Journal of Contemporary European Research

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Research Article

The French and the Italian Parliaments in EU Affairs Post-Lisbon: True Empowerment or Cosmetic Change?

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Abstract

The role of national parliaments in EU decision-making has generally been considered marginal since national parliaments participate indirectly through national executives. The Lisbon Treaty, however, triggered important developments in this regard. Direct involvement of national parliaments through the Early Warning System and Political Dialogue has prompted internal reforms. This article argues that, because of the new procedures provided for by the Lisbon Treaty and the direct relationship between the Commission and national parliaments, certain legislatures such as the French and Italian have become stronger in their involvement in EU affairs. However, seven years of practice post-Lisbon show that the innovations brought about by the new Treaty have fallen short of fully satisfying national parliaments' thirst for active engagement. We also observe that changes at the national level have only been implemented progressively and have not yet been exploited to their full potential.

Keywords

The role of national parliaments (NPs) in EU decision-making has been considered as marginal. The influence of NPs has been understood to be indirect only, since such influence has been exerted only through national executives, even when Member States' parliaments were represented in the Parliamentary Assembly of the European Community (Maurer 2001: 27-75; Lindseth 2010: 81-188). The Lisbon Treaty, however, appears to have at least altered this landscape by creating a direct relationship between NPs and EU institutions, especially with the Commission. Furthermore, depending upon the way Member States implemented the Treaty provisions at the domestic level, the new Treaty might have contributed to the strengthening of parliamentary control over the decision-making process in both the Council and the European Council by instigating tighter scrutiny of governments and more frequent exchanges of opinions between the executive and legislative branches.

Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, national reforms have been enacted or procedures have been developed through institutional practice and customary rules. These new national rules empower NPs to direct the action of national executives within these intergovernmental institutions and to check national executives' compliance with parliamentary resolutions and conclusions passed beforehand. Moreover, the direct relationship between NPs and the Commission by means of the Political Dialogue (PD) has enhanced the previously minimal role that NPs held in EU affairs. The Commission first promoted the PD, launched in 2006, as a complement to the parliaments' policing role as 'subsidiarity gatekeepers', a role that the (failed) Constitutional Treaty had attributed to them. When compared to the Early Warning System (EWS), which endows NPs with the power to ask the Commission to amend or withdraw a legislative proposal, the PD is a more cooperative and proactive tool. Confirmed by the Commission on 1 December 2009 (European Commission 2009), the PD allows domestic legislatures to send their opinions to this institution at any time, based on any grounds (including merits, legal basis, subsidiarity, proportionality) and regarding any document received. It also entitles NPs to a reply from the Commission. As a consequence of this, as well as the direct transmission of all EU

documents provided for in Protocol 1 annexed to the Treaties, NPs have become more involved in EU affairs, as illustrated below.

With a focus on the French and the Italian Parliaments as case studies, this article considers whether changes provoked at the domestic and European levels by the Lisbon Treaty have modified these NPs' role in EU affairs. While traditionally French and Italian forms of parliamentary scrutiny over EU affairs have been considered weak, both parliaments' ability to control indirectly the Council and the European Council through their governments has been reinforced since the Treaty reform. Furthermore, the attitude of each individual parliamentary chamber (the National Assembly and the Senate in France and the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate in Italy) towards the PD and the Commission has changed dramatically in recent years.

This contribution is in line with recent studies on the role of NPs following the Lisbon Treaty (Auel and Christiansen 2015; Rozenberg 2017). It, however, aims to combine the analysis of NPs' participation in some EU procedures, like the EWS and the PD, with an analysis of domestic, though EU-related, procedures, like the scrutiny of Council and European Council's meetings. In doing so, it draws on the case study of two traditionally weak parliaments in EU affairs and provides an overall assessment of those legislatures' involvement as 'European actors' after the last Treaty reform. Against this background, this article first analyses how NPs have tried to exert influence through their governments before it highlights how, since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, they also have sought to gain influence through the Commission.

NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS' ABILITY TO PARTICIPATE INDIRECTLY IN EU DECISION-MAKING THROUGH THEIR EXECUTIVES

Since the beginning of the European integration process, NPs have traditionally tried to exert influence on EU decision-making through their governments. The need to strengthen their scrutiny ability over EU affairs and their participation rights at both the domestic and the supranational level is often seen as a way to counter the long-standing problems of the 'democratic disconnect' (Lindseth 2010), of the 'representation deficit' (Bellamy and Kröger 2013), and of the weakness of political constitutionalism in the EU's constitutional construction (Glencross 2014).

Indeed, the Parliamentary Assembly of the European Community, where NPs were originally represented, as only a consultative body, had a marginal role in shaping European legislation and in making fundamental decisions for supranational policymaking. When the voting rule in the Council was only unanimity, before the Single European Act, NPs could hold their national government accountable for its voting behaviour at the supranational level. However, most national legislatures at that time did not perform such a thorough scrutiny of the executives' EU activities. NPs did not have other tools for direct involvement in EU affairs, except for their ability to exercise a veto on Treaty revisions. At that time, it was understood that 'classical' international treaties ruled the European Communities, explaining the long-held belief that NPs could be put aside without raising any major difficulties.

In this context, national legislatures have tried to exert their control indirectly over EU law-making and in particular over the Council. Undoubtedly, the extent to which this parliamentary control was and still is effective relies upon the national mechanisms and procedures to hold the national government accountable before the parliament, as well as upon the party system and the composition of the government. Furthermore, the political culture of each Member State plays a role in allowing NPs to be involved.

By no means has the Lisbon Treaty's recognition of NPs' direct involvement in EU law-making, in particular in relation to the Commission, led to an abandonment of the indirect channel of influence through national governments. Rather the opposite has occurred: the frequency, the proceduralisation (even if by institutional practice), the level of in depth-analysis reached by the parliamentary scrutiny of the Council and, even more so, of the European Council, has increased in both the French and the Italian Parliaments over the past seven years. Hence, the direct interaction between parliaments and the Commission, as analysed below, does not replace, but rather complements the indirect relationship between parliaments and EU intergovernmental institutions established through the executives. The former can also be considered an incentive to strengthen the latter in order to preserve the specific features of national forms of government in EU affairs: parliaments that act as autonomous players in the EU can be seen as a threat to the stability of the domestic legislative-executive relationship. Additionally, the introduction of the PD – and the EWS – has provided NPs with comprehensive information on EU matters without the need to depend entirely on their governments, allowing legislatures to control the executives better.

France

Parliamentary scrutiny of EU activities carried out by the Executive has usually been very weak in France. Consequently, the ability of the two Chambers, in particular of the National Assembly on whose confidence the prime minister is dependent, to influence EU decision-making indirectly through the government has been similarly weak. The weakness of parliamentary scrutiny derives, at least as regards the scrutiny of the European Council, from an evident feature of the French semi-presidential form of government: the President of the Republic, who sits in the European Council, is not democratically accountable to either chambers and can only send written messages to them. Thereby, the president is prevented by the Constitution itself from entering the chambers' buildings, meaning that the president can neither be heard before the European Council's meetings nor report to the Parliament afterwards. Neither the Constitution – as it was amended in 2008 on both the Parliament-Government relationship and the Parliament's participation in EU affairs in general in order to incorporate the novelties of the Lisbon Treaty – nor the relevant legislative provisions have been formally revised in order to specifically strengthen parliamentary control over the summits of the intergovernmental institutions in the EU.

Despite the lack of constitutional and legislative reforms, parliamentary practice and internal rules have recently enhanced parliamentary scrutiny, especially of the European Council. Both parliamentary assemblies allow for the establishment of control procedures on the Council and the European Council. This is because both internal rules foresee the possibility of organising governmental hearings. Moreover, the Ordonnance du 17 novembre 1958, n. 1958-1100 on the functioning of the parliamentary assemblies, which allows for the transmission of documents forwarded to the Council, plays an important role in guaranteeing the Chambers' access to information. As the President of France has been from the same political majority as the Prime Minister and his government (and the National Assembly) since the last cohabitation period ended in 1995, the prime minister has been able to report on the European Council's meetings to the Chambers on behalf of the President (Fromage 2014: 158).

Notwithstanding the lack of a legal obligation on the part of the government to inform the parliament about European Council and Council meetings,[1] a practice has developed since the failed referendum on the Constitutional Treaty: the parliament is involved both before and after European

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[1] By contrast, according to art. 88-4 Fr. Const., the Government has a duty to transmit EU legislative proposals and acts, regarding which the Chambers can pass resolutions addressed to the Executive.

Council meetings (Wessels and Rozenberg 2013: 46). In both chambers, debates with a representative of the government – the Secretary of State or the Minister Delegate to the Minister for Foreign Affairs with the responsibility for European affairs – are organised before European Council meetings. The Secretary of State or the Minister makes a statement before the plenary session of each chamber before the floor is opened for discussion with senators and MPs who pose questions to the government (Fromage 2014: 168). Parliamentary scrutiny of the European Council's meetings also takes place ex post by means of committee hearings, usually held before the Committee on EU Affairs of the National Assembly and the Senate, which sometimes arrange joint meetings for that purpose.

 Note, however, that while the Senate had been much more involved in the ex ante scrutiny in a plenary session in the past (21 debates in the Senate v. eight debates in the National Assembly from 2010 to 2014), in 2015 and 2016, all formal European Council meetings were preceded by a debate in a plenary session in the Senate (Sénat n/d) and the National Assembly also organised debates almost systematically.[2] The National Assembly, through its Committee on EU Affairs, had been much more active in holding the Government to account on the European Council's meetings ex post (15 committee meetings and hearings in the National Assembly v. seven in the Senate from 2010 to 2014) (Fromage 2015[3]). However, such important a difference could no longer be observed so clearly in 2015 and 2016 (minutes of the meetings of the European Affairs Committees of both assemblies). Hence, the level of involvement of the two assemblies is now high and similar both ex ante and ex post.

Equally informal, but far more recent, is the practice that has developed since October of 2014 in the National Assembly of holding hearings of Ministers before the Council's meetings. The hearings are organised primarily by the Committee on EU Affairs, sometimes in conjunction with sectoral committees whose competence includes the subject matter concerned and take place behind closed doors. The timing of these hearings is contemporaneous to the discussion of the agenda of the next Council's meeting and the national position to be supported in Brussels. It is uncommon for ex post scrutiny to be organised concerning the Council's meetings; although it may be touched upon during non-specific ministerial hearings. Following this example, the Senate has also considered the introduction of a similar procedure.

For the sake of exerting an influence on EU decision-making, based on art. 6-bis and Annex II of the Ordonnance du 17 novembre 1958, n. 1958-1100 and the governmental Circulaire of 21 June 2010 (French Government 2010), the National Assembly and the Senate receive a series of documents that enable them to control the activity of the government in EU matters. Examples of documents that the government regularly transmits to the chambers include the agendas of Council meetings and the programme of the six-month Presidency of the EU and the documents of Council working groups. However, when the Council meeting's agendas are transmitted, they are not annotated and hence indicate neither the position the government intends to take nor the position of other Member States. Instead, this type of information is either provided upon the parliamentary chambers' request or as part of the bi-annual updates the chambers receive on the current dossiers under discussion at the beginning of a new EU presidency.

Additional means for the chambers to obtain information lie in the position papers, which the French Government sends to the French MEPs, or in the impact assessment provided by the government or, for the National Assembly at least, the use of the 'diplomatic telegrams'. Besides

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[2] See Assemblée nationale, Rapport d'information no. 3195 'L'Assemblée nationale et l'Union européenne: quel bilan? Quelles perspectives?' 2015: 23.
[3] See table on p. 168 in Fromage 2015.

this, when the European Council's agendas are transmitted, they are usually very basic. The draft conclusions are forwarded approximately one week in advance. The French Parliament has four weeks to examine these documents and to send its own conclusions (potentially adopted by the Committee on EU Affairs) and resolutions (potentially adopted by the plenary session or sectoral committees) to the government.

Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the reforms it has fostered, the Committees on EU Affairs of both parliamentary chambers are at the very centre of the parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs. In practice, these bodies pass most documents – conclusions – adopted by the two French Chambers and addressed to the French Government and the Commission. Moreover, upon the initiative of their chairman or of the government, the Committees on EU affairs are entitled to receive any document from the Executive that is deemed necessary for the scrutiny and to be constantly informed about the ongoing European negotiations (art. 6-bis of the Circulaire of 2010). Such a development is, to a certain extent, a novelty: until 2008, the Committees on EU Affairs, then known as Delegations on EU Affairs, had a marginal role in this field despite the thoroughness and the quality of their analyses. They were in fact dependent on the (permanent) sectoral committees: only if one of the sectoral committees endorsed the resolution of the Delegation on EU Affairs, could it become a resolution of the chamber. By contrast, today, if a sectoral committee does not examine the resolution adopted by the EU affairs committee within a certain timeframe, the resolution is deemed adopted and automatically becomes a resolution of the chamber in question.

To sum up the discussion of the French Parliament's indirect influence on EU decision-making through the national Executive, since the failure of the Constitutional Treaty, and even more so after the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, a series of customary rules and institutional practices have compensated for the lack of official procedures to exercise influence on the agenda and the outcomes of the Council and the European Council's meetings. The ability of the French Parliament to impact on the actions of its Executive in the EU intergovernmental institutions has grown significantly in the last few years. The European Council appears more carefully scrutinised than the Council, upon which the National Assembly only recently began to exercise an ex ante scrutiny. This may be explained by the fact that the legislative proposals discussed at Council level have already been scrutinised and may have been the object of resolutions prior to being discussed in the Council. It follows in any case that the scrutiny exercised in the French Chambers is still far from equivalent to a true parliamentary mandate; rather, the chambers give political direction through hearings and resolutions.

Italy

Like the French Parliament, traditionally, the Italian Parliament had been perceived as practising a weak form of scrutiny on the national Executive's involvement in EU affairs (Cavatorto 2015). The Italian public and the legislature's usual pro-European attitude had been paralleled by a loose, if not sporadic, parliamentary check on the ministerial action in Brussels, in particular within the Council and the European Council (Wessels and Rozenberg 2013: 10).

The Lisbon Treaty and the Eurozone crisis changed this status quo. The Italian Parliament and especially the Senate, which is also tied to the Executive through a confidence relationship, have become more autonomous from the government in EU affairs due to the direct conferral of powers by the EU and, in particular, the EWS and the PD. Right after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, one (problematic) episode confirmed the autonomy the Parliament had newly gained through greater availability of information and through inputs given in the EU decision-making process. In contrast to the view of the Executive, which was patently in favour of the proposal, the

Italian Senate, with the adoption of its first reasoned opinion (r.o.), claimed that the Council Decision on the import of fishery products from Greenland violated the principle of subsidiarity (COM (2010) 176) (European Commission 2010). In other words, taking advantage of its new European power, the Senate tried to influence EU law-making regardless of the standpoint of the government or of the Chamber of Deputies. Once the Executive realised that a stronger coordination with the legislature should exist to avoid the fragmentation of the representation of Italian interests in the EU, both institutions (ultimately) started playing the 'European game' in a cooperative manner. It was only at the end of 2012, following the initial marginalisation of the Italian Parliament during the adoption of the Euro-crisis measures and the strenuous insistence of the parliament on reforming legislation, that a new law regulating Italy's participation in EU affairs was finally adopted.[4]

Law 234/2012 (Italian Republic 2012) makes the possibility of divergent positions between the parliament and the Executive highly unlikely, just as it should be in any parliamentary system and extends the involvement of the parliament beyond the powers already granted to NPs by the EU Treaties. For instance, prior to the meetings of the European Council, the Italian Government is now bound to inform the two Chambers of the position it intends to follow during the next European Council and must also take into account the preferences expressed by the Parliament through the resolutions it approves at the end of the parliamentary debate. This debate enjoys great visibility since the Italian President of the Council of Ministers gives a speech before the Plenum and, in contrast to most parliamentary procedures dealing with EU affairs, the plenary session is at the very centre of this procedure.

At the request of the competent standing committee, the government must inform the committee about the dossiers under examination and its position before the meeting of the Council. When compared, however, to the systematic pre-European Council's debates in plenary session, the hearings of the competent minister or the Minister for EU affairs prior to the meetings of the Council are only episodic and rely upon the initiative of each committee.[5] The application of some provisions of Law 234/2012 has reinforced the ability of the parliament to make its voice heard by the Executive acting within the EU institutions. For example, the government is now required to ensure that the Italian position it represents within the Council and in other EU institutions and bodies is consistent with the opinions and the resolutions adopted by the Italian Parliament on the same issue (Art. 7.1). Moreover, should the government deviate at EU level from the directions provided by parliament beforehand, the president of the Council of Ministers or the minister competent on the subject matter must promptly inform the parliament and provide reasons as to why the deviation has occurred (Art. 7.2). Furthermore, the information given to parliament must be provided within fifteen days of the relevant meeting (Art. 4.1).

Legal provisions and parliamentary practice nonetheless often diverge and while the scrutiny on the European Council's meetings can be regarded as effective and systematic, the scrutiny on the different Council configurations is not really significant yet. The government regularly reports through the Minister or Under-Secretary for European Affairs to the Parliament about the outcomes of European Council meetings. However, this report does not occur in plenary session, as is usually the case prior to the European Council meetings, but rather before sectoral committees, most often before the Committees on Foreign Affairs and on EU Policies of the two chambers in joint session (Esposito 2013: 36-9). At times, the report is not sent to parliament within the required fifteen days.

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[4] There was already a Law, 11/2005, on the participation of Italy in EU affairs, which provided, however, for a limited influence on the Government by Parliament.
[5] The information provided in this section is based on interviews of parliamentary officials in the Italian Chamber of Deputies and Senate. The data collected is based on the transcript of committee meetings in both Chambers from 2013, when Law no. 234/2012 entered into force, to 2016.

By contrast, scrutiny of the Council meetings has only been carried out occasionally. In recent years, a practice has been established in which the Minister or the Under-Secretary on EU affairs and the Minister of the Economy and Finance is called to appear before the competent committees at a hearing and to give evidence about the results of the Council meetings. The scrutiny on the Council normally takes place ex post and the parliamentary committees do not adopt resolutions before the relevant Council meeting is held at the EU level. Hence, the implementation of Law 234/2012, as regards the Council's activities, is still partial.

Since the entry into force of Law 234/2012, the Italian Parliament has tried to extend its influence on the position the government takes within the European Council and (although to a lesser extent) the Council, overcoming its past reluctance to act. These procedures also make crucial information about the Council and European Council meetings publicly available. Yet, the scrutiny of the Council has proven to be more difficult in light of both the sectoral nature of the meetings and the ongoing development of a parliamentary culture. This supports the control of ministerial activities in EU affairs in the sectoral standing committees, which are key players in the scrutiny of the Council's formations.

The indirect influence that the Italian Parliament tries to exert on EU decision-making through the Italian Government is now based on a double channel. The first avenue is the traditional document-based scrutiny: particularly important in this field are the Planning Document of the Executive on its prospective activity in the EU during the coming year, which is examined alongside the Commission's Annual Work Programme (AWP) and the Annual Report on the activity the Government has carried out in the EU over the past year. Even though the delay in drafting such Planning Documents and Reports has been gradually reduced (and in 2017 the Government delivered them almost on time), the second avenue of influence, based on the hearings of ministers and of the president of the Council of Ministers following Council and European Council's meetings, has become increasingly important, especially since the entry into force of Law 234/2012.

THE AVENUES AND THE ATTEMPTS OF NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS TO DIRECTLY INFLUENCE EU DECISION-MAKING THROUGH POLITICAL DIALOGUE

In the post-Lisbon regime, NPs are entitled to receive, particularly from the Commission and in addition to what their governments already transmit to them, any EU draft legislative act and document in their respective official language. Nevertheless, according to the wording of Protocols 1 and 2, the procedure defined as the EWS, which gives NPs the power to signal violations of the principle of subsidiarity, only applies to legislative proposals falling outside the sphere of the EU's exclusive competence. This group of legislative proposals represents a very small proportion of legal acts enacted by the EU every year. Furthermore, the NPs' power of review, before the legislative procedure formally starts, is substantively limited to the principle of subsidiarity alone and must take place within the short period of eight weeks from the transmission of the translated documents.

Within the EWS, NPs are designed as 'quasi-veto players' in the EU: they can object, on the grounds of the subsidiarity principle, to the proposed change of the status quo, and as a collective actor they can delay or impose further conditions on the carrying out of EU legislative procedures (Cooper 2012; *contra* Lupo 2014). Indeed, a 'yellow card', issued when the number of NPs' r.o. is at least equal to one third of the votes cast (18 out of 56 votes), obliges the Commission to review the legislative proposal at stake, to decide to withdraw, amend, or maintain the original proposal and to explain the reasons for doing so. Thus far, raising a 'yellow card' has been challenging as the required threshold has been met only three times. Moreover, only on the first occasion, regarding

the Proposal for a Council Regulation on the right to take collective action in the field of the freedom of establishment and to provide services (European Commission 2012), the Commission finally decided to withdraw the legislative proposal. Even then, the Commission denied that any violation of the principle of subsidiarity had occurred (Fabbrini and Granat 2013; Goldoni 2014). It did so for political reasons, given the widespread opposition against such a measure (including on the part of the national executives) and as the Regulation would have required unanimity at the Council level. By contrast, the second yellow card, on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office, did not affect the Commission's attitude towards the proposal (European Commission 2013). The Commission simply decided to maintain the proposal without any revisions, since its compliance with the principle of subsidiarity was confirmed (Fromage 2016). This scenario repeated itself with the third yellow card, on the revision of the Posted Workers Directive (European Commission 2016; Jančić 2017). Hence, the impact of the second and the third yellow cards on EU law-making and on the Commission's agenda has been non-existent and the role of NPs as 'quasi veto players' in the EWS has proved thus far to be quite limited.

Nevertheless, as mentioned above, since the launch of the PD in 2006, NPs are now in direct contact with the Commission not only to object to its legislative actions, but also by means of contributions,[6] to draw its attention to their specific issues of concern and to trigger a change in the order of the Commission's priorities. Indeed, in addition to EU draft legislative acts subject to the EWS, NPs' contributions are addressed and delivered to the Commission within the PD. Lacking a recognition in EU primary law, the Commission has no Treaty-based obligation to follow these opinions, as the PD is based on an institutional 'self-commitment'.

Although some NPs, like the Swedish *Riksdag*, only send r.o. to the Commission (i.e. no contributions are submitted), since 2009, NPs have favoured the use of the PD as a tool to influence the position of the Commission in its law-making. This is evident by the results from the number of opinions and contributions received by the Commission since 2010 (Table 1).

	r.o.	Contributions
2010	34	353
2011	64	558
2012	70	593
2013	88	533
2014	21	485
2015	8	342
2016[7]	64	487

Table 1: Contributions in the framework of the PD and r.o. (2010-2016)

Notwithstanding this success, the PD has largely disappointed NPs, which perceive their participation in the PD to have a limited impact despite the high expectations the PD created when it was first launched in 2006. The Commission's replies to parliamentary contributions remain extremely vague

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[6] Contributions is the official denomination used by the European Parliament to catalogue all NP opinions other than r.o. on the grounds of the principle of subsidiarity.
[7] Data from 2016 is an estimation. Lacking the Commission Reports 2017 on the relations between the Commission and national parliaments and on the application of the principle of subsidiarity, the analysis is based on the IPEX database, www.ipex.eu; the European Commission - Relations with national parliaments' database,
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/relations/relations_other/npo/index_en.htm, and the French and the Italian Chambers' websites, which allow us to point to the trends in recent evolution.

and do not enhance NPs' awareness and more in depth understanding of the Commission's standpoint. While President Barroso had even committed to providing an answer within three months and while President Juncker made a good relationship with NPs one of his priorities, the Commission fails to respect this, causing NPs to criticise its behaviour on numerous occasions.[8]

In this context, the general decrease in NPs' participation in the PD in 2014 and 2015 may have been linked to their dissatisfaction, although the decrease in the number of legislative proposals since 2014 surely played a role as well. From the legislatures' point of view, the Commission should explicitly point out the impact, if any, of NPs on EU law-making. In this regard, the UK House of Lords has provided direction for future developments. This parliamentary chamber has detected three main avenues to enhance the influence of Member States' legislatures in the EWS and PD. It proposes that the Commission should make the link between parliamentary opinions and EU policy outputs more explicit by:

> (i) identifying national parliament contributions in summary reports on consultation exercises and in subsequent communications on the policy, including how the policy has been shaped or modified in response;
> (ii) responding promptly to national parliament contributions under the general political dialogue, usually within three months; [and]
> (iii) using its annual report on relations with national parliaments to identify the impacts of national parliament engagement (UK House of Lords 2014, § 40).

There is indeed a consensus among NPs that their role should go beyond the adoption of r.o. on draft legislative acts, which may block those acts. This new role would involve a more positive, thoughtful and holistic view of the contribution that NPs could make to the good functioning of the EU democracy. For example, NPs could invite the Commission to develop legislative proposals which they believe to be necessary or to review and adapt existing proposals for specific stated reasons (COSAC 2013a, point 31). In other words, what NPs have started to envision is a 'green card' – the power, through the enhancement of the PD and without a Treaty revision, to ask the Commission to present a draft legislative act on their behalf. The scope, the timeframe, and the effects of such a 'green card' still remain, however, largely undefined and the issue is at present the subject of discussion among parliaments (Fasone and Fromage 2016).

In 2016, the involvement of NPs in the PD (as well as in EWS) has started to rise again, perhaps as a result of a more committed Commission towards NPs' contributions and of the controversial dossiers under scrutiny during that year (on asylum, social protection and taxation). This increased participation in the PD may also be linked to the change, which started in 2015, in NPs' focus from legislative proposals to non-legislative proposals. The levels of participation in the upcoming years will in any case have to be monitored before any conclusion can be drawn. Based on this overview of the general framework of interaction between NPs and the Commission through the PD, the next section examines the peculiar cases of the French and Italian Parliaments' participation in the PD.

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[8] For instance, COSAC 2015: 17.

DO THE FRENCH AND THE ITALIAN PARLIAMENTS MAKE USE OF POLITICAL DIALOGUE?

The use of the PD by the French and the Italian Parliament has varied significantly since 2006 and between their two chambers,[9] especially in France. Instead, there appears to be a common trend to push for a reform of the PD by the Commission and the use of other informal mechanisms to influence the Commission's positions. Of the four parliamentary chambers in the French and Italian Parliaments, the latter Senate is by far the most active in the PD, both in terms of opinions delivered to the Commission and in the number of cases in which it asks for the Commission's reply.

The Italian Senate's participation in the PD started slowly and multiplied by a factor of four in one year (2010) following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, when the EWS was also officially introduced.[10] Since then, the number of opinions reached an apex in 2012, then dropped dramatically due to a combination of factors, among which was a dissatisfaction with the low impact of the contributions on the Commission's agenda. In addition, such a decrease was caused by the phase of political instability determined by the December 2012 resignation of the Monti Government, followed by the parliamentary election in February 2013, and the subsequent deadlock with the delay in the election of the head of State and the resulting appointment of the new government in May 2013. Consequently, the parliament not only operated without a fully empowered government in office for almost six months, but was also dissolved.

It is not by chance that the Chamber of Deputies, faced with the same lack of political direction from the Government as the Senate, signed the lowest number of opinions sent within the PD in 2013. Since then, the number of opinions transmitted by the Italian Chambers to the Commission increased in 2014 and then decreased in 2015, as the parliament was mainly engaged with reforming the Constitution and passing new fundamental bills (e.g. the new electoral law). It rose again in 2016, especially in the Senate. By contrast, the Chamber of Deputies has never considered the PD as a primary way to influence EU decision-making. It has instead paid more attention to the scrutiny of the government and to carefully selecting certain documents that are subject to in-depth examination.

When compared to the overall number of contributions transmitted to the Commission, the Italian Chambers have issued a small number of r.o. challenging compliance with the principle of subsidiarity, which exhibits a rather cooperative attitude vis-à-vis the Commission. At the opposite end of the spectrum stands the French Senate, which, until 2009, was the most active chamber engaged in the PD with the Commission. This high level of engagement in the PD was, however, influenced by the fact that pre-Lisbon r.o. were counted as contributions whose number was thereby automatically increased. Its participation in the PD significantly diminished with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, as it has mostly focused on the EWS. It also clearly seeks to exert its influence at a very early stage – like the National Assembly – and this might explain its belated interest in the PD (COSAC 2013b: 143 and 152). In 2015, its level of participation in the form of contributions was, however, similar to that of the Italian Chamber of deputies and in 2016 it has increased even more, so that the difference in their involvement appears to become narrower.

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[9] This analysis is carried out based on the Annual Reports of the Commission on the relations between the Commission and national parliaments published from 2007 onwards. For the year 2016 only, data is an estimation as indicated above.
[10] See Table 2.

	FR Nat. Ass.	FR Senate	IT Chamber of Dep.	IT Senate
2006	1	18	1	0
2007	1	22	0	0
2008	0	13	6	8
2009	2	12	9	17
2010	0	3 (3 r.o.)	25	71 (1 r.o.)
2011	2 (1 r.o.)	4 (1 r.o.)	28 (2 r.o.)	76 (3 r.o.)
2012	0	19 (7 r.o.)	15	96 (1 r.o.)
2013	40 (1 r.o.)	8 (4 r.o.)	6	36 (2 r.o.)
2014	34 (1r.o.)	4 (2 r.o.)	15	62 (1r.o.)
2015	23	8	7	25
2016	24 (1 r.o.)[11]	20 (7 r.o)[12]	10	81 (2 r.o.)

Table 2: Number of contributions (and r.o.) sent by the French and the Italian Parliaments to the Commission through the PD since 2006

The standpoint of the National Assembly regarding the PD is less clear. If one looks at the number of opinions sent to the Commission, it would seem straightforward to conclude that, until 2013, the National Assembly had not taken part in the PD or in the EWS. In practice, however, interviews with parliamentary officials demonstrate that since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, this chamber has entertained a direct and steady relationship with the Commission. Such a relationship was simply not evident in these channels among other reasons because of a technical problem that prevented the Commission from counting the Assembly's opinions as submitted within the PD. The Assembly's actions were additionally focused on trying to influence the Commission's legislative agenda at a very early stage of development, through, for instance, consultation documents such as white or green papers before they were turned into legislative proposals and through committee hearings of Commissioners.

In 2013, following a commitment to make the National Assembly's activism in EU affairs more visible to the public and, by the same token, to dispel the view of the National Assembly as a weak player given the absence of contributions sent to the Commission, this chamber managed to demonstrate a very active engagement in the PD (jumping from zero to 40 opinions in one year, although 25 of

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[11] Data extracted from the French Assembly's website: http://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/autres-commissions/commission-des-affaires-europeennes/
[12] Data extracted from the French Senate's website: http://www.senat.fr/europe/index.html

these opinions did not request any reply from the Commission). In fact, the Assembly started using the channel of the PD to transmit more documents. It is now usual for the French National Assembly's EU Affairs Committee to transmit its conclusions to the Commission 'on its own initiative' without necessarily requesting any reply from the Commission.

In recent years, the number of contributions submitted by the French and the Italian Parliaments has therefore varied significantly. The decrease observed in 2015 could have pointed to their dissatisfaction with the PD, in particular due to the lack of any clear acknowledgment of which policy outputs, if any, are influenced by their opinions and contributions. However, the 2016 increase may be explained by the choice of the French National Assembly to transmit the resolutions addressed to its government also to the Commission. More generally, and as detailed above, such an increase may also be explained by the political salience of the affected issues and by a change in NPs' focus towards non-legislative proposals. NPs' – in particular the French Parliament's – mixed feelings vis-à-vis this procedure is confirmed by the case of the PD on the Commission AWP. As the main planning document, the AWP (usually published in November) describes the fields of EU legislative action for the following year. An in-depth examination of this Programme, if carried out without delay, can help the relevant chamber in pre-selecting the most important dossiers that should be subjected to scrutiny in the coming year. In addition, such an in-depth scrutiny can also serve to exert an immediate influence on the Commission before the legislative proposals are published.

The information contained in the IPEX database indicates that, since the Commission's AWP for 2007, the French Senate has only transmitted its opinion on three occasions, in 2014, 2016 and 2017. These recent initiatives of the EU Affairs Committee to adopt a resolution – i.e. addressed to the government – on the Commission AWP for 2015, for 2016 and for 2017, alongside an opinion addressed to the Commission through the framework of the PD, might indicate a change in this field. The situation is similar in the French National Assembly, where the former Delegation for European Affairs only adopted conclusions on the 2007 and 2008 AWPs. Yet, like the Senate, in 2015 and 2016, the Assembly also participated and examined the AWP for 2015 and 2016 on which a resolution and conclusions by the EU Affairs Committee were adopted respectively.

In the Italian Parliament, the situation does not significantly differ: the Chamber of Deputies only participated in the PD with the Commission on the AWP in 2009, 2010 and 2011. When this document is examined, the procedure is rather solemn as all sectoral committees are involved. This is in addition to the involvement of the Committee on EU Policies of the plenary (in the Chamber of Deputies), which also adopts a resolution at the end of the process. Interestingly, because of the internal procedures of this chamber, which have been in place since 2010, the Commission's AWP is examined alongside the Planning Document of the Executive, detailing its prospective activity in the EU for the coming year.

By contrast, since 2009, the Committee on EU Policies in the Italian Senate has been regularly engaged (except in 2013 because of the phase of political turbulence it faced) in the PD on the AWP with the Commission by passing resolutions to which the EU institution provides its reply. However, it should be noted that the Senate has never been involved in the plenary session. The only significant difference with the ordinary scrutiny of EU documents and legislative acts lies in the fact that all sectoral committees are also competent to deliver an opinion to the Committee on EU Policies.

The way in which the French Parliament and the Italian Senate have used the PD for the purpose of the AWP confirms that NPs consider the PD to be a valuable tool. Nevertheless, it can, and should, be reformed and enhanced as is advocated by many national legislatures (Jančić 2017: 308-312).

CONCLUSIONS: RECONCILING THE DIRECT AND INDIRECT INVOLVEMENT OF NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS

The Lisbon Treaty created the first basis for the direct involvement of NPs in EU decision-making. It accomplished this by means of the EWS and an informal initiative, the PD, which has allowed NPs to engage in a broader dialogue with EU institutions, and, in particular, with the Commission. However, as the analysis of the French and the Italian Parliaments has shown with conclusions that can be extended to most NPs to a great extent, these two procedures, as the two Barroso Commissions conducted them in particular, are not yet satisfactory nor able to convert NPs into true 'European actors'. Therefore, NPs are advocating for the reform of the PD through the creation of a 'green card' that would eventually allow them to place certain topics on the Commission's agenda. NPs also increasingly seek to engage in the scrutiny of the AWP.

On the other hand, these possibilities when coupled with the direct transmission of EU documents to NPs, have triggered (partly because of the Eurozone crisis) the strengthening of parliamentary scrutiny on intergovernmental institutions via national executives. Consequently, new procedures have been introduced, such as procedures for better coordination between parliaments and governments, new possibilities for parliaments to hold their governments accountable in EU affairs, and new ways for parliaments to pass resolutions *ex ante*. Even if these resolutions are far from being equivalent to some Member States' existing mandates, they at least bind governments to report and justify the positions they adopt in Brussels. In the two states examined here, these procedures are tighter and more evident in the framework of European Council meetings than in those of the Council. Hence, the involvement of both parliaments in the framework of Council meetings still needs to be strengthened.

To conclude, at present, the direct involvement of NPs as 'European actors' through the Commission must be seen as complementary to the indirect control exerted through national governments on the European Council and, gradually, on the Council. By no means are these new avenues for a direct participation of parliaments in the EU going to replace the parliamentary scrutiny of the executives that is still perceived as crucial by the Italian and French (and other) national legislatures.

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Research Article

The European Identity Survey – a Bridge between Political Science and Psychology

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Abstract

At the heart of this article is the question of how we can measure European identity more accurately to answer some of the fundamental questions that are starting to emerge in times of populism and disintegration: is there a single European identity? Or are there many? In order to do so, the article first summarises the dominant discourse on collective identities in political science literature, before gauging insights from psychological approaches. Subsequently, new methods of measurement that bridge both fields are considered. Finally, all three are combined into a comprehensive and interdisciplinary European Identity Survey. This survey is designed to construct a multi-dimensional index on civic and cultural European identity. Rather than assuming some answers to be 'more European' than others, it gauges the convergence of different groups along multiple dimensions that are considered to constitute an identity. In doing so, the paper endeavours not only to introduce a new way of measuring European identity but also to contribute to analysis on the assumed growing polarisation of identity narratives and its societal and political implications.

Keywords

Current times are in many respects trying for the European Union: the financial crisis questions the social fabric of the Union, the refugee crisis undermines it and the likelihood of Great Britain leaving the Union fragments it. As such, the voices of those asking for solidarity, a sense of community, a shared identity become louder – on both sides of the political spectrum. When rising right wing parties across Europe protest and demand protection of 'their' Europe at the same time that heads of state claim to accomplish just that, it becomes evident that we can say or identify the same goals but mean fundamentally different things. For some, defending Europe might mean maintaining the white Christian status quo, while for others it might mean strengthening the liberal values and social rights enshrined in the treaties of the European Union (see Holmes 2009). Such a contestation of dominant identitarian narratives might not be atypical, after all, the European Union is a relatively young project and its history so recent that much of it is still open for emotive interpretation (Quintelier, Verhaegen and Hooghe 2014: 1114). More concerning is the emotional intensity and ideological hardening with which this discussion is led, as both factors make it more difficult to find compromise. Moisi (2009), for example, addresses the increasing role of identity and emotions in today's politics. In his book, he contends that 'if the 20th Century was […] "the century of ideology", I think there is strong evidence that the 21st Century will be […] "the century of identity"' (Moïsi 2009: 14). He explains, 'the primary reason that today's globalizing world is the ideal fertile ground for the blossoming or even explosion of emotions is that globalization causes insecurity and raises the question of identity' (Moïsi 2009: 12). Put differently, globalization and interdependencies force societies to be more in contact with one another. Through this contact with a great number of differing 'others', the 'self' is repeatedly questioned and re-evaluated. This can also have consequences for how the different identities of any one person interact. Haller and Ressler (2006), for example, find that today,

> in an era of increasing interconnection between all countries of Europe and the
> world, citizens of a single state may feel themselves more and more as Europeans

at the same time as they also become aware of their specific characteristics as Norwegians, Germans, or Italians, or even as Bavarians, Piedmontese or Catalonians (25).

In order to investigate the potential for identitarian conflict within and between individuals, a precise and multidimensional measure is needed that captures the meaning and intensity of an identity.

In the past, literature on an emerging European identity has often depended on the measures available to it. These measures primarily consisted of mere – often binary – measures of existence: do you feel European or not? They failed, however, to probe into the content of such an identity. Fligstein, Polyakova and Sandholtz (2012) or Roose (2013), for example, only use the Moreno question of the Eurobarometer: 'In the near future, do you see yourself as (1) European only, (2) European and [nationality], (3) [nationality] and European, or (4) [nationality] only'. Even though they go into detail about how different segments of a society answer this question, they do not include the possibility of different interpretations of the same question. Iserna, Fiket, Serricchio and Westle (2012) add intensity of identifications to their analysis but do not deal 'with the questions of which meanings citizens associate with their identity' (111). Duchesne and Frognier (2003) focus on whether European citizens consider themselves members of a political community and do not 'examine all the dimensions or components of what constitute a European identity' (2). However, even though the authors consciously seek the delimitation between the meaning and extent of an identity, they run into trouble when discussing the implications of their findings. Hence, Duchesne and Frognier (2003) note that '[u]nfortunately, this question does not express different intensities as between one level and another' (13). Van Mol de Valk and van Wissen (2015) are concerned by similar limitations, admitting that their 'results are based on a rather narrow measure of identification, which does not allow to investigate whether individuals refer to Europe as a cultural community or a political project of the European Union' (484). That both the intensity and meaning of an identity matter when evaluating it can be seen by the rare studies that include both elements in their design. Schrödter, Rössel and Datler (2015), for example, find that Swiss and EU citizens share a similar meaning of Europe, but the dimensions of such an identity vary in importance for each group (164).

It is such an analysis that this paper hopes to contribute to, by proposing a new European Identity Survey that draws from recent advances in the political science and psychology literature. To do so, the paper will, first, summarise and draw from identity concepts frequently used in political science literature. It will then add recent psychological advances in defining and measuring different aspects of identity. The relevant findings in political science and psychology are thus summarised and brought together on the metaphysical level. From this level, the paper will subsequently design and explain a European Identity Survey. Finally, the article will discuss the next steps to be taken and how these steps can contribute to future research. After all, if successful, the survey can effectively bridge political science and psychology. As Schwarz (2007) points out,

> much as psychology's shift from behaviourism to information processing has made psychologists interesting partners for survey methodological work, psychologists' growing interest in the socially and culturally situated nature of cognition may eventually make survey researchers interesting partners for basic psychological work (284).

But crossing that bridge when we come to it, let us first turn to the different identity concepts frequently used in political science literature.

CONCEPTS OF IDENTITY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

Although arguing that there are just as many theories on identity as there are identities themselves would certainly go too far, the extensiveness of identity theories is vast. In fact, contributions to what a collective identity is are so numerous that by and large the greatest problem of the existing literature on European identity is its divergent definitions of the concept. Brubaker and Cooper (2000) thus argue for pulling the concept apart into three main dimensions: (1) identification and categorisation; (2) self-understanding and social location; and (3) commonality, connectedness and groupness. They fear that the 'identitarian language and groupist social ontology that informs much contemporary political theory occludes the problematic nature of 'groupness' itself and forecloses other ways of conceptualizing particular affiliations and affinities' (Brubaker and Cooper 2000: 31). Such a rigorous dispute on the taxonomy behind collective identities is as necessary as it is helpful because it helps better define and grasp the dimensions hidden within the latent construct – it should not, however, be used to pull apart what belongs together. After all, all three dimensions can be seen to form part of the same construct and the authors themselves struggle to delineate clear lines between the categories they find.[1] That is why Ashmore, Deaux and McLaughlin-Volpe (2004) rightfully call for a better articulation rather than an abandonment or severe restriction of 'collective identities' (82). They see it as 'productive, and indeed […] essential, to articulate the various dimensions of the concept' (Ashmore et al. 2004: 109). This section will do just that by briefly reviewing the main dimensions found in political science literature and discussing their relevance where necessary.

Political scientists use multiple dimensions of 'collective identity', which at first sight might seem like a cacophony of terminology, but at a second glance actually resemble more of a symphony on identity composed of several movements. Starting at the individual level, Lengyel (2011) states that 'personality traits, on the one hand, and belonging to societal categories and groups on the other, are the two major dimensions of identity' (1033). Karolewski (2011) agrees when writing, 'the notion of collective identity can be seen as consisting of two dimensions: an individualistic dimension and a collectivistic one' (937). Both these dimensions are themselves constructed by different sub-dimensions. The latter especially, the collective dimension, is captured well by political scientists. Focusing on the national identity, Haller and Ressler (2006) differentiate between the self-image (cognitive component), an attachment to the nation (emotional component) and the readiness to act on behalf of the nation (the action component). Along similar lines, Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston and McDermott (2010) distinguish between the content of an identity and its contestation. They further divide the content of an identity into constitutive norms, social purposes, relational comparisons and cognitive models. This content is later on further separated into cultural and civic components (Lengyel 2011) and can be informed by a 'sense of shared *continuity* on the part of successive generations of a given unit of population, and shared *memories* of earlier periods, events and personages in the history of the unit' (Smith 1992: 58). The contestation, on the other hand, measures how much the members of the identity group agree about the content of it. That is to say, surveys might find that 'religious freedom' matters to nearly all Europeans. Contestation would add how disputed the meaning of this value is. If most Europeans agree to see it as it is defined by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, for example, contestation is low. If, however, interpretations vary considerably, contestation is high. Whether this agreement or disagreement is also relevant is captured by Castano. He further develops the concept of 'entitativity' that measures how 'real' the EU is in the lives of its citizens, by analysing shared cultural values, a perceived common fate, increased salience and boundedness (Castano 2004). How this collective identity then relates to the wider context is also discussed by Risse (2005), who investigates how various identities are interrelated and arranged. In a similar effort, Schrödter et al. (2015) confine a European identity to national

openness, European closure and relative Europeanization – all three of which posit a European identity against either a national or a global identity.

In political science literature, a collective identity thus consists of two parts: (1) the self, which is characterised by personality traits; and (2) the collective identity. The latter is differentiated by its content, its contestation, its salience or attachment and its potential to trigger action. The content is further divided into constitutive norms, social purposes, relational comparisons and cognitive models that vary along cultural or civic dimensions. Both, the self and the collective identity, are then placed into (3) a larger context of other identities that influence their relationship. This summarises the current state of political science notions of a collective European identity.

1. The Self	2. The Collective	3. Wider Context
• Personality Traits	• Content (civic/cultural) (Abdelal *et al.*'s 4 categories)	Local & cosmopolitan identities
	• Contestation	
	• Salience	
	• Action	

Figure 1: Extensive Definition of European Identity

Especially promising here is the differentiation between civic and cultural identities because it can harbour potential for the polarisation of identitarian narratives. Bruter (2005) was one of the first to define and empirically test this division. For him, the source of differentiation came from whether citizens defined and prioritised commonalities along agent or structure-based groups. In his words,

> The first, a '*cultural*' perspective, would analyse political identities as the sense of belonging an individual citizen feels towards a particular political group. This group can be perceived by him to be defined by a certain culture, social similarities, values, religion, ethics or even ethnicity. The second, a '*civic*' perspective, would see political identities as the identification of citizens with a political structure, such as a State, which can be defined as the set of institutions, rights, and rules that preside over the political life of a community (Bruter 2005: 12).

Later scholars have amended the list. Cultural group members were also assumed to value a shared language, traditions (Fligstein et al. 2012: 112) and history (Verhaegen and Hooghe 2015: 129); while the set of rights and rules valued by those with a predominantly civic group-conception were also extended to rights and duties of the individual citizen (Verhaegen and Hooghe 2015: 129). Put differently, for this group citizenship is seen as a 'legal status obtainable by anyone willing to accept a particular legal, political and social system' (Fligstein et al. 2012: 112; see also Reeskens and Hooghe 2010).

If these two categorisations are seen as two sides of the same coin – if, in other words, the 'two components of political identities exist in parallel in citizens' minds and should simply be differentiated conceptually and empirically whenever possible' (Bruter 2005: 12) – it is clear on

which side the coin will predominantly land when tossed. Stavrakakis argues that European identity remains a 'dry, institutional, symbolic conception' (2007: 216), which has not yet reached the 'hearts and the guts of the peoples of Europe (2007: 226). This is largely the case because of a self-enforcing logic. Many authors have found that the highly educated and better-off are significantly more likely to hold a predominantly civic identity (Sklair 2001; Fligstein 2008; Mau 2009; Delhey, Deutschmann and Cirlanaru 2015). This is partly due to the fact that 'higher education furthers cognitive mobilization (Inglehart, 1970) and thereby increases the taste for variety, as research on cultural omnivores argues' (Delhey et al. 2015: 2, 72; see also Peterson 1992; van Eijck 2000). In part, it is also due to the ability of those with higher incomes to engage in transnational experiences (Kuhn 2015). Since tertiary education is a hurdle requirement for any administrator post at the European Union (European Commission 2017) – that is a post in the higher grade of civil service – it follows that most of its senior staff will hold a principally civic world view. Subsequently, their policy output will also largely be of a civic nature. Indeed, the policy outputs that can more easily be associated with a cultural worldview, like the European flag, the holiday 'Europe Day' or the European anthem, have been conceptualised and endorsed by either the Heads of State or the European Parliament. However, given that the competence for suggesting new laws or regulations rests with the Commission, most of the outputs of the European Union are of a civic nature and hence stimulate a civic identification amongst the European population. This means that those who hold a civic identity would start to identify with Europe much sooner as European integration progresses than those with a cultural identity. Put in terms of strata, Delhey et al. carefully postulate that 'while all social strata become more transnational as the national standard of living rises, the upper strata do so at a faster pace than the lower ones' (2015: 285). If this finding was tested with a more precise measure of civic and cultural identities and found the same correlation, this could have large implications for the future of the European Union. In the end, those segments of a society who hold stronger cultural identities, could feel left behind – the 'losers' of transnationalization (Kuhn 2015: 8; Kriesi and Frey 2008; Kritzinger 2005) – and scared of further changes to the political structure. Such sentiments would make them vulnerable to extremist discourse that pledges a return to old times, to the nation, to sovereignty. Yet, only a small number of studies have been conducted that distinguish in their research design between cultural and civic concepts of nationality. This avenue thus seems complicated, but promising.

Referring back to Figure 1, the content of a collective identity should thus be explored further. When looking at the contestation of an identity, simple questions regarding the controversy of certain beliefs or values can be added to the survey. In order to evaluate the salience of certain issues sliding scales can be used to capture individual replies. For the remaining parts, insights from other disciplines and their recent technological advancements are pivotal. After all, personality traits and action behaviour have frequently been studied by psychologists.

IDENTITY CONCEPTS BEYOND POLITICAL SCIENCE

Even though political science can give great insight into European identity, other disciplines can also contribute to the issue. That is why Checkel and Katzenstein (2009) advocate a multidisciplinary approach to study identity, and Leach, van Zomeren, Ouwerkerk, et al. (2008: 485) describe it as a multidimensional construct. In order to get a better understanding of these multiple dimensions, findings from sociology and psychology might be of help in two ways. First, they can help clarify the categories of identity established so far. And second, they identify additional categories.

Starting with the clarification of concepts that have been established thus far, psychology can help in understanding the importance of personality traits. After all, authors of this discipline find that 'personality domains are among the most important predictors of individual differences in identity formation' (Klimstra, Luyckx, Goossens, et al. 2013: 214). Bridging political science with psychology, Tillman (2013) argues that 'future research should seek to develop a fuller understanding of the sources of perceptions of social identity and to understand their effects on EU attitudes independently and in combination with personality traits' (585). While previous studies (Curtis 2016; Duckitt and Sibley 2016) have already examined the role of the 'Big 5' – that is openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness and emotional stability – in identity formation and consolidation, little attention has been paid to the role of optimism. Yet, Aspinwall, Richter and Hoffman (2001) argue that optimists process information differently from pessimists and hence interact differently with identity stimulators, while I have found elsewhere (2017) that as European integration progresses, the chasm between optimists and pessimists in their level of European identification widens. That is why a revised LOT-R test for optimism will be included in the survey to test the importance of personality traits in a more comprehensive measure of European identity. Furthermore, Phinney and Ong (2007) shed light on the 'action' category in Figure 1. They look at ethnic (cultural) identities and find that 'ethnic identity is an internal structure that can exist without behavior'; that is why they advocate that

> for conceptual clarity, behaviors should be considered separately from identity. Research results are likely to be more parsimonious if ethnic behaviors are included as discrete measures in studies of ethnic identity, so that results can be analyzed separately, to distinguish the implications of identity per se and the associated behaviors (Phinney and Ong 2007: 272f).

Thus, both personality traits and action-related behaviour will be included and studied as separate categories.

Apart from adding to the established categories, psychology and sociology also help to unveil another important aspect of identity. 'Traditional social identity models describe how people divide the social world into in-groups and outgroups, identify with the in-group, and enhance their identity by comparing the in-group favourably with the outgroup on a valued dimension' (Shapiro 2010: 636f; also Haslam 2004; Tajfel and Turner 1979). But how do these groups come into existence? Denzin (1984) finds that 'it is through emotionality, imagination, sympathy, fellow-feeling, and revealed self-feelings that persons come to know themselves and one another' (245). 'Emotions thus serve as signals to the self, regarding the quality and acceptability of one's identity claims and performances, and emotions can lead to changes in role behaviour, network memberships, and ultimately, social structure' (Thoits 1989: 332). Taking a more macro structural-functional approach, Thoits (1989) argues that 'emotion norms are produced by and function to sustain dominant institutional arrangements' (336). Reddy (1997) agrees and maintains that emotions 'must be regarded as the very location of the capacity to embrace, revise, or reject cultural or discursive structures of whatever kind' (331). Emotions are, therefore, vital to understanding or measuring identity. After all, they form part of Kant's independent mental faculties and Hilgard's (1980) *Trilogy of the Mind*:

> *cognition*, the mental representation of reality through perception, attention, learning memory, and thought; *emotion*, the subjective experience of arousal, pleasure and displeasure, and their expression in behaviour; and *motivation*, the activation of behaviour and its direction toward a goal. All three of these mental states affect the determination of behaviour (Eich, Kihlstrom, Bower et al. 2000: 36) (emphasis added).

In summary then, collective identity is largely composed of three features. First, it is to close the gap between the 'self' and the outside world or the 'other' (Mummendey and Waldzus 2004: 60). Second, it consists of cultural and civic components. Third, as argued by Tajfel (1981), 'European identity is that part of the individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of membership of a social group together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership' (255). In a way, collective identity formation is thus about how one relates the self to the in-group and distinguishes it from the out-group using different modes of discrimination (civic or cultural) to arrive at diverse emotional intensities that yield that identity significant or not. What is new from this very brief literature review is the equation of salience with emotional activation. Thus, when measuring salience, an affective measure could strengthen and cross-validate the instrument. Based on recent methodological advances, just what might such an instrument look like?

Methodological Advances

Recent advances in the methodology of measuring identity have mostly focussed on capturing the implicit aspects of parts of the extensive definition of identity provided above. Two developments especially seem worth noting. First, Maier, Maier, Baumert et al. (2015) complement explicit attitudes (i.e. stated opinions through survey-like questions) with implicit attitudes. The latter are measured through the Affective Misattribution Procedure, where participants see either a picture of the EU or Germany, or a neutral image for a split second before they see a picture of a Chinese character. They are then asked to indicate on the computer whether they feel positively or negatively about said character. After their evaluation, they see grey noise before the test continues.


Figure 2: 'Example for a single AMP trial (here with EU prime picture)' (Maier et al. 2013: 10)

Unfortunately, the study was limited to Germany and focussed mostly on voter preference and the potential for right-wing party success at the next European election. Furthermore, it encountered difficulties in interpreting its results given the challenges of subliminal messaging. Perhaps more established tests like an Implicit Association Test (IAT) can be used instead to capture implicit cognitive patterns and biases. This would have the advantage of being able to tap into a vast literature on IATs, while at the same time introducing a new comparative pair: the European Union and one's country.

Another development is the project *How European Do you Feel? The Psychology of European Identity* by Bruter and Harrison (2012). The authors have also combined survey questions with psychological measures. These include, inter alia, asking British respondents what the first three

words were that came to mind when either seeing a picture of the European flag or simply hearing the word 'Europe'. Here the results are fairly unimaginative with 'union', 'euro', 'stars', 'continent' and 'Brussels' or 'France' among the top answers. Their second psychological approach was slightly more revealing, where the researchers asked their respondents what images (colours, animals, drinks, paintings or flowers) they associated with the European Union. For the majority of the sample, the EU would be a spring daisy if it were a flower, classical music or an opera if it were a musical genre and blue if it were a colour. For the younger cohort, the EU would be a lion if it were an animal and a coffee or a glass of wine if it were a drink; for the older age cohort, the EU would be an elephant or a glass of water (Bruter and Harrison 2012). These similes might seem playful at first but do disclose emotional attitudes through active abstraction when analysing the results on a psychological level. Bruter and Harrison, furthermore, found that there is indeed a difference between civic and cultural identity; and that 'the more citizens criticise the EU, the more they favour increased EU citizenship rights' (Bruter and Harrison 2012), showing that Euro-sceptic populations are not necessarily lacking a European identity, as is often assumed. Although this study goes an astounding step toward better understanding and measuring identity, it has two limitations. First, it focuses its innovative design only on the United Kingdom, making cross-country comparison impossible. And second, even though it does include novel ways of measuring identity, it does not include measures, such as SemDs, for interpreting the results. Are elephants or lions more positively connoted? Are the attributes always interpreted to be the same or similar? Nonetheless, these type of affective questions hold great promise.

Endeavouring to include implicit attitudes, the survey will thus comprise an Implicit Association Test and affective questions similar to those of Bruter and Harrison (2012). But what will it look like exactly?

NEW SURVEY

The survey has previously been tested in a trial run with selected European and American PhD students and is divided into seven sections.[2] Each section has its own focus on one part of European identity but at the same time cross-validates other aspects of it. Thus, the first part uses direct questions from the political psychology literature to identify the content of an identity. At the same time, it also captures the importance attributed to the identity and its contestation. The second step, an Identity Drawing, relates this identity to other spheres of influence and cross-validates its importance. In a third step, affective questions measure a degree of emotional involvement and salience of the identity, while cross-validating the content of the identity. The fourth step is an Implicit Association Test that endeavours to capture frequent thought patterns and thus also cross-validates salience. During the fifth step, respondents are asked personality questions and their degree of optimism is evaluated. Finally, the sixth and the seventh steps capture past actions and commonly used Eurobarometer questions to control for content validity. In detail, this looks like the following.

Direct Questions

The first and most important step in revising the measure of identity is creating a set of questions that stem from political psychology. When formulated correctly, they can test assumed and actual divergence of attitudes within various faculties (norms; purpose; relational comparisons; or cognitive models). This section is thus comparable to other attitude tests, although it introduces a

unique composition of dimensions: assumed – actual; norms – purpose – relation comparisons – cognitive models; and cultural – civic notions of identity; where

> constitutive norms refer to the formal and informal rules that define a group; social purposes refer to the goals that are shared by members of a group; relational comparisons refer to defining an identity group by what it is not – that is, the way it views *other* identity groups, especially where those views about the other are defining part of the identity; cognitive models refer to the worldviews or understandings of political and material conditions and interests that are shaped by a particular identity (Abdelal et al. 2010: 19) (emphasis in original).

Constitutive Norms

What is your opinion regarding the following statements?

Q1.1: (Cultural) The values of the European Union are closely tied to those of Christianity.
Q1.2: (Civic) Being European is closely tied to European citizenship.
Q1.3: (Cultural) No one shall be condemned to the death penalty or executed.
Q1.4: (Civic) Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or herself.
Q1.5: (Cultural) Welcoming those in need into Europe is a natural act of mercifulness.
Q1.6: (Civic) Countries need robust safety nets in their welfare programmes to help those in need.

Q1.7: (Cultural) Looking at torture, the end, if necessary, justifies the means.
Q1.8: (Civic) Politicians should not be coerced into party lines.
Q1.9: (Cultural) Europe preserves and strengthens local traditions.
Q1.10: (Civic) Being European means adhering to democratic values.
Q1.11: (Cultural) The dignity of the individual is inviolable.
Q1.12: (Civic) Women and men should enjoy equal rights.
Q1.13: (Contestation) European values and norms are commonly known.

The response option for Q1.1 to Q1.13 is a sliding scale, which ranges from 0 to 100 and has the following indications: Agree / Neither Agree nor Disagree / Disagree.

Q1.14: Have you ever done something profoundly European? [Yes / No]
If so, what? [OPEN].
Q1.15: (Contestation) Which European values matter to you most?
Human rights / equality / individual liberty / grace of charity / fairness / rule of law / tolerance / solidarity / diversity.
[Respondents are asked to rank the values by re-ordering them from left to right.]
Q1.16: Amongst citizens in the EU, do you think that this response [to Q1.15] is [Uncontested / contested / don't know].

Purpose

In your opinion, **whose** goals are the following? Please note that multiple answers are possible.

Q2.1: (Civic) Promote the rule of law.
Q2.2: (Cultural) Fighting poverty and social exclusion.
Q2.3: (Civic) The abolition of torture or inhuman punishment.
Q2.4: (Cultural) Respect for cultural diversity.

Q2.5: (Civic) Peace and prosperity.
Q2.6: (Cultural) Respect for linguistic diversity.
Q2.7: (Civic) Equal rights between men and women.
Q2.8: (Cultural) Respect for religious diversity.
Q2.9: (Civic) Promote democratic principles.
Q2.10: (Cultural) Good neighbourly relations.

The answer categories for Q2.1 to Q2.10 are: Myself / Country / the European Union / the West. Respondents can select multiple answers.

Q2.11: (Contestation) European goals are commonly known.
[Agree / Neither Agree nor Disagree / Disagree].

Relational Comparison

What is your opinion regarding the following statements?

Q3.1: (Civic) It is possible to feel European and [National] at the same time.
Q3.2: (Cultural) It is possible to feel Muslim and European at the same time.
Q3.3: (Civic) It is possible to feel cosmopolitan – that is, not limited to just one part of the world – and European at the same time.
Q3.4: (Cultural) It is possible to feel part of a local community and European at the same time.
Q3.5: (Civic) The European Union upholds human rights more than other regions or countries.
Q3.6: (Cultural) The European Union shows more solidarity with those in need than other regions or countries.
Q3.7: (Civic) People have more equal opportunities in Europe than elsewhere.
Q3.8: (Cultural) Europe is the biggest melting pot of cultures worldwide.
Q3.9: (Civic) The European Union upholds human rights more than [country].
Q3.10: (Cultural) The European Union shows more solidarity with those in need than [country].

The response option for Q.3.1 to Q3.10 is a sliding scale, which ranges from 0 to 100 and has the following indications: Agree / Neither Agree nor Disagree / Disagree.

Q3.11: (Contestation) Please rank the following list of actors according to their divergence from European values. The actor ranked **first** adheres **least** to European values, the actor ranked last adheres the most to European values.

['Islamic State' or DAESH / multinational corporations / Russia / banks / Turkey / the richest 1% / Muslims]

Q3.12: (Contestation) Would you say that you have more in common with a [police officer / PhD student] in another European country than with a manager in [country].[3] [On a sliding scale with indications: Much less in common with police officer or researcher / Neither Agree nor Disagree / Much more in common with police officer or researcher].

Cognitive Models

What is your opinion regarding the following statements?

Q4.1: (Cultural) European history, particularly the overcoming of two World Wars, should motivate a more pacifist foreign policy of the European Union?
Q4.2: (Civic) The European Union strengthens democracy in Europe.
Q4.3: (Cultural) European integration leads to an increase in security.
Q4.4: (Civic) European integration leads to an increase in freedom to travel.
Q4.5: (Cultural) More European integration causes a loss of [country's] traditions.
Q4.6: (Civic) More European integration leads to more bureaucracy.
Q4.7: (Cultural) More European integration causes tensions with Russia.[4]
Q4.8: (Civic) More European integration creates more opportunities for lobbying.
Q4.9: (Cultural) A shared history creates the basis for more solidarity.
Q4.10: (Contestation) There is a shared European public opinion on most issues.

The response option of Q.4.1 to Q4.10 is a sliding scale, which ranges from 0 to 100 and has the following indications: Agree / Neither Agree nor Disagree / Disagree.

In order to avoid a primacy effect, answer categories in Q1.15 and Q 3.11 are set to shuffle randomly. Furthermore, check-all-that-apply items were not included, since they are known to increase satisficing – a strategy used by respondents to give satisfactory but not optimal answers in order to reduce the time and effort spent on the survey. Finally, even though Q1.14 might be criticised for being completely open to individual interpretation, this was exactly intended to be so. As Schwarz (2007: 279) describes:

> When asked, 'What have you done today?' respondents will certainly understand the words – yet they may nevertheless not know on which behaviours they are to report. […] To provide a meaningful answer, respondents need to infer the questioner's intentions, that is the pragmatic meaning of the question. To do so, they rely on the tacit assumptions that govern the conduct of conversations in daily life (Grice 1975) and draw on the context of the utterance to infer the intended meaning.

This intended meaning is what the question aims to measure.

The answer categories were largely based on existing literature, which found that religious beliefs mattered (Garcea 2001). Previous studies have also looked at what 'typically European' can connote (Gnutzman, Jakisch and Rabe 2014; Habermas and Derrida 2003) or what aspects respondents associate the EU with (Schrödter et al. 2015). Given that this section is rather long and text-heavy, the next section will be of a more visual nature.

Identity Drawing

In the next step, participants are encouraged to locate themselves in different spheres of influence. This helps, among other things, to establish the inter-identity relations: how do the participants relate to the in-group and how to the out-group? How do these groups correlate or merge? For this, a new screen will appear that bears similarity to the windows programme 'Paint' and gives exact instructions about what respondents need to do and what each shape means. It looks like the following:

Please position yourself first, by selecting 'Me' and drawing a rectangle. Subsequently, choose the circles that matter to you and draw them around your 'Me' in a way that feels most appropriate to you. Note that this means that you do not need to use all of the shapes available. The shapes can vary in position and size. You can use the keyboard to move them.


Figure 3: Identity Drawing

The size, position and overlapping of the different spheres of influence, as well as the self, can then be evaluated using psychological standards (see Tropp and Wright 2001 or Schubert and Otten 2002). For example, the European identity could encompass all other identities, meaning that there is little personal contestation between the national and the supranational identity.

Affective Questions

In the third step, respondents are asked affective questions, similar to those of the Bruter and Harrison (2012) project, to test previous answers and open a new category of abstraction. The following questions are currently included:

For the next section, please imagine that the European Union was a person. In a few words, how would you answer the following fictitious scenarios?

These questions require a fair bit of imagination, should be given spontaneously and ideally be fun. If a question is too difficult or requires a lot of time, feel free to skip it.

Constitutive Norms
Q5.1: If the European Union were a school teacher, what kind of behaviour by students would be punished?
Q5.2: If the European Union were a father, what virtue would he teach his son?[5]

Purpose
Q5.3: If the European Union were an athlete running a marathon, what would motivate it during a dry spell and keep it going?

Q5.4: If the European Union were a person, what would make it so mad that it would immediately spring into action?

Relational Comparisons
Q5.5: If the European Union were a hypochondriac, what would be its biggest fictitious type of fear?
Q5.6: If the European Union were a person, whom would it most likely marry and why?

Cognitive Models
Q5.7: Imagine that the European Union is an old man, who five years from now dies. What is most likely to have caused his death?
Q5.8: Imagine that the European party is a person who has just invited all of his/her friends and neighbours to a giant celebration. What could be the occasion for this celebration?

These questions have two purposes. On the one hand, they invite respondents to reflect indirectly on their previous questions and validate them on an abstract level. On the other hand, they maintain an indirect emotional state with the participants without being too obvious about it. That way, respondents are already indirectly more prepared to answer the following four questions:

Please select the options that most accurately reflect your emotions. Note that several answers per question are possible.

Q5.9: The history of the European Union makes me
Q5.10: The abolition of borders under the Schengen Agreement in 1995 makes me
Q5.11: The introduction of a common currency, the Euro, in 1999 makes me
Q5.12: The imminent exit of the United Kingdom from the EU – the Brexit – makes me

The answer categories are based on the seven base-emotions and include: happy, sad, angry, disgusted, afraid, surprised, and indifferent.

Although a rather crude measure of emotional involvement (either indifferent or feeling an emotion), these questions can lead to interesting comparisons regarding whether historic moments of European integration were interpreted the same way across societal groups and across three member states. After all, a shared interpretation of history is the basis for a shared memory. To increase the gamification aspect of the survey and counter high drop-out rates, the answer categories are additionally given commonly known emojis, as can be seen in Figure 4.

The history of the European Union makes me feel...

disgusted   angry   afraid   sad   indifferent   happy   surprised

Figure 4: Example of a question with the 'happy' category being selected

Implicit Association Test

In a fourth step, an experiment will open that closely resembles the Implicit Association Test from Harvard University. This is because even if the survey measures identity more fully than previous surveys, there still remains one serious pitfall: what if subjects answer true to their feelings but feel differently in a real-world setting? This is where an experiment that tests latent identity is beneficial. Although quite a variety of experiments on identity have been conducted, most have focussed on sexual or race-related identities. A 'European experiment' in the form of an IAT would thus be quite unique.

In the original test, implicit attitudes toward African-Americans were captured by measuring the time it took respondents to place pictures and words into two categories: black and white patient; and good or bad. Through layering the two categories on top of each other, researchers could measure latent racism, if participants, for example, took longer to move words into the 'good' category, if it was also the 'black patient' category. The assumption here is that respondents resort to previously established thought-patterns. If their reactions are significantly faster when associating 'good' with 'white' than they are when associating 'good' with 'black', it is assumed that they will have thought of white as good more often.

A similar test is conducted regarding latent European identities, using the following items:

Positive: happy, joyous, love, peace, win, triumph, success.
Negative: sad, despair, war, hate, lose, defeat, terror.
Country: images of flag, national currency, football fans, capital and government buildings.
European Union: images of flag, Euro, football fans, Brussels and EU institutions.

Figure 5: Example of the European Identity Implicit Association Test

In order to control for learning effects, the participants are given a test round. The composition of the test is the following: (1) sort only country and EU images into the two categories; (2) then sort only adjectives into the 'good' and 'bad' categories; (3) a practice run with 20 items and all four categories is given; (4) an actual test with 40 items is run. Then the test rebuilds itself with reverse categories – if the EU was previously layered on top of 'bad' it will now be layered on top of 'good'. This is done in the following sequence: (5) sort only country and EU images, which have now reversed sides; (6) this is followed by another practice run with 20 items; and (7) concludes with an actual test of 40 items. To control further for learning, the order in which the EU is either

associated with 'good' or 'bad' is randomised for the sample. Overall, such a test cross-validates previously found answers on an implicit level and ideally is fun for the respondents.

Personality Questions

In the fifth section, respondents take a short LOT-R optimism test. This includes one personality trait in the analysis and tests whether such traits truly impact identity. The test looks like the following:

> Please be as honest and accurate as you can throughout. Try not to let your response to one statement influence your responses to other statements. There are no 'correct' or 'incorrect' answers. Answer according to your own feelings, rather than how you think 'most people' would answer.
>
> Q7.1: In uncertain times, I usually expect the best.
>
> Q7.2: It's easy for me to relax.
>
> Q7.3: If something can go wrong for me, it will. (R)
>
> Q7.4: I'm always optimistic about my future.
>
> Q7.5: I enjoy my friends a lot.
>
> Q7.6: It's important for me to keep busy.
>
> Q7.7: I hardly ever expect things to go my way. (R)
>
> Q7.8: I don't get upset too easily.
>
> Q7.9: I rarely count on good things happening to me. (R)
>
> Q7.10: Overall, I expect more good things to happen to me than bad.

The answer categories for all questions of this test are the same 5-point Likert scale: Agree a lot, Agree a little, Neither agree nor disagree, Disagree a little, Disagree a lot. Items 3, 7, and 9 are reverse scored (or scored separately as a pessimism measure). Items 2, 5, 6, and 8 are fillers and should not be scored. Scoring is kept continuous – there is no benchmark for being an optimist/pessimist.

Behavioural Questions

Based on the assumption that identity predetermines behaviour, questions that capture behaviour can be used to measure the content validity of the instrument. Thus, the survey includes the following questions:

> Q8.1: There was a European election between the 22nd and 25th of May 2014. For one reason or another, many people in [country] did not vote in that election. Could you please think back to [exact date for country]: did you yourself vote in the European election?
> [I am absolutely certain I did vote / I am fairly certain I voted / I don't think I voted / I am

certain I didn't vote / I don't remember whether I voted / I was not allowed to vote at the time]

Q8.2: Since the last European Parliament elections, have you read about members of the European Parliament on the internet?
[Yes / No / Don't know]

Q8.3: Supposing a general election were being held in [country] tomorrow, can you tell me on a scale of 1 to 100 how likely it is that you would vote in that election?
[On a sliding scale with indications: Would definitely not vote / Would definitely vote]

Q8.4: And supposing there was a European Parliament election being held tomorrow, can you tell me on a scale of 1 to 100 how likely it is that you would vote in that election?
[On a sliding scale with indications: Would definitely not vote / Would definitely vote]

Q8.5: Which, if any, European Union countries have you visited or travelled through this past year (2016)?
Please click on the name of the country or countries you visited or travelled through. Note that you can select multiple countries.

Figure 6: Answer Map for Question 8.5 with four example countries already selected

The questions of this section have been copied from previous Eurobarometer surveys to facilitate internal validity testing. The wording and answer categories have consequently only been adjusted minimally to reflect the current date. The answer map is added though, since a list of 28 countries might be too tiresome for respondents. Also looking at a map might trigger memories and improve reliability of the answers given. A language filter installed at the beginning of the survey will change the map to German and Dutch when respondents from Germany or the Netherlands take part in the survey.

Personal Information

Finally, in the last step, individuals are asked about their personal information relevant to the analysis, as well as the Moreno question to test the content validity. In order to allow for comparisons with Eurobarometer data, these questions again use the Eurobarometer wording and look like the following:

> Finally, just a few demographic questions. Please take one final minute to answer the following questions, as they are much needed for later analysis. We will explain on the final page why these answers really matter to our study.

> Q9.1: In political matters people talk of 'the left' and 'the right'. How would you place your views on this scale?
> [On a sliding scale with indications: Left / Right]

> Q9.2: How old were you when you stopped full-time education?
> [open text field]

> Q9.3: What is the highest level of education you have obtained?
> [open text field]
> Q9.4: What is your gender?
> [Male / Female / Other]
> Q9.5: How old are you? [open]
> Q9.6: Would you say you live in a...?
> [Rural area or village / Small or middle sized town / Large town / Don't know]
> Q9.7: In the near future, do you see yourself as
> [European only / European and [nationality] / As [nationality] as European / [nationality] and European / [nationality] only / Don't know]

Upon completion, respondents are thanked for their time and given the opportunity to leave their e-mail address on a separate page (storing the information independently due to data privacy concerns) should they wish to be informed about the outcome of the study. Throughout the survey, respondents are informed about the structure of the test, their personal progress in it and how the results will be used, to increase rapport. The average time needed to complete the survey in trial runs was 25 minutes. Minor details of gamification are included to maintain the interest of respondents during this time. The survey has been tested on the three major internet browsers (Edge, Firefox and Google Chrome), two operating systems (Windows and Apple) and on mobile devices such as tablets or phones.

NEXT STEPS AND CONCLUSION

Having designed the survey, the next step consisted of defining and reaching out to the survey population. Two groups were found: researchers and police officers in Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Whereas the first group has already conducted the survey, the police officers have yet to do so. The two groups were selected since a previous analysis of Eurobarometer data over a time span of 21 years has indicated that as European integration increases, a European identity increases as well – especially for the highly educated (doctoral studies) and the less educated (high school degree) who are nonetheless exposed to European integration (travel and work).

For the first group, doctoral and post-doctoral students were the natural choice. Given their high attention spans, the rather long survey was run for this group in the spring of 2017. The survey achieved a response rate of 83.34 per cent and a completion rate of 48.75 per cent (n=995), whereby 21.8 per cent dropped out on the first two pages that simply asked respondents which country they were from and introduced the project. Afterwards, a confirmatory factor analysis, similar to one used by Bruter (2005), was employed to test concept validity and determine which items discriminate well and explain civic and cultural identities best across countries.

In a next step, the survey will be shortened and repeated for the second group. It is anticipated that this survey will be run in the autumn of 2017. Here, police officers are interesting respondents, as they often hold high school degrees but – as part of the executive branch of government – are frequently confronted with European issues. Given that the first group predominantly encounters the advantages, while the second group also encounters many of the disadvantages of European integration, a cross-group comparison is particularly promising to determine the effect of integration on identity. For this, an identity index will be built out of the remaining items and regressed against the economic integration index developed by König and Ohr (2013). Further, the index will be used to predict political behaviour as captured in the survey and cross-validated against the Moreno question. Their age and socio-economic status, as well as the field in which they work and the area in which they live will be controlled for. Having a more accurate and elaborate measure of identity allows for better group comparisons from which very different interpretations can emerge of what a European identity actually is. The distance between these interpretations will be vital to understanding polarising tendencies in Europe today. Do Europeans have fundamentally different notions of what it means to be a European? And if so, which groups are most likely to clash? How will this impact voting behaviour and consequently the political landscape in the years to come?

Apart from this one application though, the survey will also be able to add to the literature on European identity by discerning the internal validity of some of the measures used thus far. If, for example, the survey holds more content validity than previous measures (like the Moreno questions, see Q9.7 above), results based on such previous measures would have to be revised. Furthermore, it connects questions from political science to methods from psychology, bridging both disciplines. Through this interdisciplinary synapse, new questions can be asked: how important are personality traits in the development of a European identity? Who belongs to the European in-group and who to its out-group? Are these groups contested amongst EU citizens and what does it mean for Europe if they are? If for one group of citizens all Christians belong to their European in-group, whereas all Muslims belong to their European out-group, this group will demand fundamentally different tasks from its Europe than a group who might identify all citizens of the EU as their in-group and all legal foreigners as their out-group.

This process is particularly relevant in current times of heightened communication. If the 'self', as postulated at the beginning of this paper, is continuously questioned and re-evaluated through contact with a great and growing number of differing 'others', can this help us understand tectonic shifts in the political landscape? To an extent, this could explain the re-emergence of right-wing parties in many Western countries that are more mired in global interactions through their liberal economic policies and where citizens react to a great number of 'others' by fortifying the 'self'. The causal connection drawn here would have to be tested with new measures like the European Identity Survey. The survey thus promises to open and hopefully also answer questions targeting the social fabric and the future of the European project.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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ENDNOTES

[1] For example, 'self-understanding' is proposed to abrogate the presumed juxtaposition of a deep, individualistic understanding of self with the idea of collective 'sameness' (Brubaker and Cooper 2000: 17f). Yet, Brewer already showed in 1991 that both concepts belong to a person's identity: the personal and the social. Rather than forcefully separating interrelated concepts, this article develops a measure that includes the interplay between different identities to find out where the 'European self' is located in relation to them.

[2] A few minor grammatical and stylistic changes have been introduced into the survey since it was run, in response to comments from the editor.

[3] This survey will first be tested with PhD students and police officers in Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. This is done because multi-level regression analyses of Eurobarometer data have found that both groups show heightened levels of European identification and the countries vary in their degree of European integration.

[4] Future surveys might choose to differentiate between the deepening and widening of European integration. In this section, such a distinction was not considered because it primarily focusses on measuring the similarity of thought patterns based on similar contextual interpretations.

[5] For this survey, gender effects were not controlled for. Future research should consider testing the variation in responses when using female anthropomorphisms or pay attention to gender neutral personifications.

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Research Article

Democratic Legitimacy, Desirability and Deficit in EU Governance

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Abstract

Longstanding concerns about the European Union's (EU) quest for democratic legitimacy are ever more acute. Many think such concerns can be best addressed if European institutions would become more effective crisis-managers. Stronger performance supposedly reinforces the EU's democratic credentials. This article rejects such 'output' oriented accounts as specious for assessment of the EU's democratic legitimacy. Drawing on Oakeshott's political theory, we argue that stronger performance addresses the desirability rather than democratic legitimacy of EU governance. We apply this insight as a heuristic device to consider the election of the Commission president and network governance.

Keywords

INTRODUCTION

That the European Union (EU) is in crisis has become almost a truism. Brexit, the sovereign debt crisis and the refugee tragedy pose existential challenges to EU cooperation. These crises make longstanding concerns about the EU's legitimacy ever more acute (e.g. Majone, 2014). There is growing disillusionment and frustration about the EU's incapacity to meet these crises with meaningful, concerted action (Treib, 2014). Yet, could we say, if the EU had brought about a swift resolution of these crises that its democratic legitimacy deserves stronger recognition? If we follow the predominant discourses on EU legitimation, it seems that this question must be answered affirmatively.

This article critiques approaches to legitimacy that ground such an affirmative answer, showing why the improved performance of a democratic political organization has no direct bearing on its legitimacy. For this purpose, we appropriate Michael Oakeshott's distinction between the *legitimacy* and the *desirability* of governance (1975a, p.325). Our turn to Oakeshott may come as a surprise since he never wrote on the EU and was generally sceptical about democracy. Nevertheless, Oakeshott stands out as being exceptionally engaged with the question of legitimacy and his reflection can be fruitfully brought to bear on the case of EU democratic legitimacy and the democratic deficit.

Our central objective is to show that the frequent failure of both sociologically-oriented and more normative accounts of democratic legitimacy to distinguish between legitimacy and desirability is analytically confused and politically costly. It prevents us from acknowledging that even an EU that excels in governance cannot on that account have a stronger claim to democratic legitimacy. It also prevents us from seeing that weak crisis-management does not diminish the EU's democratic credentials. Since there is persistent disagreement on what strong responses require, democratic procedures contribute to the recognition of governance as procedurally legitimate but cannot

command substantive approval of EU governance. Below we offer an exposition of output-accounts of EU legitimacy and explore two 'vignettes' that show the usefulness of Oakeshott's distinction.

Situated at the intersection between EU studies and political theory, this paper seeks to contribute to the conceptual precision and analytical clarity with which debates on the EU are conducted. This entails strengthening awareness of the political stakes of these discussions, whether found in academic scholarship, policy discourse or in popular polemics. In this context, our exposition of the distinction between legitimate and desirable EU action is best appreciated as an *interpretive heuristic device* that helps to sort out and clarify relevant questions about EU governance. The paper does not aspire to present or outline a comprehensive explanatory theory of democratic legitimacy, nor to formulate positive, normative proposals to close the alleged democratic deficit. Moreover, we cannot engage all the important articulations of the EU's legitimation challenges and hence do full justice to the richness of the wider debates to which they belong.

THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT DIAGNOSIS

Many continue to use the normative diagnosis that is (in)famously known as the 'democratic deficit' (Scharpf, 1999; Lord and Magnette, 2004). The EU's democratic deficit has been diagnosed in many different and highly sophisticated accounts (e.g. Eriksen and Fossum, 2002a; Bellamy and Castiglione, 2003; Bowman, 2006; Weiler, 2012; Theuns, 2017). Such accounts seek to highlight challenges to the EUs democratic credentials and often suggest possible remedies. Concerns with the legitimacy and the democratic deficit of the EU are often intertwined in these accounts. Indeed, legitimacy and democratic legitimacy are usually taken in the literature to be coextensive. It is important though to keep the notions analytically separate. While democratic credentials have become paramount in accounts of legitimacy, this development is historically contingent. Further, though accounts of legitimacy emphasizing democracy are dominant, the role of democratic procedures varies importantly. Some defend democratic procedures instrumentally to their securing other ends (Van Parijs, 2011 p.5-22) whereas others defend their 'epistemic' qualities (Estlund 2009, p.98-116).

EU politics is usually diagnosed with a democratic deficit for lacking supposedly key characteristics of an ideal democracy. Of course, not all EU scholars agree there is a democratic deficit at all. Majone argues that the application of democratic standards to EU governance is a category error (1994). For him, the EU is a regulatory state, which ought to pursue pareto-efficient policies (Majone, 1998 p.18-25). To frame this in the lexicon of this paper, Majone rejects talk of input *and* output democratic legitimacy, focusing exclusively on the desirability of EU policy. Moravcsik also rejects the democratic deficit through the opposite path; he argues that EU policies measure up to legitimacy standards quite as well as policies enacted in national democratic fora (2002).

Nevertheless, the dominant position is that the EU does suffer from some kind of democratic deficit. Two of the most important concerns in such diagnoses are 1) the lack of sufficient democratic control and; 2) the lack of sufficient citizen participation (for a helpful overview, see e.g. Jensen, 2009)[1]. Analysts emphasizing the lack of democratic control that citizens of the EU are able to exercise on its politics typically highlight certain institutional features that such control would require and that are missing from EU politics. A frequent proposal is the direct election of the European Commission (EC) president (Hix, 1998; Decker and Sonnicksen, 2011). This procedure

supposedly reinforced the EC president's mandate and accountability, allowing citizens to express (dis)satisfaction in line with the Schumpeterian ideal of a competitive democracy. A step in this direction was taken by European parliamentary groups when they unilaterally put forward *Spitzenkandidaten* (Hobolt, 2014). The relationship between specific procedures and democratic beliefs is complex. Alternative democratic procedures may offer a better contingent translation of democratic beliefs about legitimation. However, we argue that such alternatives cannot be the grounds of a critique of the democratic illegitimacy of antecedent procedures.

A second important strand in the literature concerns citizen participation in EU politics. The most evident and mediatized lack of democratic participation is the low and generally dropping participation in European Parliament (EP) elections (Mattila, 2003). Given the highly publicized introduction of *Spitzenkandidaten*, and the economic circumstances, there were expectations that turnout for EP elections would stabilize after years of decline. This proved inaccurate, with 42.54% turnout at final count continuing the trend of decline.

Concerns over citizen participation are not exclusively focused on voter turnout. Several theorists of EU legitimacy look to deliberative politics to find a metric of legitimacy analysis, inspired no doubt by concurrent trends in democratic theory (see especially Eriksen and Fossum, 2002b). Some see deliberative politics as a source rather than a metric of legitimacy. Joerges and Neyer for instance propose a notion they also call 'deliberative supranationalism', to justify the 'comitology' system of EU legislation (1997 p.292-298). Long criticized for its lack of transparency and the absence of Euro-parliamentarians, Joerges and Neyer defend such fora as unique sites of a discursive politics of persuasion, despite limited membership (*ibid.*).

The centrality of the democratic deficit thesis, both in academic discussion and, increasingly, in popular and political discourse, has had material effects in EU constitutional innovation. Particularly the continuous expansion of the competencies of the EP is often justified and - at least in part - caused by the attention this debate has received (see e.g. Costa and Magnette, 2003).

SYSTEMS THEORY ANALYSES OF DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY

Systems-theory approaches to EU democratic legitimacy overlap with the democratic deficit debate in that scholars who use the language of 'input', 'throughput' and 'output' legitimacy usually do so to highlight a perceived failing of the EU to measure up to one or more of these metrics (see e.g. Schmidt, 2013). The systems-theoretic approach was popularized by Fritz Scharpf in his 1999 book *Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic?* Its influence is difficult to underestimate. He was the first to introduce the distinction between 'input' and 'output' legitimacy. This distinction has since been often applied in analyses of European political institutions and policies (Borrás, et al., 2007 pp.586-597; Risse and Klein, 2007 pp.72-74; and Lindgren and Persson, 2010 pp.450-453 focusing on institutions, and Skogstad, 2003 pp.321-327; and Borrás, 2006 pp.65-66 focusing on policies). Focusing on output legitimacy has encouraged scholars to move beyond the perceived defects in the EU's identity-based, procedural or participative credentials to look at the actual domain of governance - how well the EU is able to succeed in doing what it sets out to achieve.

Scharpf developed the input/output distinction by first identifying what he takes to be two different strands of democratic theory in the history of normative political theorizing – one focused on 'governing *by* the people' and the other 'governing *for* the people' (1999 p.6, italics in the original) –

and associated these with different legitimation mechanisms. Input theories of democratic legitimacy he takes to be part of governing by the people and thus closely associated with majoritarian rule. The core question for such theories is how to overcome 'the danger that self-interested, or hostile, majorities could destroy the minority' (*ibid*. p.7) – the usual strategy being to focus on overlapping cultural, historical, linguistic and ethnic identity. It is clear that if this were the end of the story, as some theorists of the democratic deficit have supposed, the EU would not measure up very well to the standard of democratic legitimacy.

As opposed to input democratic legitimacy, output democratic legitimacy is said to correspond to the second tradition of democratic thought, which emphasizes governing 'for' the people. While broader and more flexible, Scharpf does note that it also 'tends to be more contingent and more limited' (*ibid*. p.11). Substantively, he describes output legitimacy as deriving its force 'from its capacity to solve problems requiring collective solutions' (*ibid*.) that ordinary individual and civil actions cannot solve. We will show how Scharpf's concept of output democratic legitimacy confuses the desirability of governmental activity with procedural legitimacy.

Output-oriented legitimacy serves as a metric to measure the success at which political actions are able to solve problems efficiently.[2] To this end, Scharpf identifies independent expertise, corporatist agreement, intergovernmental agreement, and pluralist policy networks as mechanisms of output legitimacy in the EU, as well as describing electoral accountability as a sort of 'hybrid' mechanism whereby the shadow of an input (elections) 'reinforces the normative orientation of office holders toward the public interest' (*ibid*., p.14). Not surprisingly, the EU is more equipped to score-high on these 'output-oriented' legitimation measures.

Before we come to criticize this conceptualization of democratic legitimacy, it is useful to see the how it works out in more detail. The interplay of input and output legitimacy would produce a two-by-two table of legitimacy judgements. It is not difficult to imagine a political institution that is well able to solve collective action problems but has no direct democratic mandate, little by way of democratic accountability, and no immediate democratic control. Such an institution would seem to score highly on output legitimacy, but low on input legitimacy. Similarly, a policy that enjoys close congruence with the 'will of the people' expressed through democratic procedures - such as for instance a measure adopted through a referendum - may fail spectacularly to 'solve the problem' that the measure was intended to address, or may prove overly inefficient.

Looking more closely at Scharpf's proposals however demonstrates that input and output legitimacy as he conceives them are not independent variables. We have already noted that electoral accountability seems to address both input and output legitimacy; one telling quote seems to go further: considering the potential of EU politics to avoid divisive decisions as a strategy for increasing output legitimacy, Scharpf writes: 'if European policy networks should be able to assure win-win solutions that satisfy all interests affected, output-oriented legitimacy would be assured, and the democratic deficit would cease to matter' (*ibid*., p.25).

It is important to note at this point that Scharpf's analysis is ambiguous as to whether output here addresses a problem of *democratic* legitimacy. When output is presented as engaging another tradition of democratic thought and as a *variable* of democracy, the assumption is that better output for the people strengthens *democratic* legitimacy and reduces a *democratic* deficit. When it is presented as independent from, say, participatory democratic input, the assumption is that better output for the people simply makes democratic legitimacy less important rather than reinforce it –

indeed, 'the democratic deficit would *cease to matter*' in Scharpf's words (*ibid*. p. 25). In the latter case, better output does not solve but helps to avoid the problem of a democratic deficit. It is in this sense, for instance, that Vivien Schmidt speaks about output or the challenge 'to get the economics right' as distinct from Europe's 'other [democratic] deficit' or the need 'to get the politics right' (2012, p.7) while at other times she also takes output as internal to a specifically democratic conception of legitimacy (e.g. 2013, pp.3-12).

Recently, scholars have proposed to add a third metric to Scharpf's toolbox, also borrowed from systems analysis - 'throughput' legitimacy. This term received some attention in the years following Scharpf's book (e.g. Wolf, 2006; Bekkers and Edwards, 2007 pp.43-46; Risse and Klein, 2007 pp.72-74), but gained in importance in EU studies literature following Schmidt's (2013) article on the subject. When applied to the EU, throughput legitimacy focuses in her words on 'what goes on inside the 'black box' of EU governance' (*ibid*. p.5). It concerns the 'processes' of EU politics, rather than the electoral procedures of input or the effectiveness of output. Schmidt takes throughput legitimacy to involve the 'efficacy of... EU governance processes and the adequacy of the rules they follow' (*ibid*.). Further, this metric also takes account of 'the accountability and transparency of the governance processes', 'the quality and quantity of EU governance processes' inclusiveness' and, 'the openness of the EU's various bodies to 'civil society'' (*ibid*.).

Schmidt's article also draws attention to the difference between the public perception of legitimacy and the normative question of whether an institution has a right to rule. This well-known distinction - between moral or normative and sociological legitimacy - has long been recognized as central to accounts of legitimacy in political theory. The question of a political agent's moral legitimacy asks whether the agent has a moral right to rule and, usually, whether its subjects have a moral obligation ordinarily to obey. In contrast, sociological legitimacy holds that an authority is *considered* to have the right to rule, supposedly leading its subjects to generally *believe* that they are under an obligation to obey.

Sociological and normative legitimacy need not be considered wholly independent, and may interact in interesting ways (Beetham 2013, pp.37-41). In our context, it is clear that the distinction cuts across the input/output/throughput distinction; for instance, without proper democratic elections (input) both the normative and the perceived democratic legitimacy of a parliament will presumably suffer. In the next section, we develop a critique of both the systems theoretic approach to the EU's legitimacy and the democratic deficit-thesis with reference to the political theory of Michael Oakeshott.[3]

OAKESHOTT'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN LEGITIMACY AND DESIRABILITY

It has been noted that systems theory regards democratic legitimacy as an 'interactive construction' (Schmidt 2013, p.11) that encapsulates the variables of input, throughput and output. From Oakeshott's perspective, by contrast, these are not variables of one interactive construction but refer to separate concepts, respectively the legitimacy and desirability of governing activities. Although his work predates the systems-theoretic approach and is far removed from its terminology, it may retrospectively be read as a premonition against the view of legitimacy as an interplay between, on one hand, participatory input and procedural throughput and, on the other hand, performance output.

Oakeshott's point of departure is that modern political thought has been preoccupied with two major but analytically distinct questions. The first of these questions is: *How should a governing body be constituted, composed and authorized in order to be considered legitimate?* The second problem is: *What should a legitimate governing body be engaged to do and to achieve?* Thus, the first question refers to the legitimacy or 'constitutional shape' of a governing body, whereas the second refers to the desirability of its activities or 'the character of its engagements' (Oakeshott 1975a, p.330).

Reflections on the legitimacy or authority of governance are not peculiarly modern. They are conducted in the idiom inherited from pre-modern political theory (such as Aristotle's threefold classification of constitutional regimes and their perversions) and express certain beliefs about the normative sources of the right to rule (Everson 1996, p.61-90). In modern European history, 'the grace of God' and 'the people' were foremost among these beliefs and not considered as mutually exclusive: *vox populi vox dei est* (Oakeshott 1975a, p.329). Nevertheless, in current legitimation discourses 'democracy' stands first among these considerations and has been translated more or less (in)adequately into democratic procedures by which the right to rule may be legitimately exercised. 'Universal suffrage', for instance, has overtaken 'hereditary succession' as a central source of legitimacy.

Procedures, as Oakeshott stresses, are internal to the concept of legitimacy and explain why the statement 'that 'law regulates its own creation' is not a paradox but a truism' (Oakeshott 1999, p.151). Legitimacy requires due observance of procedures and laws which imperfectly reflect currently-held beliefs and values about the sources of legitimacy. The translation of beliefs about legitimacy into adequate procedures remains as complex and context-dependent as the contingently-held beliefs themselves. For instance, in some polities the procedure of general elections for representatives is considered an adequate translation of the democratic belief in 'universal suffrage', in others it is thought to require frequent binding referendums. The translation of democratic beliefs about legitimacy in democratic procedures is therefore never a once-and-for-all achievement. It remains an open-ended, dynamic matter of contestation.

According to Oakeshott, reflections on the desirability of governance have become increasingly important in and characteristic of modern political thought (Oakeshott 1993, p.10-11). The reason for this focus is fairly straightforward. Whereas the scope of activities was restricted in pre-modern times (mainly to dispensing justice and organizing defence), modern European history has witnessed dramatic changes in the character and scope of governing activities. This development is best explained by the increased availability of resources and the concurrently increased power with which governments can pursue new activities. Increasing focus on the activities is, then, characteristic of modern political thought since hitherto no government could imagine engaging in the scope of activities undertaken in modern time. They have power to do things never done before, which invites reflection on the desirability of these activities (Oakeshott 1993, pp.10 -11).

Although Oakeshott thinks that in modern political thought a comparative shift of attention from the legitimacy to the desirability of governance is undeniable, for three reasons he is not surprised that this shift has not become more explicit. First, the shift of attention does not mean that the question of legitimacy has become obsolete. On the contrary, Oakeshott believes it remains crucial as the absence of firm beliefs on which its acknowledgment rests invariably indicate political disintegration. But he does think that modern reflection on legitimacy has been sparked by the changing and expanding pursuits of government rather than *vice versa*: 'authorization mattered more because

power and activity had increased' (Oakeshott 1993, p.11). Thus, the modern case for democratic legitimacy was built in response to growing activity: 'where it was not argued that a democratic constitution would increase the power of government, it was argued that it is intolerable that governments disposing of such immense power should not be democratically constituted' (*ibid*. p.11).

Second, the shift has remained under-appreciated because reflection on the desirability of governance has not produced a distinctive idiom of its own but has confusingly used and transfigured the vocabulary designed to address the problem of legitimacy. Notably, the adjective democratic, which properly belongs to the idiom of legitimacy, is often invoked as a 'confidence-trick' to recommend the desirability of specific activities –specific public goods or social services such as education or healthcare (Oakeshott, 1975a, p.193). Thirdly, reflection on legitimacy has retained a 'fictitious pre-eminence' because of the misguided conviction that the activities of government are a necessary function of its constitutional shape. Accordingly, it was wrongly expected that 'to have settled' the question of the legitimacy 'is to have decided the other', separate question of the desirability of governance (Oakeshott, 1993, p.11).

Oakeshott thus argues that the activities government undertakes cannot be seen as a necessary function of the authorization and constitutional shape which give it legitimacy, and that the distinction between these two concerns must be sharply observed in political theory. His contention is that a particular belief about legitimation (for instance, that it should be democratic) 'neither favours nor obstructs (much less compels or excludes)' a specific belief about what a governing body should achieve. In the historical context of Europe, he claims the administrative histories of governing bodies in modern Europe do not follow, nor even run parallel to, their constitutional histories (*ibid*., p.9; Oakeshott, 1975b, p.189)*.

While the distinction Oakeshott develops has become more important with the widening activities of government, its analytic foundation has earlier roots. For instance, in the *Leviathan* Hobbes distinguishes, on one hand, the authorization and constitutional shape (Ch. XVII and XIX) and, on the other hand, the office or specification of tasks (Ch. XVIII and XXX) of a governing body (Hobbes, 1651 [1996]). It also finds support in Locke's claim in the *Second Treatise* that a commonwealth is not reducible to democracy or any particular constitutional shape that bestows legitimacy, but that it signifies a certain kind of association, namely one that is independent (Locke, 1689 [2003], Ch. X). Relatedly, in *The Social Contract*, Rousseau is keen to distinguish beliefs about the desirable activities of a governing body, inferred from 'the limits of the sovereign power' and specified in 'the signs of a good government' (1762 [2002], Ch. IV Book II and Ch. IX Book III), from beliefs regarding the best constitutional shape of a governing body (*ibid*., Ch. II – VIII Book III).

Thus, from Oakeshott's perspective, our answer to an even more basic question – *What is the character of this political association?* – informs our beliefs about the desirability of its governance and a commensurate apparatus of power to adequately undertake these activities. But this answer does not dictate any particular belief about which constitutional shape legitimates governance (Oakeshott 1975b, p.196). Among those who have treated concerns about the legitimacy and the desirability of governance in terms of an 'interactive alliance', Oakeshott points to Kant for arguing incorrectly that a republican constitutional shape necessarily imposes the pursuit of peace among the activities of government and to Paine for wrongly asserting that democratically legitimate government 'would confine its activities within limits he approved and would be inexpensive' (Oakeshott 1993, p.10). Similarly, Hume (1777) and most offshoots of utilitarianism stand out for

their insistence on the inseparability between these concerns, as the recognition of legitimacy rests on desirable outcomes of governance (for which the evaluative measure is 'utility') rather than on democratic and procedural qualities.

From the above exposition, it is clear that Oakeshott's approach challenges the systems theoretic approach to legitimacy on several fronts. Three points of critique stand out. First, if we adopt Oakeshott's perspective, it becomes redundant to specify the concept of legitimacy with the compound expressions 'input legitimacy' and 'throughput legitimacy'. By this we mean that they are two inseparable properties of democratic legitimacy, both necessary and neither independently sufficient. 'Input', as noted, is primarily concerned with 'participatory quality', whereas 'throughput' is 'process-oriented' (Schmidt, 2013, pp.4-5). The former refers most explicitly to the democratic credentials of governance, whereas the latter specifies certain characteristics, such as 'accountability' or 'openness', to which procedures must conform should its activities, like the laws it enacts or the policies it adopts, be acknowledged as democratically legitimate. While it is useful to parse out these different characteristics of democratic legitimacy, they ought to be viewed as two sides of the same coin rather than two independent though interrelated metrics for measuring democratic legitimacy.

This procedural character of democratic legitimacy, as we shall stress further, is distinct from beliefs about the substantive desirability of governing activities. Procedures are concerned with 'how' governance unfolds but indifferent to 'what' is done within the bounds of authorization. In other words, to the extent that legitimacy is believed to require a democratic anchorage and conformity to procedures, it is concerned with input and throughput inseparably and by definition. There can be no democratic input which is not itself regulated and bound by throughput procedures.

In contrast to input and throughput, output does not enter this conception of democratic legitimacy. From the perspective explored here, the compound expression output legitimacy is an oxymoron since it denies a central condition of possibility for legitimacy, namely, that particular laws and policies may be ascertained as democratically legitimate even if their problem-solving quality is considered to be deplorable. 'Output' is not concerned with the legitimacy but the *desirability* of governing activities or, in the language of systems analysis, the appreciation of performance.

Indeed, debate on the desirability of certain activities presupposes the acknowledgment, be it rapturous or stingy, that governance has a measure of legitimacy (Nardin, 1983, p.265).[4] If an action of government lies outside its authorized scope then that action is illegitimate regardless of its character as desirable or undesirable. When we fundamentally deny a governing body's claim to legitimacy, our real stake is not to change but to stop its activities altogether and terminate its existence. Only when some recognition of legitimacy is given can we be said to have a stake in altering the activities of government according to what we find desirable. And, most importantly, it is because we do not expect disagreement about what constitutes desirable governance to disappear that we find democratic procedures most suitable to ascertain the legitimacy of laws and policies which some applaud and others taunt. In other words, if the legitimacy of governance is made contingent upon its expediency, fairness, wisdom or other criteria of desirability, the concept of legitimacy loses its distinct force.

This approach does not assert, as Oakeshott seems to suggest, that the legitimacy of governance completely transcends its contingent performance. Oakeshott has been criticized for insulating the recognition of legitimacy from consequential considerations about what rulers (fail to) achieve (e.g.,

Parekh, 1995, p.178). For instance, why should citizens recognize a claim to legitimacy if it cannot assure basic physical security or minimal economic prosperity? In this regard, Oakeshott's distinction seems counterintuitive.

Of course, Oakeshott agrees that governments are always legitimated to act and govern, rather than being on a permanent holiday. What he stresses is that if a governing body fails to act altogether (and thus deliver 'output'), its *de facto* existence rather than its claim to democratic legitimacy is at stake.[5] Nevertheless, we can attenuate Oakeshott's sharp distinction by saying that there is clearly a continuous interplay or dialectic between legitimacy and desirability. On this interpretation, democratic procedures, such as competitive elections, serve to channel ongoing contestation about what desirable action substantively requires. Thus, instead of joining Oakeshott in a radical separation between legitimacy and desirability, we favour a plastic and dynamic usage of his distinction which is at once careful to avoid confusion and eager to investigate the precise interplay between what is done and how it is legitimated.

We are suggesting, then, that important and ongoing contestation about the (lack of) democratic legitimacy of the EU as a body politic takes place alongside and simultaneously with the exchange of views on what desirable performance requires. Indeed, questions of legitimacy often resurface as concerns about the kind and scope of desirable activity grow - because the EU's 'power and activity' continues to increase, its 'authorization' matters more. Yet, changes in the procedures through which the EU's legitimacy is placed on a firmer democratic footing do not offer any guidance about the desirability of what it does. Stronger democratic procedures in the EU are indifferent to beliefs about the relative desirability of stimulus or austerity and of measures to promote labour mobility over those guarding against social dumping. None of these alternatives can be excluded as a possible result from the adoption of more democratic decision-making procedures in the EU. In short, the EU's democratic legitimacy neither transcends nor depends upon desirable output.

From this perspective, the EU's nonconformity to international treaties or its disregard of the results of referenda are properly identified as concerns of democratic legitimacy. While it is therefore a question of legitimacy to ascertain whether the EU's bail-out programs of Greece stand the test of legitimacy for instance, in light of their alleged violation of the Maastricht Treaty, the EU's pressure to call off a Greek referendum on the bailout in 2011 or its defiance of the 2015 referendum, it is an altogether different concern to critique the poor problem-solving quality of these programs in terms of the desirability of stimulus, austerity or structural reforms. Similarly, the ECB programme of quantitative easing through the buying up of sovereign bonds confronts us with questions of legitimacy (does this engagement fall within the ECB's mandate to assure price stability?) and desirability (is it wise and effective from a monetary and economic perspective?) that should not be conflated. Democratic legitimacy requires that relevant procedures are observed (conformity to treaties, taking referenda results into account, perhaps), but has nothing to say on the substantive desirability of the EU's performance.

These two points, that legitimacy concerns input and throughput by definition but that output addresses the desirability rather than the legitimacy of governing activities, imply a third. The inclusion of output in the trinity of variables makes it difficult to see if systems analyses offer a specifically democratic conception of legitimacy. Imagine governing body A scoring 6/10 on democratic input (for instance, open and competitive elections, low levels of abstention) and throughput (for instance, parliamentary procedure followed in legislation, freedom of deliberation, publicity) but only 3/10 on output (for instance, the quality of public goods like infrastructure,

healthcare and public schools). Governing body B scores only 4/10 on input and throughput but 8/10 on output.[6] If we follow systems analyses, according to which input and output involve 'complementarities and trade-offs' (Schmidt 2013, p.3ff.), we are forced to the absurd conclusion that governing body A should be believed, not merely to be less legitimate, but less democratically legitimate than governing body B.[7]

This conceptual amalgamation of legitimacy with expectations about what governance should achieve is also found, for instance, in the work of Richard Bellamy and Dario Castiglione (2013). Offering alternative models of democracy to scrutinize the EU's legitimacy, support for extensive public goods provision is taken to be a necessary function of 'thick' beliefs about democracy (*ibid*. p.211). But the alleged link is questionable. Governing activity can be judged to excel in such output as high-quality public goods provision ('for the people') without being democratic. Conversely, a thick democracy with strong claims to normative legitimacy may be found wanting in terms of output.[8]

If output evaluation is postulated as internal to legitimacy, we are not only left wondering whether we are presented with a specifically democratic conception but, more broadly, whether the concept has become indistinguishable from other sociologically measurable concepts like credibility, public opinion or popularity. To be sure, just as Madison (1787/1788) claims in *Federalist* No. 47 and 49 that 'all government rests on opinion', so does the normative claim to legitimacy continuously rest on sociological belief. This is formally and explicitly so in democracies, where changing beliefs about the legitimacy of governing bodies function as iterative inputs in every election cycle. Yet the acknowledgment of this does not equal, much less necessitate, approval of or favourable attitudes towards what is substantively done within legitimate, authorized bounds. Systems theory is unable to account for this distinguishing mark of the concept and hence cannot provide a satisfactory analysis of the EU's claim to democratic legitimacy.

In many of its manifestations, the democratic deficit-thesis to scrutinize the EU's legitimacy runs on the same conceptual conflation as the systems-theoretic analysis. This diagnosis often muddles democratic and procedural legitimacy with expectations about the EU's performance. This holds true not merely for scholarly debate on the deficit but also its invocation in popular and official discourse. Take, for instance, the *Staat van de Europese Unie 2013* ('State of the European Union 2013') which then Dutch Foreign Minister and current First Vice President of the EC Frans Timmermans presented to the Dutch Parliament. In his discourse, Timmermans claimed that:

> 'The Achilles heel of the EU is its democratic deficit. This deficit can only be tackled if, on one side, the EU performs better and, on the other, if democratic control within the EU is enlarged. What the EU and its Member States do they must do better, more transparently, more efficiently *and* more democratically' (2013, p.5).

This is a clear example of how the notion of a democratic deficit, which properly belongs to the idiom of legitimacy, at once lumps output performance, democratic input and procedural throughput together *and* separates these considerations ('on one side', 'on the other'). It is revealing in this regard that the adjective democratic is not reserved for considerations of performance. If the deficit-thesis is to offer a clear contribution to analyses of EU politics, it restricts itself to concerns about 'how' the EU should be procedurally legitimated in order to ascertain its democratic legitimacy but not with 'what' makes its governance substantively desirable. In the final section, we propose to interpret some empirical cases and proposals taken to bear on the alleged democratic

deficit, showing how the distinction between legitimate and desirable EU action may be useful as a heuristic device.

LEGITIMACY AND DESIRABILITY: THE DISTINCTION APPLIED

How can challenges about EU legitimation be illuminated from the perspective so far developed? In this section, we examine two cases: a) proposals to strengthen democratic control through a new procedure to elect the EC's President and b) proposals to intensify democratic participation through 'network governance'.

These two cases are intended to function as vignettes - space restrictions limit a fuller application here. Further, this paper deliberately refers to the legitimacy and desirability of EU action in general terms. The pertinence of this distinction is not restricted, in our view, to specific areas of EU action or particular EU institutions. For instance, it seems tempting to focus on the EP for 'input' legitimacy and on the EC for desirable 'output'. In our view, however for every instance of governmental activity and for every institution or actor involved, we ought to pose the twofold question: first, is this (set of) institution(s) formally authorized and legitimated to undertake this action? Second, is this action substantively desirable? To illustrate, let us first consider the election of the EC's president.

(a)

The vein of democratic deficit literature that attempts to increase the level of democratic *control* by the electorate is pertinent given our objections to output-oriented approaches to EU legitimacy. Its proponents argue that the outcomes of EU political processes tend to poorly reflect the interests and preferences of EU citizens. Generally, the argument runs on a premise regarding the (lack of) transparency of European Union decision-making (Héritier, 2003; Risse and Kleine, 2007; Schmidt, 2013, pp.4-7). To address this, many commentators suggest increasing the politicization of EU politics, for instance through strengthening European Parliament competencies, though some suggest alternative avenues of constitutional reform (Mény, 2003). Such proposals *are* geared to the processes of democracy, not its outcome, and therefore seem to be insulated from our critique.

Arguably though, democratic processes that are considered problematic insofar as they poorly reflect the interests or preferences of EU citizens cannot straightforwardly be charged with democratic illegitimacy. The outcome of a political process is legitimate if it meets existing procedural standards of legitimacy. It is democratic if the underlying source of legitimation is the participation of citizens who each have an equal stake in the procedure. Procedures that meet both these criteria are thus democratically legitimate, according to the existing standards of democratic legitimacy.

We could take the election of the European Union president as a representative example to illustrate this point. Barosso, Juncker's predecessor as President of the EC, was elected via the traditional bargaining processes between heads of state and government in the European Council. Juncker, in contrast, was the *Spitzenkandidat* for the European People's Party – the party that went on to win the largest number of seats in the EP elections. Those that were responsible for the

change in procedure could well have argued that the new procedure was more 'direct', even that it increased 'democratic control'. They would not however be able to find fault with the legitimacy of Barosso's appointment – it was done in accordance with the existing (democratic) rules of procedure. Barosso was irrefutably a legitimate EC President, irrespective of whether the new election procedure better translates evolving beliefs about the legitimation of the office of the EC president. If we accept this point, then it becomes a matter of logical consequence that this new election procedure cannot be said to 'fill' an antecedent democratic 'deficit' (though it may be more desirable, just, wise, righteous, etc.).

Changing the process by which future Presidents were to be elected displaced the site (or the character and standards) of democratic legitimacy from indirect democratic legitimation via heads of state and government to indirect legitimation via elected majorities of the EU parliament. It did nothing to suggest a democratic or legitimacy deficit of the procedures it replaced. Once more, we are agnostic as to whether the new procedure for electing an EC President better translates beliefs on the sources of legitimacy than the old procedure. All we are saying is that is anachronistic, and wrong, to apply the standards for the legitimacy of Juncker's appointment to the question of whether Barroso was appointed legitimately. More generally, changes to the site (or character and standards) of legitimacy do not necessarily indicate, much less demonstrate the existence of a legitimacy deficit, democratic or otherwise.

(b)

Concern with citizen participation constituted the second strand of democratic deficit. Some proposals putatively addressing the inadequate level of citizen participation in EU governance can sometimes be assessed in similar ways to proposals addressing the lack of democratic control. Rather than changing the site of legitimation, some of these proposals change certain characteristics of democratic processes, for instance publicizing them (as EuroparlTV publicizes the debates of the EP) or increasing the scope for deliberation. As above, changing such features may enhance the EU's democratic credentials, but they do not in themselves substantiate the charge of a prior democratic deficit.

The main problem with attempting to include 'affected' parties into the design and implementation of EU policies is that it is already a political decision who is and who is not affected by any particular policy proposal; this decision ought therefore itself be subject to democratic legitimation (Goodin, 2007). Any top-down attempt to impose a particular view over which parties or individuals are and which are not affected by a decision is therefore a depart from the democratic principle that all views are to be given an equal stake. This is particularly problematic where such a decision over who is affected impacts the subsequent decision-procedure over what final form the policy is to take. A further concern is that participative strategies of governance may lack in democratic accountability (Papadopoulos, 2010; Hazenberg, 2015). Where such aspects are already features of EU governance – described in the literature under the title 'network' 'new' and 'multi-level' governance – this is potentially a source of democratic *illegitimacy* rather than a source of legitimacy (Smismans, 2008).

Adding layers and actors to decision-making beyond the existing formal (and formally regulated) democratic procedures can compromise the competences of those *with* a democratic mandate (heads of state and government in the European Council, MEPs, ministers of the national

governments, etc.). Scharpf (1999) suggests that such pluralist policy networks, insofar as they may decrease the gap between EU legislative output and desirable output, constitute one aspect of EU democratic legitimacy, a position our argument rejects explicitly.

CONCLUSION

The main contention of this article has been threefold. First, predominant discourses on EU legitimation hold that better output performance reinforces the EU's claim to legitimacy, but equivocate whether this strengthens the specifically democratic quality of its legitimacy. These accounts can be confused as to whether stronger output reduces or avoids the problem of a democratic deficit.

Second, via our reading of Oakeshott, the article stresses the importance of observing the distinction between the legitimacy and the desirability of governance, pointing to the frequent failure of systems theory and democratic deficit analyses to observe this distinction. The legitimacy of governance neither transcends nor depends on the desirability of its output performance. Because of the peculiar interplay or dialectic between democratic legitimacy and desirability, it is unhelpful to collapse the distinction between them.

Finally, with the help of this distinction it is possible to scrutinize many specific proposals that purport to address the democratic deficit, which often displace rather than reduce the deficit. In the current context of multiple crises, a sobering conclusion therefore imposes itself: even if the EU became an admirable crisis-manager and would perform beyond all expectations, the democratic credentials of its claims to legitimacy would remain unaffected.

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ENDNOTES

[1] These two strands are by no means exhaustive, but introduce concerns important to the application of the interpretative heuristic device this paper proposes in section four. The most important omission concerns the putative lack of a common democratic culture in the EU. (See e.g. Dekker, 2002; Chevenal and Schimmelfennig, 2013; Nicolaïdis, 2013)

[2] As such, Scharpf's input/output distinction seems to mirror Dahl's earlier concerns over citizen participation versus systems effectiveness (1994).

[3] The reconstruction of Oakeshott we offer is neither exhaustive of his position nor exegetically pure. It is self-consciously instrumental and highlights only those aspects of his theory we find useful for the task at hand.

[4] Weiler makes this point very clear: 'If I am a lifelong adherent of the Labour party in the UK, I might be appalled by the election of the Tories and abhor every single measure adopted by the government of the Tory prime minister. But it would never enter my mind to consider such measures as 'illegitimate'. In fact, [...] the deeper the legitimacy resources of a regime, the better able it is to adopt *unpopular* measures critical in the time of crisis where exactly such measures may be necessary.' Weiler (2012, p.827).

[5] As Hobbes makes clear: 'The obligation of subjects to the sovereign, is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them.' (1651, Ch. XXI).

[6] For instance, in the US majority rule is well-entrenched and there are various (even if imperfect) ways to hold governing agencies accountable, but its performance in public goods provision is considered to be relatively weak. Alternatively, the constitution of Singapore's government, say, relies on some electoral procedures but these do not have strong democratic credentials. However, its performance on the provision of certain public goods is often considered to be of a comparatively higher quality than that of the US.

[7] This example assumes that the three variables are weighted equally, but similar examples could take account of a variable weighting.

[8] Some justifications of democracy run on it being a necessary procedure to *define* the political 'good', but even here the lack of adequate resources to subsequently realize the desirable good can result in a low 'output' evaluation.

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Research Article

Europeanization in Pension Policy: the Crisis as a Game-Changer?

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Abstract

The actual effects of the European Union (EU) on member states' pension policy are more extensive and complex than the contractual basis suggests. In addition to the Open Method of Coordination, a genuine instrument of social policy, 'cross-effects' of the freedom of the internal market mediated by the ECJ, as well as fiscal policy 'interventions' in member states experiencing financial difficulties have risen in importance. The sovereign debt crisis has functioned as a 'game changer' that re-adjusted the balance between European influence and national autonomy, but so far only for the countries hit most by the crisis. As European influence in this supposed 'new phase' differs markedly depending on the respective budgetary situation as well as the 'well-preparedness' of national pension systems due to previous reforms and as informal rather than formal ways of exerting pressure were chosen, the consequences for other member states and the European pension policy 'architecture' as a whole are yet unclear.

Keywords

This article addresses the question of whether the European Union (EU) has become a decisive factor in member states' pension policy and pension reforms and whether both the extent and the channels of such an influence have changed in the crisis[1] of the past few years. An analysis of national pension reforms in Germany, Italy, Poland and Sweden in the period 2001-2015 shows that the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) as a genuine social and pension policy instrument but also a soft one based on peer pressure and learning had limited influence on national policy choice. 'Interventions' by the European Court of Justice based on European anti-discrimination law occurred to a limited extent (Italy, Poland). By contrast, the reformed European economic governance instruments did exert substantial influence on pension reforms in times of crisis (as the case of Italy shows) as pensions account for a large share of public spending in EU member states. However, crises also acted as reform catalysts before the introduction of the Stability and Growth Pact (Sweden) or at least before its tightening (Germany). In addition, informal channels were more influential in the Italian case than the formal ones, namely the European Semester and the two Excessive Debt Procedures. Therefore, while a shift towards budgetary consolidation has undoubtedly occurred and it seems justified to state an increasing degree of Europeanization 'through the back door' for countries in crisis, it remains to be seen whether the crisis functions as a 'game-changer' in the sense of a fundamentally altered balance between the European level and the member states more generally, irrespective of their economic situation, size and political weight in the medium term.

THE EU - AN 'ILLUSIONARY DWARF'[2] IN PENSION POLICY?

The financial, economic and sovereign debt crisis, the refugee crisis, Brexit, deepening rifts between individual and groups of member states, the electoral successes of populist and EU-critical parties, weakness in foreign policy – without doubt the EU is in an existential crisis. Nevertheless, major

policy integration, often outside public attention, advances. This also applies to social and especially pension policy. Yet, the emphasis often lies in the notion that this has been and will remain a domain of the member states – as the contractual basis, according to which the organisation and financing of social security systems fall within member states' responsibility (Art. 153 (4)), suggests – while the European institutions in this field should not extend their activities beyond market creation (for a critical and differentiated view of the 'latecomer discourse' see Schmidt 2015: 15ff). In fact, the heterogeneous economic structure, economic performance and types of welfare states, the decision-making rules at the European level, the small budget for EU social policy, a high number of veto players and the preference of large parts of the political and administrative elites as well as of the electorate to maintain social policy within the national domain, pose significant barriers to the emergence of a strong European social policy (Anderson and Kaeding 2015; Schmidt 2015: 21ff.). At the same time, social policy is broadly accepted not only as an important factor of economic and demographic development, but also as a central aspect of the legitimacy and acceptance of a political system. To quote Jacques Delors, President of the Commission from 1985-1993, 'Nobody falls in love with a single market. We have to give Europe a soul' (cited in Leibfried and Obinger 2008: 346, translated by the author). Furthermore, social policy clearly cannot be separated from the single market and is subject to its influence, which leads to considerable spillover processes and initiatives of the community's institutions. Moreover, there are increasingly compelling reasons for more integration in this field in this current crisis: the performance gap between the European welfare states results in diverging levels of social assurance, which needs to be restored in its stabilising function in many member states and to be adjusted to demographic realities (Vandenbroucke 2014: 11ff.). The still widespread, despite notable exceptions (e.g. Anderson 2015; Falkner 2016; and see below), premise that the EU is a non-actor in social policy (Jacquot 2008: 11, also illustrated by the low priority of EU level activities in textbooks such as Dallinger 2016) undervalues relevant activities and initiatives, especially in the field of pension policy with its high share of social expenditure. Is the EU thus an 'illusionary dwarf' in pension policy, contrary to its public and, to a lesser extent, academic perception? Against this backdrop, this article discusses the following question: have influences from the European level become a decisive factor in member states' pension policy and pension reforms and, in particular, did the crisis function as a 'game-changer' in terms of the degree and channels of pension policy Europeanization? Following this short introduction, the next section gives an overview of the Europeanization literature as such and, more specifically, with a view to pension policy. The following sections are dedicated to methodology and the state of pension policy at the European level respectively, followed by an analysis of pension reforms in selected member states in terms of European influences, which are then discussed in comparative perspective and summed up in a short conclusion.

EUROPEANIZATION RESEARCH AND PENSION POLICY

Europeanization research can now be considered an established approach within integration research. After initial controversies concerning a working definition of Europeanization (e.g. Olsen 2002), Radaelli's definition is now widely accepted:

> processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies (Radaelli 2004: 3).

This paper joins this definition and places its focus on the download dimension of Europeanization,[3] understood as the extent to which national policies – as well as processes (politics) and structures (polities) (Featherstone 2002: 19; Radaelli 2003: 35), although not discussed in this article – are subject to EU-induced changes and via which channels.

The extent of Europeanization of national structures, policies and processes can be classified according to Radaelli (2003: 37f.) as 'inertia' (no change), 'absorption' (adaptation without fundamental change), 'transformation' (paradigmatic adjustment or system change) and 'retrenchment' (de-Europeanization). In terms of sources of Europeanization, the most obvious case is hierarchy, which can appear in the form of both positive and negative integration, the former via supranational legislation within or relevant to the respective field, the latter by excluding national regulatory options and triggering regulatory competition between member states (Scharpf 1999; Radaelli 2004: 12). For the former type, Börzel (1999) identifies a logic of 'goodness of fit', implying a high degree of change in cases of a moderate 'misfit' of European and national policies while a more basic misfit is expected to trigger resistance by national actors facing Europeanization pressures. With a view to pension policy, the positive form of hierarchy would, for example, include repercussions of anti-discrimination law while the Stability and Growth Pact and especially the new instruments of budgetary consolidation introduced in the crisis can be considered manifestations of the negative form (Radaelli 2004: 12). Other possible logics of Europeanization include 'usages of Europe' by national actors (Graziano, Jacquot and Palier 2011; Radaelli 2004: 4) and finally 'soft' influences such as learning effects and changes in national discourses (Radaelli 2004: 12; Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002: 171ff.). As for pension policy, the Open Method of Coordination was explicitly designed for this latter purpose and can thus be expected to foster Europeanization within a non-hierarchical framework.

EUROPEANIZATION IN SOCIAL AND PENSION POLICY

Despite a growing body of research on Europeanization, pension policy within this field of research has been relatively neglected. Whereas there are numerous studies on the OMC as such (e.g. Heidenreich and Zeitlin 2009; Zeitlin, Barcevicius and Weishaupt 2014) and some on the social policy consequences of the reformed Stability and Growth Pact (e.g. De la Porte and Heins 2015) as well as several volumes on the Europeanization of social policy more generally (Anderson 2015; Kvist and Saari 2007; Graziano, Jacquot and Palier 2011), Europeanization in pension policy has received less attention.[4] Some publications discuss the OMC in this field (e.g. Natali 2007), only a few, albeit notable others take into account the impact of crisis management measures on pension reform (De la Porte and Heins 2015: 2). Hinrichs and Brosig (2013) discuss pension reforms in nine EU member states (Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Portugal, Romania, Spain and the UK) and conclude that rapid policy changes have occurred which were in most cases imposed by external actors (ibid.: 32). Natali and Stamati (2013) analyse recent pension reforms in Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Slovenia, Sweden and the UK against the backdrop of the crisis, and focus on the role of unions in this process. Anderson and Kaeding (2015) compare reforms in Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium with a view to analysing the influences of EU gender equality law and the run-up to the European Monetary Union's convergence criteria. Their focus is on domestic institutions and programme structures to explain different patterns of adaptation. Possible changes induced by the crisis are briefly pointed out ('[t]he 2010–2011 sovereign debt crisis dramatically changes the nature of the EMU constraint (2015: 249)), but not discussed any further. Thus, while all these studies analyse important aspects of current pension reforms in Europe, they either focus exclusively on the period since the onset of the crisis (Hinrichs and Brosig 2013; Natali and Stamati 2013) or address instruments of budgetary consolidation in the early days of the EMU only (Anderson and Kaeding).

This article discusses two possible phases of pension reforms, the heyday of the OMC on pensions since 2001 on the one hand and the era of crisis management since 2010 on the other, characterised by increasing public debt in several member states, related fiscal consolidation efforts and new instruments to strengthen the SGP – especially with the introduction of the European semester – while the OMC is continued on paper only, and tries to specify whether a change of the European 'rules of the game' has occurred. Can we observe a shift from the OMC to instruments of budgetary consolidation and, if so, does it go along with increased pressure on member states and thus intensified Europeanization?

METHODOLOGY

This study is based on the analysis of four member states (Germany, Italy, Poland and Sweden), which, similarly to Esping-Andersen's typology of welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1990, often criticised, but still the established point of reference) represent different types of welfare states, and which have a certain weight within the EU due to their size, population and economic power, while only some are members of the Eurozone. While Italy was (and is) particularly affected by the sovereign debt crisis, Germany had experienced budgetary difficulties in the late 1990s and early 2000s and Poland still had to cope with the challenges of transformation while Sweden had gone through a severe economic crisis in the early 1990s and was less affected later. Comprehensive pension reforms were implemented in all four countries, quite obviously related to the respective crisis: in Sweden from 1994, in Germany from 2001, in Poland from 1999 and in Italy more or less continuously from 1992 onwards, but with a remarkable acceleration in 2011. As stated before, it is the research interest of this paper to figure out whether these national reforms – including their respective follow-up measures – had a European dimension (rather than being caused by the crises themselves) and whether European influences have grown in importance over time.

Methodologically, primary sources (documents of the EU institutions and national ministries, especially recommendations and national strategy documents within the framework of the OMC on the one hand and the European Semester on the other) and secondary literature were analysed to compare national pension policies and reforms with the objectives formulated at EU level. Obviously, the mere fact that European recommendations and national policy documents correspond in terms of content and/or wording is not sufficient to indicate a causal relationship (Zohlnhöfer and Ostheim 2007: 333ff.). Even though references to the European level may provide indications of such a connection, national actors may use 'Europe' strategically in order to justify certain, and especially unpopular, measures, with the EU functioning as an additional source of legitimacy or as a scapegoat. Vice versa, national actors need not point to European sources of influence even in cases where these exist (ibid.: 334). In the latter case, European influences would be underestimated, in the former, an 'over-determination of the European factor' (Vink and Graziano 2007: 16) would occur. Thus, rather than trying to verify a causal relationship of any kind, a more realistic aim is to assess the plausibility of European influences, which can be achieved both by sequencing developments at both levels and by conducting expert interviews as a complement to document analysis (Zohlnhöfer and Ostheim 2007: 334). Roughly 60 guided expert interviews of about 60 minutes each with representatives of the relevant EU institutions, especially the Commission, and national institutions, primarily the ministries responsible for social affairs, but also for economics and finance, were conducted, of which only a selection is cited in this article. The list of interviews undertaken, indicating with which entities and when, can be found at the end of the article.

A POLICY FIELD IN THE MAKING

Attention to pension policy has increased significantly at the European level. On the one hand, member states face extensive and structurally similar demographic and financial challenges to their budget and fiscal policy, which has led in many cases to comprehensive reform activities, but also created a common problem for national economies through the single market and particularly through the economic and monetary union (EMU). Hence, a European dimension of pension policy has gradually developed over the past 20 years despite the absence of original jurisdiction, after other international organisations, including the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the World Bank, had already submitted proposals much earlier (Maier-Rigaud 2009). The latter proved to be significantly more influential in the transformation of the Central and Eastern European countries than the, at the time, largely passive EU (Orenstein 2008: 908). Although the EU does not elaborate a unitary approach for all member states due to the principle of subsidiarity and member state responsibility for social security systems, since about 2000, the Commission has implemented the multi-pillar approach of the World Bank (European Commission 2000). The overall objective is the financial sustainability of public pension systems, inter alia by reducing the debt level, and an increase in the employment rate, through a more flexible retirement age and the extension of working life (European Commission 2011: 6). All these approaches are summarised and systematised in the 2012 White Paper on adequate, safe and sustainable pensions (European Commission 2012). The central policy recommendations of the white paper are: raising the pension entry age plus adjusting it to life expectancy; restricting possibilities of early retirement; extending working life; harmonisation of the retirement age for men and women; and support of private and/or occupational pensions (European Commission 2012: 11). Since 2001, the Open Method of Coordination has been applied to pension policy (European Council 2001: 32). The member states publish National Strategy Reports (NSR) on their progress in pursuing common objectives with the three overarching criteria of adequacy, financial sustainability and modernisation of pension systems (e.g. European Commission 2005: 6f.). This process was later included in the OMC for social protection and social inclusion in the course of the 2006 'streamlining' (e.g., Zeitlin, Barcevicius and Weishaupt 2014: 2). The Commission and the Council jointly evaluate these reports and develop recommendations. Within the framework of the Europe2020 strategy, the member states now report their activities and progress in shorter National Social Reports following their National Reform Programmes (NRP) as part of the European Semester; the evaluation is part of the yearly report of the Social Policy Committee (SPC; Council of the European Union 2011: 5). The effectiveness of the OMC, however, has remained controversial both in principle and in the area of pension provision (among many others de la Porte and Pochet 2002; Zeitlin, Barcevicius and Weishaupt 2014; Heidenreich and Zeitlin 2009).

Public expenditure on pensions in 2013 amounted, on average, to 11.3 per cent of GDP in the EU-28 and 12.3 per cent in the Eurozone (European Commission 2015) and thus represented a significant share of state budgets. In addition to the 'soft' (because not enforced by sanctions) Open Method of Coordination, the pension systems of the member states are also a focus of European budgetary monitoring. The measures taken to address the financial, economic and sovereign debt crisis in this respect have further supplemented and strengthened the Stability and Growth Pact, namely the 'Six Pack' of 2011, in particular the introduction of the European Semester, the Fiscal Compact of 2013 and the Euro Plus Pact of 2011 (e.g. Schuknecht, Moutot, Rother and Stark 2011; Hilpold 2014). Within the framework of the European Semester, the member states submit budgetary and reform plans that are evaluated and lead to Country-Specific Recommendations (CSR) which have included pensions in some cases. Thereby, the former (at least rhetorical) balance between the aims of adequacy and sustainability was in fact given up to the benefit of the latter as both the instruments

used and the increasing influence of actors such as DG Economic and Financial Affairs (ECFIN), the ECOFIN Council and the Economic Policy Committee (EPC) show.

THE INFLUENCE OF EUROPEAN OBJECTIVES AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON NATIONAL REFORMS

To what extent did national reforms in the four selected countries have a European dimension, either by way of the Open Method of Coordination or of budgetary instruments? Are we seeing a 'new phase' of European influence on national pension policy since the onset of the crisis? In Germany, cost increases within the Bismarckian social insurance system had already given rise to concern since the 1980s. In 1997, the conservative-liberal government had tried to introduce a sustainability factor into the existing pension formula which was immediately withdrawn by the ensuing red-green government in 1998. However, with the continental welfare states and especially Germany being the 'sick man of Western Europe' (Hemerijk 2013: 180) at that time, a paradigm shift was introduced with an encompassing reform in 2001. The introduction of additional funded private retirement provision with state allowances (the so-called Riester pension) meant the conversion to a multi-pillar system. As to potential European influences, the reform was carried out prior to the introduction of the OMC on pensions. Rather, the primary aim was to consolidate contribution rates and adjust the pension system to demographic developments. Thus, budgetary consolidation and the reduction of high non-wage labour costs were the main drivers of reform and do suggest a European dimension by way of the Stability and Growth Pact, although the relative weight of European influences is assessed differently (Hacker 2010: 121ff.; Hering 2006: 33; interviews 2, 4). In the following years, the reform was complemented especially by the introduction of a sustainability factor in 2004 and the increase of the retirement age to 67 in 2007 (Eichenhofer, Rische and Schmähl 2012: 172; Hacker 2010: 124f.). In the NSR for subsequent years (2002, 2005, 2006, 2008), the federal government emphasised the Commission's goals of adequacy, sustainability and modernisation, while repeatedly stressing their compatibility with the German reforms. In fact, the objectives and most of the concrete reform steps largely converged with the recommendations of the Commission and Council (Hacker 2010: 38), although the latter saw a need for further action concerning the employment rate of elderly people, access to occupational and private pensions and the high government debt rate (e.g. European Commission 2006). Nevertheless, European influences are mostly evaluated as rather small as a national expert commission, the so-called Rürup Commission (2002-2003), is seen as the main reform driver, whose final report barely mentions any European references. Furthermore, the OMC did not play an important role in the national reform discourse (Hacker 2010: 264; Schrader 2009: 54f; interviews 1, 2). The OMC was and is considered more as an institutionalised exchange platform without any serious impetus for national policy choice (interviews 1, 5), at most a trigger for pension policy debates, e.g. prior to raising the retirement age (Weishaupt 2014: 144; interview 3).

The next major reform measure was the so-called Pension Insurance Performance Improvement Act in 2013 which was evaluated mainly under the new budgetary instruments and criticised by the Council and Commission, as it could endanger financial sustainability and hinder the development of private pension provision (Council of the European Union 2014, No. 10). The fact that a reform which clearly deviated from Germany's previous reform path could be implemented anyway is attributed to Germany's economic and political position in the EU: large member states in relatively good fiscal positions obviously continue to have considerable leeway over their legislation (interviews 2, 3, 4). Overall, thus, an ambivalent picture emerges in terms of budgetary instruments: in light of serious economic difficulties in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Stability and Growth Pact had discernible influence on fundamental reforms (Hering 2006; Hinrichs 2008: 205), but as the 2013 pension package openly contradicts the CSR, a somewhat counter-intuitive trend can be

observed later on, namely a seemingly shrinking influence in spite of advanced European instruments.

In Sweden, the original Beveridge model (folkpension) had been supplemented by an income-related component (ATP) in the 1960s. After some cost-reduction efforts in the 1980s (Anderson and Immergut 2009: 367f.), the Swedish economy stumbled into a deep crisis in the early 1990s which served as a catalyst for a large pension reform from 1994. A multi-pillar system was introduced, including in its first pillar a (subsidiary) basic, an earnings-related and a mandatory funded 'premium pension', accompanied by supplementary mechanisms for automatic adjustment to available financial resources and life expectancy (Anderson and Immergut 2009: 368ff.; Natali 2011: 19; Natali and Stamati 2013: 56f.). Thus, the central reform of the Swedish pension system, often described as one of the most radical and future-orientated worldwide (Natali 2011: 11; Anderson and Immergut 2009: 349), had already been implemented when the OMC on pensions had its start, and Sweden was not even a member of the European Union when the 'grand reform' was decided upon. Only small corrections to compensate for the activation of the adjustment mechanism in 2010 were carried out later (Settergren 2011; Natali and Stamati 2013: 60). Similarly to Germany, the reform direction converges largely with the European recommendations, but the sequencing of developments speaks against European influence (whether there is an influence in the other direction, i.e. an orientation of European pension objectives towards the Swedish model, cannot be discussed in this paper). As to possible OMC influences later on, Swedish actors seem overall sceptical beyond the function as a framework for knowledge-sharing, mainly due to the 'maturity' and complexity of the Swedish welfare state (interviews 6, 7, 8, 9; Jacobsson 2005), although parallel discourses on, for example, late access to the labour market, pension age or taxation of pensions, are identified by some experts (interviews 6, 7). The rather descriptive nature of the NSRs especially after 2005 (e.g. Swedish Ministry of Social Affairs 2010) as well as the outright rejection of certain criticisms (ibid.: 45) confirm this finding.

The influence of budgetary instruments on Sweden as a non-member of the Eurozone with above average economic data can be assumed to be rather low as well (interviews 6, 9). Rather, 'the crisis confirmed the traditional strengths of the [reformed] Swedish pension system and labour market' (Natali and Stamati 2013: 58), and thus, only minor adjustments were made. Nevertheless, the Swedish Government explicitly referred to the 2010 Joint Report on Pensions (European Commission 2010) as an occasion for labour market reforms (Swedish Ministry of Social Affairs 2010a: 1) which were also meant to stabilise the pension system in light of decreasing employment and lower investment in private pensions although no recommendations on pensions as such had been issued. However, from 2011, recommendations on youth employment in the context of population ageing were not addressed to a similar degree by the Swedish government, causing the European Commission (2015a: 2) to attest Sweden's 'limited progress' in implementing the CSR. All in all, neither the OMC nor budgetary instruments had a decisive influence on Swedish pension policy. Non-membership in the Eurozone, comparatively low affectedness by the crisis and Sweden's position as a pension policy 'avant-garde' provide parts of the explanation to this finding.

The case of Poland is complicated due to deviations in the classification of pillars. In the course of systemic transformation and against the backdrop of cost expansion and shrinking contributions (Chlon, Góra and Rutkowski 1999), a large pension reform was carried out in 1999, which included the transformation of the former single (but fragmented according to occupational groups) to a multi-pillar model, but the second pillar differs from the conventional model. It is in fact a unit within the first pillar and despite its initial private management actually represents a state component. For this central reform of 1999, any influence of the EU in the wake of a possible EU accession is ruled out (Ferge and Juhász 2004: 234; interviews 10, 11). Instead, the World Bank joined in as a central

player and promoted Sweden, but first and foremost non-European countries such as Chile and Argentina as examples to follow (Orenstein 2008: 910 and 2005: 195). When the OMC started soon after, Poland presented its reforms as congruent with European goals although persistent deficits are admitted in the NSR 2005 and 2008, such as a low employment rate, expensive special systems specifically for agriculture, a gender imbalance and persistent funding problems, which have been repeatedly criticised by the Council and the Commission (European Commission 2006: 231ff; 2009: 81ff.). While this speaks against substantial OMC effects and the experts interviewed also deny a significant European influence through the OMC (interviews 10, 11, 12), Żukowski (2012: 8) points to an OMC impetus for an intensified debate about future replacement rates, active ageing and balancing the aims of adequacy and fiscal sustainability.

The instruments of budget surveillance can be divided into the two Excessive Deficit Procedures (EDP, 2004-2008 and 2009-2015) on the one hand, and the CSR within the European Semester on the other. Under the first EDP there were differences with respect to the incorporation of the capital-based (second) pillar to the public budget, which Eurostat (2004) dismissed in the end. In the second EDP, there was contention about the classification of the 1999 reform as systemic and therefore as an 'extenuating circumstance' in the assessment of the budget deficit. Since Poland significantly exceeded the deficit limit, the Commission initially rejected their argument (European Commission 2009a: 10) but revised this view after the transfer of parts of the second pillar contributions to a governmental subaccount (European Commission 2012a: 10). As a result of the design of the second pillar sketched above, the state had lost out on income with a negative impact on the budget, and from 2011 onward, a significant portion of contributions was transferred to a ZUS subaccount to finance current pensions and to reduce the deficit; since 2014, the contributions are automatically sent to ZUS when an opt-in fund model (OFE) is absent (Frasyniuk-Pietrcyk 2014 and Orenstein 2011; Naczyk and Domonkos 2016 on the realignment of pension privatisation in and since the crisis). Although the EDP was ceased in 2015 (European Commission 2015b: 4), the abolition of the mandatory OFE membership was criticised as a deviation from the reformed system and as endangering long-term stability (Eurostat 2014).

Other central elements of the recent Polish reforms included the general elimination of early retirement from 2009 and the raising of the retirement age to 67 (for men by 2020, for women by 2040) in 2013. Both measures met central European demands, but the 2011-2015 CSR continuously demanded an increase in the employment rate and the abolition of special systems. The fact that the Polish government has not implemented the second point nor significantly consolidated its budget suggests scepticism towards the effectiveness of the CSR towards Poland as a non-member of the Eurozone barely affected by the crisis and with a reformed system that was attested moderate risks in terms of sustainability only (Natali and Stamati 2013: 35f.). The opinions of the surveyed experts paint an ambivalent picture: public pressure fuelled by the media based on European arguments and especially the second EDP seems convincing for some, while others see the constitutionally enshrined national debt limit as the real motive and the European aspects mainly as an auxiliary argument to implement the modifications to the pensions system in 2011 and 2014 (interviews 10, 11, 12). It is indisputable, however, that the decision by Eurostat (2004) mentioned above had a significant legal impact as well as the ECJ ruling (ECJ 2011) that a 5 per cent limit of foreign investment for the private investment companies that manage the OFE was inadmissible. To conclude, while there is a clear influence of the ECJ in specific areas, the balance sheet is more ambivalent in terms of fiscal surveillance and European coordination. While both instruments were at times used as an argumentation aid by national actors, neither the OMC nor fiscal instruments themselves constituted a major factor in reform debates. In terms of possible changes due to the crisis, a gradual modification rather than a transition to more binding obligations has occurred which

leaves Poland with persistent financial pressures but considerable freedom of choice of instruments, e.g. in the absence of EDP sanctions for non-members of the Eurozone.

In the 1990s, the previous one-pillar pension system in Italy was restructured into a multi-pillar system with the Amato and Dini reforms and the retirement age was gradually increased in subsequent years (Ferrera and Jessoula 2009: 431ff.). In addition, voluntary private provision was introduced and the benefit calculation was modified, albeit with a long transitional period (ibid.: 437; Hinrichs and Brosig 2013: 13f.). Unlike in the other member states, the European context played a central role for budgetary decision making from the beginning, since the convergence criteria towards EMU were seen as drivers of modernisation (Anderson and Kaeding 2015: 244) that allowed for circumvention of domestic obstacles to reforming the (at least for labour market 'insiders') rather generous old system. The following years can be understood as a 'permanent transition' with further adjustments (Natali and Stamati 2013: 49), an expansion of the second and third pillar as well as increased incentives for a later retirement, while European influence remains an ambivalent issue. Although the OMC was used as supporting argument and selective inspiration, in particular the criterion of adequacy (Sacchi 2008: 163), it is not possible to prove substantive influence or learning due to the earlier comprehensive reform (Sacchi 2007: 89; interviews 13, 14, 15) – with one exception: the harmonization of the pension age for men and women in the public sector was enforced by the Commission and the ECJ (2008; Natali and Stamati 2013: 49).

Rather, the economic and sovereign debt crisis served as a catalyst for Italy to implement further reforms, especially the Fornero reform of 2011, which included, inter alia, a shortened transition period to the new system, a further increase (and alignment for men and women also in the public sector) of the retirement age, and the abolition of the so-called seniority pensions (Jessoula and Pavolini 2012: 8). The double pressure of EU and financial markets (Pavolini, Léon, Guillén and Ascoli 2014: 9) towards a stronger focus on financial sustainability was more impactful than the two deficit procedures against Italy 2005-2008 and 2009-2013 in which the pension system was not a core issue. Instead of using formal instruments such as the CSR, a joint letter of the European and Italian Central Bank (Draghi and Trichet 2011) pressured the Italian government to implement concrete reforms, including deadlines, which were put in practice immediately after the resignation of the Berlusconi government. In that sense, considerable pressure was put on Italy (Jessoula and Pavolini 2013: 15; Pavolini et al. 2014: 12; Sacchi 2014: 7f.; interviews 13, 14) and the sequencing of events clearly hints at a strong European impetus. Thus, while the crisis did change the rules of the game in the case of Italy, not just in an economic sense, but also with a view to the balance between national autonomy and EU level 'interference' in pension policy, informal channels were used instead of pension-related CSR or the two EDPs (Jessoula and Pavolini 2013: 15; De la Porte and Natali 2014: 744f.; interview 13).

DISCUSSION

All four countries have implemented encompassing pension reforms including a conversion to a multi-pillar system in the past twenty years, but at different points in time and with a diverging level of European influences. If we, for the sake of argument, assume an 'OMC phase' (2001-2009) and a 'crisis phase' (2010-today, see above), is there evidence for increased EU influence in the latter phase?

Comparing the cases at hand, the overall result is a weak influence of the OMC on pensions, irrespective of the type of welfare state or economic conditions. Central reforms were often introduced before the OMC's start and only gradually complemented later (Germany, Poland,

Sweden). While the respective national strategies paid lip service to European objectives and recommendations, these were virtually absent in national public discussions and the reform paths hardly deviated from their previous direction which had its origin either in national expert commissions (Germany, Sweden) and/or other institutional institutions (Poland). Only in the case of Italy can the OMC be seen as partially relevant for reform measures in the early 2000s, but it was mainly used as a selective inspiration and argumentation aid. Below the line, these findings confirm OMC critics who view the OMC as a sales support and selective amplifier for policies that would have been pursued at the national level anyway (Zeitlin, Barcevicius and Weishaupt 2014: 6 among many others). Similar criticism has been expressed towards the European Employment Strategy (e.g. Copeland and ter Haar 2013) even though, compared with the OMC on pensions, the former has the advantages of an explicit anchoring in the treaties as well as a longer period of application.

The effect of fiscal instruments is a mixed picture: while post-2009 reforms usually aim at financial sustainability, the extent of European pressure is, hardly surprisingly, strongly influenced by the economic situation of the respective country. In that sense, we can assume some influence on Germany in the beginning of the 2000s, when the country was in a difficult budgetary situation, but significantly lower influence in the subsequent years including the supposed 'new phase' from 2010. Sweden was not subject to substantial pressure either, given its good economic and employment data and forecasts as well as the different reach that possible sanctions have on members and non-members of the Eurozone. Nevertheless, the deep crisis in the early 1990s was an obvious trigger for the restructuring of the Swedish pension system which tentatively suggests that the fact of being in economic crisis as such might be decisive and would then only be amplified by the SGP. Nevertheless, a certain pressure for pension reform arises in the wake of the EDP for the non-EMU member Poland. Above all, however, considerable pressure – beyond the mere fact of being in a state of fiscal crisis – was put on the 'countries in crisis', as represented by Italy, from 2010 onwards, although in this case less formally as part of the respective EDPs and the European Semester but rather informally, especially by means of the 'ECB-letter'.

ECB: European Central Bank, ECJ: European Court of Justice, EFC: Economic and Financial Committee, EPC: Economic Policy Committee, SPC: Social Policy Committee: EMCO: Employment Committee, OMC: Open Method of Coordination, FG: Fiscal Governance. Source: own diagram, categories based on Radaelli 2003.

Thus, while a shift from the OMC as the EU's central pension policy instrument towards the reformed SGP is obvious (e.g. interviews 11, 18), the picture that emerges is more nuanced than the thesis of a 'new phase' of increased European influence suggests, although it is indeed obvious that 'countries most affected by economic recession have reformed the most' (Natali and Stamati 2013: 64). First, the de-facto binding effect of Country-Specific Recommendations differs depending on the respective budgetary situation as well as the 'well-preparedness' of national pension systems due to previous reforms, thus the 'domestic and EMU vulnerability' (de la Porte and Natali 2014). The German 2014 reform substantiates the conclusion that a member state in a rather comfortable economic position is able to ignore pension-related recommendations and get away with it (interviews 16, 17). Previous implementation rates of the CSR, particularly with regard to the non-members of the Eurozone (European Parliament 2015), and the data that has emerged from the general compliance debate (e.g. Börzel and Knoll 2012) also indicate that a healthy dose of scepticism should be in place concerning 'catch-all' CSR influences. Second, the case of Italy shows that while formal instruments such as the EDPs and the European Semester are able to exert some pressure on member states in trouble, informal action was central for the 2011 Fornero reform. The sequencing of actions in the Italian case strongly suggests that European pressure rather than the crisis itself (such as in Germany and Sweden earlier on) was the decisive reform catalyst. While the finding by Hinrichs and Brosig (2013) that pension reforms would not have taken place in the absence of EU pressure in the countries considered can thus be confirmed for Italy, the other member states addressed in this paper demonstrate that no general qualitative leap has been made in terms of an increased Europeanization of national pension policies although some potential has been created but not yet fully used by the Commission and the Council. Instead, informal proceedings such as the ECB letter in the Italian case or the linking of ESF means to national reform success have been chosen so far, but whether they are indeed part of the future 'rules of the game' remains to be seen. Among the consulted experts, a large majority agrees with the statement that while increased fiscal governance influences, both formal and informal, have mainly manifested in countries in crisis so far, they have the potential to affect all member states in principle. Parallels to other areas of social policy can easily be drawn, e.g. to the field of healthcare for which Földes (2016: 306) concludes that while recommendations are non-binding and some member states frequently ignore them, 'the strengthened mechanism for fiscal surveillance has the potential to affect health systems at the core'. In any case, the crisis has functioned as a game-changer in one (and possibly a half, namely Poland) case(s) only while European influences actually decreased in the German case and remained at a negligible level in the Swedish one. The general budgetary situation as well as the outcomes of previous reforms, not least in terms of projections as regularly presented in the Annual Ageing Report, therefore seem to be the most adequate predictor of European influences on national pension policy in and after the crisis.

CONCLUSION

The phenomenon of Europeanization has long since arrived in the supposed national domain of social policy, although national rationale, internal dynamics and rhetoric continue to dominate the field – less in academic discourse, but quite obviously in politics and the media. In the terminology of Europeanization research, while in the observed cases there is no European-induced 'transformation' of national pension policies and my findings confirm the widespread scepticism towards the OMC in the literature, in some cases (Germany in the early 2000s, Italy since the onset of the crisis) a (partly) SGP-driven 'absorption' has occurred. The sovereign debt crisis has indeed functioned as a 'game changer' that re-adjusted the balance between European influence and national autonomy, but so far only for the countries hit most by the crisis. Two important reservations have to be stated: first, European influence in this supposed 'new phase' differs

markedly depending on the respective budgetary situation as well as the 'well-preparedness' of national pension systems due to previous reforms. Second, informal rather than formal ways of exerting pressure were chosen, with yet unclear consequences for other member states and the European pension policy 'architecture' as a whole. In other words, while enforcement has so far only been possible in situations of severe crisis, it is too early to conclude whether the member states will be able to contain such mechanisms in economically better times or whether the new – formal and informal – rules will persist in 'normal times'.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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ENDNOTES

[1] In the following, the term 'crisis' refers to the size of the financial and consequent economic and sovereign debt crisis from 2008 onwards for EU member states.

[2] The illusionary giant in Michael Ende's novel, Jim Knopf, appears to be enormous from a distance but shrinks to normal size when seen close to. Conversely, an illusionary dwarf would increase in size as the observer comes closer.

[3] Contrary to the dominant top-down approach of Europeanization (European influences on member states), some authors call for integrating the 'other side of the loop', namely member states' influence on emerging European policies. This perspective is not taken up in this paper but cf. Börzel 2002 as a prominent example.

[4] Occupational pensions are excluded for the purpose of this article.

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INTERVIEWS

1   Federal Bank (GER), 17.3.2015, Frankfurt/M.
2   Chancellor's Office (GER), 27.3.2015, Berlin
3   Federal Ministry of Finance (GER), 20.3.2015, Berlin
4   Federal Ministry of Work and Social Affairs (GER), 11.3.2015, Berlin
5   Federal Ministry of Economy and Energy (GER), 19.3.2015, Berlin
6   Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (SWE), 31.8.2015, Stockholm
7   Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (SWE), 17.7.2015, by phone
8   Pension Agency (SWE), 1.9.2015, Stockholm
9   Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken, 2.9.2015, Stockholm
10   Ministry of Work and Social Affairs (PL), 14.4.2015, Warsaw
11   Ministry of Work and Social Affairs (PL), 14.4.2015, Warsaw
12   formerly Pension Reform Commission (PL), 13.4.2015, Warsaw
13   formerly Ministry of Work, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities (IT), 28.4.2015, by phone
14   Ministry of Work and Social Policy, 17.3.2015, Rome
15   Ministry of Work and Social Policy, 17.3.2015, Rome
16   European Commission, 23.4.2015, Brussels
17   European Commission, DG ECFIN 22.5.2015, by phone
18   European Social Insurance Platform, 11.4.2015, Brussels

Theoretical Theatre: Harnessing the Power of Comedy to Teach Social Science Theory

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Abstract

Role playing is increasingly used in European Studies and political science, to foster students' understanding of social science theories. Generally, role playing is only done by students. Not so in Theoretical Theatre, a teaching innovation which puts the onus on teachers to act. In our performances, teachers embody competing theories and enact dramatic scenarios in front of, and in collaboration with, their student audience. We explain how we developed Theoretical Theatre and contextualise it in the pedagogical literature of games and simulations, and of Drama In Education. We reflect on our experience of performing across four modules since 2012, and on our students' feedback, to discuss three key themes emerging from our practice: making theory more interesting and engaging, easier to understand and apply; and changing classroom dynamics and engagement. We outline the challenges and opportunities in sustaining this teaching method and transferring it to other settings and disciplines.

Keywords

Role playing; theatre; environment; methods; teaching; simulations

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INTRODUCTION

Theories are at the heart of social science teaching, the centre piece used to foster students' analytical capacities and their ability to interpret the world. Yet, teaching social science theories can be a very complicated endeavour (Asal et al. 2014). On the one hand, teachers have to convey the usefulness of theories to students who may never have felt a need for them. On the other hand, theories offer students different ways of understanding the world and they are often encouraged to think critically about the limits and benefits of each of them (Boyer et al. 2006, p.67). Understanding the role of theories in social science is a 'threshold concept', which students are required to grasp effectively before they are able to access and succeed in more advanced learning (Kiley & Wisker 2009, p.431). To address this, we present Theoretical Theatre (TT), a new award-winning team-teaching method designed to engage students in active learning about competing theories, with wide applicability across the curriculum. In TT, theories are 'not merely discussed, but embodied' (Jacobs 2010, p.2) by a group of teachers and/or students, bringing conceptual debates to life as interacting characters in semi-improvised performances.

We provide a brief introduction to TT as a teaching method and explain how we have used it across four different modules in environmental social science from the 2012-2013 academic year to 2015-2016. We then situate TT within innovative teaching literatures, arguing that while some of its elements are similar to simulations, Drama in Education discussions shed light on how TT redraws the relationship between teachers and students. With reference to these pedagogical perspectives, we critically reflect on our experience, and our students' feedback, to discuss three key themes emerging from our practice: TT makes theory more interesting and engaging, easier to understand and apply; and it changes classroom dynamics and engagement. We discuss the challenges and opportunities in developing TT as a team, sustaining this teaching method over time, and transferring it to other settings and disciplines.

THEORETICAL THEATRE: A TEACHING INNOVATION

TT is an innovative teaching tool using semi-improvised comedy performances where teams of 2-5 teachers collaborate to portray different characters who physically embody theories in interactive scenarios. We use props and costumes to enliven the 'extra-ordinary' lecture setting. Characters may get along or argue with each other, reflecting academic and policy debates between different perspectives. Using comedy helps students make an emotional connection with complex material, and results in active and deeper learning (McCarron & Baden 2008) by fostering a relaxed, fun and engaging atmosphere (Torok et al. 2004) .

The School of Environmental Sciences at the University of East Anglia is interdisciplinary; students with natural science backgrounds commonly encounter social science for the first time in our modules. We found that students struggled to comprehend competing theories about society, and that they did not distinguish the nuances between different theories, or had difficulties applying a theory. Sometimes students advocated 'adding together' all the different perspectives to get the 'best' aggregated approach which appeared to be 'common sense' and 'the best of all worlds'.

Consequently, we created TT to help students better comprehend the underlying basis of competing theories of society, and encourage them to reflect critically about their strengths and weaknesses. The performances we have developed to date are presented as exceptional lectures, one per module (as outlined below), to convey theoretical threshold concepts. In some cases, follow-up activities involve students developing or adopting and performing concept-characters themselves to further deepen their understanding. This is a deeply experiential way to learn: as drama pedagogue Gilberto Scaramuzzo asserts 'if we want to speak [on a topic] we must learn to become [the topic]' (Grove 2015, p.22), and pedagogical work on humour and improvisation as learning tools attest to the strength of this active learning (Berk & Trieber 2009)

DEVELOPING THEORETICAL THEATRE

We adopted TT as an evolving experiment in improving our teaching effectiveness to address the recurrent teaching challenges explained above. We developed our first prototype in 2012. We began by drafting notes about how the theories (each represented by a different lecturer) of sustainable consumption interpret the world and address key challenges, e.g. 'how can we encourage more people to use public transport' or 'why do we consume as we do?' These became quite elaborate scripts, but the delivery was still essentially a multi-voiced lecture. It lacked dynamism and we felt there was more we could do to bring the debates to life. None of us had acting, theatre or drama training nor training in employing humour in the classroom.

We started working with an expert in comedy improvisation, Charlotte Arculus[1], who used drama and improvisation games to help us lose our inhibitions and build trust as a team. We learned about performance skills, stage technique, the power of silence and stillness, awareness of the ensemble, and the importance of taking a risk, we began to feel comfortable in letting go of the aura of serious authority that as academics we usually feel we must convey, and embrace creativity and silliness to help us communicate more effectively, showing us that "humorous communication behaviors can be improved with training and practice" (Banas et al. 2011, p.138)

We then focussed on the performance piece itself, setting the scripts aside and thinking instead about the characters we would be enacting. What kind of car would they drive? Who was their hero? What did they eat for lunch? Answering these mundane questions helped us create fleshed-out characters who we would pretend to be. Thus, characters became real people (representing

theories) with backstories, hobbies, and opinions about each other. The interactions among them were funny and we enjoyed seeing each other play these characters. And once we 'knew' our characters and their views, the scripts were not needed. The drama essentially wrote itself, based on the improvisation of the characters' interpersonal dynamics.

Sustainable Consumption

The first performance we created was for a Masters-level module on *Sustainable Consumption* (20-30 students, over 12 weeks), and addressed the question of 'why do we consume the way we do?' It portrays a *Question Time*-style debate between four competing theories of consumption behaviour: logical Rational Choice Theory, gossipy Social Psychology, busy Social Practice Theory and puppet master Systems of Provision, plus the curious (and importantly, neutral) show host (see Shwom & Lorenzen (2012) for a comparison of the four approaches). Students choose one theory to apply to a case study, and critique, in their assessed work. Prior to TT, students often attempted to aggregate all the theories despite the fact that the theories fundamentally disagree with each other. Our performance brings those disagreements to life. In a follow-up workshop, students adopt the characters themselves, and this really cements their understanding as they physically embody the concepts.

Theoretical Blind Date

Developed originally as part of a second-year undergraduate module Energy and People (60-70 number of students, over 12 weeks), Theoretical Blind Date involves three characters (a business person, a policy maker and an environmental activist) facing 'real world energy problems' posing questions to three different theories (theories of behaviour change; social practice and transitions – each played by a different lecturer) that are 'hidden' behind a screen. The theories provide answers to the questions posed derived from their particular theoretical standpoint. Finally, after some vocalised deliberation and with the help of the audience of students shouting out their opinions, the character asking the question then decides which theory to take out on a 'date', in which they are tasked with the challenge of solving the problem posed in the question. Toward the end of the module, the students themselves then engage in a group activity in which they have to decide how each of the different dates went. They then have to put on a short performance to the rest of the class, playing the role of the characters and the theories themselves.

Theatre of Power

This performance illuminates the three dimensions of power as developed by Dahl (1961) Bachrach and Baratz (1962) and Lukes (2005) which are central to the second-year module on *Environmental Politics and Policymaking* (40-60 students, over 12 weeks). It is the first of several theoretical approaches students are exposed to in the module, and many adopt it in their case study. We noticed over the years that the distinction between the dimensions was often poorly understood by the students. We devised a half hour performance aiming at better fleshing out the key differences and commonalities between dimensions, as an add-on to a standard lecture. Following a 20-minute conventional presentation about applying dimensions of power to a historical case study (the 1932 Mass Trespass on Kinder Scout), the first dimension of power (holding a sword to represent brute force) interrupts the lecturer and explains how it interpret the events. The two other dimensions

(the second carries a magnifying glass to investigate hidden agendas, and the third a magician's wand to signify thought-control) take issue with the first dimension imposing its views and engage in presenting their perspectives. Questions from the student audience then start a debate on the pros and cons of each dimension.

Swipe Right for Sustainability

'Swipe Right for Sustainability' is our latest performance. It presents two competing approaches to sustainable development (Gareth 'green growth' Juggernaut, and Daisy 'de-growth' Beansprout) using a dating app, and going on a date. It was developed for the first-year undergraduate module *Sustainability, Society and Biodiversity* (154 students in 2015/16, over 12 weeks), and has since been used with Masters students on *Sustainable Consumption* (20 students in 2016, over 12 weeks). This piece was designed to help students grasp that there is no correct definition of sustainable development, but rather different perspectives (Hopwood et al. 2005). The subject is first introduced using a traditional lecture comparing and contrasting the two approaches, followed in a subsequent class by the performance. Although Daisy and Gareth initially appear to have so much in common (they are both keen advocates of 'sustainability'), their differing views soon become apparent and the date doesn't end well. The drama and comedy emerge as their dating optimism withers during the course of their conversation. Students follow-up by creating new dating profiles for the characters, and can also enact the characters themselves to give a 'date report'.

TT performances are thus all based on a common, highly flexible approach: using teachers to embody theories and interact in character in front of as well as with the students (Table 1).

	Sustainable Consumption	Blind Date	Theatre of Power	Swipe Right for Sustainability
Target audience and module description	40min performance, first delivered in 2012 for Masters-level postgraduate students (20-30 students)	40-50 min performance first delivered in 2014 for 2nd-3rd year undergraduates (60 students in 2013/14; 70 in 2014/15)	25 min performance first delivered in 2013, for 2nd year undergraduates. (55 students in 2012/13, 40 in 2014/15 and 60 in 2015/16)	20-40 min performance first delivered in 2015 for 1st year undergraduates (150 students) and in 2016 for Masters-level postgraduates (20 students).
Learning objectives	To understand critical similarities and differences between competing theories of consumption behaviour.	To introduce students to a range of theories that explore issues of social and technical change in relation to the energy system.	To introduce students to how the three dimensions of power explain events and the relationships of power among social actors differently	To understand critical similarities and differences between two competing perspectives on sustainable development
Topic	Consumption behaviour	Energy system change	1932 Mass Trespass and access to land in the UK	Sustainable development
Theories	Rational Choice, Social Psychology, Social Practice Theory, Systems	Behaviour Change; Social Practice Theory; Transitions Theory	The three dimensions of power	De-growth and Green Growth

	of Provision			
Staff needed	5 teachers (Show host, 4 theory characters)	5 teachers (Show host; 3 theory characters, and one teacher playing businessperson, policy-maker and activist)	4 teachers (facilitator, 3 theory characters)	2 teachers (degrowth and green growth characters)
Role for students	As an active audience, they are invited to ask the panel of theories questions about sustainable consumption policy and practice.	As an active audience. They are asked to shout out their opinions about which theory each character should choose to go on a date with, with a few students selected to explain their reasoning in slightly more depth.	Passive viewers of the performance initially; then invited by the facilitator to express their views (yes / no) on the views presented by the different theories, and ask questions (planted among the audience in advance, as well as their own)	Active audience in the run-up to the date (giving feedback to both characters), then passive during the date.
Follow up activities	In a follow-up workshop, students work in small groups to adopt one of the theory-characters and tackle a sustainable consumption problem (e.g. food waste) from that perspective. Students represent the characters in a short classroom performance and debate in character.	A follow-up seminar, towards the end of the module puts the students in the role of the characters and the theories and requires them to perform to the class how they think the dates between the characters went (i.e. how did the theories approach the problems, how did the characters respond to this etc.).	Students encouraged to reflect on these theories and how they can be applied to understand contested situations during the seminars they present in weeks following the performance. Many students also apply these theories in their case study coursework.	Following the performance, students work in small groups to create new dating profiles for the two characters which bring out their core differences as well as their similarities. Students can also enact the characters to give date reports on each other, as an alternative, more interactive way of presenting this analysis.

Table 1: a comparison of all four performances (2012-2016)

RECONNECTING THEORETICAL THEATRE TO THE PEDAGOGICAL LITERATURE

Although TT was born out of our own experimentations in response to a recurring teaching challenge in our School, it fits within a much broader movement aiming to push for a more learner-oriented approach (Buckley & Reidy 2014, p.342) to address the limits of conventional lectures (Asal

et al. 2014). There is a growing consensus that lectures on their own are not sufficient to help students apprehend abstract concepts. Asal *et al.* argue that lectures are mostly characterised by passive learning methods through which students can only gain superficial knowledge 'because they are not forced to engage the course material in a way that they can make the knowledge they gained truly their own' (Asal et al. 2014, p.347). Active learning is therefore a more effective alternative (Freeman et al, 2014), and, in addition to a vast array of participative learning techniques and tools, increasingly simulations, games and role play have been developed in the social sciences to enhance teaching effectiveness.[2] However, to date, this move towards active learning and simulations been limited to students-in-role and has neglected the role of teachers in enacting dramatic scenarios. We argue that TT can be understood as a hybrid between simulations – widely used in political science and international relations teaching in higher education internationally – and Drama in Education approaches, mostly used in primary education in the UK. TT uses drama and comedy to 'prevent academic content from appearing lifeless, abstract and beyond understanding' (Smith & Herring 1993, p.419). In this section, we compare and contrast our own experience of TT with both literatures.

THEORETICAL THEATRE, A SORT OF SIMULATION?

Games and simulations are an increasingly popular alternative to a 'lecture only' type of teaching (Lightfoot & Maurer 2013). They are extremely varied, ranging from a semester-long simulation of the administrative functioning of the European Commission (Giacomello 2011) to a series of short games held during one lecture (Asal et al. 2014). Some may require specifically tailored material (Usherwood 2015) or use pre-existing material such as card games (Boyer et al. 2006).

The approach that we present in this article is in many ways similar to games and simulations, moving away from simply 'telling' students, favouring instead 'showing' or 'role playing' (Paschall & Wustenhagen 2012), which can encourage 'students away from the security of a singular, authoritative narrative' (Stevens 2015, p.490). TT also uses role playing to make theories 'clear in a way that lectures and discussions do not' (Asal 2005, p.361), and requires an important amount of preparatory work by students and staff, often including more than one member of staff (Usherwood 2015). As with games and simulations, TT takes place within the context of a broader module, alongside traditional lectures, and requires careful articulation between the innovative and traditional elements of teaching (Raiser et al. 2015, p.2). Finally, as simulations and games, TT happens in conjunction with discussion and / or debrief with students (Boyer et al. 2006, p.73).

But TT radically differs from games and simulation with regards to the relation between teachers and students. In games and simulations, 'the student becomes the lab rat and then gets to discuss the experiment' (Asal 2005, p.361) and, for example, starts behaving and interacting as members of a political institution. During games or simulations lecturers can act as 'facilitator, control team, and/or observer' (Asal & Kratoville 2013, p.138) ensuring everything is running smoothly (Buckley & Reidy 2014). During a TT session, however, the onus is on the teachers. Contrary to simulations, they retain more control, but it is up to them to create "humorous stimuli relevant to the course taught" (Ziv 1988, p.13) by putting on a costume, adopting a role, behaving sometimes foolishly, to harness the power of role play and comedy to introduce students to social science theories.

These teaching methods also differ in terms of how they treat theories. In many simulations, students engage with theories before (to prepare) and after the performance (to make sense of what happened). These reflections often require prompting by teachers (Asal & Kratoville 2013), as students can struggle to make the connection between what they experienced and the theories they

are taught. TT also aims to make students reflect on the different theories and how to apply them, but theories are at the heart of the performance. Teachers embody theories, turning key social science theories into full-fledged characters with a name, profession, hobbies, favourite food and holiday destination.

Thus, while TT, games and simulations use role play, they do so in a markedly different manner. As the section below explores, the central role of teachers in role-playing brings TT closer to the Drama in Education literature through the notion of teacher-in-role (Prendiville 2000).

THEORETICAL THEATRE BY 'TEACHERS-IN-ROLE'

Drama in Education is an approach which sees students engage in drama, often through improvisation (Fleming 2010), together with their teacher(s). It was developed in the UK from the 1970s onward (Heathcote & Herbert 1985). The uses of Drama in Education have become increasingly diverse over time (Lee 2014). Solo dramas, monologues (Kemeh 2015) and 'hot-seating' -where students question a teacher-in-role (Pearce & Hardiman 2012)- do not necessarily require students and teachers role-playing together.

One of the central elements of this literature is the pedagogical strategy of 'teacher-in-role': teachers interacting with students while 'in role', as part of a group or during solo drama. Two debates regarding 'teacher-in-role' were particularly helpful to build and reflect on TT: what exactly are the teachers up to – is it acting or not? And how does theatre redraw the relationship between teachers and students?

Is teaching acting?

Early literature on Drama in Education argued forcefully that teacher-in-roles were not acting. For Prendiville (2000, p.12), teacher-in-role is 'not about putting on a performance and becoming theatrical, if you do that, you push the children away from you'. Ackroyd-Pilkington contended that rejecting acting may appear reassuring and persuasive to 'non-specialists to take on roles' (2001, p.21). Furthermore, acting tends to be 'associated with falsehood […] not deemed appropriate for the worthy and serious endeavours of classroom drama' (Ackroyd-Pilkington 2001, p.20). But such rejection is problematic, as it tends to underplay the skills required and also the creativity of role-playing (Ackroyd-Pilkington 2002, p.74).

Critically, asking whether 'teacher-in-role' is a performance leads us to consider how teaching, in all its varied forms, is a performance (Schonmann 2005, p.287). As Jacobs argues, 'In many ways, a teacher is like a live-theatre actor. A teacher has an audience of students, and has to perform in front of and for (and in interaction with) that audience' (Jacobs 2010, p.2). Yet we would argue that performing as a lecturer is not the same as performing a character embodying a theory as we do in TT. Building on theatrical concepts, Schonmann (2005) argues these two types of performances are subsumed under the 'role of the teacher' in a binary understanding of teaching in which the only distinction is between the person and their role. Adopting an alternative triadic view of teaching allows distinguishing between the person, their professional role as a teacher, and the character, e.g. the theory embodied (Schonmann 2005; Kempe 2012).

Changing how teachers are perceived?

Aitken (2007, pp.91-92) argues that theatre relationships – be they in a real theatre or in a classroom – require a 'shared understanding of how the fiction is to be distinguished from reality, what is to be considered of value, the behaviours that will support the relationship' as well as, critically for TT 'who will have the power to perform'.

These decisions are up to the teacher – the 'relationship managers' (Aitken 2007) – who need to communicate them to the students. Crucially, teachers have to take into account the pre-existing relationship with their students. When do teachers behave as 'teachers', and when are they 'teachers-in-role'? And does changed behaviour from teachers implies changed behaviour from students as well?

Props and costumes are frequently used to mark the changed relationship (Prendiville 2000, p.12)

Consequently, we built clear demarcation using props, costumes, music and lighting to set apart performances in which we appeared 'in character' from other lectures. In Theoretical Blind Date, for example, we have music and title credits to mark its beginning and end, props on the stage in the form of seats for each of the characters (in costume) and a screen to keep the date 'blind'.

New roles for students?

TT does not only change how teachers behave, it also offers different ways for students to engage. Based on the literature, we could expect during the performance, students to change from just attending a lecture, to being part of an audience, 'aware of the responses of other audience members' (Bundy et al. 2013, p.156) following both what happens during the performance and how their peers react to it. In the audience, students are exposed to a live performance, and to their teachers taking a risk – which is often positively perceived by students (Bundy et al. 2013).

In Theoretical Blind Date for example, students are explicitly invited to participate and at various points are required to shout out their opinions about which theory matches a particular character. Over and above these explicit invitations, however, students watching the performance tend to laugh (or groan) at the jokes, to film parts of the performance on their smart phones and are generally very active engaged in the performance. In the second half of most of the performances, students have the opportunity to ask questions of the teachers 'in character'. Students also make use of questions planted beforehand amongst the audience to encourage interaction.

Therefore, TT can be conceived as a hybrid between two strands of innovative teaching: Drama In Education and simulations and games. It can be expected to change how we teach, adding a third dimension (the character) to our teaching, as well as affect how students engage in the classroom. The next section compares these expectations from the literature to student voices (Stevens 2015) gathered in our evaluations.

EVALUATING THEORETICAL THEATRE

TT was born experimentally out of a desire to encourage our students to engage with social science theories and thus to try and improve their understanding. Rather than being driven by the wider pedagogic literature on Drama in Education or teacher-in-role (see above), we have come to evaluate TT against this literature more recently.

In the first year of running the original Sustainable Consumption TT in 2012 we noted that the overall quality of the coursework students produced was considerably higher than any previous cohort: the average grade jumped from 60 percent to 67 percent. Whilst this is far from a robust or conclusive result, it did encourage us to persevere in developing TT and to make use of several other techniques, especially student surveys, for monitoring its effectiveness (Baranowski & Weir 2015).

Both the Sustainable Consumption and Theoretical Blind Date variants of TT have been regularly assessed via open-ended mid- and end-of-module reviews conducted in class with the students (mid-module reviews conducted a week or two after the performance). In these, students write anonymous comments on sticky notes under three headings: 'what worked well on the module?', 'what didn't work so well', and 'how can we improve the module next year'. It is striking that TT usually garners more positive comments than any other aspect of the modules.

In addition, for Theatre of Power, follow-up online surveys (2-3 weeks later) conducted focussed predominantly on whether and how the performance increased student understanding of key concepts. Response rates were low, with 14/55, 7/40 and 16/60 completed surveys in 2013, 2015 and 2016 respectively. We asked students if they thought the performance was insightful and helped them understand the theories, how they would describe it (from a menu of options including fun, dull, boring, interesting), what they liked and didn't like, how it could be improved and whether it should be performed for next year's class.

There was also a more extensive follow-up online survey for Swipe Right for Sustainability, involving a focus on increased understanding as well as the extent to which the performance encouraged students to think about theory and to talk about it with others (55/110 response rate, conducted 1-2 weeks after the class). In addition to quantitative results, qualitative responses (both referred to in the section below) were elicited through the following questions: 'how did it change your view of the module or your degree as a whole?', 'how did it change your view of the lecturers themselves?', 'any other comments?'.

We now reflect, in turn, on three core themes emerging from this student feedback: i) making theory more interesting and engaging; ii) making theory easier to understand and apply, and iii) changing dynamics and engagement in the classroom.

MAKING THEORY MORE INTERESTING AND ENGAGING

A core aim of TT is to encourage students to engage with theory more enthusiastically by making it grounded, interesting and valuable rather than abstract, complex and unhelpful. Student feedback from across all TT variants suggests strong success in achieving this aim in two ways. First, as the following quotations show, students regularly report that a TT performance is more interesting and engaging than a conventional lecture.

> 'You've helped me get excited about theory!' (Swipe Right, 2016)

> 'Theoretical Blind Date! Highly entertaining with great interaction and learning as well. Unique and interesting.' (Theoretical Blind Date, 2014)

> 'Interesting and mostly fun alternative to 'dry' lectures.' (Theatre of Power, 2016)

Second, the students also regularly note that TT encouraged them to pay more attention in class and increased their motivation to study beyond the classroom itself. For example:

'It was a bit of a surprise at the end of the lecture – good way of getting us to pay attention! Helped my understanding a lot.' (Theatre of Power, 2015)

'It... made me more motivated to study.' (Swipe Right, 2016)

This increased motivation and excitement about theory seems to relate to the fact that, through the performance, students were able to witness the passion and enthusiasm of their lecturers. Several quotes illustrate this more 'human' connection with theory that TT generates:

'Lecturers are normal human beings trying to teach subjects they're passionate about and aren't as scary as they sometimes seem!!!' (Swipe Right, 2016)

'I like the fact that it came out of nowhere. It was so surprising. Everyone seemed really passionate and enthusiastic.' (Theatre of Power, 2015)

In this respect, it appears to matter significantly that it is the lecturer him/herself who is doing the performing, rather than a professional actor.

MAKING THEORY EASIER TO UNDERSTAND AND APPLY

Baranowski & Weir argue 'that gauging what students learned is unquestionably more difficult than determining how much they enjoyed a simulation experience' (2015, p.396), but that doing so is necessary to evaluate whether an innovation was truly successful. Here, student feedback suggests that TT has fostered students' understanding in different ways. Survey results suggest that students think TT significantly improves their understanding. For Theatre of Power, 88% of students agreed or strongly agreed that the performance had helped them understand key aspects of each dimension of power in 2013 and this rose to 100% in 2015. For Swipe Right, 78% felt it was better at helping them learn key concepts than a normal lecture.

Students' open-ended comments provide some insight into these numbers. First, students argue that the performances make theory seem clear and simple:

'I liked the three different characters playing the three dimensions of power - made it clear to see the separate ideas.' (Theatre of Power, 2016)

'Theoretical Blind Date made the theories so easy to understand.' (Theoretical Blind Date, 2015)

Whilst we have evidently thought hard about how to clearly communicate theoretical ideas through TT, we have also strived to ensure we do not dumb-down complex theoretical ideas. Indeed, we use aspects TT as a means of demonstrating the more in-depth debates between different theoretical approaches. As such, the fact that students feel TT improves their understanding stems from the performance as a medium of communication rather than from simplification of content.

A second reason that students felt TT increased their understanding emerges from the fact that TT appears to turn theory into something students want to discuss with others:

'It improved my understanding a lot quicker than merely reading and making notes about the theories, and... generated much enthusiastic discussion between the students which reinforced the concepts effectively and made them interesting to explore.' (Sustainable Consumption, 2014)

For the Swipe Right performance, results show that TT encourages students to talk to others about the performances with 76% saying they spoke about it with their classmates, 74% with other students, and 44% with friends or family outside UEA. One student commented:

> 'I enjoyed telling my parents all about it and ended up giving them a lesson on types of sustainability.' (Swipe Right, 2016)

A third explanation emerges from the fact that several students noted that the characters help them to identify with different theoretical approaches and thus think about how that character might respond in real world settings:

> 'Love the theoretical Blind Date which we can put into any situation and go through each theory. Very good practice.' (Theoretical Blind Date, 2015)

> 'I like that you gave a real-life example and applied the theories of power to a case study.' (Theatre of Power, 2016)

These comments appear to support the value of theories being embodied rather than merely discussed or taught. TT seems to allow students to identify with how a lecturer becomes a particular perspective in the performance and apply this themselves beyond the classroom.

CHANGING DYNAMICS AND ENGAGEMENT IN THE CLASSROOM

Whilst the core aims of TT are to increase student engagement with and understanding of theory, a side-benefit of the performances has been improved student engagement in the classroom. This echoes Banas et al's (2011, p.130) statement that "the positive effect generated through humour may improve the classroom environment by helping to relieve tension and student anxiety", Student feedback identifies two reasons for this.

First, the performances changed how the students perceived lecturers themselves and made them seem like 'normal human beings'. This theme was widely represented in student feedback with 56% of students who completed the follow-up survey for the Swipe Right performance:

> '[It] made the lecturers seem more approachable and less intimidating ... [so] it was easier to participate.' (Swipe Right, 2016)

> 'I felt more comfortable asking questions to lecturers.' (Swipe Right, 2016)

Mid-term reviews of Theoretical Blind Date received similar reviews:

> "Enjoy the interactive approach adopted - makes you feel involved - engages everybody" (Theoretical Blind Date, 2015)

> "I feel most confident in this module about voicing my opinion and generally speaking in class. Have gained confidence." (Theoretical Blind Date, 2015)

Second, and closely related, students also commented that TT created an 'informal and fun' atmosphere which made them more confident to take risks in class and play with, test out and try to apply the new theoretical ideas they are being exposed to. Although we have found this to apply equally across year groups, these side-benefits seem likely to be especially significant and valuable for first year students and those less used to participate in class discussions. We are aware that

collecting student feedback in comparable forms would be valuable to us and aim to do so in future evaluations of TT across our teaching.

In summary, the various methods of gathering student feedback we have used suggest strongly that TT not only achieves its aims but also, and perhaps more importantly, carries a number of additional benefits around student engagement, risk-taking and confidence in class that have the potential to improve student performance more widely. Nonetheless, despite TT's apparent benefits, there are many important challenges and areas for further development that remain to be further explored, to which we now turn.

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER DEVELOPING THEORETICAL THEATRE

TT has been recognised for its innovativeness in teaching, contributing to two of the authors winning UEA Teaching Excellence Awards, and a further University Teaching Fellowship. TT was a highlight of the SCORAI teaching benchmarking exercise and features prominently at pedagogical conferences; it has also been performed as a keynote presentation at UEA's Learning and Teaching Day 2016, which has encouraged colleagues to adopt it in their own teaching. To enable us to help transfer TT, and also to monitor our practice, evaluate progress and change, we have developed and made available a resource hub through our website[3]. It contains resources, experiences, supporting best practice and inspiring educators world-wide who would wish to adopt and adapt TT to innovate, build and transfer skills, and make teaching fun.

Herewith we take inspiration to reflect on the opportunities and challenges associated with TT (within UEA and externally) and outline what the future of comedy in the classroom looks like from our perspective.

For us, TT has been an unexpected positive team-building exercise. Our performances were shaped with the participation of colleagues. Reciprocity resulted in making us more aware of, and participant in, the teaching conducted across the School, and helped the spread of innovative teaching across the curriculum.

Despite its inherent flexibility, TT as any kind of team-led innovation, relies on building and sustaining a team over time. TT necessitates a group of dedicated people enthusiastic and willing to use improvisation and comedy to expose students to theories in an alternative to standard lectures. When this group changes over time, the challenge becomes how to adapt TT so that it can still be performed. One option we have successfully undertaken to date is the regular training of teachers willing to participate in TT, who view this as a way to develop skills and abilities as well as introduce a smile into the classroom. However, relying on a shrinking pool of teachers may put undue pressure on them. We have therefore started exploring other alternatives outlined here.

Working with PhD students and Early-Career Researchers

In recent years, we have offered the opportunity to PhD students and early-career researchers to assist with in-role performance. Engagement with TT from enthusiastic researchers has enabled some of the TT performances to take place over several years; conversely, we now experience a paucity of new recruits, due to a variety of reasons. As a temporary measure, involvement of researchers can be productive, but it does not resolve longer-term staffing issues. A lower resource TT option, has been devised in response to this challenge (see below).

Video recording

We have started recording our TT performances (see our website), in order to have them available for reflection, demonstration and training purposes as well as for use in the classroom should the TT not be deliverable. However, this substitute does not fully convey the spontaneity of the performance, the direct enactment in front of the students and the improvisation (which by its very nature changes every time TT takes place). A concern is that this mode, although less 'risky', removes the element of direct performance -- student engagement may be reduced, lessening the effectiveness of TT.

Devising smaller and simpler performances

The performances we present in this paper vary in length and in the number of teachers delivering them, making TT malleable and possible for both small and larger teams. Team size is driven by the number of theories for students to familiarise themselves with and the scenario or format devised. Crucially performances 'need only be as complicated as the educational goal demands' (Asal & Kratoville 2013, p.137). Examples such as the *Swipe Right for Sustainability* performance indicates that only two teachers may be needed to show profound theoretical divergences. Moreover, some elements of TT can also be led by only one teacher. When presenting TT in conferences, we found that simply constructing a character on paper – similar to students re-writing dating profiles after the *Swipe Right for Sustainability* performance – is an interesting exercise which allows an individual or group to identify and discuss key elements of one or more theories. Contrary to full-fledged performances, developing character sheets does not require the support of a broader team, nor long preparation. It is a low-resource TT. Thus the 'concept in character' TT model has a wide range of potential applications, and can be adapted in a variety of disciplines and teaching contexts. We have tried it at a variety of conferences with positive feedback. For example, at EUROTLC16 the character development led some participants to argue that Realism was just like Justin Bieber.

Training needs

We have argued earlier that in TT the distinction between our professional role (as teacher) and character (as a specific theory) is critical. It points towards specific skills that are not cultivated through our training to be teachers. However, we have found training in performance, improvisation and comedy skills absolutely key in facilitating becoming 'teacher-in-role' and engaging with students and colleagues in a radically different manner.

Accessing this type of training will depend on resource availability. We would recommend initially seeking and undertaking relevant staff training that may already be offered institutionally (e.g. on the performance elements of lecturing, or applied improvisation). Drama departments, or local comedy improvisation groups may offer classes, drop-in workshops or bespoke training sessions, and will be able to identify local performers who run workshops too. Two online sources we have found valuable are DramaResource.com, and the Applied Improvisation Network. In our experience, a one-day training workshop is sufficient to cover the key performance and improvisation skills, and a follow-up meeting or two (bringing together performers only) is required to create and rehearse the characters in their scenarios. Let us be clear that TT does not require lecturers to have acting experience or theatrical talent – in fact the most important quality is a willingness to try something new and creative, and put self-consciousness and the traditional detached teacher role to one side.

It is essential, first and foremost, to take the teaching method seriously, while taking ourselves somewhat less so!

CONCLUSION

This article presents a teaching innovation, TT, developed in the School of Environmental Sciences at the University of East Anglia between 2012 and 2016. The elements of TT set out here speak to different debates within the pedagogical literature in relation to the teachers' role in the performance, training requirements, student engagement and learning.

Our experience reveals that performing as theories draws upon elements of performance in lecturing, but goes beyond it. In TT we (teachers) perform as theories with the awareness that we are interested in conveying particular understandings to our students, to enable them to discern the differences between the theories enacted and use these in turn to make choices and distinctions about the theoretical perspectives in their own work. We found that training is a key component to provide skills and confidence to perform a theory in front of a student class.

Our experience of TT suggests that performing in TT does contribute to reshaping the relationship between teachers and students. We find that students are surprised and occasionally taken aback by the seemingly quirky performances. Especially in modules where students are then encouraged, later, to try it themselves, the boundary between teacher and student becomes more permeable and less strictly defined: the students are themselves teachers who perform for the benefit of their peer group, to provide further insight and understanding stemming from their individual study.

We also reflect on the challenges and opportunities provided by the development of TT. We have emphasised how the TT performed in our School has been the product of a team endeavour built on reciprocity. This takes time and effort and we foresee this will be a challenge to TT in forthcoming years, as some of this team diminishes in number, due to changes in staffing. However, to deal with this challenge, recruiting new interested people to the team, as well as video-recording the performances so that they can be presented to future student cohorts, and devising group-based exercises, are options we are actively exploring.

Our experience and evidence collected from evaluations of TT shows that TT is a highly-effective and engaging way of teaching theories: most students enjoy the performances, are engaged with them as new way of learning, are affected by them in terms of promoting their own thinking and reflection about the material performed. An emerging area of our work is to collect more systematic, comparable robust evidence of learning outcomes, to substantiate the various evaluations we have to date. We will be conducting longitudinal and controlled comparisons of learning impact in the coming year.

As we have shown, TT remains a work in progress but, we (and our students) think it has been effective in reaching its aims and is therefore worthwhile developing further in more and more varied settings. We thus conclude by inviting responses/suggestions/comment from readers of this journal and, above all, to encourage others to try TT for themselves, experience its benefits and challenges, and work with us to continue to bring social science theory to life in the classroom.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

ENDNOTES

1Her work can be found at http://www.theatreofadventure.co.uk/, accessed 08.12.2016

2 See for example the Active Learning in Political Science blog, http://activelearningps.com/ (accessed 08/12/2016)

3 Comedy in the Classroom, accessible at https://comedyintheclassroom.org/

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Identity in Today's Europe: a New Geopolitical Strategy

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Abstract

The European Union (EU) is currently facing an uncertain future as member states debate the importance of political and economic cooperation. Although the organisation was founded on liberal principles, national discourses based on realist strategies have become more prevalent, spurred by debates on borders and identity issues. In essence, Europe cannot be liberal in principle while pursuing realist policies. Focusing on the concept of identity, this paper argues for a theoretical redirection of the EU, calling for a new geopolitical concept of identity based on its liberal tradition.

Keywords

European Union; identity; liberalism; realism

IDENTITY IN TODAY'S EUROPE: A NEW GEOPOLITICAL STRATEGY

In the aftermath of the world's deadliest war, Winston Churchill called for a 'United States of Europe' as a means of securing peace (Churchill 1946). Nevertheless, Churchill's idea of united European states, sewn together through economic and political integration, is tearing at the seams. In the last few years alone, the European Union (EU) has witnessed the UK voting for Brexit, as well as threats of Catalonia and Scotland seceding from Spain and the UK respectively. Although the far right lost elections in the Netherlands and France, for the first time since the EU's birth, altogether it seems that there is more support to leave the union rather than to fight to preserve it (Taggart 1998).

The European experiment calls for a definition of European identity that is new, insofar as it must respond in innovative ways to current challenges, which had not been anticipated by the founders: heavy internal and external migration and the willingness of members to secede. This has caused further divisiveness among member states, as Germany and other EU countries have come to reject Italy's proposal to open more European ports to rescue operations carrying migrants (Barigazzi 2017). As the number of refugees entering its borders continues to increase, the European liberal political structure falters under the resurgence of divisive national identities. Without a commitment to founding aspects of the European project, the EU is doomed to fail.

LIBERAL ORIGINS AND REALIST DEVELOPMENTS

The European project was born in an attempt to avoid repeating one of the darkest periods in world history. Throughout the twentieth century, the continent was held hostage by Nazi fascism and Soviet communism. Therefore, the primary objective of the founders was to promote peace and prosperity across a shared economic design. Europe's liberalism was framed according to Kant's view of the free market as an essential agent of peace, where European peoples were encouraged to maintain amicable

relations for mutually advantageous reasons (Kleingeld 2006). The definition of liberalism in this commentary matches that of Michael Doyle: a government or state based on free individual consent, defending law and property, where the free market has pacific implications and values and republican institutions shape policies (Doyle 1997: 19). Applying this definition, with Churchill's support for a common defence and Jean Monnet's championing of a strong economy, Europe's founding idea was to create a community of people guided by institutions, which would propel the continent towards peace through reciprocally advantageous economic interactions.

At the Treaty of Paris in 1951, where the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) originated, project designers declared that what 'an organized and vital Europe can bring to civilization is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations'. They underlined that 'Europe can be built only by concrete actions which create a real solidarity and by the establishment of common bases for economic development' (Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community 1951). These ideas were strengthened in 1993 with the establishment of the Copenhagen Criteria, which formulated stipulations for accession. The criteria stated that any country wishing to join the EU would not only have to function effectively in the market economy but also guarantee democracy and human rights (Eur-Lex 1993). Later, in the 2008 formulation of the Treaty of Lisbon's Article 2, the EU committed to 'the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including minority groups' rights' (Treaty of Lisbon 2007). The focus on human rights was additionally stressed in other international agreements signed by member states, not constitutive of the European project but equally reinforcing its liberal commitment: the UN Charter, the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950, the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, Declaration of the Rights of the Child of 1959, and the UN Convention against Torture 1984. European leaders hence resorted to liberal convictions that treaties and agreements would serve as foundations for a peaceful Europe, just as Kant had envisaged (Doyle 1983).

It must not be forgotten, however, that the European experiment has been maintained by means of American intervention (Kagan 2003). After World War II, the US acted as a guarantor for the European project through both the establishment of the Marshall Plan and the presence of military troops on the continent. This meant that the US, on the one hand, continued to act as an agent for security on European soil, maintaining a substantial number of troops to ensure defence through NATO's operational capacity. On the other hand, European leaders not only consented to a great deal of intervention from the US in their countries for a continuous period, but also accepted, to a wide degree, the idea that America had a moral and strategic responsibility in guiding the world (Mearsheimer 2010: 388). Over the years, this has not only affected transatlantic relations, making the European project reliant on the US, but has likewise influenced European leaders, who more or less consciously expect America to provide solutions for issues troubling their union.[1]

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the dissolution of the USSR and of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, European leaders (with American backing) pushed for further enlargement of the EU to the East, hoping to extend its democratising and pacifying aims. However, since the end of the Cold War and the decline of American commitments on European soil, the EU has moved towards a greater degree of insecurity, leading to the triumph of what this paper defines as political realism.[2] According to Doyle, realists observe reality rather than offering value-laden prescriptions. They assume that state interests should and in most cases do dominate class interests, and that they should and can be distinguished from individual rights. As international society is best described as a condition of international anarchy, reciprocal insecurity makes all interactions temporary (Doyle 1997: 43).

Hence, Europe's state of Kantian peace, made possible by external (i.e. American) intervention, has evolved from what could be characterised as a soft power to a much more realist one, attempting to safeguard its position in the international economic order (Garcia 2013). Additionally, three major events have influenced transatlantic relations, pushing member states to take such a realist turn: first, the American reaction to 9/11, judged by many Europeans to be excessively intransigent and militarised (Hitchcock 2003: 193-199); second, the Obama administration's pivot to the Pacific, which Hillary Clinton hoped to continue had she reached the White House (Clinton 2011); third, the future of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), especially after Donald Trump's withdrawal of the US from the deal (Holland and Rascoe 2017; Eriksson, Maurice and Zalan 2016). While the first event juxtaposed the EU and the US ideologically, the last two issues cast further doubt on the economic and financial relationship between the two sides of the Atlantic, which already stood in a delicate balance (Tocci and Alcaro 2012). As the US scales down from its commitments in Europe, the Kantian paradox starts to re-emerge.

Economic self-interest couples with dissatisfaction with the nation-state system, as well as balance of power concerns. The implications are troubling (Rosato 2012). In the example of the Middle East, Europe's decision to pull away from actively supporting democracy and human rights in the area has negatively affected the state of international affairs, resulting in a weakening of the EU's global presence (Asseburg 2013). The economic crisis has additionally led to the strengthening of protectionism and de-coupling of trade deals, though these policies contradict the EU's established foreign policy goals and will most likely damage member states in the long run (Kausch 2010).

PROJECTIONS FOR NEW GEOPOLITICS: DEFINING EUROPE

While Europeans increasingly travel abroad to the US, Canada and Australia in search of better employment prospects, as they have been doing since the end of World War II, Europe finds itself at the receiving end of one of the largest migration fluxes in history. Although the EU seems to view its own emigration favourably, immigration into the Union is perceived negatively, with identity issues highlighting a return to nationalisms. Difficulties in dealing with border issues are, all in all, a manifestation of a more serious internal problem: identity. Politicians have worked for decades to institutionalise a common European identity, emphasising historical, cultural and political commonalities as a means of making citizens of the EU feel a transnational belonging (Friedman and Thiel 2012: 2). Member states are currently called upon to merge different concepts of what it means to be European in the Brexit era and what it takes to become so. Although the EU, at least on paper, centres on human rights and pursues multiculturalism, the continent is at a juncture in which non-Europeans are also testing the idea of European identity.

The issue of 'what we are' has remained unresolved since the attempts to implement the European Constitution Treaty of 2004 (Moravcsik 2006: 219-241). Member states never seem to have gone beyond the Copenhagen Criteria, whose failings have been noted elsewhere (Veebe 2011). While founders of the European project attempted to unite its members with common principles, defining European identity continues to challenge EU politicians (Scruton 2015). Insisting on a transnational European political organisation based on laws, rights and duties is edifying in the abstract, but it lacks a certain concreteness necessary for people to rally behind. The quest for European identity must treat national identities as inclusive, not divisive, which can be used as a cornerstone to forge a comprehensive, liberal project. Using Italy as a case example, Roberto Spingardi argues that 'one of the

keys to defining a European identity is to reinforce our separate national identities and understand how the positive aspects can benefit Europe as a whole' (Spingardi 2017: 65).

> The idea is to become guardians of values that we in turn pass on to our children and especially to those who work with us, by example, fully informing them, sharing values and commitments in order to help restore confidence in the future. This is the way we can help to build – even "through contagion" – a Europe that should also be based on the respect for our unique cultural values and history (Spingardi 2017: 67)

Nevertheless, in the current climate of widespread uncertainty about how to deal with the tension between what Europe is and what it is not, fear has returned. In this sense, Europe fights not only against the political temptation of returning to national sovereignty in response to a more technocratic Europe, it also needs to fend off populism, originating from a lack of substance within Europe. Considering the current political fragility of the Union, it is not surprising that recurring arguments advanced by transnational, populist, anti-European movements have entered political discourse, focusing on national identity, immigration, sovereignty, workers' rights, and political-economic needs (Poli 2014: 13). This was epitomised by consistently high support for Marine Le Pen in the recent French elections of 2017. Approval for her protectionist economic policies, anti-immigration, and anti-EU stances reached historical levels (7.7 million votes in the first round), taking her Front National to the run-off where, albeit losing to Emmanuel Macron, she gained a remarkable 10 million votes (Marchi 2017).

It is not lightly that Augstein, in analysing the phenomenon of the new populist and xenophobic right, claims that fascism cannot be relegated to the past: 'In a frightening reappearance of the past, "ethnic" categories are implemented to manage social and cultural differences. Europe is going through a popular revolution. It is taking possession of the continent, changing it profoundly, as liberalism once did' (Augstein 2015). The EU is abandoning its liberal roots in favour – this time – of a search for new, divisive identities.

The limits of nationalism, conceived not only at the state level, but at the European too, where identity takes on the traits of mere legal affiliation, are obvious. As noted by Hobsbawm and Kertzer, the temptation of turning to national xenophobia shading into racism is neither new, nor merely European. Rather, it presents a universal challenge to all human beings, as they ask themselves what exactly needs defending against 'the other', identified with the immigrant stranger. 'What is being defended,' write Hobsbawm and Kertzer,

> is not simply the position of individuals in group A against challenge by outsiders. The strength of this xenophobia is the fear of the unknown, of the darkness into which we may fall when the landmarks which seem to provide an objective, a permanent, a positive delimitation of our belonging together, disappear (Hobsbawm and Kertzer 1992: 6-8).

Undoubtedly, there were not enough treaties, constitutions, charters and declarations replicated and re-invented in a period of over twenty years to create a positive sense of identity and continental unity, consolidating the 'reference points' and the sense of belonging to this organisation called Europe, which was meant to surpass national borders (Balibar 2009). As described by Hobsbawm and Kertzer, the fear of difference persists and will continue during this fragile moment.

It is important to discuss how membership issues cannot be addressed by appealing to a purely identitarian definition (Vejvodová 2014). Jeremy Rifkin identified the difficulty inherent in 'giving depth' to the European project, which is another way to phrase the identity issue. In the wake of 9/11, Rifkin presciently wondered whether Europe's commitment to cultural diversity and peaceful coexistence would be substantial enough to withstand similar terrorist attacks in the future. He also envisioned a global and widespread economic crisis, 'a deep and prolonged downturn' in the world economy, effectively predicting what would happen in 2008 (Rifkin 2004: 384). Projecting such a scenario, Rifkin questioned whether Europeans would remain committed to the principles of inclusivity and sustainable development, faithful to an open, process-orientated form of multilevel governance, even if they were witnessing social upheaval and riots in the streets (Rifkin 2004: 383-384). Faced with the challenge posed by Rifkin, the answer seems to be negative. Europeans do not actually seem to believe in the values of inclusiveness and development in times of crisis – both within EU borders, and beyond; Europeans do not seem keen to embrace an open, multiple system of government, which they perceive as a threat to their future well-being, prosperity and cultural values. European responses to global geopolitics have resulted in a return to the national discourse of populist and anti-European groups, in the name of the 'realist' necessity to protect Europeans against 'the other'.

Despite its internal differences, or perhaps precisely because of them, Europe must find a European identity by looking inwards. Selective commitment will not do: a European continent that wants to be an authoritative global player must reinvent itself through the commitment of all its members. The EU cannot depend on Germany to manage currency and on France to call the security line and create foreign policies, turning to stronger nations (and their strongest assets) to preserve its identity. Although the ECSC originally articulated the need to lie down together the 'German lion and the French lamb', the EU must address this situation on more than just the basis of two countries. Of course, if today France and Germany find themselves alone to address the most important decisions, then more should be said about the absence of the other member of the triad that in the past contributed to global geopolitics – Britain - which since World War II has been less and less willing to take decisive action in the European arena (with the exception of the second Iraq War). This withdrawal has carried a heavy political and strategic price among European allies (Oliver 2015), culminating in the Brexit referendum of June 23, 2016. The economic and political consequences of the decision made by the United Kingdom are far from clear but it is evident that they will affect the European project deeply.

However, resolving the identity issue internally does not mean moving away from an international dimension. The original guarantor for European cooperation, the US, must be committed to the value of the European project. Besides a revamping of transatlantic relations, it is also vital to recognise that the interests of France, Germany and many other European members, especially after the Ukrainian and Syrian crises and their subsequent repercussions in Europe, call for cooperation with Moscow too. As Robert Kaplan observes, there is no clear division of our continent today, such as witnessed during the Cold War; however, Cold War dynamics are now reversed. Western Europe increasingly looks to Russia as a bulwark in the face of new threats of international terrorism and to counter the migration flows (DeBardeleben 2011). At the same time, Eastern Europe puts growing pressure on the US, as NATO does not seem to represent an effective protection against international challenges, not limited to Russian expansion of control (Kaplan 2016). For this reason, the debate on which countries ought to be responsible for European identity reflects the confusion regarding security, as the EU is called to move away from being an exclusively 'American' creation but ought to look at multiple entities - internal and external, domestic and transnational - for securing its existence and prosperity.

In respect of this consideration, a realist strategy for forging a new European identity could set the EU as one of the vertices of a hypothetical triangle, with the other two extremes being the US and Russia: the balance is stable and the triangle holds only if each of its last points is able to cultivate the bond that assures the other two, although each vertex has the potential ability to sustain itself (Nardini 2015: 53-71). As Europe has entered more or less formal arrangements with Moscow, particularly with regard to the energy issue, America can no longer be the only raison d'être for Europe. The EU as a whole requires handholds and balances to other situations with a certain degree of influence in the world (Giusti and Penkova 2014: 24).

Realism, however, falls short. European identity cannot be mapped in a purely rational cost and benefit analysis. Divisiveness must be put aside, as bureaucrats are called to design a new paradigm in which 'individuals and nations within Europe will subordinate parochial interests to achieve a common good based on the beliefs, values, and norms embodied by the identity' (Bellow 2010). Jurgen Habermas suggests that it is necessary to understand the real political challenge: the European community of nations should become a cosmopolitan community of states and citizens of the world (Habermas 2012: xi). In this sense, the future of Europeanism can be mapped: in the positive, metahistorical, forward-looking and constantly redefining sense of European cosmopolitanism (Khan 2015: 123-140; Risse 2010: 38-40). Cosmopolitanism may alternatively or additionally be understood not only as the need to overcome the concept of nation, but also to make Europe able to provide the security and intercultural education of its citizens through a common formal project that is truly faithful to the roots of the 'European experiment' (Ignatieff 1994: 9).

In terms of security, cosmopolitanism ought to move away from a perspective stressing greater self-organisation, co-ordination and negotiation as purely procedural concepts (Zolo 1997: xv). The debate on terrorism, but also the juxtaposition of assimilation and cultural integration within the broader notion of identity, would not assume a differential mode with respect to European and non-European citizens but must be brought back to neutral terms. Issues regarding security ought to be addressed in an egalitarian fashion, faithful to the liberal tradition that calls for common rules unifying the various national conceptions for the safety of world citizens. The presumption of innocence, common to every citizen on European soil (through regular or irregular entry - thus dismissing the debate on criminalising illegal immigration per se), should be coupled with a neutral application of criminal justice, free from any geographical identification, ethnic or religious, focusing solely on the principle of no harm. Such a model could be enriched with a deeper environmental vision, to meet the growing desertification, depletion of water resources, climate upheaval and rapid changes in the energy production, including the debate on fracking. It is important to go well beyond the commitments made in this area in Copenhagen and in Paris, which, however laudable, are still not binding and are related to the promise of compensation that never reached developing countries (Black 2015).

As Gerard Delanty notes, the proliferation of 'Europeanised personal identities has not produced a European collective identity as such' (Delanty 2016). European identity can nevertheless be successfully forged through education and historical awareness. Neil Fligstein argues that those with opportunity to interact with people from other member states, due to educational and/or professional opportunity, are more likely to identify with Europe (Fligstein 2008: 124). The people who have not had these opportunities usually refer more to their own state (ibid). Therefore, based on Spadolini's words, Europe should develop a social and educational model, which works on security and interculturalism, based on existing and declared values. In order to have a more stable and united future, member states must leave the theoretical realm to create a liberal, cosmopolitan project (Spadolini 1985: v-xvii). Such a project may not necessarily arise from the bottom-up, but ought to promote transnational, 'nested'

identities that could curb national resurgences, shaping them through both local and international policies, public grants and education (Shore 2000: 51). As liberalism is intrinsically woven back into the European project, a successfully inclusive European identity can look at something already in existence and not be an artificial creation.

CONCLUSION

The Europe conceived by Adenauer, De Gasperi and Schuman was undoubtedly rooted in a value-laden project for the individual, not harnessed by a utilitarian, interest-based, or realist perspective. While the future of the EU is debated across the continent, the European project can only survive if it reaffirms its liberal origins, moving away from constructing identity in opposition to 'the other', instead looking at sources of transnational belonging that can unite rather than divide.

Key concepts for a comprehensive proposal for European identity are commitment by all members, inclusive international relations, security within an egalitarian framework, a commitment not only towards republican institutions and a free market but towards the environment, education and human rights. Above all, Europe was created as an ideal, a goal for which to strive (Davies 1996: 10). Today, member states must restate that ideal: besides specific discussions on practical policies (which are beyond the scope of this paper), the theoretical framework cannot betray its founding liberal principles. Only through a return to its liberal roots can the EU live up to its self-declared objectives, solidify its internal unity, and answer the challenges that borders and identity issues present today.

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ENDNOTES

[1] Not all Europeans, however, have been accepting of America's role in the continent. A prominent example would be De Gaulle's European strategy (Ludlow 2010).
[2] The rise of neoliberal doctrines, such as Thatcherism, could also be seen as a factor accelerating the European transition to realism. Laissez-faire economics and market deregulation have undoubtedly affected EU economic policies, as well as the concept of identity and belonging to the European project.

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Foundations of Knowledge

Coal, Steel, and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955: the Germans and French from Ruhr Conflict to Economic Community

Thomas Christian Hoerber, *ESSCA School of Management, EU-Asia Institute*

Coal, Steel, and the Rebirth of Europe is a history of America's involvement in Europe during the immediate post-war years, written on the basis of primary sources. The main contribution of the book is the American perspective on the early European integration process it offers the reader. John Gillingham's introductory chapter, however, deals with the issue of coal and steel during the inter-war years. The author shows how protectionism and punitive tariffs, on the one hand, and foresight and diplomatic and political attempts to heal the wounds inflicted by a divisive economic struggle, on the other, are rooted in national politics. All politicians, even the conciliatory ones, were faced with the dilemma that it was almost impossible to find constructive ways out of the self-centricity which was the prevailing ethos in the nation states and in particular the European world powers and those aspiring to world-power status.

Subsequently, Gillingham covers the period of the Second World War. The second chapter analyses the German (under Nazi rule), the French and British economies at war. Thus, it inevitably deals with the war-important industries of coal and steel and shows that the war was waged not only on the battlefield, but also in the pits, the factories and the workshops. In this struggle the Nazi war economy, managed in the later years by the wily and talented Albert Speer, held out with remarkable tenacity and flexibility (pp. 52-64), while the French were exploited under Nazi occupation (pp. 65-77); and the British lost blood, face and treasure, and ultimately their claim to empire (pp. 78-85). The United States, not for the first time, were called in to redress the balance of the old world, with a decisive military and economic contribution to the defeat of Nazi Germany – one gets a glimpse of the Cold War when from this American perspective, the contribution of the Soviet Union to the defeat of Nazi Germany is forgotten.

The third chapter reviews the surprising change of attitude of the Americans towards the Germans after World War II, exemplified in the switch from the Morgenthau Plan to their support of the Schuman Plan. In the example of the International Ruhr Authority (IAR), Gillingham shows, first, that the Americans came to accept that the idea that a defeated Germany could be reduced to mere self-subsistence – as planned by Morgenthau – stripped of all its heavy industry so that it would never again pose a threat, was entirely impracticable. Second, he highlights the major problems the other two western Allies, Britain and France, had in running German heavy industry in their zones of occupation, both endeavouring to extract as much as possible in order to reduce their costs of occupation, which, in the French case, was a policy reinforced by old fears of the arch-enemy Germany. Their problems came to a head on the microeconomic level when strikes, sabotage, machinery failure and lagging investment reduced the output of Ruhr coal pits to an all-time low, which led to the Americans taking over control from the British. On the macroeconomic level, the British problems with the cost of occupation can be seen in the establishment of the Bizone, which put the American and the British zone of occupation under common economic direction, so that effectively the Americans were paying most of the bills and therefore, in their own jargon, 'calling the shots'. In third instance, Gillingham shows with his analysis of the IAR a growing American reluctance to micro-manage the German economy.

The situation created conditions extremely propitious to the concepts underlying the Schuman Plan, which combined checks and balances on German economic power with necessary emancipation from occupation rule. The Schuman Plan also added the bonus of a type of compulsory Franco-German reconciliation. For the Americans, this offered good prospects for peace and stability in the future, a marked improvement on the occupation regime. The following chapter adds a good deal of practical detail fleshing out the overall picture of American involvement. It also gives the perspective of the miners, of the pit managers, and of the impact of dismantlement policy (relatively short-lived in the West) on their lives, and it shows their keenness to circumvent the restrictions imposed by the occupation regime.

The fifth chapter then makes it clear that the IAR was in fact the first step away from this occupation regime and hence also the first step towards emancipation for the Germans, in that they recovered some real influence over their coal and steel industries. Particularly among SPD supporters in Germany, the IAR was, however, judged to be a betrayal of German interests. Theoretically, in terms of considerations of national sovereignty, this judgment was not entirely unfounded, and the issue was close to the heart of the SPD because of the fate of the miners. Germany, of course, was not at any rate an equal partner. Konrad Adenauer – dubbed by the SPD the 'Chancellor of the Allies' because he agreed to the IAR – had few illusions on this score and therefore preferred the path of cooperation with the Allies to that of confrontation. For him this was a necessary compromise in his step-by-step approach to the goal of full German sovereignty.

Adenauer would never agree to any plan except on a basis of parity, but when the Schuman Plan came in May 1950 it was clear that his goal was in sight. However, in its eventual outcome, Gillingham calls the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) the "success of a failure". The ingredients of this failure were Monnet's stubborn attitude and unwillingness to compromise (in his role of first president of the ECSC's High Authority), matched by the obstructionist views adopted by the representatives of heavy industry. ECSC regulations on national coal and steel industries were constrained, in particular due to the remnants of the occupation regime. For example, Law 27 required that the decartelisation of the Ruhr should be completed as part of the ECSC process (p. 301). Gillingham concludes that the ECSC overall achieved only very few concrete results. It became a 'success' because it set a precedent – emblematic and practical – for further European integration. The ECSC was an example how European integration could work in the future. The author believes this was exactly what the Americans – consistent supporters of European integration thereafter – wanted and Monnet delivered to them (p. 369). It was also a success, because it transformed the French policy of holding Germany down into a real partnership between the two countries, and hence eliminated the main reason for conflict in Europe (p. 368).

For Gillingham, rigorous analysis of the early years of integration will not provide an answer to what Europe is today. After almost 400 pages of detailed analysis he readily concedes that there is more than meets the eye in what is the present-day European Union (p. 370). There are, he believes, transcending motivations driving the integration movement and holding the EU together today, e.g. "(…) the often remarked and all too easily trivialised deep longing for unity felt to some extent by all Europeans." (p. 371) Concessions by Germany in order to press European integration forward also figure here – notably Germany's acceptance of permanent net-contributor status to the EU budget. Another important factor is the learning process as part of integration and which has completely changed statecraft in Europe – one may say it has established trust between the nations where once the 'default' attitude in the various foreign offices was one of innate suspicion (p. 371). European integration is also more open than any other international organisation and hence it is more available to public participation and more sensitive to the people's interests. It is also more concrete, because its purpose is not academic debate of political constructs such as federalism, but the solution of concrete economic problems (p. 372). Lastly, Gillingham concludes that only in the shadow of the Cold War, when Berlin and Paris were no longer centre-stage, and because of the threat of nuclear apocalypse which reduced Europe's ancient feuds to relative insignificance, could European integration succeed (p. 372).

Coal, Steel, and the Rebirth of Europe was written for an academic audience or patient readers ready to cope with a mass of historical detail. For experts in the field of European integration it remains an essential reading, because of its analysis of one of the most important players in this process, the United States, not least because the American role is usually considered as marginal to European integration studies. Thus, Gillingham's study – though published some time ago – must rank as one of the standard works in the field of early European integration analysis.

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Author: John Gillingham

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 ISBN 0521 52430 X, pp. 386 + index

Book review

Malcolm Craig, Liverpool John Moores University

ROY JENKINS AND THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION PRESIDENCY, 1976-1980: AT THE HEART OF EUROPE

Author: N. Piers Ludlow

Abstract

A fine piece of research and writing on a pivotal figure in British and European political history. Using previously untouched archives, this work on Roy Jenkins and his period as president of the European Commission is a valuable addition to the scholarship on Britain's storied relationship with the European project.

Keywords

It is difficult to contest the assertion that Britain has had – and continues to have – a complex and often fraught relationship with both the reality and the idea of European integration. The many instances of this have only been brought into even sharper relief by the UK's 'Brexit' referendum. The fallout from the supposed democratic will of the British people is for future historians to analyse, but the vote to leave the EU was also bound up in questions of sovereignty, deep-seated concerns about immigration, and ephemeral notions of national greatness (or a lack thereof).

This being the case, it is more vital than ever that historians continue to explore and chart not only the evolution, nature, and outcomes of integration, but the role played by Britain and British individuals in advancing or retarding the integration process. The London School of Economics' N. Piers Ludlow's latest book *Roy Jenkins and the European Commission Presidency, 1976-1980: At the Heart of Europe* offers a timely and fascinating account of British influence at the centre of the European Economic Community (EEC) maelstrom.

One of the leading historians of post-war European integration, Ludlow has previously written and edited impressive works on the subject, ranging from European reactions to the UK's first EEC membership application, through the challenges posed by Gaullism, to questions of identity's place within visions of integration. As a scholar he is thus eminently well placed to explore and analyse Roy Jenkins, one of Britain's most fascinating pro-European politicians. Not only does the book set out to assess the perspectives, talents, and priorities that Jenkins brought to the role of European Commission President, it also seeks to shine a light upon the role itself, enquiring into its nature and history, and the ways in which the European Community sought to face up to the economic turbulence of the 1970s.

This is not, it must be noted, a book for the casual reader. Aimed at an informed audience, it is deeply researched and highly detailed, frequently offering microscopic detail of policy, process, and personality. It forms part of Palgrave Macmillan's 'Security, Conflict, and Cooperation in the World Series', which covers topics as diverse as US-Iranian relations, the Falklands Conflict, and a number of works on the diversity of European Community politics in the twentieth century. This being the case, it is priced at the academic end of the spectrum, placing it beyond the reach of all but the most dedicated amateur.

Very helpful for the reader is Ludlow's opening sketch of Jenkins's storied career as Labour Party politician, crusading Home Secretary, forceful Chancellor of the Exchequer, frustrated would-be leader of his party, and Prime Minister that never was. This first substantive chapter helps to place Jenkins in context: frustrated with the thwarting of his domestic ambitions, staunchly pro-European, and the kind of political heavyweight that the European Commission sought as a leader in the crisis of the 1970s. The author then goes on to offer chapters on Jenkins's preparations for the presidency, his battle to ensure his participation in the G7 summits (a fight that he won), his critical participation in the European Monetary System's launch, Community enlargement, and international relations, and the President's eventual return to British politics as a driving force behind the new Social Democratic Party.

At the heart of Ludlow's research sits an impressive source base. As the first historian to access the voluminous papers of Jenkins's *chef de cabinet* Sir Crispin Tickell, this volume breaks new archival ground. As Ludlow recounts, Tickell's papers are quite different to the normal European Commission sources. They are detailed and highly informative, quite unlike the "highly patchy" and often 'Delphic' (to use the author's own words) European Commission archives. This archive – and Ludlow's scrupulous attention to it – is of immense value. It permits the author to construct a picture of the ambitions, work, and travails of a Commission president in more detail than ever before. And this thus throws greater light on the workings of the Commission, the Community as a whole, and the interactions of Commission and Community with the wider world. If anything deserves highlighting regarding this impressive volume, it is this particular archival aspect.

Aside from the Tickell papers, Ludlow also draws upon a wide range of interviews, memoirs, diaries, and a significant body of secondary material. This gives the book impressive scope and weight. It also aids in avoiding the perils of the political biography by providing a granular, sometimes raw, portrayal of Jenkins and his work.

Ludlow's new work will appeal to a variety of scholars. For those interested in a moment where it appeared Britain might take a genuinely formative, leading role in European institutions, it offers an impressive analytical account. Those who study the role of the individual in European affairs will find much food for thought, especially in regard to the nature and influence of the European Commission President since Jenkins's tenure. Finally, it adds to our knowledge of the 1970s in an international context. Since this decade is currently the subject of increasing scholarly attention, this can only be a good and valuable thing.

One aspect that could have been drawn out a little more explicitly is the role played by globalisation – broadly defined – during Jenkins's tenure. This is an expanding, vibrant field of study, with historians using the concept of globalisation to offer new analyses of domestic and foreign policies, transnational organisations, religion, and so on and so forth. Within the context of external relations between the EEC and the wider world, it would have been interesting to examine how the currents of globalisation affected the president's work and the role of the Commission in both intra-European and international contexts.

Another related area which receives brief attention is energy policy. As Ludlow points out, the Commission did not begin to substantively grapple with the complexities of energy until the 'second oil shock' following the 1979 Iranian Revolution. However, given the warm relationship between Jenkins and US president Jimmy Carter, it would be interesting to know if and how the Commission reacted to Carter's global nuclear energy and non-proliferation initiatives (such as the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation Program) that he proposed in the first few months of his administration. Was is the case that the Commission simply did not engage with these matters? With Jenkins present at the G7 summits where energy and non-proliferation were extensively discussed (although he was excluded from the 1977 meetings of national leaders), are these factors present in the Tickell files? If they are present, this could be a fruitful avenue for future research. If they are absent, this seems to represent an interesting omission worthy of further consideration. This is not to say that increasing global interdependence and energy concerns go unremarked in the volume. However, a wider exploration of these themes may have been useful (if indeed the archival sources make such wider exploration possible, which may not be the case).

In the end, any criticisms are minor. Ludlow has taken his extensive experience and applied it to a fascinating new set of sources that demonstrably enhance a previously patchy archive. To return to Britain's relationship with Europe and with those who study it, it demonstrates – if any demonstration were needed – the absurdity of certain pro-Brexit politicians' statements that experts should just keep quiet.

Book Review

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WAR AND INTERVENTION IN THE TRANSNATIONAL PUBLIC SPHERE: PROBLEM-SOLVING AND EUROPEAN IDENTITY FORMATION

Author: Cathleen Kantner

Abstract

The examination of European collective identity formation and the 'transnational' are the richest contributions of this book. It also presents an impressive long-term quantitative-qualitative research method. The discussion of intervention and war is less rewarding.

Keywords

Transnational, European identity, European integration, methodology

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Cathleen Kantner's book examines the debate in European newspapers about post-Cold War international crises (wars and interventions), and compares it with that of the United States. She argues that the debates took place in a transnational political community and evolved into a process of collective sense-making that shaped transnational identity-formation in Europe. Kantner traces this process by reading newspaper articles for two kinds of identity discourse – pragmatic problem-solving and ethical self-understanding. Using a comparative, quantitative-qualitative research methodology, and employing computational-linguistic tools, Kantner and her project team analyse almost half a million articles published by 'quality' newspapers in six European states over sixteen years (1990-2006). The book's contribution extends beyond its innovative research methodology, due to its significant findings. Among the most significant is that a transnational European identity is emerging (1-3, 17).

Kantner's book will interest political communication scholars and those in other fields. For example, the book addresses a methodological weakness of constructivism, a leading theory of International Relations. Constructivism struggles to show how public convictions regarding the international change over time, and in comparative perspective, but Kantner shows that the technological and methodological hurdles can be overcome (5). Her work will also excite scholars interested in research methodology, transnational history and politics, European identity and integration, and European Union 'actorness'. Despite its sub-title, however, the book is not as strong discussing wars and interventions. For example, Kantner defines intervention as actions not motivated by national self-

interest, which is a problematic assertion since the self-interest of the intervening states is almost always involved at some level. In addition, she does not engage seriously with the key debates relating to intervention, such as those which revolve around authority and sovereignty. What discussion there is does not break new ground.

In terms of placement in the scholarly literature, Kantner's book takes the middle ground on debates that have been polarized. One example concerns the potential for collective sense-making. Most constructivists stress the piecemeal character of collective learning beyond the state. The book's continuous long-term design not only made peaks in the media debate on wars and intervention distinguishable, it also showed that debate-driven identity-formation processes emerged in Europe and that transnational mass political communication occurred within Europe and between Europe and the United States. (5, 147-48). A second example concerns political communication. Kantner is less strident than those working on global public spheres, who see potential for transnational democracy, and less sceptical than those who see little hope of transcending bounded national polities (149-50).

Kantner spends a lot of time explaining her theoretical framework, terms, and methodology before getting to the empirical research results in the second-last chapter. The introduction does a good job laying-out the design of the book, and the project on which the book is based. The project received major European funding and had about twenty-five researchers and student assistants involved at one point or another. Chapter two discusses the identity discourses that are tracked through the media database, and distinguishes between 'ordinary wars' and 'humanitarian military interventions'. Chapter three covers the methodological decisions and steps used to code and analyze the database. The empirical findings are, as mentioned, in chapter four, and chapter five sums-up and highlights the most surprising findings and larger significance of the book. One of the most surprising according to Kantner is that Europe is presented somewhat more as an ethical community than as a problem-solving community. This was not expected, for, with Jürgen Habermas, she believes that political communities most often resemble problem-solving communities, and that this is enough for political integration.

We see how this works in the discussion of European identity, which is among the richest and most interesting in the book. Kantner notes that most of the sample countries did not show a pronounced upwards trend in European identity expressions (the exception was France). However, expressions of shared identity were prominent and increased in frequency in articles referring somehow to Europe (153). Identity formation was not a steady process, but one of varying intensity that depended on the density of political interaction and interdependence on a given crisis. European identity expressions were highest on the most controversial and intensively debated crises, such as the Kosovo intervention of 1999 (153).

Kantner's understanding of the 'transnational' also merits attention. Scholars in a variety of disciplines are making use of this as yet vaguely-defined perspective. Kantner argues that the 'transnational' in transnational political communication should be seen as intertwined communication in national media (146). Transnational political communication emerges around transnational interdependent issues, which are debated at the same time using similar framing. However, the people involved do not have to express the same opinions. They do not have to be reading the same media articles, or speaking the same languages, for the political communication to be transnational (6, 10). For Kantner, transnationalism is a synchronous process of reaching shared interpretations on common problems, one that is leading to hybrid European-national forms of identity in Europe (17).

This transnational perspective potentially has broader applicability beyond Kantner's book. For example, surely there have been other instances of synchronously debated social ideas and forces forming transnational political communities. Perhaps even more diverse sets of actors than in Europe, having arrived at a common understanding through transnational political communication, developed shared interests and identities that enabled them to move forward on an international problem. In any case, though the book devotes too much space to theory and methodology, as compared to the empirical sections, and does not add to the literature on civil wars and interventions, it is still excellent value. War and intervention in the Transnational Public Sphere is well written and accessible to those outside its target European studies and political communications fields. Readers, especially those interested in European identity, transnationalism and innovative methodologies will find Kantner's book rewarding.