anni di governo in Europa*. Bologna: il Mulino.

Spierenburg, D. (1979) 'Proposals for Reform of the Commission of the European Communities and its Services. Report made at the request of the Commission by an Independent Review Body under the chairmanship of Mr Dirk Spierenburg', Brussels: Commission of the European Communities.

Suvarierol, S. (2008) 'Beyond the Myth of Nationality: Analysing Networks Within the European Commission'. *West European Politics* 31(4):701-24.

Tenkasi, R.V. and Chesmore, M.C. (2003) 'Social Networks and Planned Organizational Change: The Impact of Strong Network Ties on Effective Change Implementation and Use'. *The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science* 39(3): 281-300. doi: 10.1177/0021886303258338.

Weick, K.E. and Quinn, R.E. (1999) 'Organizational Change and Development'. *Annual Review of Psychology,* 50(1):361-86.

Wille, A. (2013) *The Normalization of the European Commission: Politics and Bureaucracy in the EU Executive*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

INTERVIEWS

Interview 1: former cabinet member, telephone

Interview 2: former cabinet member

Interview 3: former cabinet member

Interview 4: former head and member of cabinet

Interview 5: current head of cabinet

Research Article

The European Commission's Role in Marine Materials, Equipment and Components Mutual Recognition Certification

Iraklis Lazakis, *University of Strathclyde*
Anna Lito Michala, *University of Strathclyde*
Osman Turan, *University of Strathclyde*

Abstract

The European Commission in the past has updated the regulations regarding marine operations in order to enhance safety and protection of the environment. In that respect and with the scope to enhance safety onboard ships, Regulation No 391/2009 and in particular Article 10 on certification of ships suggested that EU Recognised Organisations (EU ROs) should harmonise their rules and procedures related to certification of materials, equipment and components based on equivalent standards issued by them. As a result the EU ROs Mutual Recognition (MR) scheme was initiated. This article investigates the current implementation of the requirements of Article 10 through the developed questionnaire and case studies. The results have shown that while safety is considered at the highest level, the current implementation needs further improvement and harmonisation of individual rules, which can be delivered as the process matures. Additional information and dissemination of the overall MR process is also required engaging all marine industry. The current implementation is regarded as acceptable; however, the expansion of the scheme is a cause for concern. Finally, global acceptance of the MR scheme remains a challenge to be overcome.

Keywords

INTRODUCTION

The marine and maritime regulatory regime involves a number of national and international organizations and authorities such as the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), National Flag Authorities and others that may instigate relevant rules and regulations such as the European Union (EU). A National Flag Authority is the country that a particular vessel is registered with or licensed under and whose laws the vessel and its operator must abide by. All the involved regulators have the common goal of providing high standards of safety on all levels of naval activity safekeeping the environment among others, as presented by the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS 2011).

In addition to the above, Classification Societies are organizations that operate internationally (non-governmental) and are responsible for developing, establishing and maintaining technical standards for the construction and operation of marine and maritime structures including vessels. Classification Societies are well-established organizations, which operate globally and have, in some cases for hundreds of years, been developing expertise and acquiring experience in the sector. As part of their presence worldwide, they have established main offices in EU countries as well. Flag administrations can often authorise Classification Societies to carry out a number of surveys and inspections of ships among others, as required by the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea - SOLAS (IMO 2015a) and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships - MARPOL (IMO 2015b) to verify that the regulations are adhered to. The Classification Society acting on behalf of the Flag administration is known as Recognised Organisation (RO). Each RO is accountable to the Flag administration for the work that it carries out on the administration's behalf,

such as surveys onboard ships, issuing certificates related to the seaworthiness of the vessel among others. All ROs acknowledged by EU Flag Administrations are collectively referred to as EU ROs.

REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

Apart from the condition of ship structures, EU ROs also certify the marine equipment used onboard ships. Suppliers of such equipment need to apply for certification to various EU ROs in order to ensure access of their products to EU and global markets. However, EU ROs have different sets of rules, resulting in the suppliers needing to apply for multiple certifications. On the other hand, EU ROs tend to have very similar requirements for certification, in some cases based on identical tests carried out at the same laboratories.

Even though mutually recognised certificates have been used for years in other sectors, such as in aviation (US-EU 2011), in marine equipment this had not been fully implemented. Some work in this direction had been performed by the Marine Equipment Directive group – MarED (EU 2014). However, at that stage it was not obligatory for the EU ROs to neither harmonise their procedures nor accept certificates from other EU ROs within the EU.

Traditionally, EU Flag Administration policy-makers have taken the lead in shaping the policy followed within the maritime sector (Groenleer 2010). As the European institutions extended their role and presence over and above national policy in shaping regulation especially concerning safety (Gulbrandsen 2011), the issue of certification was brought forward. This was addressed during the implementation of Article 10 of the Regulation of the European Commission (EC) No 391/2009 (EC 2009). The EC has the ability to influence policy making within the EU and support the integration process in every aspect (Camisão 2015); in this context the integration of maritime sector policy. Article 10 referred to a single certificate (e.g. an MR certificate) being issued which can provide the same level of safety as all the relevant certificates issued by various EU ROs. In this respect, Article 10 of the Regulation places an obligation on EU ROs to harmonise their rules and set up a system of mutual recognition of their classification certificates for marine equipment, materials and components.

EC introduced the specific Article of the Regulation to encourage the mutual certification process and reduce the burden on European manufacturers. However, as this Article refers to certification processes practiced globally through international organizations, even though it is proposed through the EC, it has a global outreach. As such this Article goes beyond EU to international law and thus the application regime is not clearly specified. The balance in this case is challenging. Similar issues have occurred in other cases of maritime safety regulations enforced by the EU, but having a global impact (Ringbom 2008). Moreover, if such EU regulations either introduce standards that are more demanding than the internationally accepted standards or introduce new standards that did not previously exist, similar challenges arise (Marten 2015). Article 10 mandates the use of the most stringent certification rules to be used for the mutually accepted certificates. However, such challenges were addressed by allowing EU ROs to specify the implementation of the mutual certification process. By issuing a mutually recognised (MR) certificate and not replacing the currently existing ones, the EU ROs proposed a scheme that did not enforce change on internationally established processes. Thus, a new certification process was added to the global certification regime instead.

As a result, the actual implementation of the Article was not fully enforced as such. However, as the Article tasks the EU ROs to propose the best strategy in order to satisfy the requirements of the Article while maintaining the highest level of safety, another important issue was highlighted. While

EU ROs have no regulatory authority as such, they are comprised of ROs that individually have developed requirements and certification processes over hundreds of years of experience, which are globally accepted. In this respect, several consultation meetings with a variety of stakeholders e.g. manufacturers, EU ROs and others were arranged prior to the proposition of a strategy (Lazakis et.al. 2015).

Additionally Article 10 mentions that the assessment of the implementation is mandatory and reports to the EC are submitted to that end. Assessing the impact of Article 10 has been an ongoing target through various studies in the maritime community (Danish Maritime Authority (DMA) 2013; EU ROs 2014; European Marine Equipment Council (EMEC) 2010) following up on similar approaches performed in the past e.g. the 'New Approach to technical harmonisation and standards between EU and USA' (EU 2004).

In order to address Article 10 of the Regulation, the EU ROs voluntarily set up a group among them. The group consists of eleven members and is structured in two main parts, the technical committee and the advisory board. They collectively worked on the technical and procedural requirements, while also on the terms and conditions by which the EU ROs certificates of appropriate types of materials, equipment and components could be mutually recognised. In this respect, the EU ROs developed an approach consisting of 6 levels for materials, equipment and components, based on commonly agreed safety considerations starting from the simplest to the most complex items (EU ROs 2012). Level 1 included all items with no classification requirements while Level 2 included items for which manufacturers' certificates are sufficient. Items requiring Type Approval certification were listed under Level 3 while those requiring Unit Certification under Level 4. Level 5 consists of a list of more complex items the certification of which is dependent upon sub-certification of individual parts. Finally, Level 6 includes full-build certification of a system.

As a starting point, several items included up to Level 3 were selected to be included in the MR scheme as the focus was placed on simple items that were more straightforward to certify compared to other more complex ones. In this respect, several individual items were eventually added in four Tiers of products since 2012, including a total of 44 Level 3 items as the MR scheme has gradually expanded over the years (EU ROs 2012; EU ROs 2013; EU ROs 2014). As also was mandated by Article 10, awareness was raised in the maritime industry by gathering feedback through workshops and relevant stakeholder meetings. As an example, well-attended workshops took place in Hamburg in 2013 and London in 2014 as published by the Ships and Maritime Equipment Association of Europe (SEA Europe 2014).

Considering all the above, it is important to identify and examine both the challenges and the expectations of the stakeholders involved in the MR process in order for the MR scheme to comply with Article 10 and simultaneously address the industry needs. The main aim of this study is to (1) provide an analysis of the progress achieved, (2) investigate the current state of the MR scheme following the provisions of Article 10.2 of the Regulation (EC 2009) and (3) identify the necessary steps for the acceptance and application of the scheme in practice. This article will also aim to clarify whether the MR scheme is having an impact on safety, market access as well as cost of current MR certificates and moreover assess the need for further MR certification of marine products.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

In order to address the above aims, an initial thorough review was performed on similar studies as discussed in the Questionnaire and Discussion sections. Additionally, information was gathered from Internet sources, while carrying out research interviews. This led to the development of a structured

questionnaire including closed and open-ended questions. The aim of the questionnaire was to acknowledge and record the views, requirements, interests and expectations of a as wide spectrum of participants as possible in order to ensure the objectivity and independent spirit of the study undertaken.

The generation of a specific case study on assessing the implementation and cost implications of the MR scheme for a particular piece of equipment, material and/or component belonging in Tier (TR) of marine items TR1, TR2 or TR3 group of marine products was performed as well (TR4 was not yet established at the time of performing the case study). This was necessary in order to validate the results of the questionnaire and to identify whether the application of the MR scheme is in line with the expectations and views of the marine stakeholders.

QUESTIONNAIRE

The design of the questionnaire considered the methodology described in previous studies by Brace (2008) and Groves (2009). These considered the development of the structure of the questions that would cover the various aspects of this study and provide effective results that could be analysed in a meaningful way. Additionally the method for testing and evaluating surveys presented by Presser (2004) was used to assess the results, which are presented in the following section. Also the analysis used in (McAuliffe 2014) was taken as guidance as well as other sources (Brittern 1995; Punch 1995; Sarantakos 2005; Scheurich 1997; Johnson 1999), in order to evaluate the quality of the questionnaire and associated results. A web-link and a hard copy were available. The electronic version was used as the main data collection strategy of this study, as it provided for wider distribution and response gathering in short time (Best 2001).

The structure of the questionnaire included initial sections with generic information required, then followed by more targeted questions. Questions were grouped in demographics, awareness, perception and critical review, relevance, involvement and suggestions for future developments. Both closed and open-ended questions were present to allow participants to express their views. This approach was utilised to provide better insight into the reasons behind the current perception of the MR scheme and to allow the respondents to present their views (Brittern 1995; Punch 1995; Sarantakos 2005; Scheurich 1997; Johnson 1999). A cover letter was also included as the first page of the questionnaire to inform users and introduce the research scope of the study.

The questionnaire was then distributed to all relevant stakeholders in order to gather feedback and evaluate the questionnaire design and validity (McAuliffe 2014). Eventually, a revised version was distributed to a total of 309 individuals and 59 responses were gathered over a period of two months. Marine stakeholders included EU ROs, manufacturers, suppliers, marine and maritime associations, shipyards, ship owners, flag state authorities, regulatory authorities, Insurers, Protection and Indemnity (P&I) clubs and charterers. P&I refer to maritime insurance providers covering open-ended risks associated to members of the marine and maritime industry.

DATA ANALYSIS

Descriptive statistics and percentage distributions were used to analyse the results of the questionnaire for the closed questions, as there were no initial hypotheses set out at the beginning of this paper. Open-ended questions were also similarly analysed based on frequency of similarity in

responses and grouping. More elaborate analysis was deemed unnecessary, as the data were categorical and non-continuous (Johnson 1999).

CASE STUDY

In order to further contribute to the investigation on the application of the MR scheme, a case study was performed. Contact with companies and manufacturers that had already applied and had been issued with an MR certificate was performed. It is worthwhile mentioning that not all companies' headquarters are located within the EU (e.g. some companies are based in the USA, Taiwan, South Korea, etc.), which presented difficulties in identifying the appropriate contacts within these organizations.

The case study was implemented so that questionnaire results could be validated as well as to explore additional issues that might have not been clarified through the questionnaire. These could potentially include more practical issues presented when companies/manufacturers actually applied and acquired the MR certificate.

RESULTS

Respondent characteristics

A total of 59 responses were received from a sample of 309 recipients. Overall, this is considered to be a satisfactory response rate (19.1 per cent) as previous studies have shown that most questionnaires have response rates similar to the rate or lower of the present study (between 10-20 per cent) (Brace 2008; Groves 2009; Presser 2004; Oppenheim 2000). Additionally, similar numbers of responses have been recorded in previous attempts to evaluate the state of implementation of Article 10 (EMEC 2010; SEA Europe 2014). It is also worthwhile highlighting that the present study had a higher impact by including a number of different stakeholders, while also achieving a higher number of responses overall, thus assuring the wider participation across the marine industry.

The questionnaire was completed by Flag State authorities (3 per cent), insurer associations (2 per cent), marine and maritime associations (9 per cent), marine equipment manufacturers (49 per cent), marine equipment suppliers (7 per cent), Recognised Organizations (17 per cent), regulatory authorities (3 per cent), shipyards and shipbuilders (2 per cent), ship owners (3 per cent) as well as stakeholders from the education and finance sectors of the industry (5 per cent, Other category).

Out of the total number of responses, 47 per cent included large organizations while 41 per cent included Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs). An additional 12 per cent included associations and other organizations. It is worthwhile mentioning that the responses included companies/institutions operating on more than one continent showing the global relevance as well as the inherent international features of the maritime industry. The respondents covered a wide area of activity on all continents and were also active within Europe. From the respondents' characteristics it is evident that a wide range of stakeholders are active at an international level. As a result, the outcomes of the questionnaire can be regarded as providing a holistic overview of the current perception over the MR Certification process including all major stakeholders.

Level of awareness

Respondents acknowledged that the classification standards currently used by different EU ROs differ among them for products already available for MR Certification within Tiers 1–3 as shown by 42 per cent (Figure 1). A significant number (24 per cent) were not aware of the existence of any differences. A portion of respondents (14 per cent) did not identify any differences in classification standards among EU ROs. This further stresses the need for harmonisation between EU ROs, which is one of the issues the MR certification process strives to resolve and is in line with results of other studies as well (SEA Europe 2014; Milieu Ltd 2015).

Figure 1.Classification Standards' variation between European Union Recognised Organisations

The respondents' general awareness level towards the regulatory regime related to MR Article 10.1 of the Regulation was high. Good and Excellent responses accounted for 68 per cent of the responses, while only 21 per cent reported a Fair or Poor awareness level. Related to the participants' awareness on the harmonisation process of classification rules by the EU ROs since the implementation of Article 10.1 of the Regulation, 46 per cent of them indicated that they were aware of it while another 25 per cent was not aware of them (Figure 2).

Figure2. Awareness on harmonisation of European Union Recognised Organisations classification rules

The quality of the to-date developed EU ROs MR rules was regarded as average to very good by the majority of respondents (73 per cent) while 16 per cent considered the current rules not to be adequate. Given these responses it can be concluded that the MR classification rules' quality is

generally acceptable. All the respondents that were aware of changes towards the harmonisation of the EU ROs' rules (46 per cent) also responded to the question regarding which changes they were aware of. Their comments included a general recognition of the changes affecting their individual products or area of work within the industry. Additionally, they were aware of the process followed by the EU ROs and Tiers 1-3 as well as the standards followed for the design of the EU ROs MR rules. The latter reveals that the majority of the respondents are not only aware of the scheme but are also aware of the particular effect the MR process has on the marine industry they are involved in.

Opinions were divided (32 per cent responded yes, and 32 per cent no), when stakeholders were asked to provide their view on the alignment of standards for the accreditation of material, equipment or component certification between each EU RO. This can be attributed, to an extent, to the experience of each stakeholder and the interaction they have with different EU ROs as well as to the type of product/market they are involved in. These responses also illustrate the complexity of the current regime, as the standards are different among products and thus difficult to make an overall judgement.

The MR Scheme

Related to the already issued certificates being accepted by all EU ROs, with 14 MR certificates having been issued so far by all EU ROs for products up to Level 3 (Lazakis 2015), 54 per cent replied that they were not aware of it. However, another 34 per cent denoted that they were aware of the entire process (Figure 3). This indicates that regardless of the level of awareness of the scheme there is still confusion over the acceptance of the issued certificates.

Figure 3. Are you aware whether already issued certificates for materials, equipment and components are being accepted by other European Union Recognised Organisations?


The answers to the next question further validated this result, as 39 per cent of the participants reported that they did not have any knowledge of whether the new MR certificates issued by a single EU RO is directly recognised by the other EU RO group members. A further 10 per cent also reports non-acknowledgement of MR certificates by other EU ROs. The latter confirms the early stages that the MR process is currently in, while it also suggests that there is still some ambiguity among companies applying for the MR certificate.

Questioned about their knowledge of the three Tiers of products currently available for MR certification, marginally under half of the population sample replied positively (49 per cent), while 17

per cent was unaware of Tier 1-3 products. Additionally, 19 per cent of the respondents indicated that there exist some products in Tier 1-3 that are not yet included in their company's portfolio, while a further 24 per cent replied that all/some of the listed Tier 1-3 products are part of their company's portfolio (Figure 4). As this question was more relevant to manufacturers (49 per cent of overall respondents), it is evident that only a very small percentage was not aware of the products in the Tier lists, which further underlines their interest as well as the effect this scheme is going to have on their businesses.

Figure 4. Are all/some of the listed materials, equipment and components in Tiers 1, 2 and 3 part of your company's portfolio?

When asked if they have applied for at least one MR certificate for their products, 12 per cent replied positively. This statement is further strengthened by Figure 5, which illustrates that a number of respondents (25 per cent) are positive towards applying for MR certificates in the future. The reasons for not having applied yet for MR certification or not intending to apply, as summarised from the responses to the questionnaire, are related to a number of reasons. The latter refers to companies not being expected to apply for a certificate for a specific product prior to the introduction of the MR scheme, as well as to cost issues, witnessed testing, uncertainty related to the acceptance of the certificate both globally and among EU ROs and thus the practical value of such a certificate. Another reason was identified as the initial resistance to change when benefits of the new MR scheme are not obvious compared to the previous certification regime.

Figure 5. Do you intend to apply for a European Union Recognised Organisations Mutual Recognition certification for at least one of your products?

Evaluating the overall application process, stakeholders underlined through their responses an issue with the additional requirements for new certificates. Furthermore, technical requirements were reported as needing refinement while intensity of testing was reported as being overwhelming compared to current practices. Similar responses have also been recorded in previous studies (SEA Europe 2014; Milieu Ltd 2015). It was also highlighted by some stakeholders that due to lack of experience the EU ROs struggle internally to handle new applications. Other than that, the process was found to be straightforward and well documented for interested parties.

Having observed the above, the benefits of the MR scheme can be multifaceted and interesting to explore. For some of the participants the benefit of reduced cost and bureaucracy was evident along with the reduced time to market, even though the lack of worldwide recognition is still overshadowing the benefits. To others, any benefit is yet unclear as products available are still few and insufficient time has passed in order to compare the results of this process to current practices. Also in terms of safety some expect the MR rules to be beneficial while others see neither a positive nor a negative effect.

Moreover, further interesting features were revealed through the questionnaire as well. Firstly, manufacturers were concerned that additional certificates would be needed for products previously not requiring any certification. Secondly the cost of witnessed tests for some products was reported to be higher than non-witnessed tests available for products in Tiers 1-3. Furthermore, the global acceptance of the MR certificate is a major consideration, which prohibits companies from applying for this certificate. This has been an ongoing issue since the initial implementation of the MR scheme (SEA Europe 2014; Milieu Ltd 2015).

The time for Article 10 to be implemented in practice, and the limited availability of products were also mentioned as inhibiting issues. Finally legal implications and liability associated to the new certificates were still questioned due to the limited applications available. The latter can be associated with the suggestion of withholding the expansion of the MR certification process to Level 4 safety critical items as indicated in the responses to the questionnaire. However, regardless of the concerns voiced in the previous responses, when rating the status of the content of Tiers 1-3 in terms of number of items included in the scheme and their application, 37 per cent rated them as Good and Very Good to Excellent, while 17 per cent considered them to be Poor with an additional 19 per cent rating them as Fair.

From the responses to the questionnaire it was suggested that it would be desirable for additional items to be included in the MR certification list of Tiers such as steel parts, alloys and materials used in ship construction, components used in propeller systems, soft starters, pilot devices (push buttons), solid-state relays/contactors for non-motor-loads, pipes, fire safety products and pumps among others. Generally, items that have marginal differences in rules between EU ROs were also suggested. The application of common environmental standards was also recommended though this does not strictly fall within the scope of the current implementation of Article 10. Finally the need for experience in practice with the currently available products was stressed before any further expansion of the list of products is possible.

Regarding the improvement of the selection process of materials, equipment and components for the MR certification scheme, a number of changes were suggested as well. These mostly relate to the simplification of the scheme, the publication of the common rules for all EU ROs and the expansion of the scheme to cover more products. Also greater involvement of industry was suggested through the responses and further work towards the direction of wider recognition. To that extent the use of global standards and globally recognised certification methods could facilitate the desired acceptance as indicated by the respondents.

Attention was further drawn to issues related to the question on the main barriers towards the broader acceptance and application of the MR scheme. One of the suggestions mentioned was related to increasing the transition period for new items to be included in the scheme and constrict the Tiers to the current level (Level 3) until further experience can be accumulated in practice. Again the cost issues due to stringent rules and witnessed testing were reported. Finally, the level of awareness particularly between shipowners and shipbuilders, the issues with global acceptance, safety considerations by some stakeholders and, most importantly, contractual considerations between EU ROs and ship-owners, were reported as obstacles of further MR implementation.

In addition to the above, respondents suggested that the barriers mentioned could be overcome by making MR compulsory or by further disseminating the relevant information among shipbuilders and shipowners. Moreover the involvement of local surveyors was reported as an important step forward. In addition, the publication of information on Type Approval booklets, publication of cost for MR Certificates by all involved EU ROs, and expanding the range of products while ensuring safety is adhered was an important suggestion as shown through the responses received. Moreover, an interesting suggestion as identified by an open-ended question was to allow for an international independent/regulatory body to oversee and perform the implementation of the MR scheme.

Involvement

On the subject of transparency and identification of the industry involvement in the implementation process of the requirements set out in Article 10 of the Regulation, the consultation steps that have been taken by the EU ROs towards industry groups and trade associations were rated as satisfactory (36 per cent) while 17 per cent of the respondents reported they were not fully satisfied with them. It is clear that the process has already moved towards the involvement of the majority of stakeholders and there is a general appreciation of the result, though some stakeholders would have wanted greater involvement as also denoted by 34 per cent of the responses. This further stresses the need for involvement by various stakeholders so that the industry is able to feedback any concerns in advance of the publication of new technical requirements or additional products, which has also transpired through other studies (Milieu Ltd 2015).

The same need for better communication between the various stakeholders with regards to the developments around the MR certificates is stressed even further by the responses presented in Figure 6. A small majority (52 per cent) expected to be better informed while only 20 per cent is informed to a satisfactory extent.

Figure 6. How would you rate, up to now, the overall level of awareness on Mutual Recognition certification?

It is also important to note that the majority of respondents (61 per cent) were not fully satisfied with the knowledge of and involvement in various initiatives by the EU ROs in informing and educating the stakeholders over the progress achieved on the introduction of the MR scheme. As in earlier questions on awareness from which participants reported a higher level of satisfaction, it could be concluded that respondents were mostly referring to involvement in this question.

Regulators and incentives

Responses to the question on incentives considered to be essential for a widely accepted MR certification process are summarised in this section. Among others, the increased involvement of EU authorities and EU ROs and better advertisement of the scheme were suggested. The launch of a general point of contact for information on the MR scheme was another option presented. Finally, the clear identification of responsibility and liability was reported as an incentive for the implementation of the MR scheme to enjoy wider acceptance. On the other hand, reducing the overall cost and paperwork for new MR certificates and the overall certification process was suggested as an incentive for the companies to embrace the scheme.

When enquiring if the EU ROs MR scheme should be further promoted, the responses were mostly positive (37 per cent), while another 33 per cent is still uncertain or negative about it showing the overall ambiguity on the MR process (Figure 7).

Figure 7. Should the European Union recognised organisations mutual recognition certification scheme be further promoted?

Further promotion should be facilitated - according to responses received - by supporting global MR certification acceptance, share information with all marine stakeholders, support the MR scheme by IACS members and by providing information on the scheme via local surveyors in EU ROs branch offices across the world. In addition, involvement has been requested in the past thus leading to the initiation of several attempts by EU ROs (Lazakis 2015). However some stakeholders mentioned that, this was the first time they had been asked to provide their views on this subject thus highlighting the need for broader dissemination as depicted in previous replies as well. This can be partially attributed to the global and multiscale nature of the industry as well as the "baby steps" of the application of the scheme so far.

Moreover, as shown in Figure 8, a significant proportion of the respondents (32 per cent) suggested that an EU Regulation is not regarded as the scheme that is most relevant to these issues. Reasons reported by the respondents included the need for an easier approach to harmonisation of rules without the need for such a detailed process as well as cost and safety implications. Further, the MR scheme not being a global initiative and the additional bureaucracy in the event of non-acceptance of the scheme in the global market were also mentioned. Moreover, some respondents identified that the EU ROs are not the appropriate organisations to facilitate Article 10 of this Regulation, while another body such as the IMO was suggested instead.

Figure 8. Do you consider a European Union regulation to be appropriate for these issues?

However, an interesting feature of this question was that 24 per cent of the participants mentioned that an EU Regulation is considered appropriate for MR issues. Reasons for supporting the EU Regulation as depicted by the provided answers include the good existing framework of cooperation among EU ROs towards common rules and guidelines on marine products, the protection of the EU market while also moving the marine market back to EU. Other comments recommended that the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) committees and harmonised standards should be consulted prior to finalising the technical requirement specification as well as that EU ROs should not have been involved in statutory work.

Case study

In order to review the experience gained by manufacturers that have already applied for and been issued with MR certificates, a number of direct contacts were performed via emails and direct telephone calls. A semi-structured interview style was followed and the discussion was divided into the following sections: application, concerns and future developments. The most important points drawn from those conversations are summarised next.

MR in practice

When a new product (e.g. valve) was developed, the company directly applied for the new MR certificate. Before choosing which EU RO to apply through, the company contacted a total of three

EU ROs. One of them was most helpful in providing information as personal contact was established as well. Moreover, the price regarding the same MR certificate was different among EU ROs, which assisted in the selection of the EU RO to be employed. According to the contacted companies, the time from the initial application to acquisition of the MR certificate was the same as that of any other certificate for the same product within the general framework of the previous Type Approval certificate as well.

The companies that participated in this case study reported that the cost of certification for mass produced items such as air pipes was similar between EU ROs and close to the cost of acquisition of Type Approval certificates. On the other hand, where individual certificates for specialised products would be required (e.g. water-tight doors), the Type Approval certificate cost was much higher and differed substantially among EU ROs. To this extent, the difference in cost of current practices could lead to similarly differently priced MR certificates in the future. Additionally, it was mentioned that no maintenance fee was applicable for the duration of the MR certificate, which is similar to that of the previous Type Approval certificate (5 years).

It is also important to highlight that EU ROs issued two certificates (MR and Type Approval) for the same product in a particular case. The new MR certificate was issued together with an EU RO Type Approval certificate for the same product. The Type Approval certificate was issued for use with ships registered with the particular EU RO. The new MR Certificate on the other hand was issued to be used for ships overseen by other EU ROs (IACS members). Moreover, it was mentioned that a single price was presented for both certificates (i.e. new MR plus the EU RO Type Approval certificate). In this particular case, the price was similar to the existing Type Approval certificate price.

Challenges

With regards to the companies' concerns over the validity of the MR certificate worldwide, it was mentioned that the new certificate should be similarly valid compared to the existing EU ROs Type Approval certificates that are already accepted worldwide. However this conflicts with the general perception and practical acceptance of the scheme in some countries as recorded in the questionnaire responses and other studies (SEA Europe 2014; Milieu Ltd 2015). It was also reported that the validity of MR certificates was only relevant for the case of on-board ships and not on offshore applications.

The future

From the manufacturers' experience, the future application of MR certificates is certainly regarded positively. Additional comments from the manufacturers' side included the specification of a single rule set to be used by all 11 EU ROs as then the MR Certificate would be much more easily accepted in countries and non EU Flag States. This is in line with recommendations and expectations from the manufacturers side (SEA Europe 2014). This would be particularly beneficial in the event of a shipowner/company selecting to collaborate with a different EU RO as the same certificates could be used as well. Further recommendations included the expansion of the scheme to higher than Level 3 items such as main engines and propellers.

In conclusion, according to manufacturers it is straightforward to apply for the new MR certificates; and a reduction in administrative load and time-to-market for new products could be achieved.

However, time is needed for industry experience to feed back into the MR certification process before stakeholders are fully convinced to apply the new MR certificates at a larger scale.

DISCUSSION

High safety standards and harmonisation

In the current implementation of Article 10 of the Regulation the most important aspects have been the preservation of highest standards related to safety and the harmonisation of the rules of all the EU ROs towards a mutually accepted certificate. Regarding Article 10.1 of the Regulation, there is consensus in terms of the major aspect that the MR process addresses; in other words, safety issues are of paramount importance and are considered accordingly by all key stakeholders. A potential area of concern could include the use of MR certificates issued from different EU ROs for various sub-systems onboard ships. However, since the strictest rules apply for the preparation and implementation of the Technical Requirements for all new MR certificates, all EU ROs will need to follow the same rules for issuing them. Moreover, any new MR certificates that are issued will have exactly the same standing worldwide.

On the other hand, the review of the current state of implementation provided evidence of the harmonisation process being underway. However, it must be noted that thus far the extent of the harmonisation is still in its infancy. Although a separate MR certificate has been provided for a certain number of items, it has not yet replaced the individual EU ROs' certificates for the same products as initially expected by the marine industry. The above discussion highlights the need for additional time to test the new MR certificate in practice, which may eventually become common practice replacing the individually issued certificates and thus simplifying a complicated regulatory regime.

Cost reduction or not?

Overall, as the MR scheme is still in its infancy, and currently available information is limited. However it was found that the cost for the new MR certificate may vary according to the item that will be issued for. To this extent, for simple mass produced items (e.g. valves, electrical components, etc.), the cost for the new certificate can be similar to or up to twice the price of the one for the same product for which Type Approval certification was previously required. On the other hand, maintenance fees seem to be similar to those for other Type Approval certificates where applicable. The fact that witness testing is needed and more rigorous standards are to be met, have potentially led to the increase in cost in certain cases. However, the case study also revealed that for that particular product the time to issue the new MR certificate was the same as for the older Type Approval certificates.

Moreover, it was shown that the duration of the new MR Certificate is 5 years which is the same as the previous Type Approval certificates. As was revealed through the questionnaire results, additional benefits can be generated when applying for the replacement of a number of old certificates with a single new MR certificate for a variety of products under the same category (e.g. one single certificate for a range of display screens), which will also lead to the overall reduction of cost in addition to minimising the administrative burden for the industry.

Awareness exists, but further involvement is necessary

The present study has highlighted that the marine industry is involved in the MR certification process to a certain extent. On one side, big Original Engine/Equipment Manufacturer (OEMs) are more involved in the MR process due to their own interest and prior knowledge of similar certification processes in the past through other international collaborations e.g. international standardisation activities for electrical or mechanical products and equipment. However, smaller OEMs are not as well informed and involved in the MR process due to their inherent market characteristics e.g. smaller size companies, constraints in terms of administrative and financial resources. It is this part of the marine manufacturers that would appreciate higher level of involvement and availability of information regarding the MR certification scheme. Accordingly, it is this particular sector of stakeholders that would most benefit from Article 10 of the Regulation as multiple certificates are less often affordable by these manufacturers.

The above statement highlights an additional feature revealed through this study including the limited information available to a wide range of stakeholders. This can be attributed to the limited time that the MR certificate has been eventually applied and showcased in the marine market (all current MR certificates have been issued over the last 16 months). As was expected, all EU ROs have developed internal processes for the MR certification in order to increase awareness within their organisation. The latter has been applied at both within the EU and worldwide level (i.e. EU ROs headquarters and site offices worldwide), very much related to the global operations of each organisation. At the time of the preparation of this paper (March 2015), a total of 14 MR certificates were already published most of which within the last year. The fact that companies with MR Certificates are based all over the world further highlights the global nature of the industry and the outreach of Article 10 as well as the importance for global acceptance of the issued MR certificates.

The need for additional involvement by a larger group of stakeholders is stressed, as is the fact that there is some confusion over the procedure through which the EU ROs accept and issue the MR certificates as well as the scope of the scheme. The above can be addressed through the publication of additional information on the technical requirements of the products to a larger proportion of stakeholders with different industry interests, also providing for time to process and allow for feedback and recommendations. Further involvement of international regulators would be beneficial for the scheme in terms of status, feedback as well as acceptance.

Steps to facilitate future acceptance

The EU regulatory framework related to the MR scheme, although it provides support to an industry scheme introduced by EU ROs, has provoked some concerns in terms of its wider implementation worldwide, particularly related to non-EU Flag states. This issue could be resolved if a pilot voluntary multilateral scheme is put in place among the Flag state, EU ROs and end-users that could lead to a wider and global acceptance of the new MR certificate. However, as Article 10 of the Regulation has a global impact and would potentially introduce changes at international level several challenges have to be overcome to facilitate future global acceptance.

Finally, the expansion of the scheme to higher than Level 3 items is eagerly awaited by some of the marine stakeholders. Level 4 safety critical items could be considered for inclusion in the MR scheme as well while a six-month pilot study is scoped for implementation to ensure that safety is maintained at the highest level. Dissemination of the recorded information and involvement of the majority of stakeholders in the process will become beneficial at that stage too.

Validation

The findings of this study were validated through a full day workshop that took place in Glasgow in September 2015. It is worthwhile mentioning that positive feedback was received as denoted in EU ROs news bulletin (EU ROs 2015). The results were presented to representatives of all the stakeholders including EU ROs, SEA Europe representing the European manufacturers, the shipowner association (International Chamber of Shipping - ICS), European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) and the EC amongst others. Based on the discussion of the results presented in this paper, future actions were suggested which included among others to continue gathering experience within the proposed Level 3 tiers before expanding to higher levels while also increasing cooperation with stakeholders.

Future work

Even though a significant amount of data was gathered through the initial thorough review, questionnaires and the case studies, this study is not exhaustive. Further investigation of the reasons for some of the main areas of concern will need to be investigated, as there is still not sufficient practical experience with the full implementation of the MR scheme at this stage.

Moreover, additional studies will need to be carried out, as more MR certificates will be issued. Most importantly the inclusion of safety critical items higher than Level 3 will be an important development. The global acceptance of the scheme is of paramount importance and further discussion among all stakeholders through workshops and feedback mechanisms will be instrumental to that.

CONCLUSIONS

Through the questionnaires and additional case studies, this article has critically examined and presented the views and opinions of a range of stakeholders within the marine industry with regards to the development and application of the MR scheme so far. In this respect, a number of key conclusions can be derived from the above. First of all, the developed MR scheme is compliant with Article 10 of the EU Regulation. At the same time, through the application of the risk-based approach for the selection of items included in the latest Tiers and the adherence to the strictest rules, safety is fully promoted.

The application process for MR Certificates was considered as straightforward and where experience exists the industry is satisfied by the general cost and administrative burden reduction as well as with the duration of the certificates and their quality. However, when witnessed testing is necessary, it is considered overwhelming (especially for SMEs), as it affects the cost of acquiring an MR certificate compared to previous certification. Also, the industry is supportive of the MR scheme and looks forward to its expansion but further surveyor training and promotion of the scheme would be an asset to the current state of the implementation through involvement of a variety of stakeholders in the process.

At this stage international acceptance is the most important obstacle to overcome, as impact to liability and contractual agreements is yet to be identified. It is still early stages of the implementing Article 10 and such issues have not had to be dealt with as of yet. However, since the harmonisation process is not directly linked to the guidelines of each individual EU RO, it is still considered to be

short of providing the market need for common application among all EU ROs. At the same time, there is a clear direction towards further expanding the mutual recognition certification scheme including the close collaboration among all interested stakeholders.

***

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS

Iraklis Lazakis, Department of Naval Architecture, Ocean and Marine Engineering (NAOME), University of Strathclyde, Henry Dyer Building, 100 Montrose Street, Glasgow, G4 0LZ, UK [iraklis.lazakis@strath.ac.uk]

REFERENCES

Best, S.J., Krueger, B., Hubbard, C., Smith, A. (2001) 'An assessment of the generalizability of Internet surveys', *SocSciComput Rev* 19: 131–145.

Brace, I. (2008) *Questionnaire Design: How to Plan, Structure and Write Survey Material for Effective Market Research (Market Research in Practice).* Kogan Page Great Britain.

Britten, N. (1995) 'Qualitative research: qualitative interviews in medical research', *Br Med J*, 311, p. 251.

Camisão, I. (2015) 'Irrelevant player? The Commission's role during the Eurozone crisis', *Journal of Contemporary European Research*. 11 (3), pp. 268 - 286.

Danish Maritime Authority (2013) Danish RO Agreement 2013: DMA.

European Commission (2009) 'Regulation (EC) no 391/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on common rules and standards for ship inspection and survey organisations', *Official Journal of the European Union L 131/11*. Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32009R0391: EC. Accessed on 11 February 2016.

European Marine Equipment Council (2010) *Final report on the implementation of Article 10 of regulation EC391*: EMEC.

European Union (2004) 'Council decision of 21 April 2004 on the conclusion of an Agreement between the European Community and the United States of America on the Mutual Recognition of Certificates of Conformity for Marine Equipment', *Official Journal of the European Union.* L 150(47), 30/04/2004. Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=OJ%3AL%3A2004%3A150%3ATOC: EU. Accessed on 11 February 2016.

European Union (2014) 'Marine Equipment Directive (MarED), Council Directive 96/98/EC on Marine Equipment'. Available at: http://www.mared.org. Accessed on 23 December 2014.

European Union Recognised Organisations (2012) 'Mutual Recognition within ship classification', *Report to the EU*. Available at: http://www.euromr.org/SiteAssets/Document%20Archive/EU_report_1212_L02.pdf:EU ROs. Accessed on 11 February 2016.

European Union Recognised Organisations (2013) 'Mutual Recognition in ship classification - Supplement No 1 to First Report to the European Commission and the Member States', *Report to the EU*. Available at: http://www.euromr.org/SiteAssets/Document%20Archive/EU%20Report%20Supplement%20No%201%20TR2%20require ments%2001%20July%202013.pdf:EU ROs. Accessed on 11 February 2016.

European Union Recognised Organisations (2014) 'Mutual Recognition in ship classification - Supplement No 2 to First Report to the European Commission and the Member States', *Report to the EU*. Available at: http://www.euromr.org/SiteAssets/Document%20Archive/Supplement%20No%202%20Tier%203%20requirements%20Jul y%202014.pdf:EU ROs. Accessed on 10 January 2010.

European Union Recognised Organisations (2015) 'EU RO Mutual Recognition Group – Newsletter, Issue No. 5 – January 2016', Available at: http://www.euromr.org/SiteAssets/stakeholder-relations/EU%20RO%20MR%20Newsletter%20-%20Issue%205.pdf:EU ROs. Accessed on 10 January 2016.

Gulbrandse, C. (2011) 'The EU and the implementation of international law: the case of "sea-level bureaucrats"', *Journal of European Public Policy,* 18 (7): 1034-1051.

Groenleer, M., Kaeding, M., Versluis, E. (2010) 'Regulatory governance through agencies of the European Union? The role of the European agencies for maritime and aviation safety in the implementation of European transport legislation', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 17 (8): 1212-1230.

Groves, R. M., Fowler Jr., F. J., Couper, M. P., Lepkowski, J. M., Singer, E., Tourangeau, R. (2009) *Survey Methodology*, New Jersey: Wiley.

International Association of Classification Societies (2011) 'Classification societies - their key role', *IACS report*. Available at: http://www.iacs.org.uk/document/public/explained/CLASS_KEY_ROLE.pdf: IACS. Accessed on 10 January 2016.

International Maritime Organisation (2015a) 'International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974. Concluded at London on 1 November 1974. Treaties and international agreements registered on 30 June 1980 No. 18961'. Available at: https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201184/volume-1184-I-18961-English.pdf: IMO. Accessed on 10 January 2016.

International Maritime Organisation (2015b) 'International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) Adoption: 1973 (Convention), 1978 (1978 Protocol), 1997 (Protocol - Annex VI); Entry into force: 2 October 1983 (Annexes I and II)'. Available at: http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-Convention-for-the-Prevention-of-Pollution-from-Ships-(MARPOL).aspx: IMO. Accessed on 10 January 2016.

Johnson, D. (1999) 'The insignificance of statistical significance testing', *J Wildl Manage*, 63 (3): 763–772.

Lazakis, I., Turan, O., Michala, A.L. (2015) 'Final Report on the level reached in the process of harmonising the rules and procedures and on Mutual Recognition (MR) of certificates for materials, equipment and components, pursuant to Article 10.2 of Regulation (EC) 391/2009', *Report to the EU*. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/maritime/studies/doc/2015-05-29-report-mutual-recognition.pdf. Accessed on 10 January 2016.

Marten, B. (2015) *Jurisdiction over Ships. Post-UNCLOS Developments in the Law of Sea. Chapter 5 – Port State Jurisdiction, International Conventions, and Extraterritorially: An Expansive Interpretation*. Koninklijke BRILL NV, Leiden.

McAuliffe, S., Potts, J., Canessa, R., Baily, B. (2014) 'Establishing attitudes and perceptions of recreational boat users based in the River Hamble Estuary, UK, towards Marine Conservation Zone', *Marine Policy*, 45: 98-107.

Milieu Ltd (2015) 'Ex-post impact assessment on the implementation and effects of the Third Maritime Safety Package', *Report to the EU*, PE 536.331. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/tran/dv/eia_thirdmaritimesafetypackage_/eia_thirdm aritimesafetypackage_en.pdf. Accessed on 11 January 2016.

Oppenheim, A. (2000) *Questionnaire Design, Interviewing and Attitude Measurement.* London: Bloomsbury.

Presser, S. Rothgeb, J.M., Couper, M. P., Lessler, J. T., Martin, E., Martin, J., Singer, E. (2004) *Methods for Testing and Evaluating Survey Questionnaires. New Jersey:* Wiley.

Punch, K. (2005) *Introduction to social research: quantitative and qualitative approaches.* Sage London, 2nd ed.

Ringbom, H. (2008) *The EU Maritime Safety Policy and International Law.* Publications on Ocean Development. Leiden: Brill.

Sarantakos, S. (2005) *Social Research.* Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

Scheurich, J. J. (1997) *Research method in the postmodern*. London: Falmer Press.

Ships and Maritime Equipment Association of Europe (2014) 'Mutual Recognition Study', *Report*. Available at: http://www.vsm.de/sites/default/files/dokumente/9c721b3441531645a4bd41052c8e781b/sea_europe_mr_study_decem ber_2014.pdf: SEA Europe. Accessed on 10 January 2016.

United States – European Union (2011) 'Information Note: Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on cooperation in the regulation of civil Aviation Safety. Available at: https://www.easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/Information%20note%20-%20Agreement%20EU-US.pdf: US-EU. Accessed on 10 January 2016.

Commentary

Explaining the Member States' Varying Military Engagements: the Potential of a Strategic Culture Perspective

Tim Haesebrouck, *Ghent University*

Abstract

An increasing number of studies examines the security and defence policies of the EU and its member states from a strategic culture perspective. This scholarship has been predominately occupied with examining whether the EU is developing its own strategic culture, mapping the differences between the strategic cultures of the member states and assessing whether these are converging into a common European strategic culture. This commentary reviews the main conclusions of this research with the goal of exploring the potential of theories on strategic culture for explaining the variation in the member states' military engagements. It concludes by arguing that increased scholarly attention to the link between the member states' strategic cultures and their military engagements would provide valuable insights into the prospects and pitfalls of increased European cooperation in security and defence.

Keywords

When looking at the turmoil swirling around Europe's immediate and wider neighbourhood, one can only conclude that military operations will, in all likelihood, continue to be a necessary instrument to protect the interests of the EU member states (Giegerich 2016). Given the decreasing willingness of the United States to assume a leading role in military interventions in and around Europe, the EU members will be more and more required to meet demands for military crisis management themselves. Moreover, crises where one member state is willing and able to conduct an operation successfully with minimal support from the rest of the EU will probably not become the standard for European military intervention. More often than not, Europeans will need to collaborate to foster sufficient resources to meet the continuous demand for military crisis management (Biscop 2015: 181).

However, the record of European troop deployments shows significant variation in the member states' patterns of military engagement. France and Britain, for example, took the lead in the 2011 operation in Libya, to which other key member states like Germany and Poland contributed nothing at all. Likewise, the majority of troops deployed in EUFOR Congo was provided by France and Germany, while the UK only participated with two staff officers in this operation. Two years later, both Germany and the UK decided not to contribute to EUFOR Chad, in which the small member states Ireland and Austria participated with 400 and 180 troops respectively. What explains these differing levels of contribution? And can these differences be overcome to the extent necessary to allow for deeper cooperation between the EU member states?

The literature on strategic culture offers relevant insights on the above questions. Lacking a unitary definition, strategic culture is generally used to refer to the shared norms, beliefs and ideas within a society on the appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives (Meyer 2006: 20; Lantis 2009: 38-39; Biehl, Giegerich and Jonas 2013a: 12). The concept of strategic culture suggests that 'different security communities think and behave somewhat differently when it comes to strategic matters' (Gray 2009: 226). Differences in the member

states' strategic cultures thus constitute a plausible explanation for their varying levels of military engagement.

After concisely setting out the key discussions that surround the concept of strategic culture, this commentary reviews the academic research that studies Europe from a strategic culture perspective and assesses the potential of this concept for explaining the member states' varying military engagements. It concludes by arguing that increased scholarly attention to the link between the member states' strategic cultures and their military engagements would provide valuable insights into the prospects and pitfalls of increased European cooperation in security and defence.

STRATEGIC CULTURE

The concept of strategic culture was introduced in modern security studies by Jack Snyder in a 1977 RAND report.[i] Although Snyder later moved away from the concept, his notion of strategic culture led to the emergence of 'a not insubstantial body of literature' (Longhurst 2004: 8; Zaman 2009: 73). One of the most influential scholars in the so-called first wave of this research is Colin Gray, who defined strategic culture as 'modes of thought and action with respect to force' that are derived 'from perception of the national historical experience' (Gray 1981: 22). In a 1995 article in *International Security*, Ian Johnston (1995: 45) started one of the most important debates in the subfield of strategic culture by criticising Gray and other first generation scholars for including both thoughts and behaviour in their definitions of strategic culture. To avoid this pitfall, Johnston (1995: 44) constructed a definition of strategic culture that does not include behaviour, and set out a positivist research strategy that aimed to isolate how much and which part of a state's strategic behaviour results from its strategic culture. Gray responded by arguing that Johnston was seriously in error in his 'endeavour to distinguish culture from behaviour' (1999: 50). According to Gray, 'culture is behaviour, because those responsible for the behaviour necessarily are uncultured' (1999: 55). Therefore, scholarship on strategic culture should try to interpret and understand strategic behaviour, rather than aim at predicting the impact of culture (Gray 1999: 59).

The debate between Johnston and Gray remains unresolved to date (Haglund 2014: 318). However, writing in 2009, Gray stated that he was 'less and less persuaded that that debate had, or has, any real significance' (1999: 227). Haglund, in turn, argues that the Gray-Johnston debate has outlived its usefulness, given that 'the distinction between explanation and understanding can be overdrawn' (2009: 20). Likewise, Bloomfield and Nossal contend that it is possible 'to move towards making explanatory and possibly even predictive findings' after 'having attained a thorough understanding of a particular subject' (2007: 228). Recent scholarship thus suggests that it should be possible to move beyond merely interpreting foreign policy from a strategic culture perspective and arrive at explanatory findings on the impact of strategic culture.

Notwithstanding their differences, strategic culture analysts agree that behaviour is not solely the result of material constraints and opportunities and accept that 'cultural context, and therefore history' matters (Haglund 2009: 23). However, 'culturalists' do not contend that 'culture is always, or even necessarily often, the prime determinant of decision and action' (Gray 2009: 226). Meyer argues that 'this is particularly true in the case of military interventions' (2006: 19), in which 'the influence of norms varies according to different situational factors as well as more permanent features of national decision making systems and resources'. Therefore, the differences in the member states' strategic cultures can, at best, provide a partial explanation for

their varying levels of military engagement. The following subsections review the scholarship that studies Europe from a strategic culture perspective to assess the potential of the concept for explaining the member states' varying military engagements.

TOWARDS A STRATEGIC CULTURE FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION?

A first category of academic research focusses on the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and assesses whether and to what extent the EU is developing a strategic culture. Although the operations deployed under the CSDP framework only account for a small portion of European troop deployments, this line of work is relevant for the purpose of this commentary (Haesebrouck and Van Meirvenne 2015). If such an EU strategic culture would replace or transcend the strategic cultures of the member states, the latter would become less relevant for explaining the differences between the member states' military commitments. However, scholarship suggests that such a scenario is unlikely to materialise in the foreseeable future.

Writing two years before the CSDP became fully operational, Cornish and Edwards (2001: 588) argued that there were signs that an EU strategic culture was developing. Similarly, after the first CSDP operations had just been launched, Rynning (2003: 486) argued that the member states were gaining a more coherent conception of the EU as 'a liberal force for the good of democracy' and increasingly considered the use of military means a legitimate instrument, as long as international law is not violated. However, before examining the possibility of a EU strategic culture, Rynning contended that the question of whether the EU has 'a strategic sense of purpose and utility of military force is easy to discard because of the obvious differences' (2003: 482) in the member states' national outlooks. After the burst in operational activity under the CSDP in the second half of the 2000s, Rynning maintained that strategic power and culture in Europe are still predominately national, although he did contend that there was a weak 'EU CSDP denominator' (2011: 536).

In an edited volume on European security policy and strategic culture, Schmidt and Zyla agree that there are indeed 'many indications that there exist a number of clusters of ideational and cultural preferences that guide Europe's civilian and military operations' (2011: 489). This assertion is based on theoretical and empirical articles, three of which focus on military operations deployed under the CSDP. Pentland (2011) examines EUFOR Concordia and EUFOR Althea, which suggest that the member states agree on the appropriate means for EU-led crisis management, as well as have some common interests. Following an analysis of EUFOR Artemis and EUFOR Congo, Schmidt also recognises 'some sort of EU strategic culture' (2011: 568). However, his study also demonstrates that this EU strategic culture does not replace the strategic cultures of the member states, which continue to play a dominant role in the deployment of military forces and determine the member states' contributions to CSDP operations (Schmidt 2011: 577). Haine, in turn, concludes from an analysis of EUFOR Chad that the member states' different strategic cultures cause the EU only to undertake 'figurative operations aimed at fostering the European institution itself' (2011: 598).

The dissimilar conclusions of Pentland (2011), Haine (2011) and Schmidt (2011) suggest that examining different CSDP operations results in different inferences on the extent to which the EU is developing a strategic culture. This resonates with the findings of Chappell and Petrov (2014), who examined whether the reasoning behind the deployment of EUFORs Althea, Atalanta, Congo and Chad was in line with the norms displayed in the European Security Strategy. While this was

to a large extent the case for the former two operations, the EUFORs Congo and Chad reflect French rather than European interests.

To sum up, scholarship suggests that there are at least some shared norms, ideas and beliefs on the appropriate means and ends of the CSDP, suggesting that an EU strategic culture is developing. However, the latter can be expected to coexist with or complement the 'well-developed' (Cornish and Edwards 2005: 820) national cultures of the member states, rather than replace them (Norheim-Martinsen 2011: 517). This indicates that the strategic cultures of the member states will continue to be the most important determinants of their military engagements.

THE STRATEGIC CULTURES OF THE MEMBER STATES: DIVERGING OR CONVERGING?

A second category of research focusses on the strategic cultures of the member states. First of all, a number of studies examines the security and defence policies of single member states from a strategic culture perspective and provides evidence that history and cultural context indeed matter for foreign policy behaviour (Longhurst 2004; Longhurst and Zaborowski 2007; Rosa 2016). More interesting for the purpose of the current review is research that assesses the differences between and similarities of the strategic cultures of the member states. Writing in the aftermath of the European divisions over the 2003 Iraq War, Adrian Hyde-Price argued that 'European attitudes towards the use of force are characterized by considerable heterogeneity' (2004: 324). Rather than being directly related to material power capabilities, this heterogeneity is rooted in the second half of the twentieth century and reflects the member states' different experiences during World War II and the Cold War (Hyde-Price 2004: 325). Howorth (2007: 179), in turn, contends that it would only be a slight exaggeration to contend that there are 27 distinct strategic cultures within the EU. Biehl, Giegerich and Jonas (2013a) arrive at similar conclusions. In an edited volume that presents country studies of the (then) 27 member states, they conclude that there are remarkable commonalities amongst the member states' strategic cultures, but that 'persistent differences are just as, if not more, frequent' (Biehl, Giegerich and Jonas 2013b: 396).

One of the most rigorous academic analyses of the member states' strategic cultures is presented in a book length study by Meyer (2006), who examines whether the strategic cultures of France, Germany, Poland and the UK have converged since 1989. Meyer (2006) agrees with Hyde-Price (2004) that 'collective memories of events of the first half of the 20th century' still shape threat perceptions' (Meyer 2006: 76). Nevertheless, the results of his study suggest increasing convergence on the question of the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention, a stronger role for the EU as a framework for the security and defence policy, the desirability of UN authorisation, a growing concern for domestic authorisation, the de-prioritisation of territorial defence and the appropriateness of using force to tackle security threats (Meyer 2006: 11, 169, 185). However, Meyer (2006: 11) also emphasises that convergence implies that cross-national differences have narrowed, not that national beliefs have become fully compatible. Moreover, his analysis also suggests long time incompatibility between the member states' strategic cultures on the appropriateness of using force to advance economic and political interests, for the purpose of pre-emption and in high risk situations.

Scholars who examine the member states' strategic cultures, therefore, consistently conclude that there are considerable and persistent differences between the member states' norms, beliefs and ideas regarding the goals for which the use of force is considered appropriate or legitimate (Meyer 2006: 11).

STRATEGIC CULTURE AS A DETERMINANT FOR MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS?

Many of the previously discussed works refer to the member states' behaviour in military operations to illustrate the differences in their strategic cultures. Very few studies, however, aim to explain member state contributions to military operations from a strategic culture perspective. In one of the few articles that establishes a convincing link between a member state's strategic culture and its military engagements, Dalgaard-Nielsen (2005) traces the impact of two competing schools of thought within Germany's strategic culture on its policy towards post-Cold War military operations and 'its categorical 'no' to any participation in potential military actions against Iraq' (2005: 340). Her detailed analysis suggests that Germany's strategic culture determines which type of military engagements do not provoke domestic resistance.

Schmitt (2012) examines Germany's decisions to participate in EUFOR Congo and not in EUFOR Chad. However, his case studies mainly describe how Germany's political leaders used facets of their strategic culture to legitimise decisions made for other reasons. Davidson (2011) makes a similar argument in a study on European contributions to US-led operations. Although the latter builds on a neoclassical realist framework, one of his alternative hypotheses expects that consistency between a state's identity and the 'case of intervention' makes military participation more likely (Davidson 2011: 27). This proposition is not convincingly supported by the presented case studies, which do, however, show that governments use identity and normative rhetoric to justify their decisions and reduce domestic opposition to military contributions (Davidson 2011: 177).

Strikingly, perhaps the most convincing evidence for the impact of cultural variables on European military deployments is provided in a study that considers cultural analyses as a competitor to its main argument. In an analysis of European responses to the crises in Bosnia and Kosovo, Brian Rathbun argues that cultural theories 'offer important insights on the role of the past in explaining the present, but nevertheless have difficulties in explaining change over time' (2004: 9). Although his theoretical framework focusses on the impact of political parties on military deployments, historical experiences are attributed an important role in his argument. More specifically, Rathbun contends that history is critical for explaining how left-wing parties resolve the conflict between their preferences for anti-militarism on the one hand and promoting human rights on the other. His analysis convincingly shows that leftist parties in countries with a 'positive experience with the use of force' (Rathbun 2004: 27), such as Britain and France, supported humanitarian intervention in the Balkans, while their counterparts in countries with a negative experience with the use of force, such as Germany, initially eschewed participation in these operations.

In sum, only a few studies examine the link between the member states' strategic cultures and their military engagements. The few scholars who do generally consider strategic culture as a complementary or competing explanation for their main argument but nevertheless provide evidence that strategic cultures have an impact on the member states' military engagements. However, there is no agreement on whether strategic culture only has an impact on the way elites 'sell' military contributions domestically, determines which type of military engagements do not provoke domestic resistance or frames ideological debates between left and right wing parties.

CONCLUSIONS

This review suggests that cultural theories constitute a plausible explanation for the member states' varying military engagements. First of all, there is a broad consensus that an EU strategic culture is unlikely to replace the strategic cultures of the member states, suggesting that the latter will continue to be the most important determinants for explaining the EU members' military engagements. Moreover, scholars who examine these national cultures consistently conclude that there are persistent differences between the member states' norms, ideas and beliefs regarding the use of force. Since elites embedded in different strategic cultures are expected to react somewhat differently to similar situations, the member states' diverging strategic cultures are a potential explanation for their varying contributions to military operations. The few studies that examine this conjecture provide some evidence that strategic culture plays a role in the member states' military engagements. However, there is a lack of research that systematically examines and compares the member states' military engagements from a strategic culture perspective.

This constitutes a substantial gap in the literature on European defence and security, not least because increased cooperation and specialisation in capability development is generally considered indispensable for Europe. However, deeper cooperation comes at the cost of reduced national autonomy, since each member state's ability to conduct operations would depend on its partners' willingness to grant access to their capabilities (Giegerich and Nicoll 2012: 267). If strategic culture is decisive for military engagements, fostering collaboration between member states with similar strategic cultures would be the most promising avenue for European defence and security cooperation (Biehl, Giegerich and Jonas 2013b: 395). However, given that few scholars argue culture is not the only determinant for action, systematically examining when and to what extent strategic culture has an impact on the member states' military deployments constitutes an important task for future research (Lantis 2009: 43; Biehl, Giegerich and Jonas 2013b: 399).

***

CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS

Tim Haesebrouck, Ghent University, Universiteitstaat 8, 9000 Ghent, Belgium [Tim.Haesebrouck@ugent.be].

[ii] An exhaustive review of the literature on strategic culture is beyond the scope of this commentary and can be found in Lantis (2009) and Zaman (2009).

REFERENCES

Biava, A., Drent, M. and Herd, G. P. (2011) 'Characterizing the European Union's Strategic Culture: An Analytical Framework', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 49(6): 1227-1248.

Biehl, H., Giegerich, B. and Jonas, A. (2013a) *Strategic Cultures in Europe Security and Defence Policies Across the Continent*. Potsdam: Springer.

Biehl, H., Giegerich, B. and Jonas, A. (2013b) 'Conclusions', in H. Biehl, B. Giegerich, and A. Jonas (eds), *Strategic Cultures in Europe Security and Defence Policies Across the Continent*. Potsdam: Springer: 387-401.

Biscop, S. (2015) 'The state of defence in Europe: dependence, deterrence and deployment', *Global Affairs* 1(2): 169-182.

Bloomfield, A. and Nossal, K.R. (2007) 'Towards an explicative understanding of strategic culture: the cases of Australia and Canada', *Contemporary Security Policy* 28(2): 286-307.

Chappell, L. and Petrov, P. (2014) 'The European Union's crisis management operations: Strategic culture in action?', *European Integration online Papers* 18(2): 1-24.

Cornish, P. and Edwards, G. (2001) 'Beyond the EU/NATO dichotomy: the beginnings of a European strategic culture', *International Affairs* 77(3): 587-603.

Cornish, P. and Edwards, G. (2005) 'The Strategic Culture of the European Union: A Progress Report', *International Affairs* 81(4): 801-820.

Dalgaard-Nielsen, A. (2005) 'The test of strategic culture: Germany, pacifism and pre-emptive strikes', *Security Dialogue* 36(3): 339-359.

Davidson, J. (2011) *America's Allies and War: Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Giegerich, B. and Nicoll, A. (2012) 'The Struggle for Value in European Defence', *Survival* 54(1): 53-82.

Giegerich, B. (2016) 'European military capabilities and future conflict', *European Geostrategy* 8(7). Available online: http://www.europeangeostrategy.org/2016/03/european-military-capabilities-and-future-conflict/ [last accessed 14 June 2016].

Gray, C. S. (2009) 'Out of the Wilderness: Prime Time for Strategic Culture', In J. L. Johnson, K. M. Kartchner and J. A. Larsen (eds), *Strategic culture and weapons of mass destruction: culturally based insights into comparative national security policymaking*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan: 221-242.

Gray, C. S. (1981) 'National Style in Strategy: The American Example', *International security* 6(2): 21-47.

Gray, C. S. (1999) 'Strategic culture as context: the first generation of theory strikes back', *Review of International Studies* 25(1): 49-69.

Haesebrouck, T and Van Meirvenne, M. (2015) 'EUFOR RCA and CSDP Crisis Management Operations: Back on Track?', *European Foreign Affairs Review* 20(2): 267-285.

Haglund, D. G. (2009) 'What good is strategic culture?' In J. L. Johnson, K. M. Kartchner and J. A. Larsen (eds), *Strategic culture and weapons of mass destruction: culturally based insights into comparative national security policymaking*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan: 15-32.

Haglund, D. G. (2014) 'What Can Strategic Culture Contribute to Our Understanding of Security Policies in the Asia-Pacific Region?', *Contemporary Security Policy* 35(2): 310-328.

Haine, J. Y. (2011), 'The Failure of a European Strategic Culture–EUFOR Chad: The Last of its Kind?', *Contemporary Security Policy* 32(3): 582-603.

Howorth, J. M. (2007) *Security and defence policy in the European Union*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hyde-Price, A. (2004) 'European security, strategic culture, and the use of force', *European Security* 13(4): 323-343.

Johnston, A. I. (1995) 'Thinking about Strategic Culture', *International security* 19(4): 32-64.

Lantis, J. (2009) 'Strategic Culture: From Clausewitz to Constructivism,' In J. L. Johnson, K. M. Kartchner and J. A. Larsen (eds), *Strategic culture and weapons of mass destruction: culturally based insights into comparative national security policymaking*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan: 33-52.

Longhurst, K. and Zaborowski, M. (2007) *The New Atlanticist. Poland's Foreign and Security Priorities.* London: Blackwell Publishing.

Longhurst, K. (2004) *Germany and the use of force: The evolution of German security policy 1990-2003.* Manchester*:* Manchester University Press.

Meyer, C. O. (2006) *The quest for a European strategic culture: changing norms on security and defence in the European Union*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Norheim-Martinsen, P. M. (2011) 'EU strategic culture: When the means becomes the end', *Contemporary Security Policy* 32(3): 517-534.

Pentland, C. C. (2011) 'From words to deeds: strategic culture and the European Union's Balkan military missions', *Contemporary Security Policy* 32(3): 551-566.

Rathbun, B., C. (2004) *Partisan Interventions: European Party Politics and Peace Enforcement in the Balkans*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Rosa, P. (2016) *Strategic Culture and Italy's Military Behavior: Between Pacifism and Realpolitik.* Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Rynning, S. (2003) 'The European Union: Towards a Strategic Culture?', *Security Dialogue* 34(4): 479-496.

Rynning, S. (2011) 'Strategic Culture and the Common Security and Defence Policy – A Classical Realist Assessment and Critique', *Contemporary Security Policy* 32(3): 535-550.

Schmidt, P. (2011) 'The EU's military involvement in the democratic republic of Congo: security culture, interests and games', *Contemporary Security Policy* 32(3): 567-581.

Schmidt, P. and Zyla, B. (2011) 'European security policy: Strategic culture in operation?', *Contemporary Security Policy* 32(3): 484-493.

Schmitt, O. (2012) 'Strategic users of culture: German decisions for military action', *Contemporary Security Policy* 33(1): 59-81.

Snyder, J.L. (1977) *The Soviet Strategic Culture. Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations.* Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.

Zaman, R.U. (2009) 'Strategic Culture: A "Cultural" Understanding of War', *Comparative Strategy* 28(1): 68-88.

Commentary

Pirating European Studies

Natalia Timuș, *Maastricht University*

Zakaria Babutsidze, *SKEMA Business School*

Abstract

Open Science has gained a lot of attention not only within the academic community but also among policy-makers. Some international publishers have been active in moving towards open access publications and research data, but, overall, modest results have been achieved so far. In this context, the digital piracy engines emerge as vital actors in disseminating and determining the impact of research. This study examines the Sci-Hub downloads data in order to uncover patterns of piracy in European Studies research. We identify journals and the subjects of articles that have been pirated the most. We also study the geographical distribution of download requests. The analysis reveals that the readers are mostly interested in subjects reflecting the current major European challenges, specifically populism and the economic crisis. Both developing countries as well as the 'old' EU members are active in illegal downloads.

Keywords

> The days of keeping our research results to ourselves are over. There is far more to gain from sharing data and letting others access and analyse that data *(*European Commissioner Carlos Moedas, 4 December 2015).

Open Science, or 'Science 2.0', is dominating contemporary academic and societal debate. The speed and scale of digitalisation are transforming the way we produce, circulate and consume knowledge. We are witness to an ongoing evolution in 'the modus operandi of doing research and organising science' (European Commission 2015: 1), driven by digital technologies and Big Data, in the context of scientific globalisation and growing public demand to tackle societal challenges. The underlying idea behind the open science concept is that scientific knowledge 'should be openly shared as early as is practical in the discovery process' (Nielsen 2012). Thus, it entails multiple ongoing transitions of the research cycle and scientific practice.

Although open science is a relatively new concept, it has gained a lot of attention not only within the academic community, but also among policymakers. The European Commission and specifically its Directorate General for Research and Innovation has made open science a top priority on their agenda and has made a significant breakthrough in this field. The Commission concern with open science is natural given that the European Union is one of the world's leading producers of scientific knowledge.

One of the Commission initiatives is the Open Research Data (ORD) pilot of Horizon 2020, aimed at improving and maximising access to and re-use of the data of Horizon 2020 research projects (European Commission 2016a). The Commission has brought together key conceptual insights in its book about the three Os: *Open Innovation, Open Science, Open to the World* (European Commission 2016b). In May 2016, the Competitiveness Council of the EU set the year 2020 as the target for all publicly funded research published in Europe to be open access (Enserink 2016).

The debate around knowledge production has crystallised into two trends: open access and open source. The former refers to online, free access, peer-reviewed publications, with limited or no restrictions on copyright and licensing. Open source is about co-created free software without proprietary restriction (European Commission 2016b).

Discontent with paywall protected research has been growing for decades. The main reason for this is that the generation of the scientific content is largely funded by public funds. The creator, the author, provides this content for free to the publishers, who extract significant profit from users of this knowledge (other scientists, who are also funded by public funds and want to access copyrighted knowledge). Before the internet, publisher profit was relatively easy to justify, after all they were playing the crucial role in knowledge dissemination. However, the rise of the internet has changed this drastically. Today authors can share scientific knowledge with peers easily, directly through the internet. Thus, publishers have effectively lost their crucial role. This movement has disrupted the scientific publishing industry and resulted in the establishment of open access as a norm.

The rise of digitisation of intellectual property and of the usage of the internet as a distribution channel has also created a shift in consumer attitudes. Technology commentators have argued that digitisation and the internet would push businesses (of which publishing is one) to provide large parts of their content for free (Anderson 2009). As per the argument, this would be necessary to persuade consumers to pay for premium quality service, possibly because of the non-excludability feature of digital products. This is indeed what has happened in publishing with a number of projects like Google Books, as well as open access issues of scientific journals.

One could argue that the abundance of free content provided by copyright holders would leave consumers wanting more free content and push them towards pirating the part of the content that is not free. This is highly likely for products like music where end-consumers personally pay for products. However, we would argue that this is unlikely to be the reason when it comes to scientific journal content. In this case the end-users, researchers, do not personally pay for access to this content. Rather, most scientific journal sales go through subscriptions that are paid for by libraries. Besides, despite the rise of open access journals in recent years, a great majority of the high quality research is still behind paywalls. Thus, the role of free access to part of the content in encouraging consumer expectations for more free content is not clear in the case of scientific publishing.

Although open access emerged as an international desirable practice a few decades ago, modest results have been achieved so far in providing the public with free access to scholarly research. This is, arguably, due to the fact that scientific journal publishers turn significant margins from peer-reviewed journal subscriptions and are reluctant to open up to free access.

However, some international publishers have been moving towards (partial or full) open access publications and research data. In the field of European Studies (ES), online journals like this one (the JCER) and the *European Integration Online Papers* have been pioneers in making top-level research accessible for free worldwide. Moreover, generally these types of journals also prove to have a higher research outreach than non-open access content (Antelman 2004).

Compared to the open access journals, the creation of digital piracy engines for sharing international scientific publications represents a more radical development of open access practice. These new players emerge as vital actors in disseminating and determining the potential of research outreach regarding various academic and societal stakeholders. Piracy services are seen as the portal that gives a chance to scholars from poorer countries to access paywall-protected scientific research.

Online piracy represents a copyright infringement whereby copyrighted material is reproduced or distributed without appropriate permission. For the purpose of this piece, the copyrighted material

represents scientific articles. In a classic scientific publishing model, the copyright holder is a publisher to which the author assigns the right. Therefore, any further use of the scientific content requires explicit agreement by the publisher. The situation when a scientific article is reproduced or distributed without such agreement constitutes a copyright infringement, which has come to be known as online (or internet) piracy.

However, it is appropriate to point out the difference between online piracy and the original meaning of the term. Piracy originally describes the theft of excludable goods (meaning that consumption by one person precludes the consumption by another), while online piracy concerns a non-excludable good — scientific research. In the latter case, the consumption of the good by one person does not preclude others from consuming the same good.

Online piracy involves (at least) two parties: end-users and facilitators. Facilitators are individuals or organisations that acquire the content (usually through legal means) and share this content with other individuals who do not have sufficient legal rights to access the content. The latter actors are end-users of the act of piracy. It needs to be stressed that in most legal systems the responsibility lies with the facilitators, not the end-users.

The most well-known piracy engine (facilitator) for scientific papers is Sci-Hub, which has been rapidly gaining in popularity since its creation in 2011. Up to very recently, however, not much has been known about the size of its operations. Thus the cash-strained-researcher enabler status of Sci-Hub was never verified. However, recently data on five months of downloads from Sci-Hub service has emerged (Elbakyan and Bohannon 2016). The analysis of the raw data delivers a fascinating picture (Bohannon 2016). The concern of Bohannon (2016) is with the geographical distribution of download requests. The conclusion is that not only researchers in less-developed countries use the engine, but the Sci-Hub seems to be popular in developed countries too.

The picture presented by Bohannon (2016) is an aggregate view that relies on all download requests for all fields of study. Given that real science publications are more numerous compared to their social science counterparts, these findings might be hiding interesting patterns within social sciences.

In this work, we examine the Sci-Hub downloads data in order to uncover patterns of piracy in ES. We identify those ES journals that have been pirated the most. After identifying the top downloaded articles, we examine the subjects that most interest readers. We also analyse the geographical distribution of download requests, with a particular focus on developing countries and advanced Western countries and regions (e.g. the EU).

DATA

We use the data comprising all download requests received by the Sci-Hub servers between October 2015 and February 2016 (Elbakyan and Bohannon 2016). This represents a total of 22,915,621 download requests. The data have been anonymised in order to protect the identity of the user. For this the IP addresses have been aggregated to the nearest city location. Thus the data contains the city and the country from where the download request was received. The data contains the Digital Object Identifier (DOI) of the article requested. There is no other information about the requested article.

Therefore, identifying the articles from the ES field represents a challenge. Clearly, all ES articles cannot be identified. Therefore, we followed Babutsidze (2016) and proceeded as follows. We relied on information provided by UACES, the University Association for Contemporary European Studies;

UACES provided the list of ES journals, which comprises 25 journals. The impact factor across all these journals varies. The general consensus in scientific research is that the top journals aggregate the most robust and cutting edge research. Therefore, articles published in high impact-factor journals are more likely to be sought after, and thus pirated. Thus, in order to determine the extent of pirated consumption of ES research it sufficed to focus on high impact factor journals. From the list of 25 ES journals provided by UACES,[1] we chose the journals that have the highest ISI (Institute for Scientific Information) impact factor above 1. This criterion was satisfied by six journals: *West European Politics* (WEP), the *Journal of European Public Policy* (JEPP), the *European Journal of Political Research* (EJPR), *European Union Politics* (EUP), the *Journal of Common Market Studies* (JCMS) and *European Political Science Review* (EPSR). We identified the articles published in these six journals that were downloaded through Sci-Hub service between October 2015 and February 2016.

To identify the articles from the selected set of journals, we analysed the DOI assignment procedures by publishers of each of the journals. We identified unique character strings contained by digital object identifiers for each of the six journals that allowed us to separate ES publications from the rest of the observations. This reduced the working dataset drastically to 2,390 observations. This represents only 0.01 per cent of the whole dataset.

Following Babutsidze (2016), before carrying out the analysis, we removed duplicate downloads from the raw data by Bohannon (2016). The original data contains all page load requests received by Sci-Hub servers. When the user refreshes the browser that is in the process of loading the article, the server registers an additional download request. If we had the original IP data, these kinds of downloads could have been perfectly screened out. However, given the anonymised data we had to work with download time - download location pair of variables - in order to identify duplicates. To screen out multiple records for one actual download, we identified groups of downloads for the same paper that occurred from the same city within five minutes of one another. For each of these identified groups we retained only one download in our final dataset. This eliminated 80 observations and left us with the final dataset of 2,310 downloads for 1,537 distinct papers.

ANALYSIS

Our analysis includes 2,310 downloads over the span of five months. This implies 462 downloads on average per month for all the content generated by the six journals in our sample. One can conclude that the ES piracy numbers are not so impressive. In our opinion, this phenomenon can be explained by the fact that ES researchers are mostly concentrated in European countries where scholars have good access to scientific journals and thus do not have the financial need to pirate. Another reason for such a low number could be that researchers do not know about the existence of Sci-Hub as an alternative open resource to access the scientific output.

Table 1: Top downloaded European Studies articles

Authors	Year	Title	Journal	No of downloads
M. Rooduijn & T. Pauwels	2011	Measuring Populism: Comparing Two Methods of Content Analysis	WEP	10
L. Curini & F. Zucchini	2012	Government Alternation and Legislative Party Unity: The Case of Italy, 1988–2008	WEP	10
A. Niemann & D. Ioannou	2015	European economic integration in times of crisis: a case of neofunctionalism?	JEPP	8
C. Lyrintzis	1987	The power of populism: the Greek case	EJPR	7
G. Majone	1994	The rise of the regulatory state in Europe	WEP	7
C. Mudde	1995	Right-wing extremism analyzed	EJPR	7
M. Bovens	2010	Two Concepts of Accountability: Accountability as a Virtue and as a Mechanism	WEP	7
I. van Biezen, P. Mair & T. Poguntke	2012	Going, going, . . . gone? The decline of party membership in contemporary Europe	EJPR	7
S. Engler	2015	Corruption and Electoral Support for New Political Parties in Central and Eastern Europe	WEP	7
G. Cordero & P. Simón	2016	Economic Crisis and Support for Democracy in Europe	WEP	7

Table 1 shows the ranking of the most downloaded papers. It shows that the two most pirated ES articles have collected only 10 downloads each over the five month period. Another observation is that people pirate both old and new articles. This is different than in the case of other disciplines, such as Economics, where a similar study has found that it is the download of recent articles that prevails (Babutsidze 2016).

One of the most interesting discoveries is linked to the subjects of the top ten downloaded articles. It appears that the highest demand for illegally downloaded articles is in the field of party politics (six out of ten). Populism and extremism are among the top searched subjects. Other leading subjects are the economic crisis and the related topics of the regulatory state and democratic accountability. Similar to populism and extremism, the latter subjects reflect the current major societal challenges confronting Europe.

Table 2: Top downloaded European Studies journals

Journal	No of downloads	No of articles downloaded	No of downloads / journal's total output	No of downloaded articles / journal's total output
West European Politics	795	546	0,462	0,317
Journal of European Public Policy	748	482	0,506	0,326
European Journal of Political Research	517	353	0,195	0,133
European Union Politics	180	108	0,436	0,262
Journal of Common Market Studies	68	46	0,030	0,020
European Political Science Review	2	2	0,012	0,012

Table 2 presents analysis at the journal level. We have to acknowledge that journals have generated article stock of different sizes. Obviously, more articles imply more potential downloads. Therefore, we needed to control for the size of research at a journal level. We gathered the data from ISI Web of Science about the total number of articles published by each journal. Web of Science (WoS) records are not perfect; however, they span over an extended number of years. Using the WoS data, we could estimate the number of articles published by each of the journals yearly and construct an estimate of the journal's total output. The last two columns in Table 2 normalise download data using these estimates. When examining the most pirated journals, it is worth mentioning that there are only three journals mentioned in Table 1 out of the six journals that we studied: WEP, the EJPR, and the JEPP. The fact that WEP leads with the top ten downloaded articles (six out of ten) and the total number of downloaded articles (in absolute terms) is not a surprise. The journal has established itself as one of the most authoritative publications on Western Europe and provides comprehensive coverage of all the major political and social developments in the region, including the European Union. However, when the number of published articles is taken into account, the JEPP comes top.

Looking at the profile of the top three downloaded journals, we can also conclude that Sci-Hub users are mostly interested in EU studies. This finding highlights that ES research (in terms of both supply and demand) is largely dominated by the study of the European Union.

Table 3 presents the countries from where the content has been most frequently downloaded. Compared to the rankings reported by Bohannon (2016), our data reveals a different pattern of geographical downloading. The explanation seems quite straightforward as the European Studies field has a strong geographical determinant. However, it is noteworthy that Brazil, China and the United States still generate more than 10 monthly downloads each.

Table 3: Top downloading countries

Country	No of downloads	No of yearly downloads / UACES member
Spain	308	22
Italy	289	18
Germany	176	5
Ukraine	144	173
Poland	103	9
Brazil	96	-
Turkey	90	9
France	76	8
Russia	65	26
Belgium	59	2
Hungary	57	10
China	54	26
United States	51	6

A more accurate picture on the popularity of piracy in ES has to take into account the size of the research bodies in each of the countries. For this we require the number of researchers engaged in ES in each of the countries. Such data is not readily available. However, we can proxy the number of ES researchers by the data on UACES membership. One of the 13 countries in Table 3, Brazil, has no UACES members. The data on the remaining 12 countries is taken into account in the third column of Table 3.

Financial background and the likelihood of the illegally downloaded scholarly articles are expected to be highly correlated. The well-established Northern European universities, for example, have sufficient financial resources to provide legal access to electronic resources to its staff and students. Moreover, these institutions have a larger number of ES courses and ES programmes (Timus and Cebotari 2014; Timuș, Cebotari and Hosein 2016). However, the opposite is expected in developing countries, both on the European continent (e.g. post-Soviet EU neighbours) and worldwide. Paradoxically, our data reveals that the highest number of total downloads comes from 'old' EU members, such as Germany, Italy, Spain and not developing countries. We believe this may be explained by the higher demand for ES research in the West European countries. As Germany and Italy were among the founding members of the EU, they have a stronger tradition of ES research. But it is also likely that the poorer financial situation of Italian and Spanish universities may be the driving factor behind the highest ES piracy rates in absolute numbers.

Table 3 also reveals that Ukraine is on the top of illegal downloads per UACES member. First, we must acknowledge that there were only two officially registered UACES members in Ukraine in 2014. However, Ukraine also holds fourth place among the countries with the highest downloads in terms of absolute numbers. The Ukrainian context, in our opinion, combines a poor financial situation for higher education institutions and an increasing demand for ES research. This demand may also be linked to the pro-European orientation of Ukrainian political elites since the Orange Revolution in 2004 and particularly after the Maidan protests in 2014. One can speculate that the high number of country downloads in Turkey may also be explained by the ongoing EU accession process and the active political and societal debates linked to the European integration process.

CONCLUSION

Despite the limited time period of data on illegal downloads, this study has revealed several factors explaining the illegal download of ES scholarly publications. First, the limited number of downloads in the ES field, compared to other disciplines, may be due to the geographical concentration of the ES research on the European continent. The high degree of access to scientific journals among European universities, particularly within the EU, could be a major explanation for the lack of financial need to pirate. However, we do not rule out the possibility of a low degree of knowledge about Sci-Hub as an alternative open source of downloading ES research.

Second, the most pirated journals are the well-established top ES journals like *West European Politics*, the *European Journal for Political Research* and the *Journal of European Public Policy*. The readers are mostly interested in subjects reflecting the current major European societal challenges, specifically populism and the economic crisis.

Last, but not least, the analysis presents mixed findings regarding the worldwide downloading pattern. On the one hand, the financial situation of universities in certain countries appears to be accountable for a higher number of downloads within Europe. On the other hand, the higher demand for ES research represents another key determinant of the number of downloads worldwide. Our analysis reveals that an older EU membership explains a stronger tradition of ES research and, consequently, higher illegal downloads of ES publications. Moreover, a pro-European political discourse (Ukraine) or an ongoing EU accession process (Turkey) can also account for a higher demand for pirated ES research.

Ultimately ES might be getting something good from the Sci-Hub: publishers are not losing much revenue (due to the small number of downloads), while researchers in under-developed countries and cash-strapped universities are getting access to important content. This is what open science should be about!

<p align="center">***</p>

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS

Natalia Timuș, Maastricht Graduate School of Governance and UNU-MERIT, Boschstraat 24, 6211 AX Maastricht, The Netherlands [n.timus@maastrichtuniversity.nl].

[1] List of European Studies Journals, available online http://www.uaces.org/resources/list-of-european-studies-journals [last accessed 06 June 2016].

REFERENCES

Anderson, C. (2009) *Free: How Today's Smartest Profit by Giving Something for Nothing.* London: Random House.

Antelman, K. (2004) 'Do Open-access Articles Have a Greater Research Impact?' *College and Research Libraries* 65(5): 372-382.

Babutsidze, Z. (2016) 'Pirated Economics,' *MPRA Paper No*: 71703. University Library of Munich, Germany, https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/71703 [last accessed 20 June 2016].

Bohannon, J. (2016) 'Who's Downloading Pirated Papers? Everyone,' *Science* 352(6285): 508-512. DOI: 10.1126/science.352.6285.508.

JCER (2016) 'Continued Journal Ranking Success,' *Journal of Contemporary European Research*, available online: http://jcer.net/index.php/jcer/announcement/view/35 [last accessed 20 May 2016].

Elbakyan, A. and Bohannon, J. (2016) 'Data From: 'Who's Downloading Pirated Papers? Everyone'', *Dryad Digital Repository*. DOI: 10.5061/dryad.q447c.

Enserink, M. (2016) 'In Dramatic Statement, European Leaders Call for 'Immediate' Open Access to All Scientific Papers by 2020', *Science*, 27 May, DOI: 10.1126/science.aag0577 [last accessed 28 May 2016].

European Commission (2015) 'Public consultation 'Science 2.0': Science in Transition,' *Background Paper*, available online: https://ec.europa.eu/research/consultations/science-2.0/background.pdf [last accessed 20 May 2016].

European Commission (2016a) *Guidelines on Open Access to Scientific Publications and Research Data in Horizon 2*020, available online: http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/data/ref/h2020/grants_manual/hi/oa_pilot/h2020-hi-oa-pilot-guide_en.pdf [last accessed 9 May 2016].

European Commission (2016b) *Open Innovation, Open Science, Open to the World*. Brussels: Directorate-General for Research & Innovation (RTD).

Moedas, Carlos (2014) Speech at European Research and Innovation for Global Challenges, Lund, 4 December 2015.

Nielsen, M. (2012) *Reinventing Discovery: The New Era of Networked Science*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Timuş, Natalia and Cebotari, V. (2014) *INOTLES Survey on Teaching European Studies* (2014), available online: http://www.inotles.eu/survey-teaching-es [last accessed 9 May 2016].

Timus, N., Cebotari, V. and Hosein, A. (2016) 'Innovating Teaching and Learning of European Studies: Mapping Existing Provisions and Pathways', *Journal of Contemporary European Research* 12 (2): 653 - 668.

Review of Books

Thomas Hörber, *École Supérieure des Sciences Commerciales d'Angers (ESSCA)*

ENVIRONMENT, OIL AND ENERGY - AN OVERVIEW OR A PECULIARLY GERMAN PERSPECTIVE ON POWER, MONEY AND THE BLACK GOLD?

SEO: Three books are reviewed, each centred around the topics of environment, oil and energy and published by the German government-funded *Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung* (BPB), The Federal Centre for Political Education. The BPB's remit has for a long time been to publish books and articles on pertinent topics which would not necessarily find a commercial publisher. In this case, however, the three books are very topical in dealing with major and popular issues of our time.

Thomas Seifert and Klaus Werner's book is written in a journalistic style, with a hint of a spy thriller when oil wells are discovered, bribes are paid, the US Army moves into Saudi Arabia, or when the installations have to be protected against potential terrorist attacks. On the face of it, this contribution does not seem to have much academic value. The titling seems to be too flashy for serious consideration. And the authors seem all too prone to ramblings promoting long-discarded prejudices in a manner too simplistic even to begin to explain why oil is such an important commodity in our world. However, beyond the sketchy surface some good analysis can be found, notably as to how higher oil prices have also stimulated the search for alternative energy resources, e.g. renewable energies (21-2). That goes for the oil crises in the 1970s, but also for the peak just before the financial crisis of 2008/9. It also leads to energy saving, such as in thermal insulation of buildings or more fuel-efficient cars. The historical narrative about oil exploitation in the Middle East covers all the major events, from the six-day war in 1967 in which Israel occupied Gaza, the Sinai, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights (47); next the oil crisis of 1973, cruelly exposing western dependency on oil, and the fact that the Europeans could neither agree with the Americans nor agree among themselves, on a common policy. Instead, everyone pursued their own national solutions (54). Next, the second oil shock in 1979, from which sprang fundamental doubts in the mantra of economic growth which eventually led to the Green movement, particularly in Germany (59).

The narrative also covers, of course, the spectre of the thirst for energy of emerging powers such as China and India (209); spectre, because of the increase in the oil price, the resultant serious impact on lifestyles and living standards in the West, and because of the environmental impact of another 2.5 billion people using the same amount of energy the West has used over past decades. Unfortunately, the authors see this as a lethal competition between major nations over scarce resources, rather than an opportunity for them to work together for a sustainable world (217). Thus this book must be classified in the category of black and white analyses such as the ones elaborated by Jeremy Rifkin, which the authors seem to hold in high regard (229). It is an intriguing thought that Rifkin put forward the idea that hydrogen could revolutionise our energy markets. The idea is that

solar panels and windmills provide the power to produce hydrogen in a hydrogen cell, which at the same time is the engine of the car in one's garage. It would certainly get around the problem of energy storage, but we are a long way from either sufficient renewable energy, hydrogen powered cars or hydrogen storage units, which could be installed in private homes (233). This idea entails decentralisation of power production and many small producers close to energy self-sufficiency in their own private home. Whether the suspicion of the author is justified that the current energy giants would use all their conspiratorial power to prevent such a revolution must remain open (234, Hennicke: 122), but it could be given a positive turn in the question of how to interest the energy giants in renewable energies (Hennicke: 128). Many problems remain with hydrogen technology, the storage problem particularly is hard to solve, which is one reason why it has not been implemented in recent years. In contrast, a more likely scenario is permanent overproduction through renewable sources, which can provide power to all users through a potent energy grid, perhaps on a European scale rather than a national one.

The second book by Hennicke and Fischdick picks up precisely this topic of renewable energy. It covers in much more detail all the possible technologies which make up the field of renewable energy today. The problem is that not all of these energies are yet competitive. Therefore, Green philosophy says that current subsidies can be justified on the basis that renewable energy will be profitable in the end. On the economic side, this covers speed of innovation, reduced energy costs, increased export opportunities and general technological progress. The environmental side almost needs no arguments in this Green philosophy because renewables manifestly reduce pollution as a major part of sustainable development (8). However, it is interesting to see the development of this Green philosophy featuring a strong economic rationale. The security aspect adds a further element in that renewable energy will decrease dependency on energy imports and thus enhance energy supply security and could well help, even, to avoid conflicts over resources (13). Further, this could curtail the monopoly of energy giants such as RWE, E.ON, EnBW or Vattenfall in Germany. These realist arguments of the second generation Green philosophy link up with their roots in the idea of the decentralisation of power production through many small producers, e.g. the already mentioned solar panel on the roof, which could today cover about two thirds of a household's energy demand (17, 37, 128). From this root springs one danger, which is an intriguing idea at the same time – self-sufficiency. Green philosophy sometimes advocates concepts of self-sufficiency not only for households and individuals but also for states. The problem with this is, however, that economic isolationism has never been beneficial – witness the fate of the Soviet Union – and therefore Green philosophy, in my opinion, must be careful to guard against advocating ideas promoting national energy self-sufficiency or even individual self-sufficiency. The positive juxtaposition is the empowerment of citizens in administering their own energy projects in their communities, while at the same time remaining connected to the energy grid (18).

It goes without saying that in this kind of context, nuclear energy is on its way out (24). The energy solution of the future, hence, is energy efficiency plus renewable energy (25). One recent addition to this Green philosophy is the installation of solar parks in northern Africa. The appeal, again, stems mainly from wild ideas of the kind that Morocco alone could cover the world energy demand from solar power (47). However, there are serious doubts about the viability of such an option, e.g. cost of installation, transport and perhaps most importantly, political stability before and after such a huge investment. In the context of the climate change debate, all such projects with renewable energy sound very attractive. It is, however, important to realise that all of them still depend on public subsidies (93) – of course it was pointed out that fossil and nuclear technology also received huge subsidies in the early stages of their development and sometimes even up and until today (132). There are two ways to achieve economic viability of renewables: on the one hand by speeding up the introduction of renewables; on the other, by phasing out fossil fuels. In both scenarios, energy will become more expensive before it becomes cheaper again, when renewables will have reached their maturity. However, regarding the issue of sustainability, the changeover to renewables clearly

leads in the right direction. Energy efficiency and energy saving must come as a second leg of such an energy strategy (108). The financial and political steering capabilities are essential for the promotion of this process. Green philosophy often falls into the trap of renationalisation of politics (112, 122), while it is evident that the nation states cannot possibly solve environmental or energy problems in a satisfactory manner by themselves. We are more likely to find the solution in reasonably efficient international organisations such as the EU. It is fortunate that in this book the European potential for pushing energy and environmental policy forward is recognised, for example, in EU directives on energy efficiency and energy provider services (125).

The third book that of Dietrich Jörn Weder, is a summary of the major environmental threats and preservation potentials from a distinctly German perspective. It is by no means cutting-edge academic thinking, but it is nevertheless an excellent starting point for those who wish to approach topics such as environmental protection, sustainability and the tough choices humanity will have to face in the future. It serves the widest possible audience because it covers topics of general interest, such as species' extinction (Ch. 2), deforestation (Ch. 3) or water pollution (Ch. 4), but at the same time, it gives a detailed overview of early German environmental legislation, for example. The book starts out with a chapter on climate change and the potential destruction resulting from it. In some passages it is, perhaps, a little apocalyptic, but through that it drives home the serious threat we face (8-16). After the previously mentioned chapters, it covers the explosion of world population, which is at the root of the problem of sustainability (59-70). After the Brundtland Report of 1987, the connection between depletion of resources, on the one hand, and unsustainable population growth, on the other has disappeared into oblivion. This might be because the link is not direct, that is the carbon footprint of the countries with large populations or strong population growth, e.g. China, bears no comparison with what Western industrialised countries consume. However, if we are seriously thinking about sustainability in terms of guaranteeing the survival of humanity, then controlling population growth seems to be just as necessary as a substantial decrease of carbon emissions.

After this comes a very good and detailed introduction to German environmental policy, which got under way in the 1970s, promoted by Chancellor Willy Brandt (83). As usual in the beginning, environmental policy was geared towards alleviating the worst environmental repercussions of industrial production, such as from the heavy industry in the Ruhr. The German population quickly picked up on the importance of environmental protection: by 1972, two thirds of the German population considered this an important issue (84). Distrust of nuclear power was added in the 1970s and became the consensus after the nuclear meltdown at Chernobyl in 1986 (85). From that point onwards, the nuclear industry fought a rear-guard battle in order to protect its huge financial investments, but the atom had lost its appeal as an energy source for the future. That is also the year when Germany as a latecomer established a ministry for environment and reactor security (87) - in Britain an environment ministry was established in the early 1970s. After dealing with issues of recycling and the German ecotax, taxing energy while reducing taxation of labour, this chapter lists the main European environmental laws, from the directive on drinking water in 1980 to the emissions trading scheme of 2002 or the car recycling directive from 2000 (92).

The next chapter on sustainability covers topics such as urbanisation and the steady growth of the road network (98), which is continuously diminishing areas of natural habitats (103). This leads to the usual Green commitment to communal transport, such as buses and trains (104) and also the usual slight imbalance against individual traffic (106-7). Critically, one might say that individual mobility is an essential element of modern society, and might even be a tenet of the fundamental value of freedom itself. Hence, the objective cannot be combating individual traffic, but to introduce technologies which make such traffic environment friendly, such as in hydrogen cells (105). It must also be said that mobility is an essential element of European integration and globalisation and has taken us beyond nationalism and isolation. Here the pressure really is on how this traffic can be

made sustainable, for example, if the hydrogen cell cannot yet be applied to individual cars and households, because it is too dangerous or too difficult, it might well be worthwhile thinking about hydrogen aircraft where one has specialists working with the engines in a reflectively controlled environment.

The final quote by Ernst Ulrich von Weizäcker makes a telling prediction for the future: 'We are entering the century of the environment, regardless of whether we want to or not. In these times, everyone who calls himself a realist will have to justify his actions as a contribution to sustainability and environmental protection'[i] (137).

These three books together constitute a really good entry into the topic of energy & environment, for practitioners, academics or students of the subject. Clearly the focus here is on Germany, but there is a wider perspective which includes Europe and the world.

<p align="center">***</p>

---

[i] My translation

BIBLIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

Schwarzbuch Öl – Eine Geschichte von Gier, Krieg, Macht und Geld (The Black Book on Oil - a story of greed, war, power and money).

Authors: Thomas Seifert, Klaus Werner

BPB, Bonn, 2006.

ISBN 3893317295 (paperback), free of charge at the BPB, 251 pages.

Erneuerbare Energien (Renewable Energy)

Authors: Peter Hennicke, Manfred Fischdick

BPB, Bonn, 2007.

ISBN 978-3-89331-837-7 (paperback), free of charge at the BPB, 145 pages.

Bedrohung und Bewahrung (Environment – Threat and Preservation)

Authors: Dietrich Jörn Weder

Umwelt –BPB, Bonn, 2003.

ISBN 3-89331-535-7, (paperback), free of charge at the BPB, 144 pages.

Book Review

Fadıl Ersözer, University of Manchester

THE EUROPEANISATION OF CONTESTED STATEHOOD: THE EU IN NORTHERN CYPRUS

Author: George Kyris

The increasing influence of the European Union (EU) in the domestic affairs of its member states and its 'near abroad' (the EU's eastern, such as Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and southern, such as Morocco, Syria, Israel, Palestine neighbours) has attracted a significant degree of academic interest in the past two decades. Yet much of the scholarly work has studied the EU informed changes at the domestic level in relation to uncontested states, while the relevance of the EU for contested states (i.e. states unrecognized in world politics) remains an under-researched topic (2015: 1). *The Europeanization of Contested Statehood: The EU in Northern Cyprus* (2015), by George Kyris, is a remarkable contribution to the literature of Europeanization on the EU's engagement with contested states and how the unique context of the contested statehood relates to the EU's impact on their domestic affairs, with a focus on the case of Northern Cyprus (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus - TRNC). It is for a broad range of academic audiences, specialists and non-specialists alike, who are interested in Europeanization, the EU's role in contested statehood, and the Cyprus problem.

The main research questions are, *how has the EU affected the Turkish Cypriot civil society, political parties, and institutions and how has contested statehood affected this impact?* [Emphasis added]. Accordingly, the book consists of seven chapters. After a brief introduction that places the study in its field, the second chapter provides an overview of the literature on Europeanization and contested statehood. It highlights that the effect of the EU will be examined based on three main mechanisms of Europeanization (institutional compliance, change of domestic opportunity structures and ideational change). Additionally, the chapter determines a set of characteristics of contested states that are expected to influence the process of Europeanization (lack of recognition, international isolation, influence of a 'patron state', lack of effective state structures, lack of effective territorial control, importance of the regional dispute for domestic affairs). This allows the author to set a precise research framework about the EU's impact in the affairs of Northern Cyprus. The third chapter places the Turkish Cypriots in historical context, where the focus is on the evolution of the Turkish Cypriot administrative bodies, and successfully prepares the reader for the empirical study. The following three chapters track the effect of the EU in three domestic remits of the affairs of the Northern Cyprus; Civil society and political parties (politics), as well as institutions (polity) as the main interlocutors with the EU. The final chapter summarizes the findings and addresses further avenues for research in order to understand the EU's engagement with contested states.

The book captures the different ways in which Europeanization has taken place (in Northern Cyprus, the contested state) between the pre- and post-accession periods (of the Republic of Cyprus, the uncontested state). Kyris argues that, Europeanization in the pre-accession period has taken place in

relation to the prospect of the EU membership, which was linked to a potential reunification of the island. A set of changes with regard to the political parties took place though redefinition of party programmes, the emergence of new political parties based on the EU discourse and shifts in the patterns of party competition between moderates and hard-liners. Similarly, civil society actors reconfigured their initially Eurosceptic interests (e.g. trade unions) and embraced the EU-trend for achieving their long-standing aim of reunification of Cyprus. According to Kyris, these fully EU-informed changes were a manifestation of 'ideational' Europeanization (2015: 82), mainly because they occurred in absence of direct links with between the EU and the contested state. On the other hand, this period showed no Europeanization effects in the Turkish Cypriot institutions, due to their absence from the EU membership preparations of the uncontested state.

According to the author, the post-accession direct involvement of the EU in Northern Cyprus provided new elements to the process of Europeanization (2015: 63). For example, the growing affiliation of the moderate political parties with the EU has increased their power in the Turkish Cypriot politics (2015: 95). Similarly, training and financial and technical assistance under the capacity-building programmes has become a direct link between the EU and the Turkish Cypriot civil society. Such direct link sustained the ideational Europeanization via transfer of knowledge and organizational skills as well as giving birth to new organizations. Additionally, the similar institutionalization experience for dealing with the EU matters in North Cyprus, the influential 'patron state' Turkey, and the RoC is taken as 'socialization' of Turkish Cypriots into the EU environment, which indicates ideational Europeanization (2015: 101).

The book portrays the post-accession Europeanization of institutions as an example that resembles the experience of EU enlargement, yet a 'different enlargement', due to the unique characteristics of the contested statehood (2015: 97). There is an EU-informed strengthening of the executive branch vis-à-vis the legislative branch of the state for adoption of the EU *acquis communautaire* and needed reforms. However, the EU avoids official contacts with the contested state institutions and its officials, in order to prevent, what is called, 'recognition by implication'. Instead, new influential interlocutors are empowered, which are less identified with the contested state, and the state structures are by-passed (2015: 113). For example, Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce a civil society actor, has been given a set of responsibilities involving interaction with 'Brussels', which are normally activities dealt by official governmental structures. Similarly, the European Union Coordination Centre, maintaining EU matters, such as legal harmonization with the EU law, is developed in less identification with the state institutions to acquire more direct contacts with the EU.

It is noteworthy how the book captures the characteristics of the EU's engagement with Northern Cyprus. Yet, the extent that such relationship form remains valid in different issue areas in Cyprus, or in other examples of contested statehood invites more research. For example, the 'cooperation via de-politicized engagement' pattern did not occur on the recent hydrocarbons dispute in Cyprus, despite the call of the Turkish Cypriot side for cooperation under a similar de-politicized framework (an ad-hoc committee to by-pass state structures). The EU did not utilize the same approach to push cooperation on the island, which escalating tensions brought the peace talks to a temporary halt in late 2014. This aspect brings some important questions into the discussion, how does the political flexibility of both the uncontested and the contested state relate to formation of the de-politicized relationship that the EU inclines to develop in engaging contested states? Also, would the impact and the routes of Europeanization in Northern Cyprus be significantly restricted if the Turkish Cypriot authorities did not show the political flexibility to empower the 'non-state' interlocutors? Some discussion on these questions would further help the reader to understand the EU's opportunities and limitations in engaging with contested states.

A few issues could be addressed at the empirical level. One in particular is the statement that the declaration of the TRNC excluded 'any' references to a 'federal state' in Cyprus and did not take into account the UN-supported efforts towards establishment of a federation (2015: 78). In fact, the text explicitly states that TRNC does not hinder efforts to establish a 'genuine' federation, but 'such proclamation can facilitate efforts in this direction by fulfilling the necessary requisites for the establishment of a federation...and urges the pursuit of negotiations under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General' (KKTC Meclisi, 1983: 10). In addition, with regard to the explanation below a table on the Turkish Cypriot election results, where the 'lighter colours indicate moderate/ pro-EU parties, while hard-line/ Eurosceptic are presented in darker colours', the case is just the opposite (2015: 79). Finally, there are some inconsistencies in using the Turkish characters such as Kıbrıs/ Kibris, Türk/ Turk, Öğretmenler/ Ogretmenler, Sendikası/ Sendikasi (2015: 56). Nevertheless, it should be noted that these issues do not reflect badly upon the analysis or hinder the findings in any aspect.

Kyris' study develops a deep engagement with academic literature and a strong analytical framework that is successfully applied throughout the research. It is adequately supported by empirical evidence such as interviews, data, figures, as well as by visual tables. Overall, this study is an invaluable contribution not only because it fills the gap of scholarly work on Europeanization of Northern Cyprus. The analysis adds on the conceptual approach and it significantly improves our understanding of how the EU behaves and extends its influence into contested states. In a timely manner, this book is also a rewarding read in view of the acceleration of the peace-talks following to the victory of the pro-solution Turkish Cypriot leader Mustafa Akıncı in the 2015 elections. It is particularly relevant because of the growing consensus between the two leaderships on the island, and the European Commission, that the Turkish Cypriots should be prepared for implementation of the acquis prior to a potential reunification on the island, which will accelerate Europeanization in Northern Cyprus.

***

REFERENCES

KKTC Meclisi (1983). 'KKTC Bağımsızlık Bildirgesi'. *Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti Cumhuriyet Meclisi.* 15 November. Available at: http://cm.gov.nc.tr/Bilgi/bildirge.pdf. [Accessed on 4 January 2016.] [The English translation is taken from, "DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE BY TURKISH CYPRIOT PARLIAMENT ON 15 NOVEMBER 1983. *The Association of Turkish Cypriots* Abroad. Available at: http://www.atcanews.org/archive/declarationofindependence.pdf. Accessed on 4 January 2016.]

BIBLIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

The Europeanization of Contested Statehood: The EU in Northern Cyprus

Author: George Kyris

Routledge, 2015

ISBN: 9781472421593 (hardback), 60.00 GBP, 168 pages

Other formats: 9781315558479 (EPUB)