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Research Article

Are Some States Luckier than Others in the Council of the European Union?

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Abstract

When states engage in negotiations in the Council of the European Union, the position of actors relative to their negotiating partners has a substantial impact on outcomes. Those with extreme positions will experience difficulty in winning support, while those in the centre will find states more amenable to their perspective regardless of their actual negotiating power. The bulk of the literature on bargaining in the Council has tended to assume that this form of 'luck' will balance itself out across negotiations, but is this actually the case? Using the DEUII dataset I show that certain states consistently adopt 'luckier' positions than others and that this effect appears to benefit smaller states. The clear implication of this finding is that we require a better understanding of the preference formation stage if we are to capture fully the dynamics of EU decision-making.

Keywords

Bargaining; Council of the European Union; EU legislative process; Luck; Preference formation

The distinction between 'luck' and 'power' is well established in the literature on political decision-making (Barry 1980). While the outcome of a negotiation may reflect the ability of individual actors to bring others around to their ideal position; it may also reward those who, by sheer quirk of circumstance, happened to support a position closer to the negotiated outcome from the outset. Assessing which actors are powerful, and which are merely fortunate, is consequently one of the key components in any analysis of bargaining success.

In the Council of the European Union, where national governments negotiate the content of EU legislation, this principle is of obvious relevance. Yet although luck has frequently been mentioned in the literature on bargaining in the Council (see in particular Arregui and Thomson 2009; Selck and Steunenberg 2004; Thomson 2011), the notion that it might persist across a large number of decision-making areas is controversial. For Arregui and Thomson (2009), the concept is essentially an element of structure which influences outcomes on an issue-specific basis, but evens itself out to the extent that there are no clear beneficiaries overall. Schneider, Finke and Bailer (2010: 89) take a comparable view, stating that it is 'highly unlikely that the luck of an actor persists across a large set of decision-making situations'. Cross (2013: 73) adopts a similar perspective, reasoning that luck 'should be randomly distributed across all actors and enter the bargaining success measure as random error'. In Selck and Steunenberg's (2004) study of the Parliament's role in legislative decisions, the thrust of the argument remains broadly comparable: that luck is a form of statistical noise which must be eliminated from an assessment of a state's genuine bargaining strength.

This paper subjects this assumption to empirical study. Based on the insights of Bailer (2004), it assesses whether luck, as defined in the literature, does indeed even itself out over time, or whether certain states consistently adopt 'luckier' positions than their negotiating partners. Taking inspiration from previous research which has highlighted the counter-intuitive success of smaller states in Council decision-making (see in particular Rodden 2002; but also Bunse, Magnette, and Nicolaidis 2005; Golub 2012), the study also examines whether the size of a state has any impact on the

frequency with which it adopts 'lucky' positions. The analysis finds that, contrary to the assumptions in the bulk of the existing literature, there are numerous cases in which the extremity of a state's position in relation to other states in the Council, the position of the European Commission, and the position of the European Parliament, does differ significantly from its negotiating partners across a large number of negotiations. Moreover, in every statistically significant case of a state deviating from one of its partners in the Council, the effect benefits the smaller state in the comparison. The key implication of this finding is that while there may be sound reasons for studies of bargaining success to regard the distribution of positions among states as a neutral process which is subject to a degree of random chance, the way states formulate their preferences is a more structured process than has commonly been recognised, and one worthy of further study in its own right.

The paper is structured as follows. The first section outlines some of the existing empirical work on the bargaining strength of states in the Council. The second section specifies the types of luck which are assumed to play a role in negotiations, noting that the distance of a state's position from the mean position in the Council, the position of the European Commission, and the position of the European Parliament are predicted to have the largest impact on outcomes. The third section elaborates on the research design before the fourth section presents the results of the analysis. The final section presents the implications of the findings for our understanding of Council decision-making, and suggests three potential avenues for future research.

BARGAINING SUCCESS IN THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Over the past 15 years, a growing body of literature has emerged on bargaining within the Council of the European Union (Aksoy 2010; Arregui and Thomson 2009; Bailer 2004; Golub 2012; Schneider, Finke and Bailer 2010; Selck and Kuipers 2005; Thomson 2011). The importance of this area of study is self-evident, given that bargaining success determines not only the nature of EU legislation, but also the potential future direction of the integration project as a whole. Additionally, the prospect of Council negotiations producing clear 'winners' and 'losers' raises significant democratic questions, in view of the issues of national sovereignty which are at stake whenever the EU adopts a new piece of legislation (Heritier 1999: 275).

These democratic concerns have provided an incentive for European decision-makers to ensure that no one state, or group of states, consistently achieves favourable or unfavourable outcomes in negotiations. Indeed, several studies of bargaining in the Council have indicated that this standard might be met in practice. Bailer's (2004) study of Council decision-making in the EU-15 finds a relatively narrow spread in overall bargaining success, leading to the conclusion that the EU's legislative system 'guarantees that all member states are occasionally winners and losers' (Bailer 2004: 113). Arregui and Thomson (2009), using data from both before and after the 2004 enlargement, also find that there are no clear winners and losers among the member states. Thomson (2011), using updated data, reaches a similar conclusion, noting that there is 'little variation among actors in terms of the aggregate distances between their demands and outcomes across a range of issues' (Thomson 2011: 231). In the latter two studies it should be emphasised that, while at the aggregate level there is little difference between the bargaining success of states, there is significant variation in the distance between demands and outcomes when negotiations are considered in isolation. These studies find evidence that individual negotiations do produce winners and losers, but that this success and failure is not maintained when a large number of negotiations are considered together.

The basic method adopted in these analyses has been to use positional data on the stance of national governments in the Council to calculate the average distance of a state's position from the

negotiated outcome in a given legislative discussion. Having calculated the average distance for each state, 95 per cent confidence intervals are then determined to give an indication of whether differences between states are statistically significant (Arregui and Thomson 2009: 668; Thomson 2011: 243). In almost all cases these intervals overlap, which has led to the conclusion that there are no (or few) significant differences in overall bargaining success between states. In the case of Thomson's (2011) study, for instance, there is only one example where confidence intervals do not overlap: Sweden being closer to the negotiated outcome, on average, than France (using pre-2004 data).

Yet as Golub (2012) notes, calculating confidence intervals around average distances in this way is likely to downplay the potential for discovering statistically significant differences between states. It is possible for the distance of state positions from negotiated outcomes to differ significantly even when confidence intervals overlap. Only by performing a t-test, or constructing confidence intervals around the difference of means (rather than simply each state's average distance from the outcome of negotiations), can the existence of 'winners and losers' be properly examined (Golub 2012: 1301-2). Using this adapted methodology, Golub illustrates that certain states do, indeed, find themselves closer or further away from outcomes in the Council than other states. Moreover, in contrast to what might be expected by a 'realist' account of intergovernmental negotiations, this effect seems to work actively against larger states, with France and Germany proving particularly unsuccessful in negotiations.

Although this is counter-intuitive, several other studies have noted that large states do not appear to gain any structural advantage from their size in negotiations. Both Arregui and Thomson (2009) and Thomson (2011) find little benefit from having a larger population in Council negotiations, despite larger states such as France, Germany and the UK receiving more votes under the Council's qualified majority voting rules. Other country-specific studies, such as Selck and Kuiper's (2005) analysis of Denmark, Finland and Sweden, have also demonstrated the success that small states can have in Council decision-making. As yet, the precise mechanism underlying this success/parity remains unexplained.

LUCK IN COUNCIL NEGOTIATIONS

As stated above, the potential that negotiations may reward states who, by chance, happened to support a position closer to the negotiated outcome from the outset, is a well-established problem in studies of bargaining power (Barry 1980). In the context of Council negotiations, this form of luck has typically been viewed in similar terms to bargaining success in the sense that most studies assume it will even itself out across a large number of negotiations. Nevertheless, at the level of *individual* negotiations, luck is assumed to play a large role in determining outcomes in both Arregui and Thomson's (2009) and Thomson's (2011) studies. This is consistent, in their view, because luck is not something which persists, but instead only appears in isolated cases, with no states proving consistently 'luckier' than others over time.

In terms of the factors which have the greatest effect on negotiations, Arregui and Thomson (2009: 669) provide a multivariate analysis to map the relative impact of several circumstantial elements on state bargaining success. As might be expected, they find that the extremity of a state's position in a negotiation has the largest effect: the more extreme a state's position is relative to the other states in the Council, the less likely the outcome is to match that state's wishes. In addition to the extremity of positions, however, they also find two other factors that are important.

The second largest impact stems from the salience states attach to individual issues, with states' negotiating positions more likely to be closer to the final outcome of discussions if they attach a high

level of salience to the issue at stake. Although we would expect states to drive a harder bargain on issues that are particularly important to them, the size of this effect is smaller in magnitude than that for the extremity of their position. Salience is not generally considered a type of luck, but is rather viewed as a factor that will influence how a state chooses to negotiate (Leuffen, Malang and Wörle 2014). One interesting factor that has not typically been considered in previous analyses, however, is that the distribution of salience across issues could itself be regarded as a form of luck. The salience of an issue for a given state might be determined via domestic interests over which the state's government has little control; yet a state may be considered 'lucky' if they attach a high level of salience to an issue few other states view as important, thereby increasing their chances of negotiating a successful outcome. Given previous studies have not typically viewed the distribution of salience in this way as a form of 'luck' comparable to the extremity of a state's position, salience is not included in the calculations set out below. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that definitions of luck can be extended beyond the distribution of state positions relative to other actors.

Finally, a third factor is the relation of a state's position to the other key institutions involved in the EU legislative process: the European Commission and the European Parliament. Arregui and Thomson's (2009) analysis shows that states have an advantage in negotiations if their position is closer to that of the Commission and Parliament, although this effect depends to a significant extent on the type of legislative procedure used. In decisions made under the consultation procedure, where member states in the Council are not bound by the position of the Parliament, only the location of a state's preference relative to that of the Commission has a statistically significant impact on their bargaining success (Arregui and Thomson 2009: 666-7). In contrast, in decisions made under the EU's 'ordinary legislative procedure' (previously referred to as the 'co-decision procedure'), the Parliament has a direct role in decision-making. In these areas, only the location of a state's preference relative to that of the Parliament has been shown to have a statistically significant impact on bargaining success (Arregui and Thomson 2009: 666-7). In both cases, the magnitude of this effect is much smaller than for the distance of a state's position from the mean position in the Council (Arregui and Thomson 2009: 669), but higher than other structural factors.

RESEARCH DESIGN: TESTING THE PERSISTENCE OF LUCK

To test whether previous studies have been correct to assume that luck, as defined in the literature, will not persist from issue to issue, I assess how the extremity of a state's position and the distance of a state's position from that of the European Commission and European Parliament varies over a large number of negotiations. Two distinct hypotheses can be put forward, based on the above review. First, given the consensus in the literature on the random nature of these three factors, we should expect that no state will *consistently* find itself closer to the mean position of the Council, the position of the Commission, or the position of the Parliament. The first hypothesis is therefore:

H1 There should be no statistically significant variation in the location of states' starting positions relative to the mean position in the Council, the starting position of the Commission and the starting position of the European Parliament.

To go a step beyond this first hypothesis, a second hypothesis can be proposed. If the distance of state positions from the mean position in the Council, the position of the Commission or the position of the Parliament does differ significantly, then we would not expect this to have any structural pattern as 'luck', by its very nature, should be distributed randomly. One test of this would be to mirror the approach of previous studies (notably Golub 2012; also Arregui and Thomson 2009) which have structured analyses of bargaining strength around the distinction between small states and

large states, and assess whether this distinction has any expression in the distribution of luck. As the literature suggests that it should not, the second hypothesis therefore states that:

H2 Small states should not have a statistically significant advantage over larger states in terms of the location of their starting position relative to the mean position in the Council, the starting position of the Commission and the starting position of the European Parliament.

Clearly if H1 is proven to be true, then H2 will necessarily be true as well. It should also be noted that the intention in adopting H2 is not to test whether *all* of the bargaining success which small states have displayed in previous studies is simply the result of luck. The analysis does not aim to rule out the possibility that small states may also possess genuine bargaining power relative to larger states, rather it functions as a test of whether the assumptions previous studies have made about luck stand up to empirical study.

DATASET AND METHOD

To test these hypotheses, the most natural resource to draw on is the updated European Union Decides (DEUII) dataset (Thomson, Arregui, Leuffen, Costello et al. 2012). The DEUII dataset uses responses from semi-structured interviews to assign a value from 0 to 100 for the position of every state, the European Commission and the European Parliament on 331 controversial issues relating to 125 legislative proposals which passed through the Council between 1996 and 2008. Although the EU has changed a great deal since the mid-1990s, the DEUII data, along with the earlier 'DEU' dataset which it is built on, has been used in the bulk of the research on bargaining in the Council (Arregui and Thomson 2009; Thomson 2011; Golub 2012). Given this widespread usage it offers not only a robust source to carry out the analysis, but ensures that any break in my analysis from previous studies cannot be explained by inconsistencies between different datasets.

It should be noted, however, that the DEU/DEUII data is not without its critics. The most detailed critique offered thus far is arguably that put forward by Slapin (2014), which draws attention to the presence of potential measurement errors in the collection of the data on the preferences of actors. Measurement errors are a problem likely to be encountered by any study of this nature. Clearly, the aim of providing an accurate numerical representation of every state's position on a given legislative issue has always been extremely ambitious. Yet this is the nature of all social science research and there is nothing in Slapin's critique to suggest that fear of measurement errors should prohibit future studies from using the DEU/DEUII data for specific purposes, as Slapin acknowledges, so long as they carefully consider measurement errors when interpreting their results (2014: 37-8).

In terms of method, I take inspiration from Golub's (2012) adapted methodology for calculating the statistical significance of differences in the average distance between state starting positions and outcomes in negotiations. As noted above, Golub (2012: 1301) argues that simply calculating confidence intervals around mean distances for each state is liable to downplay the significance of differences between countries. Instead, it is necessary to compare differences between states issue by issue using a paired t-test. If this is true for testing differences between state bargaining success, however, then it should also be true for testing the significance of differences between states in terms of the distance of their positions from the mean position in the Council, the position of the Commission and the position of the European Parliament.

I therefore adopt a slightly modified version of Golub's method, testing differences in the three types of luck identified above. For the first type of luck – the extremity of a state's position relative to the other states in the Council – I calculate the mean position for every state in the Council for every individual issue under negotiation. The DEUII dataset contains several missing values and there

is a long-standing debate over whether such cases should be excluded from analyses or whether 'imputed' values should be substituted instead. I opt to follow the advice of Thomson (2011) in excluding missing cases, including from the calculation of the mean values in the Council. Having calculated this mean value, I then use the distance of each state's starting position from this mean value (rather than the distance of a state's starting position from the outcome of the negotiation). This provides a measure of how 'extreme' each state's position is relative to its negotiating partners on a given issue. With the other two types of luck, the calculation is more straightforward as the DEUII dataset contains the positions of the European Commission and European Parliament on each issue.

The DEUII dataset also contains a measure of the salience attached to each issue by individual states. However, while weighting the distance between a state's position and the outcome of a negotiation might make sense in calculations of bargaining success, there is no anticipated value in using salience-weighting to assess the luck of states. For salience to have an effect on luck there would have to be a degree of conscious strategy involved on the part of a state. States would have to pick their position relative to other actors intentionally in anticipation that this provides a strategic advantage in negotiations. If we take these factors as luck, as previous studies have done, then salience should not have an impact on this calculation – if luck is randomly determined then it should make little difference whether an issue is deemed particularly important to certain states or otherwise. For this reason, I do not use salience to weight the distance between state positions and the mean position in the Council or the positions of the Commission and Parliament.

With regard to time period, the dataset contains negotiations from 1996 to 2008, with fewer negotiations available which include all of the states that joined the European Union during or after the 2004 enlargement. The primary intention of the analysis is to test whether previous studies have been correct to assume that 'luck', as defined in the literature, will even itself out across a large number of negotiations. I have therefore followed the approach of previous studies, notably Golub's (2012) analysis on which my method is based, by focusing only on those states (the EU-15) that were already members prior to the 2004 enlargement, excluding the possibility that any deviations in my findings are simply the result of selecting different states in the analysis.

Broadly, there are two options available in terms of using the post-2004 data. One approach would be to consider all the issues contained in the dataset as a single set, with those states that joined after 2004 removed from the calculation. The drawback with this approach is that decision-making before and after the enlargement could be considered to be qualitatively different. For instance, even if we only assess EU-15 countries, the mean position in the Council after 2004 also has to be calculated using the starting positions of the accession states. It might be the case, therefore, that while a given state was 'lucky' relative to the positions of other EU-15 states, it might be less lucky after 2004 if its positions are more extreme in comparison to the enlargement states.

Nevertheless, there are also downsides associated with only considering negotiations prior to 2004. By drastically cutting the number of negotiations which can be assessed, the power of any statistical test is also reduced. This is also largely unnecessary in the case of comparing the distance of state positions from those of the Commission and the Parliament. For this reason, I choose to treat all of the negotiations as a single dataset, but also to test whether there is a significant difference between pre-2004 and post-2004 results for the case of the extremity of a state's position. Including the post-2004 results does not significantly alter the conclusion outlined below for the extremity of state positions.

Finally, with respect to the calculations involving the Commission and the Parliament, there could be an argument for separating these negotiations into two separate groups corresponding to those using the consultation and ordinary legislative procedures. However, if states are more prone to

having positions closer to the Commission or the Parliament, this should be true regardless of the legislative procedure being used. Separating the negotiations on the basis of the decision-making procedure is important if we are assessing bargaining success, but as an assessment of luck it is likely simply to reduce the number of observations available.

RESULTS

Following Golub's (2012) approach, I performed paired t-tests for each of the three types of luck. I separated these, as Golub does, between large and small states: with the five largest EU states by population, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK, being taken as 'large states'. I also performed a simple linear regression using each state's distance from the mean position in the Council as the dependent variable and size as a dummy variable (large states and small states). This indicated that there was a statistically significant difference¹ between the two groups, with the positions of large states more likely to be further away from the mean position in the Council.

Table 1 shows the results of the 50 pairwise comparisons for the average distance of a state's starting position from the mean position in the Council. If this were to even itself out over time, as is assumed in the bulk of the existing literature, we would expect there to be no cases in which one state is closer or further away from the mean position in the Council to a statistically significant degree. Each cell contains the average difference between a small state's distance from the mean position in the Council and the paired large state's distance from the mean. A positive value indicates that the small state on the vertical axis was closer to the mean position than the large state on the horizontal axis. The actual value indicates the distance: for instance, France was on average 5.04 points on the 0-100 DEUII scale further away from the mean position than Austria. For each comparison, p-values are shown in brackets, with significance indicators using the standard Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. As the Bonferroni method is a conservative approach, the more powerful Holm-Bonferroni method is also included. Previous studies have generally used $p < 0.1$ as the threshold for significance, but I also show results using $p < 0.05$ and $p < 0.01$ where appropriate.

Taken together, these results clearly illustrate that the distance of a state's position from the mean position in the Council does not even itself out over time. If $p < 0.05$ is taken as the threshold of significance, then even using the conservative Bonferroni correction there are 14 statistically significant instances of states being closer/further away from the mean position in the Council than their larger counterpart. If the Holm-Bonferroni method is adopted with a significance threshold of $p < 0.1$, this figure rises to 22 statistically significant comparisons. Moreover, in every statistically significant case the larger state is further away from the mean than the smaller state it is paired with. In the cases of Belgium and Ireland, all of the comparisons with large states are statistically significant. We can conclusively reject the first hypothesis and state that contrary to the assumptions in existing studies, certain states are consistently closer to the mean position in the Council than others.

With only three of the comparisons showing a small state further away from the mean than its larger partner (Sweden-France, Netherlands-Italy, and Sweden-Italy, respectively), and none of these comparisons being statistically significant, there is also some strong evidence that the distribution of this effect privileges small states over their larger rivals. An illustrative figure can be provided to this observation, however, by subjecting the data to a further calculation. The simplest method for doing this is to create a new set of combined figures of average distances for each of the two groups: that is, the group of five large states and the second group of ten small states. By compiling the mean distance for each of these groups from the mean position in the Council, two new columns of data

can be created (one for large states and one for small states) which can be analysed using the same method as above.

Table 1. Pairwise comparisons for the mean distance of state positions from the mean position in the Council using the DEUI dataset

	France	Germany	Italy	Spain	UK
Austria	5.04* (0.0015)	5.57*** (0.0000)	3.17 (0.0329)	5.06* (0.0015)	6.82*** (0.0000)
Belgium	5.44*** (0.0001)	6.29*** (0.0000)	4.36** (0.0007)	6.75*** (0.0000)	6.52*** (0.0000)
Denmark	1.85 (0.2395)	2.72 (0.0879)	0.09 (0.9481)	2.57 (0.1012)	2.38 (0.0915)
Finland	3.68 (0.0121)	4.41 ^{hh} (0.0029)	2.08 (0.1405)	4.23 (0.0038)	4.53* (0.0012)
Greece	1.42 (0.3498)	2.50 (0.1318)	0.15 (0.9167)	2.65 (0.0534)	2.41 (0.1463)
Ireland	5.54*** (0.0000)	6.53*** (0.0000)	4.18 ^{hh} (0.0028)	6.10*** (0.0000)	6.33*** (0.0000)
Luxembourg	4.74 ^{hh} (0.0034)	5.06** (0.0009)	3.47 (0.0178)	5.18** (0.0007)	5.88*** (0.0000)
Netherlands	0.64 (0.6795)	1.62 (0.2487)	-1.44 (0.3486)	0.93 (0.5656)	0.49 (0.7194)
Portugal	3.25 (0.0227)	4.55 ^{hh} (0.0024)	2.03 (0.0995)	3.75* (0.0010)	4.12 (0.0043)
Sweden	-0.59 (0.7218)	0.85 (0.5855)	-1.84 (0.2391)	0.37 (0.8202)	0.24 (0.8720)

Note. Each cell value is the result of subtracting the mean value (average distance from the mean in the Council) of the small state in the vertical axis from the mean value for the paired large state in the horizontal axis. A positive value indicates that small states were closer to the mean position in the Council on average than the paired large state. For each comparison p-values are given in brackets. ***Bonferroni $p < 0.01$; ** Bonferroni $p < 0.05$; * Bonferroni $p < 0.1$; ^{hh} Holm-Bonferroni $p < 0.1$.

When this calculation is made, we find that the group of large states is on average 3.17 points further away from the mean position in the Council than the group of small states ($p < 0.01$). In addition to rejecting the first hypothesis, we can also therefore reject the second hypothesis. The analysis indicates that small states are on average consistently closer to the mean position in the Council than large states. This result is consistent when using random selections of five small states in the comparison: given that there is potentially an in-built bias toward a larger group of states when comparing distance from a mean value (i.e. it might be expected that as the ten small states make up a larger proportion of the total states in the Council, they would naturally be closer to the mean than a group of five states).

DISTANCE FROM THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Following the same approach as above, Table 2 shows the results of the 50 pairwise comparisons for the average distance of a state's starting position from that of the European Parliament.

Table 2. Pairwise comparisons for the mean distance of state positions from the position of the European Parliament using the DEUII dataset

	France	Germany	Italy	Spain	UK
Austria	-4.12 (0.1875)	3.17 (0.1677)	-7.46 (0.0157)	-4.22 (0.1674)	-0.16 (0.9607)
Belgium	6.76 (0.0054)	13.17*** (0.0000)	4.06 (0.0936)	6.87 (0.0093)	8.34 (0.0052)
Denmark	4.16 (0.1826)	9.99*** (0.0002)	0.80 (0.7952)	2.94 (0.3625)	7.02 (0.0055)
Finland	2.61 (0.3966)	9.80** (0.0004)	-0.32 (0.9200)	2.41 (0.4470)	4.91 (0.0686)
Greece	-0.34 (0.8923)	6.78 (0.0387)	-2.83 (0.2312)	-0.78 (0.7582)	3.68 (0.2780)
Ireland	0.71 (0.7943)	6.25 (0.0421)	-3.64 (0.1980)	0.06 (0.9849)	3.55 (0.1401)
Luxembourg	-2.14 (0.4600)	7.13 (0.0188)	-4.98 (0.0785)	-1.98 (0.4975)	3.17 (0.2864)
Netherlands	-0.91 (0.7465)	6.44 (0.0172)	-3.62 (0.2365)	-0.37 (0.9108)	1.51 (0.5037)
Portugal	1.16 (0.6388)	8.82 (0.0065)	-2.18 (0.3546)	-0.19 (0.9301)	3.47 (0.2325)
Sweden	4.67 (0.1553)	11.08*** (0.0001)	1.68 (0.6152)	3.20 (0.3550)	6.40 (0.0102)

Note. Each cell value is the result of subtracting the mean value (average distance from the position of the Parliament) of the small state in the vertical axis from the mean value for the paired large state in the horizontal axis. A positive value indicates that the small state was closer to the position of the Parliament on average than the paired large state. Significance values are given in brackets. ***Bonferroni $p < 0.01$; ** Bonferroni $p < 0.05$; * Bonferroni $p < 0.1$; ^{hh} Holm-Bonferroni $p < 0.1$.

Here, the results are less striking than with regard to the mean position in the Council, but there are nevertheless three statistically significant cases if $p < 0.01$ is taken as the threshold for significance and four if $p < 0.05$ is used. All of these cases relate to Germany, with the country on average significantly further away from the Parliament's position than Belgium, Denmark, Finland and Sweden.

DISTANCE FROM THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Finally, Table 3 shows the last set of results for the distance of a state's position from that of the European Commission.

Table 3. Pairwise comparisons for the mean distance of state positions from the position of the European Commission using the DEUII dataset

	France	Germany	Italy	Spain	UK
Austria	5.19 (0.0902)	1.80 (0.4248)	4.23 (0.1590)	7.60 (0.0111)	-5.07 (0.0894)
Belgium	8.26** (0.0009)	4.98 (0.0817)	5.65 (0.0183)	8.56* (0.0012)	-1.60 (0.5783)
Denmark	4.85 (0.1109)	1.61 (0.5397)	3.20 (0.3082)	6.07 (0.0540)	-3.77 (0.1081)
Finland	8.98 (0.0037)	5.92 (0.0319)	6.42 (0.0404)	9.58* (0.0020)	-0.84 (0.7346)
Greece	0.09 (0.9731)	-2.99 (0.3628)	-1.36 (0.5515)	0.78 (0.7550)	-7.95 (0.0224)
Ireland	6.70 (0.0138)	2.08 (0.4807)	3.91 (0.1787)	7.78 (0.0050)	-3.71 (0.1122)
Luxembourg	6.00 (0.0417)	4.71 (0.1185)	5.57 (0.0550)	8.55 (0.0035)	-3.68 (0.2055)
Netherlands	6.04 (0.0389)	3.98 (0.1434)	4.44 (0.1558)	8.35 (0.0111)	-2.27 (0.2927)
Portugal	6.15 (0.0127)	2.62 (0.3978)	3.14 (0.1623)	6.76* (0.0018)	-4.56 (0.1270)
Sweden	7.18 (0.0261)	3.99 (0.1374)	4.31 (0.1981)	8.90 (0.0084)	-3.47 (0.1319)

Note. Each cell value is the result of subtracting the mean value (average distance from the position of the Commission) of the small state in the vertical axis from the mean value for the paired large state in the horizontal axis. A positive value indicates that the small state was closer to the position of the Commission on average than the paired large state. Significance values are given in brackets. ***Bonferroni $p < 0.01$; ** Bonferroni $p < 0.05$; * Bonferroni $p < 0.1$; ^{hh} Holm-Bonferroni $p < 0.1$.

Although almost all of the comparisons, except those for the UK, show the larger state further away from the Commission's position than the smaller state it is paired with, only one of these comparisons – France and Belgium – is statistically significant at $p < 0.05$. If $p < 0.1$ is taken as the threshold of significance then this rises to four comparisons: with the addition of Spain being further from the Commission's position than Belgium, Finland and Portugal.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS: DOES LUCK MATTER?

The findings indicate that we should reject the two hypotheses. Contrary to what we would expect from the literature, some states do consistently find themselves in positions that are closer to the mean position in the Council, the position of the Commission and the position of the European Parliament than others. This also appears to be uniquely true of smaller states in relation to their larger partners.

How should we interpret these results? First, an important distinction must be made between a *significant* finding and a *substantive* effect. While it may be the case that certain states consistently adopt positions closer to the average position in the Council (or the position of the Commission or the European Parliament), the net effect of this in negotiations may not be enough to alter the outcomes of discussions substantively. Most of the average differences identified in Table 1, for instance, are around 5-6 points on the DEUII dataset's 0-100 scale, although in the other tables the average differences are as large as 13 points, in the case of Belgium's proximity to the European Parliament relative to Germany.

A rough indication of the size of the effect can be provided by using Arregui and Thomson's (2009: 669) figures, which indicate that for every one unit increase in the extremity of a state's position, the decision outcome will be 0.57 points further away from their articulated viewpoint. This would equate to around a 3 point 'disadvantage' for most of the differences in extremity identified in Table 1, although this is obviously only an illustrative figure given the measurement error that can be assumed to play a role in any analysis using the DEUII dataset. Clearly this effect alone is not enough to invalidate the conclusions of previous studies on Council negotiations, far less to claim that all of the success experienced by small states is derived from luck.

The more important implication of the analysis lies in what the results suggest about the way states adopt their preferences prior to negotiations. The term 'luck' implies that the distribution of positions between states prior to a negotiation is subject to random chance. By its very nature, this type of luck should not persist across a large number of negotiations. If the distribution of positions between states were the result of random chance, it would be impossible to identify persistent patterns like those found in the analysis above. It is therefore questionable whether this effect should really be labelled 'luck' at all. It is far more probable that what has been uncovered in the analysis above is the result of meaningful, structured elements present in the preference formation process that occurs prior to a negotiation. States adopt positions closer to the average position in the Council not because they are 'lucky', but because of the structured way in which they formulate their preferences. By asserting that all positions are distributed among states in a neutral fashion and that any deviation from a normal distribution is simply the product of 'luck' or 'chance', we are at risk of obscuring the impact that preference formation can have on outcomes. The key implication of this study is therefore that we must improve our understanding of how states formulate their preferences if we are to capture the EU decision-making process fully.

There are at least three potential avenues for future research that show particular promise for explaining the findings in this sense. First, while studies of bargaining success in the Council have tended to view states' positions as something approximating 'ideal positions' which are determined free from structural interference, it may be the case that states adopt their positions strategically. Previous research conducted by Schneider and Cederman (1994) has shown that states have attempted to use extreme positions as a method for influencing negotiations which take place under unanimous voting. The basic principle is that by appearing to drive a hard bargain, they can hope to bring other states round to a more amenable position by threatening the use of a veto. The use of strategic positioning of this nature in decisions made using qualified-majority voting is perhaps more problematic in principle but would offer one explanation for certain states consistently adopting positions closer to the mean position in the Council.

A similar explanation could be that preferences are formed using incomplete information. Most EU legislation which passes through the Council is of a technical nature. It is natural that the position adopted by a state prior to negotiations might subsequently change through the course of a discussion with their negotiating partners. Moreover, given the vastly different levels of resources available to smaller and larger member states, it would not be greatly surprising if this emerged in a structured way, potentially accounting for the kind of results uncovered in Table 1.

A second possible explanation would be that, rather than reflecting conscious strategy or incomplete information, the preference formation stage could itself be subject to differing levels of influence by some states over others. A hypothetical example illustrates the point. If we were to subscribe to the notion that the 'big three' states (France, Germany and the UK, prior to its 2016 referendum on EU membership) have dominated EU decision-making, then it is possible this could provide strategic incentives for smaller states to locate themselves closer to consensus positions. For instance, if these three states were just as powerful as each other and rarely collaborated, they might each 'win' negotiations a third of the time. Smaller states, in contrast, would presumably have little incentive in this situation to pursue an independent line. If every piece of legislation reflected the French, German or UK position, then the best strategy for smaller states would simply be to adopt one of these three models as their own and argue for it accordingly. Their position would essentially be entirely dependent on the largest three states, but smaller countries would nevertheless appear to get their way more often in discussions if they regularly picked the 'winning' model.

It has long been recognised that EU states have an incentive to 'upload' their domestic policies to the European level (Börzel 2002). While this might be credible for a large state such as France, Germany or the UK, the chances of a small state such as Luxembourg 'uploading' its policies and having them accepted by the rest of the Council may be less likely. Moreover, a smaller state's domestic policies might already be heavily influenced by its larger neighbours. One might envisage that if a particular approach to regulation in a given field emerges in Germany, for instance, it may find a willing audience more readily among smaller states than it would among larger rivals such as the UK or France. A state's structural weakness might therefore have the counter-intuitive effect of making it more likely to be in tune with prevailing regulatory trends than those states which are large enough to have a credible alternative.

A final explanation could stem from the existence of consistent policy dimensions in the Council. If there were a stable structure of preferences then certain states might consistently articulate positions which are more extreme within this framework – in the same way that an extreme-right or extreme-left politician in a national parliament will consistently find themselves on the outside of negotiations. There are problems with mapping such consistent policy dimensions to the Council, not least because the composition of national governments changes with the electoral cycle. However, in popular discourse, the belief that certain states are consistently on the outside of EU discussions is widespread: the kind of disruptive reputation cultivated by states such as the Czech Republic during the Presidency of Václav Klaus, Hungary under Viktor Orbán or the UK prior to its EU referendum are examples. Alternatively, we could cite interview responses such as those in Bailer's (2004) study, which characterise Luxembourg, for example, as 'often kind of neutral', while noting that they 'mostly support the Commission' and that 'they have basically no influence' (Bailer 2004: 111). This form of persistent preference structure would go some way toward explaining why some states appear to adopt more/less extreme positions than others over time.

All three of these approaches have the potential to offer an explanation for the findings above. What is clear, however, is that the preference formation process should be viewed as a potentially fruitful object of study in its own right. By recognising that the distribution of positions in the Council is not simply the product of circumstance, but rather the result of a structured process, it is possible not only to account for the paradoxical finding of 'luck' persisting for states over time, but also to develop a more comprehensive understanding of how outcomes emerge from EU decision-making.

CONCLUSION

The intention of this paper has been to assess whether previous studies of bargaining success in the Council of the European Union have been correct to conclude that 'luck', as defined in the literature, does not persist across negotiations. The results of the analysis show conclusively that three of the most common definitions of 'luck' cited in the literature – the distance of a state's position from the centre position in the Council, the position of the European Commission, and the position of the European Parliament – do persist for certain states across negotiations, and that this appears to be uniquely true of smaller states in comparison to their larger rivals.

The question of why some states appear to adopt 'lucky' positions more frequently than their rivals raises fundamental questions not only about how we define 'luck', but about the way states formulate their preferences prior to negotiations. Future research may shed light on precisely how this preference formation stage leads states to adopt the positions they do prior to a negotiation and the impact this process has on the dynamics of Council decision-making.

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ENDNOTE

¹ Full results are available from the author: $r^2 = 0.46$, $F < 0.01$, size coefficient = 3.43 ($p < 0.01$).

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Research Article

The European Union under Threat of a Trend toward National Sovereignty

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Abstract

The European Union represents the most advanced case of voluntary regional integration in the world. But today, after several decades of the pooling of sovereignty within the EU, Europe is experiencing a renaissance of national sovereignty supported by a nationalistic turn of public opinion and represented by parties on both ends of the political spectrum. The size of the national sovereignty trend among European citizens and discovery of its main drivers are the main problems that we address in the article. Through Eurobarometer data of the period before the referendum on Brexit, we show that seeing a better future outside the Union is related to shrinking support for globalization and liberal values among the population. Furthermore, popular disaffection toward EU membership did not develop in a vacuum but is fuelled by the contemporaneous occurrence of two shocks, the economic and the migration crises, a combination of circumstances that have aggravated the problem of the reduced legitimacy of the EU among citizens.

Keywords

EU; Nationalism; Liberalism; Economic crisis; Immigration

Considering the scope of integration attained through economic policy coordination at the EU level, scholars have addressed the question of whether a common market created ‘from above’ by national and supranational elites with the support of transnational economic interests, may develop into a democratic political community legitimised by citizens ‘from below’. The integration of Europe has indeed become a more divisive, yet politicised issue within society and scholarly research currently reflects the primacy of this issue in the European public debate (Kriesi, Grande, Dolezal, Helbling et al. 2012; Zürn 2016).

Citizens’ attitudes toward the EU have been explained through different theoretical approaches that focus mainly on cultural predispositions (McLaren 2002), interests (Gabel and Palmer 1995; Gabel 1998), cognitive mobilisation (Inglehart 1970), values (Inglehart 1971) and trust in institutions (Anderson 1998). However, recent emerging phenomena have challenged these traditional arguments. Nationalism in its different facets, consisting above all of cultural and economic chauvinism (or neo-protectionist economic nationalism), is on the rise across Europe and has been building more rapidly since the global financial crisis. More recently, a call for border control has been fuelled by Europe’s migrant crisis. After several decades of pooling sovereignty in the EU, Europe is experiencing a renaissance of sovereigntist ideology that has found a voice in recently emerged parties on both ends of the political spectrum, or in former minority parties that have been rejuvenated by the nationalistic turn of public opinion. The size of the national sovereignty trend² among European citizens with respect to the EU is the first problem that we address in the article. We are not only interested in the description of this problem, in the article we also identify its main drivers. Thus, the two problems (scope and determinants) of the sovereigntist trend among the EU population will be addressed through the two following research questions. To what extent do the citizens of the member states support the idea that their country would be better outside the EU (the hardest form of Euroscepticism one may think about)? To what extent is citizens’ discontent with the EU contingent on the current situation of multiple (economic, migration) crises affecting the

European continent? To existing scholarship in the field, we add the use of fresh data that incorporate the EU crisis context (economic and refugee crisis, Brexit) and we test the validity of theory in the critical scenario of our days.

The article is organised as follows. The first section discusses different theoretical approaches explaining citizens' support for a more united Europe. It also introduces our theoretical framework and working hypotheses. The second section presents the data and the method used to test our hypotheses along with some descriptive analyses. The third section discusses the main results of our multivariate analysis, while the conclusion summarises the main findings of the article and their implications for the future of the EU.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Public attitudes toward the EU have been studied very intensely in the past and especially in recent times. For a long time, there was only limited interest in the study of public opinion and the EU, as citizens were considered to give their permissive consensus to the elites to pursue the goal of Europe's integration (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970). However, since the Maastricht Treaty and the launch of a Monetary Union, the EU has produced an impact on the member states that has certainly become more evident to citizens who, as a consequence, have changed their views significantly (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007). Since then, the political elites can no longer rely on the permissive consensus of citizens (Hooghe and Marks 2009) and a Eurosceptical turn has materialised within society (Usherwood and Startin 2013).

Classic research shows that the most relevant determinants of citizens' attitudes toward the EU pertain to a mix of socio-demographics, utilitarian calculations, ideological and symbolic motivations, cues. In the attempt to systematise these different determinants in an encompassing theoretical framework, some authors (Hooghe and Marks 2005 and, more recently, Sanders, Bellucci, Toka and Torcal 2012: 222-225) have grouped the relevant factors under the four dimensions of 'cognitive mobilization', 'utilitarian calculations', 'political heuristics' and 'polity identification'.³ These multiple motivations that inform attitudes can be considered evidence of progress in the integration process, from mainly addressing economic cooperation to encompassing political and symbolic aspects as well.

As to cognitive mobilisation, already in the 1970s, Inglehart (1970; 1991) argued that information and knowledge of the EU as well as a higher level of education positively influence citizens' attitudes toward the integration process. This argument was also confirmed in more recent research (Hakhverdian, Van Elsas, Van der Brug and Kuhn 2013). Following a utilitarian approach, other authors argued that citizens make their own calculations about the costs and benefits stemming from EU membership based upon their personal interests and those of their community (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Gabel and Palmer 1995; Loveless and Rohrschneider 2011). In this vein, Hobolt and de Vries (2016) have recently demonstrated that those citizens who felt more adversely affected by the economic crisis and discontented with its handling by the EU have been more prone to vote for Eurosceptic parties in the most recent elections of the European Parliament.

Some other scholars maintained that the political orientations of citizens and their attitudes toward national politics filter their stance on the EU. In this perspective, ideology (Lubbers and Scheepers 2010) and attachment/trust in the national institutions (Anderson 1998) are considered influential factors.

In more recent times, identity was proposed as another powerful source of support for and opposition to the EU, but whereas some authors argued that a strong national identity is an obstacle to the development of a truly European identity (McLaren 2002; Carey 2002), others maintained that there is a positive correlation between these two layers of identification (Bruter 2005; Citrin and Sides 2004). In general, research on Euroscepticism found a close relationship between a general hostility toward other cultures (of non-nationals) and opposition to the EU (De Vreese and Boomgaarden 2005; Hobolt, Van der Brug, De Vreese, Boomgaarden et al. 2011).

In this study, we build on the above theoretical arguments to see if they reflect Europe's situation of today. Since European reality has experienced dramatic changes in recent times, our framework reflects on the impact of new circumstances. The recent crisis context of the EU calls for testing how the impact of economic and cultural concerns shape public opinion. Notably, we consider the impact of chauvinist beliefs within society, perceived effects of the economic crisis and attitudes toward immigration. As to national chauvinism, after several waves of enlargement, the EU has become a more diverse community, which has created new opportunities but also unprecedented competitive pressures on the economies of the member states while the economic imbalances within the EU have become greater. These phenomena are specific to Europe, at the same time their particular effects have interacted with other global pressures that, in the end, have induced greater market competition (including labour competition) along with uneven economic opportunities within society and among European countries. This, in turn, has generated a more diffuse sense of economic insecurity within sizable groups of EU citizens, it has also led many to turn their back on the core values of European integration based on free movement and international economic interdependence and to embrace, as a reaction, the principles of economic chauvinism (Hobolt and Tilley 2016; Kriesi et al. 2012; Teney, Lacewell and De Wilde 2014). Given the circumstances, it becomes relevant to understand whether the liberal foundations of European integration (Scharpf 2010; Schmidt 2003) are at risk due to an upsurge of economic chauvinism at the individual level among EU citizens, hence our first hypothesis:

H1: Positive attitudes toward globalization and economic liberalism increase the probability of seeing a better future within the EU. On the opposite side, negative attitudes toward globalization and economic liberalism increase the probability of seeing a better future outside the EU (exit).

These long-standing processes and their effects have interacted in more recent times with two of the most serious crises that the EU has ever faced. The close economic interdependence within the EU, along with the economic imbalances within the Eurozone, have transformed the effects of the global economic crisis into a more specific Euro crisis (Copelovitch, Frieden and Walter 2016; Offe and Preuß 2015). Faced with this challenge, Monetary Union has revealed its structural weaknesses and the more vulnerable European economies have become the objects of exceptional financial pressures, as well as of consequent efforts of crisis management at the EU level. In this process, the interests of the EU member states appeared to conflict and to antagonise the debtor and creditor countries, while the mediating role of the EU institutions emerged as one that can easily be trapped by the uncompromising interests of the different parties. The duration of the bargaining process and the unpopularity of the applied solutions for the constituencies representing the different parties in this game have produced increased pessimism in public discourse about the EU and its mediating capacities (Brack and Startin 2015). Indeed, the Euro crisis has revealed divisions across countries that are heavily dependent on their asymmetric power and varieties of capitalism, while Monetary Union has become a more polarising and more politicised issue across the member states (Hobolt and de Vries 2015; Leupold 2016; Zürn 2016). At the same time, opposition to austerity politics has also expanded in the member states. Austerity has become identified with the EU, the established parties have become perceived as the executors of the EU policy plans, and there has been a sudden increase in protest events and votes for the radical parties (Della Porta 2015; Hobolt and Tilley

2016). We hypothesise that this distress felt about the European economic system and the enduring effects of the economic crisis are leading to mass mobilisation against the EU.

H2: Pessimistic perspectives about the effects of the economic crisis increase the probability of seeing a better future outside the EU.

Another crisis that has raised many concerns among the European public involves immigration. The fears of Europeans have increased along with the mounting number of illegal immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers reaching EU borders, especially as a consequence of conflicts in the Middle East. Under the economic crisis, concerns about the cultural impact of immigration have become strengthened by fears about its economic impact, especially where immigrants are perceived as competing for the same resources as the host population and these resources are scarce. The exceptional external immigration pressure adds to the broad phenomenon of internal migration within the EU that has also created concerns among the host populations, particularly after the most recent waves of enlargement. Although freedom of movement and residence for citizens is a cornerstone of EU citizenship, and despite the fact that internal migration is necessary for the common market, it has had negative effects on support for European integration in the host societies (Azmanova 2011; Toshkov and Kortenska 2015). As a consequence, overt opposition to immigration, expressed as support for closed national borders, has increased throughout Europe. This has played a role in reinforcing nationalism and the tendency toward ethnic chauvinism among Europeans. Thus, nowadays, immigration is a broad phenomenon – both endogenous and exogenous to the EU – that may undermine broad public support for EU integration (Hobolt et al. 2011; Toshkov and Kortenska 2015). We hypothesise that fear of immigration has emerged as a main driver of mass mobilisation against the EU in recent times.

H3: Negative views about immigration increase the probability of seeing a better future outside the EU.

Finally, we aim to check how perceptions of the economy and attitudes toward immigration interact with the liberal ideology that has inspired the EU up to the present day. In this respect, we hypothesise that the economic crisis and immigration have become a main concern for European citizens that may water down the positive impact of liberal economic values on support for the EU.

H4: Concerns about the economy and immigration weaken the positive effects of liberal economic values on support for the EU.

Our explanatory framework allows us to update theory on public attitudes toward the EU in light of the most urgent pressures that currently afflict Europe and in an unprecedented context where leaving the EU has materialised as an option for citizens in the member states.

VARIABLES AND METHOD

In order to test our working hypotheses, we focused primarily on the Eurobarometer (EB) 84.3 of November 2015. This EB wave fits the purpose of the present study since it includes a variety of indicators of policy preferences, political and economic beliefs, concern for political and social issues and views about the EU.⁴ We completed our descriptive analyses with longitudinal data that document the recent trends.

The dependent variable that we selected from the dataset refers to the level of agreement with the idea that, in the future, the respondent's country would be better outside the EU.⁵ This indicator is

conceptually different from a classic indicator of diffuse support for the EU such as *benefits* coming from EU membership. Indeed, the indicator that we selected here introduces a perspective assessment (future outside the EU) that is more suitable for our research questions and for contemporary times than the traditional retrospective assessment (benefits of membership) about the effects of EU membership on the respondents' own country. Indeed, this question has become more crucial since the morning of 24 June 2016, when the results of the UK referendum gave an unexpected result in favour of Brexit, a process that immediately brought to reality the formerly only hypothetical option of the exit of a member state (stated in art. 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon).

The EB series has administered a specific question on exiting the EU since November 2012, when the debate on Brexit started to become mainstream.⁶ Taking 2012 as a starting point, if we look at the broader picture of the EU countries, we find a trend made of flat lines for both the respondents agreeing (better outside the EU coded as 1) and disagreeing with an exit option. However, a clear majority of citizens (between 55 and 59 per cent) refused the idea of a better future outside the EU. Around 30 per cent of EU citizens (between 29 and 34 per cent), on the contrary, thought that their country would be better outside the EU. Hence, public support for 'remain' appears majoritarian and resilient overall.

However, the picture partially changes as soon as we break down data by country. Within a majority of countries, the share of citizens who thought that their future would be better off outside the EU was below the EU average (33 per cent), but ten out of twenty-eight countries were actually above. Most notably, in Austria, Cyprus, Slovenia and the UK, the share of people who saw a better future outside the EU was close to or above 50 per cent;⁷ this share exceeded 35 per cent in Croatia, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Italy and Poland (Figure 1). The level of integration attained in the European continent has no comparison worldwide and, today, the EU is a layer of the European multi-level governance system consisting of substantive power and capacity to constrain the member states. In the presence of such an extraordinary political power, it is certainly detrimental to EU legitimacy that citizens question their country membership in the EU in such large numbers.




Fig.1 Percentages of people agreeing about a better future outside the EU per country, November 2015.

Note: Don't Know included. Source: Eurobarometer 84.3 (2015).

In order to understand why this happens, we now turn to possible motivations dictated by cultural backlash, fear of immigrants, economic insecurity and anti-economic liberal views. These are phenomena that have recently erupted in many Western societies and that have seriously contributed to enhancing protest among the population (Inglehart and Norris 2016). Hence, in our

attempt to explain the negative attitude of many Europeans toward EU membership, we first selected from the dataset an indicator of exclusive national identity⁸ and one measure of attachment to the EU.⁹ Eurobarometer data show that the exclusive national identity has been, on average, quite stable during the last five years, at around thirty-eight per cent.¹⁰

Also in this case, percentages vary substantially across member states. In November 2015, fifteen countries (Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, UK) show percentages of exclusive national identity above the EU average (more than 40 per cent). Nine countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden) report values between 30 and 38 per cent, while only three countries (Croatia, Luxembourg and Spain) are more than 10 per cent points below the EU mean (Figure 2). Attachment to the EU seems to have gone in the opposite direction: it is higher in countries with low percentages of exclusive nationalists and lower in countries reporting high percentages of exclusive nationalism (Figure 2). Investigating this negative relationship is far from the purposes of this article and would deserve a specific analysis. Moreover, some cases (Estonia, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania) clearly do not show any tension between exclusive national identity and attachment to EU. Without entering into this complex debate (see among others Haller and Ressler 2006; Fligstein 2008) we can claim here that identification with their own nations has certainly not vanished and it is even predominant within a large share of society. This high identification, in some countries, coexists with a low level of attachment to Europe, while in some others the two have similar values.¹¹




Fig.2 Percentages of exclusive national identity and attachment to EU by country.

Note: Don't Know included. Source: Eurobarometer 84.3 (2015).

We now turn to public perceptions of immigrants. We are interested in understanding if those who perceive immigration as a threat would prefer their country to be out of the EU as a means of limiting the intermingling of people. In the analysis, views about immigration¹² were tested at a time (2015) when the migration crisis was particularly acute through a question that points to the perceived costs/benefits of immigration (an encompassing measure, as the question does not discriminate between cultural and economic costs/benefits). In seventeen European states, the majority of people disagree with the idea that immigrants contribute to their own country

(disagreement has been coded as 1, see Figure 3). In five countries, percentages range from 42 to 48, while only six EU countries show percentages below 35.




Fig.3 Percentages of respondents disagreeing with the statement that 'immigrants contribute a lot to their country'.

Note: Don't Know included. Source: Eurobarometer 84.3 (2015).

Turning to views about the economy, the effects of the economic crisis have been tested through a question (transformed in a binary variable) that reflects the degree of optimism/pessimism about the future of the economy as a consequence of the economic crisis.¹³ In 2015, about six years from the beginning of the Great Recession, almost half of the EU citizens (46 per cent) think that 'the worst is yet to come' (coded as 1). Once again, among the EU countries, people show different levels of pessimism, although, in 17 out of the 28 member states, more than 40 percent of people remain pessimistic about the future of the economy (Figure 4).




Fig.4 Percentages of pessimism about the future of the job market as an effect of the economic crisis ('the worst is yet to come').

Note: Don't Know included. Source: Eurobarometer 84.3 (2015).

In order to define viable measures of attitudes toward economic globalization and liberalism, we created two indexes based on the factor scores of two factor analyses (FA). The first index was created using a question on attitudes (negative vs. positive) toward economic liberalism, relevant economic actors and state intervention.¹⁴ We first recoded answers into binary variables, assigning one to the positive ('very' and 'fairly' positive) answers and zero to the negative ones. Then, we ran a factor analysis (Varimax rotation, see Appendix for factor loadings) including one variable for each item and we obtained three different factors as a result. We selected the second factor where only *free trade*, *globalization* and *liberalization* came out as most related items. We labelled this factor as *globalization* and we calculated the factor scores for each respondent on this factor. We obtained an index, ranging from -4.297 to 1.631 pointing to positive and negative views about the global economy: the higher the score, the more positive the perception of globalization. Figure 5 shows average values per country: Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia and UK are, on average, less supportive of global economic liberalization than the other countries. The result for UK may well anticipate the fears of the British public over the economic transformations of the country in recent decades that a few months later were epitomised by the vote in favour of Brexit, where the most 'left behind' social groups massively mobilised against EU membership (Goodwin and Heath 2016).




Fig 5. Average values of Globalization index by country, November 2015.

Source: Eurobarometer 84.3 (2015).

The index that we labelled *economic liberalism* was created from a question asking respondents to indicate their most important personal values.¹⁵ The index measures to what extent respondents share liberal economic values such as individual freedom and self-realisation. Each respondent could select a maximum of three items and we focused in particular on *individual freedom* and *self-fulfilment* (Factor 1, see appendix). These two dummy variables have been aggregated in an additive index ranging from zero to two depending on whether respondents selected both (coded as 2), one (coded as 1) or neither of these two items (equal to 0). The average values (not shown) appear close across countries (with a range from 0.55 for Lithuania to 0.23 for Denmark) but show larger variation at individual level (the average value is 0.38 with a standard deviation of 0.54).

Finally, European efficacy is measured by respondents' confidence in the capacity of the EU to defend its interests at the global level.¹⁶ In our framework, this variable is meant to prove whether the perception of the EU as a successful global actor increases the likelihood of supporting a 'remain' option.

Along with these main independent variables, the models that we present in the following section also include some control variables whose relationship with support for Europe has been tested in past studies. These indicators include confidence in the national government to test whether citizens employ proxies rooted in attitudes about domestic politics when responding to survey questions about the EU (Anderson 1998);¹⁷ education,¹⁸ whose impact is emphasised by supporters of the cognitive mobilisation argument (Inglehart 1970; Inglehart, Rabier and Reif 1991); and the respondent's working position to test arguments about a rationalistic approach when people make assessments about the EU (Gabel 1998).¹⁹ Finally, in the models we inserted some socio-demographic variables such as gender²⁰ and age,²¹ as control variables.

The descriptive statistics that we present in this section show some important national variations suggesting that strong national patterns might be at work. This result recommends controlling for the nationality of respondents when testing our hypotheses at the individual level.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

In order to test our hypotheses, we estimated four logistic regression models where 'future better conditions outside the EU' is taken as the dependent variable.²² We created the first model by including identity, attitudes toward globalization, economic liberalism, the socio-demographic variables and the control variables. This model is meant to test the effects of personal beliefs (identity, globalization and economic liberalism) on the perception of a better future outside the European Union. We then moved the focus of the analysis to the two most urgent issues for European public opinion: the economic crisis and immigration. Accordingly, the second model includes all the socio-demographic variables, the control variables along with perceptions about immigration and the future of the economy. The third model includes all the selected variables and the fourth adds interaction terms between the globalization index and the two variables related to immigration and the future of the economy.

Table 1 reports the results of the analyses.²³ In model one, identity plays a crucial role for individual perceptions about a future outside the EU. People feeling (very or somewhat) attached to the EU are more likely to see a better future within the Union. The opposite is true for exclusive national identity holders. Those people identifying themselves exclusively with their national community tend to refuse membership of a supranational entity such as the EU. This result is consistent with the theory of perceived threats that, in the case of more nation-minded citizens, are strongly associated with other nations and other cultures (McLaren 2002), with which the EU seeks to intermingle. As its explanatory power shows (those respondents with an exclusive national identity have twice the probability of seeing a better future outside the EU), an exclusive national identity produces the largest effect in favour of exiting the Union. This finding explains why the Eurosceptical propaganda of populist parties, largely based on a nationalistic drive and calls for a shift of powers back to the nation state, has become so successful in mobilising citizens.

Table 1. Logistic Regression Models with 'a better future outside the EU' as dependent variable (clustered by countries).

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	OR	Robust St. Er.	OR	Robust St. Er.	OR	Robust St. Er.	OR	Robust St. Er.
Exclusive Nationalism	1.917****	0.084			1.812****	0.080	1.808****	0.081
Globalization index	0.881****	0.018			0.904****	0.019	0.716****	0.026
Economic liberalism index	0.898***	0.033			0.895***	0.033	0.897***	0.033
European efficacy	0.805****	0.036			0.858***	0.039	0.847****	0.039
Confidence in government	0.830****	0.037			0.885***	0.041	0.886***	0.041
EU attachment	0.574****	0.025			0.613****	0.027	0.614****	0.027
Immigration			1.657****	0.068	1.293****	0.056	1.323****	0.058
Economic crisis			1.714****	0.070	1.366****	0.059	1.377****	0.060
Globalization index* Immigration							1.318****	0.052
Globalization index* Crisis perception							1.157***	0.046
Gender (male)	0.939	0.037	0.897***	0.035	0.935*	0.037	0.935*	0.037
Age	0.995****	0.001	0.995****	0.001	0.995***	0.001	0.995****	0.001
Education								
16-19	0.963	0.061	0.915	0.057	0.987	0.063	0.986	0.063
20+	0.735****	0.051	0.639****	0.043	0.755****	0.053	0.761****	0.053
Social position								
manual workers	1.108*	0.061	1.135**	0.062	1.107*	0.062	1.101*	0.061
skilled workers	0.994	0.050	0.968	0.047	1.016	0.051	1.025	0.051
Country	@		@		@		@	
Constant	1.039	0.159	0.479****	0.070	0.703**	0.112	0.723*	0.115
Pseudo R2 (McFadden)	0.097		0.071		0.103		0.107	
Count R2	0.675		0.654		0.682		0.680	
Adj. Count R2	0.127		0.071		0.146		0.140	
Wald (sig.)	0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000	
Number of obs.	12,749		12,749		12,749		12,749	

Note: ****p<0.001; : ***p<0.010; : **p<0.050; *p<0.100. The reference category for Education is 0-16, while for Social Position is 'not into the labour force'.

Country dummies were calculated (see Appendix) but they are not reported here.

Source: Eurobarometer 84.3 (2015).

Contrarily, economic liberalism still represents the underlying ideology of EU integration (H1). People having positive views on free trade, economic liberalisation and globalization tend to support the EU and are less likely to perceive a better future outside of it (odds ratio [or]=0.88). The relationship between economic liberalism and support for (remaining in) the EU is also sustained by another two indicators included in model one: EU efficacy at the global level and the economic liberalism index. Our results show that 1) citizens who consider the EU as a power able to defend its own interests in the global world also tend to refuse any exit option; 2) personal inclinations to self-fulfilment and individual freedoms increase the willingness to remain part of the EU polity. These findings appear to confirm from a bottom-up perspective the scholarly notion of the European Union as a 'regional variant of globalization' (Schmidt 2003) where the EU is conceived as a by-product of economic liberalism and globalization.

The control variables reinforce the robustness of our findings and at the same time they largely confirm the results reached by past studies. As was expected, the proxy effect of trust in government and factors of cognitive mobilisation (such as education) are significant and negatively related to the view of a better future outside the EU. The work occupation only partially respects the expectations of Gabel on rational calculation (1998). As expected, manual workers, who tend to be less specialised and more exposed to competition in the job market, are more likely to see a better future outside the EU. However, self-employed and white-collar workers do not show the expected support for the EU despite their skills and the fact that they may find better recognition and larger opportunities in the common market. Finally, the older generations tend to see a better future within the EU, as well as men compared to women.²⁴

The second model includes all control variables, the socio-demographic variables, the perceptions about the economy and attitudes toward immigration. Pessimistic perceptions about the future of the economy significantly increase the likelihood of seeing a better future outside the EU (1.7 times more likely). Similarly, people perceiving immigration as not beneficial for their country tend to prefer an exit option (1.7 times more likely). Hence, our results show that the most urgent issues creating greatest concern among the European citizens, such as the economic crisis and immigration, increase distrust of the EU and drive people to prefer an exit option (H2 and H3). We interpret this as a sign that, despite such large-scale crises having their origins outside Europe, people blame the EU for not being able to anticipate their effects or manage their impact.

Model three includes all selected variables. This model confirms the relationships found in the previous models. Exclusive nationalism, economic crisis and immigration represent the most influential factors in this model. Support for globalization, attachment to Europe and high education are, on the contrary, the factors that increase the probability of refusing any exit option.

Our fourth model looks at the relationship between endogenous and exogenous factors. We find that the interactions between the globalization index and both opposition to immigration (figure 6) and pessimistic perceptions of the crises (figure 7) are significant. However, the analysis of marginal effects shows that it is mainly the economic crisis that impacts on attitudes: the positive effect of support for globalization on 'remain' is weaker when people think that, as an effect of the economic crisis, *the worst is yet to come* (H4). The economic crisis undermines the positive impact of liberal economic values as a source of support for the own country membership in the EU (Figure 6).




Fig.6 Average Marginal Effects of Globalization index on 'exiting the EU', when negative attitudes towards immigration increase - with 95 per cent Cis.

Source: Eurobarometer 84.3 (2015).




Fig.7 Average Marginal Effects of Globalization index on 'exiting the EU', when crisis perception increases - with 95 per cent Cis.

Source: Eurobarometer 84.3 (2015).

In the analysis, hostility against a global liberal ideology, concern about the effects of the economic crisis and negative attitudes toward migration have emerged as the main factors for the explanation of opposition to respondents' own country membership in the EU. In the presence of other factors, whose influence has been maintained by past research and largely confirmed by our study, our models show that the above three factors have emerged as valuable explanations of citizens' commitment to the project of European integration. The economic crisis in particular has more

negatively affected the image of the EU; a sustained period of economic growth and of a fight against socio-economic grievances would therefore be necessary to restore citizens' faith in the EU.

CONCLUSIONS

A trend toward national sovereignty has become widespread across Western societies. On the European continent, this trend creates a serious challenge to European integration, the main course of action in recent European history and the most advanced case of macro-regional integration world-wide. European countries have accepted an incremental transfer of sovereignty and regulatory power to the EU, and, where this has occurred, the political benefits of integration have been considered by national decision-makers to outweigh the costs of losing political control over policy. However, this course of action has now come under tension because of a turn in support of sovereignty in politics and in society. The debate opposing an integrated and liberal world based on interdependences against a 'return' to national supremacy and closure has become more central. As part of a global liberal system, the EU is challenged by sovereigntist forces on the basis of revanchist propaganda pushing toward exiting the EU.

In this article, we found that a preference for remaining in the EU is majoritarian among citizens, but not in every member state. Since the referendum on Brexit, the exit option has materialised as a possible strategy for the member states and in many countries the political debate, especially by radical forces, has incorporated this kind of option. If the decision on whether to remain in the EU were submitted to referendum today, the result would be uncertain in many countries. One explanation of this Eurosceptical turn in public opinion is related to the shrinking of support for globalization and liberal economic values among the population; when they shrink, the support for the EU process declines. The notion of a liberal economic order, a system based on open borders and open societies, is increasingly condemned for increased insecurity and for the decline of the economy and of social harmony since it creates winners and losers within society. On the opposite side, growing demands for homogenous societies and tighter control by the government over the territory and its borders have emerged.

We showed that this paradigm shift in Europe did not develop in a vacuum, but is fuelled by the contemporaneous occurrence of two shocks, the economic and the migration crises, a combination of circumstances that have aggravated the problem of reduced legitimacy of the EU among citizens. Many citizens consider the EU impotent in the face of the current crises, maybe they even see the EU as one of their causes. Indeed, citizens who see immigration and the future state of the economy in more pessimistic terms would also see their country as better off outside the EU.

The situation appears critical under different viewpoints. On the one hand, the EU is called to provide solutions to the most urgent crises that create concerns among citizens. On the other hand, the time for doing so, as well as the scope of manoeuvre, are severely limited by citizens' disillusionment with the EU and by a national introverted turn in public opinion. Citizens sanction the EU and any further pooling of national sovereignty in many ways, such as through negative voting in EU referenda, or voting for anti-EU forces in the national elections. The main problem for EU legitimacy today appears to be providing fast solutions to the most urgent problems perceived by citizens, something that is not easy to attain through EU decision-making, which is based on long negotiations and consensus that is difficult to reach given the vested interests of the national governments.

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ENDNOTES

¹ The authors are listed in alphabetical order and contributed equally to this work.

² Colgane and Keohane (2017) observe a general tendency in Western countries of leaders who promise to cast off external restraints in defence of national sovereignty becoming increasingly popular.

³ In our view, the more recent contributions, rather than replacing the four approaches, have simply explored some of their more specific dynamics. For example, among them, we would like to mention the studies considering the welfare state (Beaudonnet 2015), instrumental sociotropic proxies (Guerra 2013) and inequalities (Beckfield 2006; Kuhn, van Elsas, Hakhverdian and van der Brug 2014) that could be ascribed to the utilitarian calculation approach.

⁴ The most recent EB waves of 2016 do not include, unfortunately, all the variables that are crucial for the test of our hypotheses. For this reason, information from 2016 is of more limited use in the article.

⁵ The question reads as follows: *Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements - (YOUR COUNTRY) could better face the future outside the EU.* It is an ordinal variable that we have recoded assigning 1 to 'totally agree' and 'tend to agree' and 0 to 'tend to disagree' and 'totally disagree'.

⁶ The British Prime Minister Cameron announced that he wanted to renegotiate the UK's relationship with the EU and then give people the choice between staying in under those new terms or leaving the EU.

⁷ The discrepancy between the result of UK (47 per cent in favour of Brexit) and the actual vote in the referendum (51.9 per cent in favour) can be explained by the fact that the survey was conducted months before the referendum when the voting choice of citizens was not definitive yet.

⁸ The question is *Do you see yourself as...? (NATIONALITY) only; (NATIONALITY) and European; European and (NATIONALITY); European only.* Starting from this question, we created a binary variable for nationalism where 1 defines respondents answering 'nationality only' and 0, all the other options.

⁹ The question reads as follows: *Please tell me how attached you feel to... [the European Union], answers include 'very' and 'fairly' attached (recoded as 1), and 'not very', 'not at all' attached (recoded as 0).*

¹⁰ The exact figures are: 38 per cent (May 2012), 38 per cent (May 2013), 39 per cent (May 2014), 38 per cent (May 2015), 39 per cent (May 2016), 35 per cent (May 2017).

¹¹ It is worth mentioning that there is an open debate in the literature on how to measure identity at different levels (national, European etc.) and that the so-called 'Linz-Moreno' question has attracted some criticism (see Guinjoan and Rodon 2015). Sinnot (2006) concluded that these types of questions (i.e. the Linz-Moreno) in the Eurobarometer surveys perform better than others, while Guinjoan and Rodon (2015) emphasised their limits and observed that at best they show whether one identity is preferred over another. In the end, the discussion on how to best measure attachment has not driven scholarship to discard the Linz-Moreno question, which, on the contrary, remains a widely used question in scholarly research.

¹² The question reads as follows: 'To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?' - *Immigrants contribute a lot to (YOUR COUNTRY).* It is an ordinal variable that we have recoded assigning 0 to 'totally agree' and 'tend to agree', and 1 to 'tend to disagree' and 'totally disagree'.

¹³ The question reads as follows: *Some analysts say that the impact of the economic crisis on the job market has already reached its peak and things will recover little by little. Others, on the contrary, say that the worst is still to come. Which of the two statements is closer to your opinion?* We recoded the variable giving a negative direction by assigning 1 to 'The worst is still to come' and 0 to 'The impact of the crisis on jobs has already reached its peak'.

¹⁴ The question reads as follows: 'Could you please tell me for each of the following, whether the term brings to mind something very positive, fairly positive, fairly negative or very negative?' - *Large companies, Small and medium-sized companies, Free trade, Protectionism, Globalization, Liberalization, Competition, Trade Union, Reforms, Public service, Security, Solidarity, Entrepreneurship.*

¹⁵ The question reads as follows: 'In the following list, which are the three most important values for you personally?' (list of items, see appendix for items and factor loadings).

¹⁶ The question reads as follows: 'For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree or totally disagree' - *The EU has sufficient power and tools to defend the economic interests of*

Europe in the global economy. It is an ordinal variable that we have recoded assigning 1 to 'totally agree' and 'tend to agree', 0 to 'tend to disagree' and 'totally disagree'.

¹⁷ The question reads as follows: 'I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain media and institutions. For each of the following media and institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it' - *The (NATIONALITY) Government*. We created a binary variable where 1 indicates 'Tend to trust' and 0 'Tend not to trust'.

¹⁸ The question was *How old were you when you stopped full-time education?* The ordinal variable was coded in the following way: 1= <16, 2=16-19; 3=20 or more.

¹⁹ The question reads as follows: *What is your current occupation?* We first selected the EB variable with recoded categories (D15a_r2 of the original file). We assigned a value of 0 to the people not in the labour force, 1 to manual workers, and 2 to skilled workers (including white collar).

²⁰ The variable is coded in the following way: 0=female; 1=male.

²¹ The variable ranges from 18 to 99 (and older).

²² In order to avoid the influence of contextual factors (Heteroskedasticity) related to the respondents' country of residence, the models have clustered standard errors. We also included binary variables to control for country effects.

²³ The interpretation of R² in the logistic regression models is not as straightforward as in linear regression models (see Long and Freese 2000). To assess the explanatory power of the models we have considered Count R² – it measures the percentage of cases that were correctly predicted – and Count Adjust R² – the explained variance that was correctly predicted. These parameters allowed us to estimate models on cases that were correctly predicted and to avoid misleading conclusions (see Long and Freese 2000; Menard 2002).

²⁴ Gender is only significant in models 2, 3 and 4 (p<.1).

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APPENDIX

Table A.1 Factor loadings of attitudes toward globalization and free market

Variable	Fact or1	Fact or2	Factor3	Uniquen ess
Large companies	0.17 42	0.58 57	0.1904	0.5903
Small companies	0.73 65	0.10 33	0.1155	0.4336
Free trade	0.44 49	0.55 76	-0.0667	0.4866
Protectionism	- 0.0641	0.46 85	0.3765	0.6346
Globalization	0.05 49	0.70 58	0.2264	0.4476
Liberalisation	0.23 48	0.68 31	0.0809	0.4717
Competition	0.49 23	0.43 27	0.0439	0.5685
Trade unions	0.09 61	0.11 90	0.7514	0.4120
Reforms	0.37 33	0.33 45	0.3558	0.6221
Public service	0.24 53	0.14 53	0.6676	0.4730
Security	0.56 35	0.04 62	0.4109	0.5115
Solidarity	0.61 02	0.10 09	0.2775	0.5405
Entrepreneurship	0.68 93	0.24 28	0.0859	0.4586

Note: Number of obs. =16,384; Retained factors = 3 Rotation: varimax; number of params = 36; LR test: independent vs. saturated: $\chi^2(78) = 4.3e+04$ Prob> $\chi^2 = 0.0000$; Source: Eurobarometer 84.3 (Nov. 2015), Variables QA10_1 to QA10_16 recoded in binary variables (positive=1; negative=0).

Table A.2 Factor loadings of personal values including attitudes toward economic liberalism

Variable	Factor1	Factor2	Factor3	Factor4	Factor5	Factor6	Factor7	Factor8	Factor9	Uniqueness
The rule of Law	-0.0732	-0.0549	0.0510	-0.1197	-0.0517	0.9154	0.0222	-0.0560	-0.0548	0.1274
Respect for human life	-0.0764	0.7232	-0.0735	0.0861	-0.3113	0.0242	0.0335	-0.1172	-0.1147	0.3329
Human Rights	-0.0593	0.0288	-0.8418	-0.1030	0.0556	-0.0446	0.1722	-0.0596	-0.0578	0.2347
Individual freedom	0.7638	0.0139	-0.0287	-0.1498	-0.2278	-0.1636	0.0251	-0.0585	-0.0571	0.3072
Democracy	-0.1228	-0.7251	-0.0513	0.0888	-0.2546	0.1090	0.1161	-0.0656	-0.0639	0.3501
Peace	-0.4068	-0.1895	0.2972	-0.4309	-0.1040	-0.4130	0.0683	-0.2293	-0.2235	0.2360
Equality	-0.0716	-0.0137	-0.0466	0.0041	0.8908	-0.0458	-0.0114	-0.0436	-0.0427	0.1930
Solidarity	-0.0860	-0.0200	0.0908	0.9130	-0.0099	-0.1242	0.0167	-0.0566	-0.0553	0.1282
Tolerance	-0.0442	0.0443	0.1055	-0.0130	0.0130	-0.0156	-0.9331	-0.0150	-0.0144	0.1133
Religion	-0.2726	0.2872	0.4248	-0.0655	0.0130	-0.0080	0.3608	0.0283	0.0290	0.5264
Self-fulfilment	0.5842	0.0010	0.3406	0.0093	0.2378	0.0760	0.1212	-0.0496	-0.0483	0.4608
Respect for other cultures	-0.0263	-0.0189	0.0335	-0.0301	-0.0284	-0.0321	0.0140	-0.0213	0.9841	0.0259
None	-0.0273	-0.0193	0.0347	-0.0311	-0.0292	-0.0330	0.0147	0.9834	-0.0215	0.0269

Note: Number of obs = 27,681; Retained factors = 9; Rotation: orthogonal varimax (Kaiser off); Number of params = 78; LR test: independent vs. saturated: $\chi^2(78) = 2.5e+04$ Prob> $\chi^2 = 0.0000$

Table A.3 Variance inflation factors (VIF) for each model

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Variable	VIF	VIF	VIF	VIF
Better future outside the EU	1.12	1.11	1.06	1.12
Exclusive Nationalism	1.26	1.24		1.26
Immigration	1.15		1.06	1.09
Economic crisis	1.14		1.06	1.15
Globalization index	1.09	1.07		1.14
Economic liberalism	1.02	1.02		1.02
European efficacy	1.10	1.08		1.10
Confidence in government	1.10	1.08		1.10
EU attachment	1.26	1.23		1.26
Gender (male)	1.01	1.01	1.01	1.01
Age	1.19	1.18	1.16	1.19
Education	1.17	1.17	1.14	1.17
Social position	1.23	1.23	1.23	1.23
Country	1.03	1.03	1.02	1.03
Mean VIF	1.13	1.12	1.09	1.13

Table A4. Logistic Regression Models with 'a better future outside the EU' as dependent variable (clustered by countries, country dummies shown)

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	OR	Robust St. Er.	OR	Robust St. Er.	OR	Robust St. Er.	OR	Robust St. Er.
Exclusive Nationalism	1.917****	0.084			1.812****	0.080	1.808****	0.081
Globalization index	0.881****	0.018			0.904****	0.019	0.716****	0.026
Economic liberalism index	0.898***	0.033			0.895***	0.033	0.897***	0.033
European efficacy	0.805****	0.036			0.858***	0.039	0.847****	0.039
Confidence in government	0.830****	0.037			0.885***	0.041	0.886***	0.041
EU attachment	0.574****	0.025			0.613****	0.027	0.614****	0.027
Immigration			1.657****	0.068	1.293****	0.056	1.323****	0.058
Economic crisis			1.714****	0.070	1.366****	0.059	1.377****	0.060
Globalization index* Immigration							1.318****	0.052
Globalization index* Crisis perception							1.157***	0.046
Gender (male)	0.939	0.037	0.897***	0.035	0.935*	0.037	0.935*	0.037
Age	0.995****	0.001	0.995****	0.001	0.995***	0.001	0.995****	0.001
Education								
16-19	0.963	0.061	0.915	0.057	0.987	0.063	0.986	0.063
20+	0.735****	0.051	0.639****	0.043	0.755****	0.053	0.761****	0.053

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	OR	Robust St. Er.	OR	Robust St. Er.	OR	Robust St. Er.	OR	Robust St. Er.
Social position								
manual workers	1.108*	0.061	1.135**	0.062	1.107*	0.062	1.101*	0.061
skilled workers	0.994	0.050	0.968	0.047	1.016	0.051	1.025	0.051
Country (France)								
Belgium	0.851	0.115	0.857	0.115	0.875	0.119	0.859	0.117
Netherlands	0.352****	0.057	0.463****	0.074	0.405****	0.066	0.396****	0.065
Germany	0.995	0.132	1.008	0.131	1.034	0.138	1.014	0.136
Italy	1.805****	0.252	2.228****	0.305	2.001****	0.283	2.007****	0.284
Luxembourg	0.772	0.141	0.659**	0.118	0.783	0.144	0.790	0.145
Denmark	0.647***	0.102	0.836	0.129	0.735*	0.116	0.734*	0.117
Ireland	0.816	0.121	1.212	0.177	0.998	0.150	0.976	0.147
United Kingdom	1.627****	0.225	2.236****	0.301	1.737****	0.242	1.696****	0.236
Greece	1.016	0.132	1.119	0.141	0.994	0.130	0.954	0.125
Spain	0.805	0.124	0.881	0.133	0.908	0.141	0.895	0.139
Portugal	0.952	0.136	1.104	0.155	1.078	0.156	1.056	0.153
Finland	0.872	0.134	1.068	0.160	0.938	0.145	0.912	0.143
Sweden	1.036	0.150	1.223	0.172	1.113	0.162	1.112	0.163
Austria	1.924****	0.258	2.402****	0.316	2.087****	0.283	2.057****	0.279
Cyprus	1.807***	0.308	2.324****	0.386	1.859****	0.318	1.830****	0.312
Czech Republic	1.407**	0.196	1.649****	0.225	1.482***	0.209	1.483***	0.209
Estonia	0.599**	0.137	0.677*	0.152	0.636**	0.146	0.624**	0.143
Hungary	1.346**	0.182	1.356**	0.179	1.411**	0.192	1.392**	0.189
Latvia	1.330	0.237	1.424**	0.247	1.357*	0.243	1.346*	0.241
Lithuania	0.705**	0.109	0.747*	0.113	0.741*	0.115	0.724**	0.112
Malta	1.168	0.238	1.248	0.249	1.294	0.265	1.261	0.258
Poland	1.977****	0.315	2.307****	0.362	2.260****	0.365	2.286****	0.371
Slovakia	0.818	0.113	0.899	0.121	0.835	0.116	0.827	0.115
Slovenia	2.314****	0.321	2.498****	0.341	2.409****	0.337	2.417****	0.339
Bulgaria	1.193	0.190	1.457**	0.226	1.312*	0.211	1.320*	0.213
Romania	1.150	0.170	1.218	0.176	1.254	0.187	1.220	0.182
Croatia	1.676****	0.224	1.972****	0.259	1.900****	0.257	1.829****	0.248
Constant	1.039	0.159	0.479****	0.070	0.703**	0.112	0.723*	0.115
Pseudo R2 (McFadden)	0.097		0.071		0.103		0.107	
Count R2	0.675		0.654		0.682		0.680	
Adj. Count R2	0.127		0.071		0.146		0.140	
Wald (sig.)	0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000	
Number of obs.	12,749		12,749		12,749		12,749	

Note: ****p<0.001; : ***p<0.010; : **p<0.050; *p<0.100. The reference category for Education is 0-16, while for Social Position is 'not into the labour force'.

Source: Eurobarometer 84.3 (2015).

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Student Engagement: Key Skills, Social Capital, and Encouraging Learner Contributions to Module Resources

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Abstract

This 5-year project involves a Masters international political economy module, taught annually to diverse cohorts studying an MSc in international business. The module addresses challenges to global stability and the business environment. Students are invited to work in groups to create researched presentations on any country where issues of governance, political dysfunction, or stresses relating to globalization affect economic and political development. Countries ranging from St Lucia to Myanmar, from China to Romania, have featured. This student-generated, student-selected work provides a developing resource for the module, available on the Virtual Learning Platform. The initiative showcases student-centred learning and positive student engagement through independent learning, key skills, group work and research, as well as personal emotional engagement. Importantly, students bring prior experience and own-country knowledge to the wider cohort, encouraging and enabling internationalist perspectives, sharing experience, and comparison between diverse situations and challenges. The project therefore promotes a holistic form of student engagement and facilitates cross-cultural understanding and sharing of cultural capital to generate educational capital.

Keywords

Student engagement; cultural capital; social capital; internationalization; student-centred learning; key skills.

This article describes an initiative designed to promote student engagement (SE) by providing international students with opportunities to select, research, design and deliver course content related to their countries of origin and thereby broaden the geographic scope of the module in question. The activity enables significant benefits for the learners in respect of SE. It provides opportunities for key skills development, but also a rich personal and emotional engagement. It facilitates sharing of social capital between students by allowing them to draw on their own experiences and prior learning.

The article has three main sections. First, the theoretical context underpinning the activity is described, explaining contested meanings of student engagement (Milburn-Shaw and Walker 2017) and notions of cultural capital (Bourdieu 1980), social capital (Coleman 1988; Lesser 2000), internationalization (Knight 2003; de Wit 2011) and constructivism (Tenenbaum et al. 2001). A further key concept underpinning the activity is active citizenship (British Council 2011). Following a broad theoretical discussion, the activity, its context and its pedagogical method is described. Concluding remarks explain how the activity can be applied in a variety of disciplines.

THEORETICAL CONTEXT

Student engagement (SE) is a notion with a motherhood-and-apple-pie aura: few would doubt that it is 'a good thing' and it has emerged as a strategic priority for every university and a cause celebre for the Higher Education Academy, the Quality Assurance Agency and higher education (HE) thinktanks everywhere (Anyangwe 2011). Regrettably, however, SE has been subsumed within metrics used to judge the suitability and relevance of courses in an increasingly marketized, instrumental approach

to higher education (Milburn-Shaw and Walker 2017). It is increasingly measured by instruments like the Teaching Excellence Framework (TEF), the National Student Survey (NSS) and the Post Graduate Taught Experience Survey (PTES). It tends to be judged quantitatively, according to attendance, participation, assessment marks and ultimately, the class and the degree awarded. It has become incorporated into a key skills agenda fundamental to 'graduateness' and 'employability'. This conception of SE has emerged together with the instrumentalisation of the university as an agent serving government-defined needs of the national and international economy, including the imperative of economic growth.

Key skills are a set of competences that higher education (HE) aims to develop and which serve to enhance graduate employability. The Dearing Report (Dearing 1997) two decades ago identified communication skills, numeracy, the use of information technology and crucially, learning how to learn. Successive governments have promoted a close relationship between employers and HE, privileging the role of organisations like the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) in determining the skills graduates should have to best meet the needs of the economy. A survey of employers' expectations identified the following key skills: team working, problem solving, self-management, literacy and numeracy, ICT knowledge, good interpersonal and communication skills, ability to use own initiative and to follow instructions, and leadership skills where necessary (Lowden et al. 2011). The CBI (2007) cited a positive attitude, self-management, team working, problem solving, communication and literacy, numeracy and IT skills as fundamental attributes of employability. The exercise reported in this article offers practice in all these areas.

A fees regime that renders students as consumers has further legitimised the notion of employability, which successive governments appear to view as a key arbiter in assessing the worth of a degree. Universities are viewed first and foremost as servants of national economic needs. Correspondingly, key skills and their assessment is an important component of the Teaching Excellence Framework (TEF), introduced in 2016 as a new metric in evaluating university performance (BIS 2016).

An alternative view of SE is 'a difficult-to-measure, holistic and abstract transition that students undergo throughout their higher education career' (Milburn-Shaw and Walker 2017, 54). It focuses on cognitive-emotional value, promoting a holistic approach to students and their learning, a developmental process of discovery about the world and one's place within it. This fits the traditional understanding of 'what the university is for' – an opportunity for wider learning and self-discovery, to achieve better understanding, to develop critical perspectives, analytical competence and a drive to make the world a better, more sustainable place. This critical perspective implies reform and betterment, rather than acquiescence in a system-maintaining mindset. It avoids the increasingly utilitarian approach found in professional training or the single-minded pursuit of a required qualification as *a thing to have*, rather than a focus on the process through which the qualification is achieved.

In the exercise described here, the critical perspective is of central importance. The project involves students studying an International Political Economy (IPE) module in an international business degree in a Management School. The module may be regarded, within the usual business school context, as subversive, since it challenges many preconceptions, including the presumption that the core purpose of the degree is to provide a stepping stone to a position as a 'manager' or 'business leader', well remunerated and enjoying high status. Indeed, in many cases the choice of studies may have been made by aspirational parents in emerging market economies, especially the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), the home of typically 70 per cent of the students on the module. The remaining 30 per cent are from many countries, so cohorts have been highly diverse, an important factor, as shall become apparent.

The activity is a distinctive and innovative example of learning and teaching practice. It is designed to promote and develop both the instrumental key skills type of SE as well as the cognitive-emotional dimension. The latter relates to utilising students' cultural capital (Bourdieu 1980). The initiative delivers benefits in terms of internationalizing the SE and enhancing cross-cultural understanding by encouraging students in a diverse cohort to deliver course content related to their own country. It therefore facilitates sharing of cultural capital. For Bourdieu, cultural capital is an asset shared among groups that contributes to class identity. The origins of this concept are found in Marxist thought and can be utilised in acts of exchange among different groups, in much the same way as occurs with economic capital. Bourdieu's notion has been applied to the international classroom setting, as learners with different provenances bring diverse cultural capital which may, given appropriate encouragement, provide opportunities for others to learn about other countries and the world. The notion of cultural capital recognises and celebrates a diversity of knowledge and experience and even values, between groups. It is not about the homogenisation of cultures but more about developing an appreciation of this diversity and better non-judgemental understanding of difference. The sharing of cultural capital therefore enhances understanding and promotes an emotional-cognitive type of SE, being geared towards shared goals. These should be articulated and nurtured by the teaching and learning environment, so the tutor's role is to facilitate sharing of cultural capital. Bourdieu noted how cultural capital may be objectified in academic qualifications and appropriated by institutions in reward systems, a process resembling 'social alchemy' (Bourdieu 1986).

The notion of cultural capital has been extended into social capital in analysing how organisations work, especially in the digital age (Lesser 2000). Social capital 'is about the value created by fostering connections between individuals' (ibid i). The interest in social capital has been judged neo-capitalist, somewhat different to Bourdieu's understanding, and a product of 'American Communitarianism' (Julien 2015, 356). Julien argues that Bourdieu understood social capital as 'class goods', typically used to exclude others and to conserve community resources, so evidently the notion of social capital, while having its origins in Bourdieu, has developed markedly different characteristics. Julien considers an integrative view of social relations within which social capital equates with public goods, not class goods (Lin 1999, 2000; Huysman and Wulf 2004; Daly and Silver 2008). Social capital may also equate with 'civiness', an idea articulated by Putnam (1993) for whom social capital means 'features of social organizations, such as networks, norms, and trust that facilitate action and cooperation for mutual benefit. Working together is easier in a community blessed with a substantial stock of social capital' (ibid 35-6).

The project is grounded in this trend among educationalists and begins from an assumption that internationally diverse cohorts provide opportunities for sharing knowledge and experience and developing mutual understanding, while developing learners' confidence and self-belief that their prior learning and cultural background are significant assets in a learning community. In this way the project utilises positive SE, valuing cognitive-emotional commitment to one's own life experience, prior learning and interest in societal betterment. However, the activity also meets the institutional need to develop key skills, an established trend in HE reflected in module and programme learning outcomes (Bell and Egan n.d.). At the same time a bias towards the cognitive-emotional element in SE is evident in that the activity is not formally assessed, plays only a tangential part in the module summative assessment, and is not compulsory.

The HE environment has been greatly affected by contemporary economic globalization, with increased international competition and opportunities afforded by higher disposable incomes for many, especially in new and emerging markets. Hans de Wit, commenting on university internationalization strategies, says 'It is indisputable that competition and market processes have more and more influence on the manner in which internationalization is implemented' (de Wit

2011). He defines internationalization as 'a process by which intercultural, international and global dimensions are introduced into higher education to improve the goals, functions and delivery of higher education and to improve the quality of education and research' (ibid).

Universities' internationalization strategies reflect an economic rationale (Yang 2003; Middlehurst and Woodfield 2007). Turner and Robson (2008) refer to 'symbolic' internationalization which delivers massive expansion in numbers of students studying overseas, mainly in the USA, the UK and Australia. This exponential growth is driven by processes broadly encompassed within the notion of globalization, defined as 'the intensification of worldwide social relations linking distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many thousands of miles away and vice versa' (Giddens 1991:70).

However, Middlehurst and Woodfield also highlight other concepts and behaviours such as international citizenship, comparing practice and performance, learning from others, developing international links to raise national and international profile, improving understanding across borders and providing a counter-balance to ideological tensions around globalization. It is this broader conceptualisation of internationalization, also described as the 'transformative' model (Turner and Robson 2008), that relates to the notion of social capital underpinning the approach described in this article. Moreover, the initiative encourages students to create module content, so it contributes to the curriculum of a degree.

Internationalization strategies should reflect student-centeredness (Fielden 2007). This contrasts with the 'marketization of higher education', governed by foreign student recruitment which under the gaze of university accountants and financial controllers aims to boost revenue (Molesworth et al. 2009; Collini 2011; Nixon et al. 2016). Marketization promotes the economic benefits of higher education rather than any cultural factors (HM Government 2010, 2011; Warner 2015). It engineers an ethos through which students are consumers of a product focused on getting a degree, consolidating the commodification of higher education (Molesworth et al. 2009; Nixon et al. 2016). The UK government has prioritised boosting competition across the sector, encouraging market mechanisms, removing the cap on student numbers and encouraging new entrants with degree awarding powers (HM Government 2016). Innovations reflecting similar imperatives include a government standards agency, the Office for Students - and the idea to have universities publish graduate earnings as a further metric in institutional and even degree comparisons. The increased commercialisation of the sector, promoted by government as enabling 'consumer choice', risks furthering a market-driven understanding of internationalization, undermining the contribution diversity can bring to enhancing social capital. As HEIs focus recruitment on lucrative markets such as China this means less diverse student cohorts, already evident in many UK departments - especially in business and management schools which are often institutional 'cash cows'.

A well-known definition of internationalization is 'the process of integrating an international/intercultural dimension into the teaching, research and service functions of the institution' (Knight 1994), later modified to 'the process of integrating an international, intercultural or global dimension into the purpose, functions or delivery of post-secondary education' (Knight 2003). This understanding of internationalization underpins this initiative since it aims to ensure that other countries and regions are referred to in the module. This raises the profile of minority groups in a student body dominated by PRC nationals and where the second largest group has been Europeans, a diminishing group perhaps due to a 'Brexit effect' making the UK less appealing for EU students. The initiative has meant other countries and regions gain profile and representation in module resources, echoing a plea for those seldom heard to be given a voice (Freire 2001) and the exhortation that pedagogy should use opportunities presented by multilingual and ethnically diverse student populations (Canagarajah 2007).

Internationalization in our universities should embrace internationalism, defined as ‘a commitment to wider societal benefits as represented in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights and UN Development Goals’ (Sweeney 2010). Internationalism seeks greater intercultural understanding by encouraging students to learn about and empathise with others’ experiences. The reference to the UN Declaration (United Nations 1948) and UNDGs (United Nations 2015) insists that educators have a responsibility to help students and graduates make the world a better more tolerant place, so the concept of internationalism is vital. Moreover, sharing cultural capital exploits student mobility, embracing the knowledge and experience of degree mobile students, i.e. those undertaking an entire course away from their home country (Sweeney 2012). This enhances the learning experience for all students, home and overseas, mobile and non-mobile.

The activity exploits existing cultural capital within the cohort and develops academic or educational capital from this (Howard et al. 1996; Lesser 2000; Phillipson 2010). Some scholars have voiced concern about the linguistic hegemony of a standard ‘high status’ variety of English in UK HEIs, where linguistic diversity, pluralism and multiculturalism may be regarded as problematic, rather than indicative of a diverse and linguistically and culturally rich community (Martin 2009; Preece and Martin 2009; Preece 2009, 2011). The dominance of English, and the presumption of superior status for standard varieties, may undermine the preparedness of speakers of other codes of English, including non-native speakers to actively contribute to classroom debate, or to present in a seminar. Classroom practice should develop all students’ awareness of how to improve their communicative competence within international and linguistically diverse learning contexts, while also valuing different codes or varieties of English (Wicaksono 2012). This perspective challenges any implied superiority of the standard code and is an important aspect of the intercultural dimension of this initiative in that it encourages participation by speakers from diverse linguistic backgrounds, utilising different varieties of English and different linguistic codes. Different varieties of English is an obvious characteristic of diverse cohorts, an increasingly common experience in many universities throughout Europe and beyond.

Students are resources of knowledge and experience and they need encouragement to be autonomous learners. The teaching and learning process must be multidirectional and inclusive. It should foster a democratic and egalitarian ethos within which all participants, students and tutors, share in the learning experience, learning from each other. This openness enables cultural capital to generate the educational capital that enhances the teaching and learning process and enables learners to develop the skills, knowledge and other assets that enable them to derive long-term benefit from their schooling. Educational capital is an intangible asset that enables individuals to benefit from learning opportunities within formal educational settings; it also prepares them for future learning, suggesting a foundation for lifelong learning (Howard et al. 1996).

Milburn-Shaw and Walker (2017) criticise the instrumental nature of the Bologna Process which underpins the European Higher Education Area (EHEA)¹. But the Leuven Communiqué, a key EHEA reference point, emphasises the importance of student-centred learning, ‘(the empowerment of) individual learners, new approaches to teaching and learning, effective support and guidance structures and a curriculum focused more clearly on the learner’ (Leuven Communiqué 2009: 3). It underlines how student-centred learning enhances employability by preparing students to cope with a changing labour market, improving lifelong learning abilities and skills, while also helping them become engaged and responsible citizens. The principles and practice of the EHEA embrace both the utilitarian and the cognitive-emotional strands of SE, especially through encouraging curriculum, institutional partnering, student mobility, cultural diversity, language learning and faculty exchange. There is no contradiction between EHEA fundamentals such as student-centred learning and a holistic approach to SE combined with the positive exploitation of cultural capital. Student- (or

learner-) centred learning improves student performance and promotes the social context for innovation learning (Barraket 2005), echoing the notion of sharing social capital referred to above.

The activity described in this article reflects a constructivist approach dependent on student participation and active learning (Papert 1980; Papert and Harel 1991; Davis and Sumara 2002; TeAchnology 2011). A study of constructivist practice in HE identified seven components of a constructivist approach to teaching and learning: 1) arguments, discussions, debates; 2) conceptual conflicts and dilemmas; 3) sharing ideas with others; 4) materials and measures targeted toward solutions; 5) reflections and concept investigation; 6) meeting student needs; 7) making meaning, real-life examples (Tenenbaum et al. 2001). These features are all reflected in the practice described in this paper and consistent with the principles and practice of student-centred pedagogy (Barraket 2005). Constructivist pedagogy enables learners to construct knowledge for themselves (Hein 1991). The practice reported in this article, being focused on group research, team work and group presentation, has a markedly social constructivist orientation where interaction between learners and with the tutor as facilitator are key (Jadallah 2000; Maypole and Davis 2001). It also gives students autonomy in selecting subject matter (Gibbs 1992).

The activity depends on learners making use of their prior experience and nurturing the ability to re-shape assumptions in the light of new experiences and new ideas, including the concepts taught in the early part of the module. The tutor/facilitator role is to ensure opportunities for learners to make use of their experiences and make fresh discoveries. It exploits the concept of spatial citizenship (Gryl et al. 2010; Gryl and Jekel 2012) by developing opportunities to consider diverse geographies and locations. It promotes active citizenship (Mascherini et al. 2009) through understanding the role of place in society. The European Commission DG Education and Culture adopted the notion of spatial citizenship in its SPACIT initiative, aimed at secondary education but with implications for the tertiary sector. It seeks to promote an active citizenship that highlights the common needs and aspirations of different communities, underpinned by notions of human rights and environmental sustainability (Spatial Citizenship 2015). It fosters an interdisciplinary approach that connects social sciences, civics education, geoinformatics, didactics and teacher training. It deals with mainstream technology, as well as new ITC developments relevant and essential for teacher education and practice at all levels. The British Council echoes SPACIT through its own active citizenship initiative which aims to develop 'a world where people are empowered to engage peacefully and effectively with others in the sustainable development of their communities' (British Council 2011, 7).

In all instances since the initiative began in 2013 maps have been a significant visual support for students introducing the featured countries. This may seem a trivial point, but for many learners this may be the first time they have encountered the country concerned in a classroom, or at all, so learning basic geography of the Caribbean or of West Africa for example is significant, the more so for being the home of certain classmates. Considering such issues as natural resources, climate and infrastructure for these countries may often be a first for many. Depending on the choices made by the students involved, their contributions may address specific challenges such as democracy, human rights, law and governance, as well as political economy in general.

The practice emphasises student-centred learning, a student-focused and peer-oriented pedagogy (Mazur 1997). It challenges and changes the traditional learning environment where the teacher is knower and students listen and absorb 'facts', or the teacher's enlightened interpretation of knowledge. A learner-centred approach offers space for students' aspirations and involves their recognising opportunities for self-realisation and improved competence (Kumar 2007). Students are active learners engaged in making choices, a prerequisite for establishing a pattern for lifelong learning, a key skill central to good pedagogical practice that empowers graduates and improves employability. This activity gives learners choice in materials selection and themes and countries on

which to focus. They choose how the theory presented in the module relates to specific country circumstances that might otherwise not be highlighted. The activity provides a focus on the circumstances of specific communities, with the additional benefit of underlining how every country and community is impacted by the dynamics of the international political economy, echoing Giddens's definition of globalization cited above. It also allows for meaningful debate about positive and negative impacts of globalization.

In summary, the practice permits a holistic interpretation of student engagement underpinned by theories of cultural and social capital, generating educational capital. It involves an internationalisation ethos that celebrates diversity, mutual understanding and respect, and sharing learning about others' experiences and cultures. It echoes constructivist logic in developing empathy between learners that can foster a willingness to embrace global citizenship in the interests of common understanding and shared responsibility for improving the lives of all humanity. This ambition equates to an ideal type of graduate, not simply the utilitarian assumptions of neoliberal governance that pushes the marketisation of universities, obliging them to operate like private companies in a competitive environment where their primary function is to serve corporate and national economic interests.

CLASSROOM CONTEXT AND MECHANICS OF THE ACTIVITY

The module involved is *International Political Economy and Business*, a core autumn term module in three international business and management-related MSc programmes at York Management School, University of York. The subject content deals with globalization, corporate social responsibility, Neoliberalism, international trade and development, themes introduced in the opening weeks of the module. Learners are encouraged to think about how globalization and specifically the dominant ideological force that drives globalizing processes, Neoliberalism (Gray 2010), impacts upon states and communities.

Students are asked to contribute original work based on their own research through a presentation supported by related reading. The eventual PowerPoint slides and associated reading material are uploaded to the module Virtual Learning Platform (VLP). Student material therefore contributes directly to module content and is accessible to all. Students benefit from hearing presentations by their peers who choose to engage with this opportunity. The broad theme of the contributions, which are voluntary and depend on students choosing to contribute, is 'the impact of contemporary economic globalization on a newly industrialised or developing country'. Students choose how to interpret this. They may opt for a generic broad-brush approach or focus on a specific industry or community and describe how it has been affected by globalization in general; or they may choose a specific aspect of globalization, or an incidence of international trade, or government or institutional policy.

The voluntary aspect of the activity is important. The protagonists are a self-selecting subset of the cohort, so are already predisposed towards a cognitive-emotional engagement with the issue they focus on. It is significant that the presentations are not formally assessed, though they are tutor-evaluated as to suitability for uploading. Participation is a clear indication of creative and cognitive engagement and the students contribute to class learning and that of future cohorts since the work adds to a bank of student-generated materials serving the module.

As mentioned, most students on the module – around 70 per cent - have historically been from the PRC. The rest are highly diverse, with up to 30 countries represented. It is beyond the scope of this article to go deeply into this, but experience has shown that students from other countries tend to focus on damaging impacts of globalization (sweat-shop labour in Bangladesh, multinationals

dominating Costa Rican banana production, financial instability in the Bahamas, low wages in *maquiladoras* close to the US border in Mexico, pollution from oil spills in Nigeria, oil dependency in Saudi Arabia, labour exploitation in Ivory Coast coffee production, etc) while Chinese contributions tend to celebrate growing Chinese wealth, foreign direct investment, joint ventures, and huge government-led initiatives like the Belt Road Initiative. There is often a reluctance among Chinese students to draw attention to negative impacts of Chinese development post-1978 and internal politics are almost completely taboo, although controversial views may be aired in seminars. Students from Hong Kong or Taiwan are even more reticent and will not speak publicly about relations with mainland PRC. If Chinese contributions are controversial, it is in relation to Chinese economic power, manifesting a kind of push/pull, a positive with a caveat, for example in relation to the ASEAN-China trade agreement in 2010. Since 2013 the number of presentations from other countries has been inversely proportional to the balance of nationalities in the cohorts. This is a good thing given that most students already know quite a lot about China's economic power and its developing consumer economy; they learn about this in other modules too. They know far less, perhaps nothing, about Vietnam, Bahrain, or Mauritius. It is presentations about lesser powers or smaller states that add most value and demonstrate the reach and power of contemporary economic globalization.

Generalisation about 'Chinese learners', or any nationality group, risks cultural stereotyping (Watkins and Biggs 1996, 2001). Large cohorts contain highly diverse individuals with various learning styles, levels of assimilation with the host community, different degrees of immersion or social commitment to one's own compatriots. It is important to provide opportunities for students to express themselves: 'Thus, while 'the Chinese learners' may have certain identifiable characteristics, some of them related to culture, they may also learn and behave differently in different contexts, in ways related more to personal needs and situational demands' (Gu 2009). The activity described in this paper provides such an opportunity. Nevertheless, in many UK universities and especially in business and management schools there is a high proportion of PRC students, making reaching out beyond their own national group more difficult and less likely.

Many schools with large numbers of PRC students report that Chinese students tend to work and socialise primarily within their own national group, which is unsurprising and not a trait reserved for Chinese nationals. Many studies report difficulties for international students moving abroad to study, including language barriers (Agar 1996), culture shock (Adler 1985; Ward et al. 2001), education shock (Gu 2005, 2009). During the life of this initiative, some Chinese students have joined with non-Chinese to research and present on another country, but relatively few. The activity at least provides an opportunity for this to happen - and voluntarily, without coercion.

The module is relatively unusual in business and management degrees in that it is rooted in political science, with a critical take on the impact of Neoliberalism. It requires that core IPE concepts are established early in the module to sensitise students to the power relations involved in neoliberal economics and the policy preferences of elites, both private (e.g. corporations) and public (e.g. international governmental organisations [IGOs] such as the WTO) that are important in shaping and managing the global economy. This includes understanding how IGOs impact policy-making, while contemporary economic globalization privileges multinational corporations' access to new markets for goods and services and their exploitation of natural and human resources. These are challenging issues for students, many with a conventional business studies undergraduate background and often the typical multi-module, wide-ranging nature of a Chinese bachelor's degree, comprising modules such as English Language for Business, Introduction to Economic theory, Elementary Statistics, Military Theory, Basic Principles of Marxism, Maoist Ideology, International Business Etiquette, or Investment and Accounting.

The module *International Political Economy and Business* has evolved somewhat conventionally with a core textbook (Baylis et al. 2016) and a range of readings from books, journals and other sources, including film and documentary material as supplementary resources. The design and delivery of the module has sought to implement basic principles regarding student-centred learning, internationalizing the student experience, exploiting cultural capital by encouraging students to refer to their own countries and prior learning and experiences relating to their home communities. Essential benefits of the initiative are that it encourages student participation and broadens course content, bringing shared experience and knowledge. It provides opportunities for empathy between different communities' experience and reduces the proportion of western-centric course material (Phillipson 2010).

Early in the module students are alerted to the repository of student presentations on the VLP and invited to explore these. They are told of the opportunity to contribute new content. They are invited to deliver original material referring to a developing or newly industrialised country (NIC). This may be an individual effort, though group work is strongly encouraged. They may choose any aspect of globalization and its impact on an NIC. In practice the focus has been on international trade, power relationships and the impact of foreign direct investment (FDI). Students are encouraged to focus on their own country, or that of one of the presenting group. This allows for stronger personalisation of content and more emotional engagement, while it underlines the idea that students can refer to their own first-hand witness experience, their prior knowledge of what is familiar in their home city or region, but probably unknown to others. Where students are part of a group but the country in question is not their own, this adds to students learning from each other, working collaboratively and finding out about another place. Sometimes a group references more than one country, reflecting diversity within the group and allowing a comparative approach to different experiences and situations. Delivering work that relates to international students' own countries tallies with the notion of exploiting cultural capital within diverse student cohorts. It also enhances positive student engagement.

Students apply theories introduced during the module and relevant to their chosen context. Guidelines include a suggested fifteen-minute presentation, relevant support materials, supplementary reading, YouTube clips, or websites useful for students wanting to learn more about the issues raised. Each presentation is discussed with the module tutor, who gives formative feedback on content and design and advice on presenting technique. The group then practises before actual delivery in class. After the event students get further feedback before the work is uploaded to the VLP. Individuals are encouraged to use learning from this activity to inform their 3,000-word summative assessment, an essay with broad scope for referring to different countries or regions. The activity is therefore fully embedded in the module despite not being formally assessed. Student module evaluations show that the activity is greatly appreciated, sometimes referred to as a highlight in the learning experience.

The module documentation identifies various learning outcomes relating to academic and graduate skills, stating that by the end of the module students should be able to:

- Demonstrate a critical understanding of the assumptions which underpin key approaches in the field of IPE
- Identify and understand links between policy and recent developments in international trade, investment, money and finance
- Develop a sound understanding of policies adopted by key states in the international environment
- Demonstrate a critical understanding of the impact of globalization
- Evaluate and apply learned concepts and theories.

In addition, the exercise provides opportunities to practice and develop study skills, communication skills, practical use of information technology, social and political awareness. These attributes are identified by employers as deficient in graduates (Ennis-Reynolds 2001, 6) so this initiative helps to improve students' employability and satisfies the more instrumental aspects of SE referred to above.

A further feature of the initiative is that each presenting group is encouraged to elicit questions from the audience and to facilitate discussion of issues raised in the presentation. This can be challenging and may require the presenting group to ask the audience questions, referring to other contexts such as the impact of 'free trade' on employment, social upheaval, the effect of inward investment on local communities or the state itself. It is helpful to encourage a comparative approach between states, or identification of historical precedents. A significant tutor/facilitator role is therefore to guide the presenting groups towards eliciting contributions or questions from the audience. In practice this has been reasonably successful, indicating that the activity benefits group dynamics and student-centred learning.

The key stages of the activity within the 15 weeks module are summarised here:

- Weeks 1-4 Key IPE theoretical and institutional frameworks presented and discussed
- Week 2 The initiative introduced; students invited to form groups and to eventually contribute module content; previous contributions highlighted on VLP
- Weeks 3-5 Students form groups, discuss topics, plan contributions, prepare materials and design (PowerPoint) presentations
- Week 6 Module leader discusses contributions with groups or individuals, gives feedback and guidance, also on use of PowerPoint e.g. avoid gimmickry, reduce number of slides, include effective illustrations, web links. Edit slides, cut superfluous words, avoid information-heavy slides and long bullet-point lists. 'Short and Simple, Concise and Clear (SSCC)'
- Weeks 7-8 Student presentations included as part of 2-hour teaching sessions; Q&A/discussion after each 15' presentation
- Weeks 8-9 Feedback provided. Material uploaded to VLP
- Week 9 Students invited to refer to issues raised by their contributions in summative assessments (essays)
- Week 10 Formative assessment and feedback (based on essay outlines)
- Week 15 Essay submission deadline

ADAPTING OR ADOPTING THIS PRACTICE FOR OTHER DISCIPLINES

While the initiative described has featured in an IPE module in Masters courses in international business, the features and principles involved could be adapted for various modules at any level and certainly throughout the social sciences. In other areas too, the idea that students can contribute content and utilise prior learning and experience is surely evident. The practice requires us as practitioners and facilitators to have the confidence to invite students to use their initiative, make choices, suggest course topics and ultimately have more control. We can facilitate student contributions to course subject matter while overseeing and offering advice, feedback and encouragement. Ultimately, we judge the suitability of the material for uploading to the module VLP

and how long it stays there. This project has generated high quality work adding value to classes, benefiting group dynamics and improving the bank of course resources. Examples from five student presentations are shown (Figs.1-6).

The Caribbean

Countries

[Antigua and Barbuda](#)

[Bahamas](#)

[Barbados](#)

[Cuba](#)

[Dominica](#)

[Dominican Republic](#)

[Grenada](#)

[Haiti](#)

[Jamaica](#)

[St. Kitts and Nevis](#)

[St. Lucia](#)

[St. Vincent and the Grenadines](#)

[Trinidad and Tobago](#)

Territories & Dependencies

[Anguilla \(U.K.\)](#)

[Aruba \(Neth.\)](#)

[British Virgin Islands \(U.K.\)](#)

[Cayman Islands \(U.K.\)](#)

[Guadeloupe \(Fr.\)](#)

[Martinique \(Fr.\)](#)

[Montserrat \(U.K.\)](#)

[Netherlands Antilles \(Neth.\)](#)

[Puerto Rico \(U.S.\)](#)

[Turks and Caicos Islands \(U.K.\)](#)

[U.S. Virgin Islands](#)

28 countries , Population 36m of which 22 less than 1m

Strong ties with colonial powers (European).

GDP per capita range from \$1,200 to \$28,000

11



Fig.1 Presentation on Saint Lucia, the Caribbean and its place in the global economy

The Bahamas

Population: 330,000

GDP per capita: US\$ 28,000

Main economic drivers: Tourism - 48%

Financial services -10%

Real estate – 19%

No. of Islands – 700!!!



Fig. 2 Presentation on the the financial crisis and the Bahamas

Mauritius: the economy

1960s - 1970s

Low income agriculturally based economy

1980s onwards

Sugar exportation boom ended and Mauritius diversified to textile, tourism, financial and industrial sectors

Growth averages 4.6% compared to 2.9% of Sub-Saharan Africa



Fig. 3 Presentation on Mauritius and globalization



Fig. 4 Presentation on the oil industry in Nigeria

UNEP Environmental Assessment,
Ogoniland 2011



Fig. 5 Presentation on cocoa production in the Ivory Coast

Child labour and cocoa – despite official working age of 18, much farming work carried out by children in order to cover a minimum standard of living. Some are enslaved by overseers who beat them if they try to escape. Many come from Mali.





Fig. 6 Presentation on Maquiladoras in Mexico

The activity clearly benefits from the opportunities provided by a relatively diverse student cohort, albeit with a high proportion of PRC nationals. The reality in many universities and a consequence of increased wealth and better access to higher education, is that many courses now have quite diverse student populations, especially in English-speaking countries or where the medium of instruction is English. Even if this is not the case in terms of national provenance the activity can still focus on students' prior learning, family experience, city experience, or different urban/rural backgrounds. There is always diversity of some kind in any cohort. Another variation is for students to research a different country experience, even if it is *not* their own. Admittedly this is likely to reduce, but not eliminate, the potential for cognitive-emotional engagement. A further potential adaptation is for students to base part of their research on interviewing nationals from another country about their experiences or knowledge of their country. A study highlighted the importance of internationalisation in 23 of 26 countries under analysis with Australia, Germany, Malaysia, the UK and China being the most open to encouraging student mobility, both inward and outward (University of Oxford 2017). Others are scrambling to catch up, while in Ireland, France and the Netherlands some HEIs have high numbers of mobile students. The same report says over a fifth of students at UK universities are international (ibid, 14), with a high proportion on postgraduate programmes.

CONCLUSION

This paper has described the theory and practice underpinning a project involving student-designed presentations and support materials that constitute direct student input into course content and module resources. The theoretical underpinning of the initiative has been discussed, the context and mechanics of the activity described and discussion of how similar activities could be integrated into a range of disciplines.

The initiative has proved popular with students, both those who have volunteered to be 'providers', designing and delivering presentations and also those preferring to be audience for their peers' efforts. Student feedback indicates a positive experience for both sides. Students welcome the change of focus, the inclusivity and the putting into practice of a key principle that there are as many teachers and as many learners in the room as there are people. We can all learn and contribute to the teaching and learning process. As well as students learning from each other and exercising some autonomy over course content, the initiative has brought fresh perspectives, new geographical settings and new histories that would otherwise not gain the visibility that this practice makes possible.

The project has provided significant resources to the module, broadening the geographical coverage and the range of topics. Countries represented include the Bahamas, Bahrain, Brazil, China, Colombia, Greece, India, Ivory Coast, Mauritius, Mexico, Myanmar, Nigeria, Romania, Saudi Arabia, St Lucia and Vietnam. These countries illustrate a range of impacts from Neoliberalism and other globalization trends including environmental, social and employment factors and dramatic internal change. They underline how globalization has shaped countries' fundamental social, political and economic experience. This offers a close fit with the IPE concepts studied in the module.

Students benefit from the initiative in many ways. This is student-centred learning in practice; it is substantially student-directed; it offers clear opportunities for autonomous research. It also fosters collaborative efforts among a diverse cohort and broadens students' understanding of other countries, highlighting common as well as contrasting experiences. The presenters themselves are engaged in a specific task that is student-designed and student-led, which has important motivational benefits. Team working, time management, communication skills, negotiation, respect

and mutual support, are all features of the activity. Preparing and giving a formal presentation is a key learning experience. It provides a skills development exercise that maps into key skills and learning outcomes for both the module and the degree programme. It fits with the university's expectations regarding pedagogical practice and chimes with the need to enhance graduate employability.

The activity is voluntary and essentially cooperative, so there is less pressure than if formal assessment were involved. Students are encouraged to remember their contribution to the module and refer to it in future or reflect on it as a highlight in their studies. They may enjoy having contributed directly to module resources; they may ask for a reference from the module leader who will mention the student's achievement in positive terms. As well as key skills, the initiative delivers on employability imperatives. Perhaps the core benefit from the activity however is that it extolls the value of cultural capital in diverse student cohorts and generates educational capital through a learner-centred and inclusive approach to building module content.

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ENDNOTES

¹ The author served on the UK British Council/Socrates Erasmus Bologna Experts Committee between 2006-2013. Bologna Experts, sponsored by the European Commission, worked to promote the principles and practice of the Bologna process that established the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) with 48 signatory states.

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Commentary

Europe's Crises: Preparing to Study Disintegration

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Abstract

The question of European ‘disintegration’ is drawing an increasing amount of scholarly attention. In light of Brexit, this is no surprise. Yet the seeming focus on proposing comprehensive theories at this point seems premature. The Brexit process is very much still in the making and it will be some time before the dust settles, leaving room for comprehensive analysis. Fortunately, there might be quite a few empirical puzzles already out there that can help lay the groundwork for future theories of disintegration. In this commentary, I argue that the emerging literature on disintegration would do well to consider the insights of New Institutional literature to investigate these. Tried and tested rational choice, sociological and historical institutionalist lenses can have a lot to say. After all, disintegration is a form of institutional change. Directing attention towards less glamorous but, all the same, interesting institutional changes manifesting signs of disintegration can steer the disintegration literature towards more deductive research designs. This commentary illustrates the point through an example from the Union’s Common Commercial Policy, suggesting some possible further avenues of research.

Keywords

Common commercial policy; Disintegration; European Union; Institutional change; New Institutionalism

Increasingly, a number of scholars have argued for a paradigm shift in EU studies in order to equip Europeanists better to study what seems to be the new normal: the EU in crisis (Börzel 2018; Rittberger & Blauburger 2018). A lively debate is unfolding around the question of how best to formulate comprehensive theories of disintegration, especially in light of Brexit. While acknowledging that the demise of the European project might not happen for some time – indeed it might not happen at all – this scholarship makes a valid observation. The current theoretical toolbox of EU studies is largely incapable of formulating expectations as to how disintegration might occur (Jones 2018). Filling this gap is no small task.

As Rittberger and Blauburger (2018) suggest, there is probably a systematic functionalist bias in EU scholarship, coming to affect the way the Union is conceived of, researched, taught and communicated about. For the most part, the emerging scholarship seeking to fill this gap has attempted to lay the foundations of grand theories of regional disintegration (Börzel 2018; Rittberger & Blauburger 2018; Vollaard 2014), while others have gone as far as conducting colourful thought experiments about what EU scholars themselves might do if the Union were to disintegrate (Hodson & Puetter 2018). However, looking to Brexit for empirical validation of any conjectures on disintegration has proven difficult. With little more than half a year left on the clock to negotiate the UK’s exit, fundamental questions relating to borders and trade are still fluid and changing on an almost weekly basis. As Hans Vollaard points out, the question of disintegration can be approached from several different starting points: intergovernmentalism, supranationalism and systems theory may all have something to say here (Vollaard 2014). Yet the messiness of Brexit will likely mean that little in terms of clear-sighted empirical analysis can be achieved in the near future. The purpose of this commentary then is to point out that beyond

theoretical discussions and a fascination with Brexit, scholarship can already start going empirical in relation to disintegration.

This would be an important step in the right direction. Ben Rosamond implicitly made the call to go empirical two years ago in this journal noting that: '[the EU's crises] should be understood within a much broader set of transformations, themselves disintegrative in character, that challenge the democratic capitalist compact which gave rise to the EU and within which it has been embedded' (Rosamond 2016: 8). In order to study these broader disintegrative transformations, that might be less spectacular than Brexit, I propose turning to the New Institutional (NI) literature on European institutional change. This strand of literature has arguably lost much of its appeal over the past decade or so. Theoretical refinements of NI lenses have become passé, perhaps even degenerate, in a Lakatosian sense. Yet, there is no apparent reason not to use these otherwise comprehensive theoretical frameworks or analytical lenses to study institutional rule changes under conditions of crises.

CHANGE, YES. BUT IN WHAT DIRECTION?

The NI turn in the social sciences came about to provide more systematic analytical tools to understand the lasting structural level effects that institutions have on political life. In other words, to theorise the importance of institutional stability, where institutions were understood as: 'shared concepts used by humans in repetitive situations organized by rules, norms and strategies' (Ostrom 2007: 23). In EU studies, however, the focus of the NI literature quickly shifted to make expectations about why and how institutional *change* would unfold in-between and at intergovernmental conferences (Stacey & Rittberger 2003). Different expectations are premised on the different assumptions of the three main 'brands' of the NI literature especially in relation to the importance of agency and structure and how these interact.¹

Agency can be understood as something akin to the capacity of institutions (on aggregate) or individual level political actors operating within institutional settings to have internalised agendas that they are willing to pursue in a consequentialist manner vis-à-vis other actors. Structure, in turn is understood as a conjuncture of acceptable norms (both procedural and substantive) that constrain the boundaries of agency by imposing value-positive visions of what constitutes appropriate institutional behaviour. Rational choice institutionalists (RCI) prioritise the importance of agency over structure – seeing norms as little more than tools for bargaining – while sociological institutionalists (SI) question whether agency is possible at all in settings where deeply embedded norms exist. Historical institutionalists (HI), in turn, employ an oftentimes eclectic approach in prioritising one over the other to explain how institutions respond to external shocks and why institutions maintain path dependencies over long periods of time (Hay 2006). In relation to shocks, the absence of an appropriate norm can lead to agency-based responses to crises. Alternatively, previously side-lined norms can come to gain recognition in times of uncertainty, shaping institutional responses to unforeseen challenges.

In the heat of competition, scholarship increasingly sought to turn RCI and SI from lenses of analysis into endogenous theories of institutional change, sometimes developing complex causal mechanisms to provide self-sustaining and cyclical explanations of both formal and informal change (Rittberger 2012; Windhoff-Héritier 2007); in a sense, developing their own narratives of path dependencies. Institutions can either be caught in perpetual loops of bargaining or be subject to the isomorphic spread of norms. Nonetheless HI's descriptors of how institutions respond to external shocks have oftentimes been used as the go-to mechanism for explaining deviations from these endogenously theorised patterns (Hay 2006). Indeed, the number of crises

identified by authors seeking to theorise disintegration are also formulated as such: changes attributed in part, or entirely to unforeseeable external events like the: ‘Financial crisis, euro crisis, Greek crisis, Crimean crisis, Ukraine crisis, Syria crisis, migration crisis, rule of law crisis’ (Börzel 2018: 1).

In seeking to move beyond the theoretical compartmentalisation of the different NI narratives, mature iterations of NI literature have suggested building on HI’s eclecticism to overcome the dichotomy between rigid assumptions about structure and agency. This has meant relaxed rationality assumptions and the acknowledgement that norms sometimes do take a backseat to bargaining (Aspinwall & Schneider 2000; Ethington and McDonagh 1995). However, the reason this literature still remains incapable of formulating theoretical expectations to consider the possibility of institutional disintegration, or ‘negative change’ as a result of external shocks is precisely because of its inability to shake its bias towards endogeneity. Expectations that solving crises situations amounts to finding more efficient bargains, or that new substantive norms will build on the explicit or implicit understanding that integration is elementally good, are present throughout the literature. Once new bargains are struck or a new norm is settled on, the cycle of pro-integration change is expected to go back to normal. New path dependencies are found or old ones are continued with new justifications. Perhaps this has to do with the biased responses that European elites have provided in practice to external shocks that have multiplied in the post-Maastricht Period. Two failed popular referenda failed to stop the Constitutional Treaty from being rebranded and reborn at Lisbon. The sovereign debt and Euro crisis was met with increased integration imposing more austerity in the field of fiscal policy, despite significant bottom-up contestation. And the exigency to make the EU more democratic, transparent and accountable has not led to more transparency in the Council, leaving national electorates in the dark as to the type of double dealing conducted by their elected governments.

However, there is nothing preventing us from ‘turning the tables’ on these theoretical expectations. Recognising that external shocks disrupt institutions and path dependencies leaves us with a simple realisation; depending on the context, institutional actors might prefer to (partially) *disintegrate* or *roll-back* institutions that prove to be problematic: meaning a decrease in formal or informal (member state) power delegation to the supranational level, or a loss of supranational institutions’ (quasi) autonomous decision-making powers, or loss of once obtained competences. This can occur because it is seen to be more appropriate or because it is seen to be more rational.

In a way, the *new intergovernmentalist* argument, which claims that in the post-Maastricht period member states have pursued integration through new means, side-stepping old modes of institutionalisation, is premised on a similar logic (Bickerton, Hodson & Puetter 2015). Namely that responding to external crises can prompt open-ended thinking on behalf of elites. We do not have to look far to discover precursory indicators of this. For instance, instead of proposing the end of integration, President Juncker’s White Paper on the Future of Europe envisioned the possibility of committing the EU to substantive institutional disintegration in two of five possible scenarios to counter the prolonged democratic and legitimacy crisis of the Union (European Commission 2017a).

At this point a brief demonstration is in order. Instead of suggesting any single *good* way to combine NI lenses, I illustrate one possible way of doing so in relation to EU trade policy.

DISINTEGRATION AND REINTEGRATION IN THE COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY

On May 16th 2017, the Court of Justice of the European Union (the Court) brought an end to a 7-year period of institutional flux in the EU's common commercial policy (CCP) which started with the Lisbon Treaty taking effect. Following the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, the international trading agenda expanded beyond tariffs and non-tariff barriers to include a variety of regulatory measures. From aiming to liberalise services, to imposing stricter intellectual property rights protections, to fostering regulatory cooperation, and harmonising investment standards, the *new trading agenda* was born (Young & Peterson 2014). The EU defined its trade strategy accordingly at the outset of the twenty first century (European Commission 2006).

Accordingly, member states delegated an increasing amount of trade competences to the Commission with the Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon Treaty changes, to prepare the Union to be able to face these new challenges effectively. As is commonly known, many of the Lisbon changes were copy-pasted from the failed Constitutional Treaty, which was in large part elaborated at the Constitutional Convention; a unique venue for treaty change, where for the first time the Commission and Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) had a chance to influence treaty rules. And they did. Both the Commission (Meunier 2017) and MEPs (Márton 2018) obfuscated rule changes to their benefits that member states did not notice. One such rule change 'by stealth' was that the Commission managed to gain competences to negotiate foreign direct investment (FDI) on behalf of the Union (Meunier 2017). This meant that the Commission was free to include so called investor-to-state dispute settlement mechanisms (ISDS) in the Union's Free Trade Agreements.² The spectre of corporations pursuing private arbitration against sovereign states proved to be particularly problematic in the public eye. These mechanisms became the centrepiece of the public contestation of trade with protesters rallying against ISDS (Buonanno 2017).

In light of this contestation, with its ruling on advisory Opinion 2/15³ the Court effectively split EU trade policy into two (European Commission 2017b). On the one hand, the Court jettisoned investment policy from the EU's trade competences. By confirming national parliaments' right to ratify trade agreements containing ISDS and non-direct FDI provisions, the ruling has prompted the European Commission to consider systematically omitting comprehensive investment chapters from future agreements (European Commission 2018; Politico 2017). On the other hand, by finding that the EU has all the requisite competences to conclude the remaining elements of new generation FTAs exclusively, without involving national legislatures in the process, the ruling strengthened the EU's independent *actorness* significantly (Gáspár-Szilágyi 2017). It created the circumstances necessary for the EU to become a more effective and credible negotiator while vesting the European Parliament with the responsibility of providing democratic scrutiny and legitimacy for future agreements (European Commission 2017b). In this sense then, trade policy has become more integrated and less integrated, simultaneously. EU competences on FDI are clearly enshrined in the treaties (Article 207 TFEU), yet the investment competences of the EU have apparently been detached from the EU level, perhaps because of the way they were included in the treaties in the first place.

The Court's ruling was delivered amidst the heated debate on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which has been seen as a response to the increased contestation of trade in Europe. The Seattle riots during the 1999 Seattle Ministerial of the WTO were an early yet powerful manifestation of just how strongly people felt about trade understood as market regulation (Laursen & Roederer-Rynning 2017). And while the size of protests at Ministerials might have dwindled over the years, public interest in trade has flared over the course of the past

decade in the EU. The plans for the EU to join the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) to combat internet piracy led to protests over the course of 2012, with tens of thousands marching for a 'free internet'. Similarly, plans of the TTIP and its little brother the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the EU envisioning wide spanning regulatory cooperation saw tens of thousands take to the street across European capitals. Quite simply, the move to more regulatory measures in trade making has meant that anti-trade groups have an easier job at problematising trade and galvanising public discourse (Laursen & Roederer-Rynning 2017; Roederer-Rynning & Kallestrup 2017).

Think of the spectre of Europeans being forced to eat chlorine washed chickens or GMO fed beef originating from the United States. Or the spectre of large corporations 'suing' countries for lost profits. It is difficult not to be reminded of Rosamond's point that the EU's crises are best understood as the results of a wider failure of the 'democratic capitalist compact' that has guided past integration by way of depoliticisation and technocracy (Rosamond 2017). While the EU's trade strategy was modelled on the WTO agenda, there was never any substantive discussion or dialogue in Europe to determine what policy agendas Europeans saw as being desirable.

CONCLUSIONS

Returning to the question of why and how a NI lenses could help analyse these changes from the point of view of (dis)integration I propose the following precursory observations.

While the politicisation of seemingly discrete trade agreements like ACTA, TTIP or CETA might be understood as separate external shocks, through the application of a HI perspective the contentiousness of trade in general could be conceptualised as an external factor coming, over time, to disrupt path dependent integration in this specific policy subsystem. The role and preference of the Court in mitigating this conflict might well fit with the RCI literature's expectation of the Court acting as a *third party arbiter* to settle bargaining disputes, especially when rules breed contention (Windhoff-Héritier 2007: 119), as was the case with the above FDI example.

Taking a broader perspective, research in this vein could investigate how policymakers respond to external shocks that challenge long, locked-in, 'sticky' patterns of change under a variety of different circumstances. Institutions can trivialise, amplify or otherwise steer responses depending on just how resilient the logic of consequentiality and/or appropriateness proves to be. When and why are EU decision-makers capable of providing effective as opposed to disjointed and tone-deaf responses to unforeseen challenges?

As the trade example seems to suggest, disintegration is not a certainty. Indeed, a fortification of past path dependencies might well prove to be sufficient to stop disintegration. But in some cases, de-institutionalisation might well be unavoidable, taking place simultaneously with institutionalisation. Better understanding the conditions of when this might be more likely than not would be useful to understanding the EU's multitude of crises.

These initial observations are, of course, in need of further development. Yet the point is this. European institutions are constantly changing. While the sudden implosion and disintegration of the EU is of course possible, it would seem more intuitive to conceive of a paradigm shift where some parts of the Union disintegrate while others are reinvigorated. Not having a single – or even several – framework(s) for recognising these processes would be a mistake. The NI literature can be particularly helpful here since it contains a number of well-developed and grounded

mechanisms. Of course, there may or may not be one single good formula as to how best to go about this. It is up to EU scholarship to start taking the first empirical steps to determine this.

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ENDNOTES

¹ For a comprehensive overview see: Hall & Taylor 1996; March & Olsen 2008.

² For a comprehensive overview see: Kuijper et al. 2014.

³ CJEU, *Opinion 2/15*, EU:C:2016:992.

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Book Review

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LOBBYISTS AND BUREAUCRATS IN BRUSSELS: CAPITALISM'S BROKERS

Author: Sylvain Laurens

Translator: Trista Selous

Abstract

The book illustrates the complex relationship between the lobbyists and bureaucrats, often misunderstood by both media and academics. While the term 'lobbying' gives an image of working solely for business interests of certain companies, Laurens provides rather comprehensive insights of interactions between the European institutions and the business communities to share a wide range of information and knowledge – hence, the subtitle 'capitalism's brokers'.

Keywords

European Commission; lobbyists; interest groups; bureaucracy; democratic deficits

We often downplay (if not forget) the notion that European integration is an unprecedented regional project with a complex governance mechanism. The knowledge of 'who's who' within the European institutions is highly valuable for facilitating communication among stakeholders and increasing efficiency. Since the capitalist economies triumphed out of the Cold War, it is rather natural for the policymakers of the European Union to include business communities in its decision-making process. At the same time, the recent financial crisis casts a light of doubt on the cosy cohabitation between the European institutions and business representatives, or lobbyists, in Brussels. While their day-to-day interactions by no means suggest corruption, the frustration of economic depression often turns into an anger against pre-crisis regulatory mechanisms. This 'how-could-have-happened' impulse leads to an opinion that the pre-crisis regulations were somehow inadequate to supervise business activities, and this inadequacy was often understood as a goal of lobbyists. This book is a myth-buster in this respect.

Sylvain Laurens lays out an entertaining introduction to the world of lobbying in Brussels by sharing insightful anecdotes and interviews, beyond what is reported (somewhat misleadingly) in the media and analysed in the scholarly works. Being trained as a sociologist, Laurens focuses not only on institutional structures and arrangements, but also on individual activities and organisational evolutions. As such, his interviewees are not limited to elites (i.e. heads of organisations), but anyone who have experienced the changing characteristics of lobbying at large, including those who conducted regular meetings between institutions and organisations. Some of his case studies are thoroughly detailed while others are more of overviews, depending on the context in which they are presented. Thus, to a certain extent, the book reflects his Francophone academic tradition, presenting a historical and evolutionary background of the lobbying in Brussels as a basis for further institutional analyses. The book first appeared in French as *Les Courtiers du capitalisme*, published in 2015 (Editions Agone). As the lobbying in Brussels evolved alongside the development of the so-called 'Eurocracy', Laurens' narrating style to incorporate individual accounts into his institutional analyses seems to fit well with the purpose of the book.

Excluding the introduction and conclusion, the book is divided into seven chapters. The first two chapters provide an analytical framework in a historical context; the former chapter deals with up to 1980, while the latter deals with from 1970 onwards. In other words, Laurens' periodisation is not strictly placed but the chapters chronologically overlap each other. The first chapter, entitled 'Entanglement: a new administration in search of economic interlocutors (1958-1980)', takes a case of Common Agricultural Policy and surrounding agriculture and food industries, in order to highlight how the EC/EU tries to survey the impact of their policies among the business communities. Here, Laurens implies that both the policymakers and lobbyists sought what makes the Brussels administration 'European'. The second chapter, entitled '1970-2010: how Brussels became crucial to the private sector', narrates such interactions from the lobbyists' point of view. A particular attention is given to the rise of 'direct' access to the Commission as an advantage for Brussels-based business organisations. In a sense, these two chapters set historical and perhaps evolutionary context in which the rest of book is presented.

The next two chapters illustrate a typology of lobbying: 'Lobbying: harnessing bureaucratic resources as a weapon for business' and 'Routine lobbying: the personal appropriation of administrative knowledge'. The last three chapters characterise these activities: 'Containing the political and depoliticization: behind the closed doors of the administration', 'Serving the scientific standardisation of markets: the technical extension of commercial wars', and 'Expertise in the service of business: lobbying and the European Chemicals Agency'. While these titles are already informative and intriguing, the detailed (both primary and secondary) interview quotes from the lobbyists, the concise charts to clarify the institutional arrangements, and the topic 'boxes' for case studies make these chapters more entertaining and accessible for the readers, even when a certain topic does not fall into their expertise (e.g. a CAP scholar reading a case about the chemicals market).

For political scientists, these chapters (implicitly) highlight three intertwined themes surrounding the administration and lobbying in Brussels. First, the European institutions, the Commission in particular, are able to utilise their constant contacts with the lobbyists for surveying the business environments in Europe. Yet, such cohabitation assumes that those lobbyists truly represent the industries' voices. Second, the national division (or division between the Old and New Member States) may well come from the uneven access to the Commission by the national business representatives. This issue, however, is rather complicated as their weak representation is not only on the Brussels' level, but also on the individual business association's level. Third, the asymmetric information on the EU administration among the lobbyists creates a competitive market for the European 'governance' – those who accumulate the knowledge of the EU administration can easily

work for the EU itself, mixing the labour markets for policymakers and lobbyists entangled. In this sense, one of Laurens' own conclusion 'Lobbying as a race to manipulate bureaucratic capital' (208), unfortunately, might be misunderstood, or even misleading. We do not know who 'manipulates' whom.

Laurens, in a sense, likes to place intriguing – sometimes provocative – subsection titles. For example, while the chapter is called 'Routine lobbying', day-to-day (read: boring) interactions between the European institutions and business representatives, one of its subsections is entitled 'Lobbyists: an intellectual, intermediary element of the business bourgeoisie' (86). He then introduces an interview with 'a French 27-year-old graduate from Sciences-Po in Paris' (87) to illustrate the hiring mechanisms of many business organisations in Brussels. This technique to build a case from individual storytelling is more effective with Laurens' choice of subsection titles.

An unfortunate item in Laurens' conclusion is 'democratic deficit' (210). It was nuanced throughout the book, but it was never elaborated until the very end of its conclusion. As the book's main analytical focus is the interaction between the policymakers and lobbyists, the democratic deficit – a relation between the policymakers and general public – is secondary, to say the least. However, casual mentioning of such a heavy analytical item ignites the readers' curiosity, and the unextinguished flame becomes a source of frustration.

Nevertheless, I enjoyed this book very much. Being trained as both economist and geographer, the book deepened my understanding on the socio-institutional dimension of the capitalist policymaking with a geographical anchor, 'Brussels'. Agglomeration of actors in Brussels was well depicted beyond institutional concentration. Moreover, the interchangeable nature of their labour markets (and how NGOs are segregated from such markets) is remarkable in light of institutional learning. It may take several years for other scholars to provide complementary studies, but I believe this book can easily be a concept maker in European studies and beyond.

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Lobbyists and Bureaucrats in Brussels: Capitalism's Brokers

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Book Review

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WRITING THE RULES FOR EUROPE – EXPERTS, CARTELS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Authors: Wolfram Kaiser and Johan Schot

Abstract

The book offers shrewd insights into the underlying technological structures of European integration. Its analysis commences in the 1850s rather than the 1950s; this offers a new perspective that shows how a new elite of experts which grew out of industrialization carried out plans for closer European collaboration.

Keywords

European integration; experts; cartels; international organization

In *Writing the Rules for Europe* technology is seen as a major force for world change but also for the progress of European integration. This is not a surprise, as the book forms part of the 'Making Europe: Technology and Transformations 1850-2000' Series, launched by the Foundation for the History of Technology at Eindhoven University of Technology in the Netherlands. Kaiser and Schot offer a view on European history through a technological rather than military lens. The analytical approach is that of history providing a positive narrative of European integration: '(...) recent European history is as much about building connections across frontiers as it is about playing out conflicts between nation states.' (x) The series editors make the fundamental point that technology is not sterile, rather that it is a process of human activity.

For the editors, 1850 – no later – marks the beginning of 'The Long Twentieth Century' and 1990-2000 – no earlier – its end. This period is characterized by globalization, of which Europeanization is a major factor. This book shows that new technologies, such as the digital revolution have played an important role in such shifting power relations in the world. The who, when, how and why are the driving questions of the historical analysis. Research networks are, naturally, one example of such European collaboration, which has led to a globalized Europe that looks quite different today from

what was imagined in the founding period. Such networks of knowledge and expertise are seen as the bedrock of European integration. Only on a basis of common rules for industry and the resulting standardization could the economic and political integration in the post-war period be successful. Hence, 1945 was not the 'zero-hour' (15). Kaiser and Schot accentuate what has happened before, and make a clear connection with older underlying structures, which made possible the success of post-war European integration (294).

Major infrastructure projects, such as motorways in the 1930s and space infrastructure today are perceived as the 'motor' of European integration and effectively also as the glue that holds Europe together. This also extends to the implementation of policies that now give full meaning to the European Union: '(...) focusing on organizations, committees, and experts making rules for Europe allows us to write a transnational history of how this continent has to some extent been governed jointly even in the hey-day of the nation-state and in times of national or ideological conflicts.' (9) Consequently, the definition of 'Europe' must remain fuzzy. The purpose of the book is to highlight the different meanings the notion of Europe could bear, e.g. 'as an ambition, a problem, a necessity, a stepping stone, a last resort, a response to America, a background factor, or an unintended consequence.' (11)

The technical expert became important as an agent of integration, setting common standards so that the new technologies could be brought to all corners of Europe. Expertise permeated multiple fields, from radio transmission to the railway network. The world exhibitions of technological advancement of 1851 in London and 1855 in Paris provided forums of progress where the new European elite of inventors, engineers, explorers and entrepreneurs met to pool and exchange ideas. In economic terms, the case for free trade also began to win much wider acceptance in this period, against the old mercantilist tradition. Education was transformed through new schools training technical and administrative elites, such as the *Grandes Écoles* in France, which offered innovative alternatives to law and theology as the traditional disciplines of higher education. Experts were important for Europeanization because their expertise and elitist training earned them a degree of political trust. Eventually, their belief in the power of logic and their influence would bring about the institutionalization of Europe.

The Telegraph Union is a good example of the way in which experts believed in the power of logic and how it would create a material between the European peoples through the ether. As with the European Union today, such 'societies' have a diffusing effect, i.e. they become norm setters and their rules are adopted even by outsiders for this very reason. Again, like the EU, integration started in very specific areas but spilled over into other areas and led towards a comprehensive institutional structure for the whole of Europe.

The early post-war years of European integration followed the same internationalist, technocratic and sectoral but, at the same time, deep-reaching integration logic. Most of the experts, working in post-war European institutions, had knowledge of pre-war technical societies and often shared their behavioral pattern. 'The first new dimension was the EU's explicit federalist normative thrust, and the second its new legal design which was to foster this federalist agenda. As a result, with the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic Community (EEC), making rules for Europe became intimately linked to the idea of European political integration.' (104) In parallel, national governments conceived investment plans for their industries, such as the Monnet Plan in France, with the purpose of rebuilding and modernizing their economies.

A European economic recovery plan came in the form of the Marshall Plan. This book demonstrates nicely that the European steel industry was a strong candidate for technical and political integration, because steel was the material of the future, the substance of progress and growth, but also, sadly,

the raw material of armed conflict. However, experts were limited in their freedom to act within the ECSC. The political objectives of Franco-German reconciliation and the creation of the European Communities became more important than setting technical standards, i.e. what became the 'ever closer union.' (257) However, Monnet as head of the ECSC, nurtured, older ideas stemming from enlightenment and the age of reason. Rational argument was supposed to lead to the best solution for Europeans. Monnet associated politics with failure and blockage and he was not alone in that in the post-war period, particularly in France and Germany where the national political system had failed its citizens during the Second World War. He saw rational argument and transnationally-shared objectives as the way forward for Europe.

This rational ethos often stood in stark contrast to power politics as played out in national parliaments, which lacked an international perspective and often got embroiled in nationalist squabbles. Moreover, Franco-German cooperation and attempts to create a 'supranational' Europe politicized 'core Europe' integration beyond the functional goals of earlier specialized transnational or international organizations.' (266) A good example of this politicization is the political objective of the ECSC 'to contribute to transnational social integration through European-level investments' (267). The EU, therefore, seems to represent an evolution from well-established functionalist technocratic organizations to a political union. '(...) driven by political leadership, shaped by business and legal elites and expertise, and fostered by legal integration, the creation of a customs union and later, internal market, crucially allowed the EU to deepen its integration and draw nearby countries into its orbit, extending both its functional and spatial scope.' (274)

Overall, to start with the analysis of European integration in the 1850s rather than the 1950s brings a refreshingly new perspective. It shows that the roots of European integration go further back, effectively carried by a new elite of experts which grew out of the industrialization. The argument that technology formed society is very different from the idealist political European integration effort of the inter-war period. Many studies have been done on Aristide Briand or Walter Rathenau, who led European integration efforts in France and Germany during the interwar year. There are fewer contributions on telecommunication or railway engineers, with a comparable focus on integration. *Writing the Rules for Europe* provides this rather neglected perspective. It is easy to read, but at the same time offers shrewd insights into the underlying technological structures of European integration, which should be valuable to scholars and the general public alike.

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Writing the Rules for Europe – Experts, Cartels, and International Organizations

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